Michael Kaufman, et al v. FCA US LLC, et al

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11402
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
IN RE: TAKATA AIRBAG PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION
__________________________________________
MICHAEL C. KAUFMAN,
MARY JACKSON ROBINSON,
DIANA MYERS,
CHERYL BUTLER-ADAMS,
DEBRAH HENRY, et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
versus
FCA US LLC,
GENERAL MOTORS, LLC,
DAIMLER AG,
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11402
MERCEDES-BENZ USA, LLC,
GENERAL MOTORS HOLDING LLC, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees,
INFLATION SYSTEMS INC, et al.,
Defendants.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 1:15-md-02599-FAM
____________________
Before W ILSON, NEWSOM , and L UCK , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
This appeal from multi-district litigation proceedings arises
from four notices of appeal filed after the district court certified the
dismissal of certain claims as an immediately appealable judgment
under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The notices of appeal were filed by
four groups of plaintiffs who are a subset of the plaintiffs who filed
three consolidated class action complaints in March 2018 in the
multi-district litigation proceedings, which we refer to as the
“Whitaker,” “Boyd,” and “Puhalla” complaints. The Whitaker
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23-11402 Opinion of the Court 3
complaint was filed against General Motors LLC, General Motors
Company, and General Motors Holdings LLC (collectively, “the
GM Defendants”). The Boyd complaint was filed against FCA US
LLC (“FCA,” and also referred to as “New Chrysler”). The Puhalla
complaint was filed against Daimler Aktiengesellschaft (“Daimler,”
and also referred to as “Daimler AG”), Mercedes Benz USA
(“MBUSA”), and several other defendants not parties to this appeal.
Each complaint generally alleged that the named plaintiffs, and var-
ious nationwide and state classes they represented or sought to rep-
resent, suffered economic injury, under the laws of about 30 differ-
ent states, because the defendant car manufacturers knowingly
sold them vehicles with defective airbags.
The four notices of appeal collectively seek review of four
district court orders: (1) a June 21, 2019, order that, in relevant part,
dismissed all claims against Daimler for lack of personal jurisdic-
tion; (2) a May 6, 2021, order that denied a motion for clarification
in which the Puhalla plaintiffs had sought to amend their personal
jurisdiction allegations concerning Daimler; (3) a November 10,
2022, order that partially granted defendants’ motions for summary
judgment and dismissed all claims brought under the laws of 14
specific states; and (4) the March 30, 2023, order that granted plain-
tiffs’ motion for entry of judgment under Rule 54(b) and entered a
partial final judgment in favor of Daimler on all claims against it
and in favor of the other appellees on all claims under the same 14
states’ laws.
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11402
On appeal, we issued a jurisdictional question asking the par-
ties to address whether the district court properly certified an im-
mediately appealable judgment under Rule 54(b). Upon review of
the record and the parties’ responses, we conclude that the Rule
54(b) certification was improper, and therefore we lack jurisdiction
over the appeal.
We generally only have jurisdiction to review district court
orders or judgments that constitute “final decisions.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291; CSX Transp., Inc. v. City of Garden City, 235 F.3d 1325, 1327
(11th Cir. 2000). But an exception to the finality requirement arises
under Rule 54(b), which permits a district court to certify as “final,”
and therefore immediately appealable, a judgment resolving fewer
than all the claims in an action. Supreme Fuels Trading FZE v.
Sargeant, 689 F.3d 1244, 1246 (11th Cir. 2012).
However, the district court may only issue that certification
if it “expressly determines that there is no just reason for delay.”
Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b); see also Lex Tex Ltd. v. Unifi, Inc. (In re Yarn
Processing Pat. Validity Litig.), 680 F.2d 1338, 1338-40 (11th Cir. 1982)
(stating that Rule 54(b) requires both an express determination of
no just reason for delay and an express direction for entry of judg-
ment, and dismissing appeals from district court orders dismissing
third-party complaints where the district court entered judgment
but made no determination about delay). A district court may ex-
pressly determine there is no just reason for delay by granting a
Rule 54(b) motion that represents that there is no just reason for
delay. See Denson v. United States, 574 F.3d 1318, 1335 n.52 (11th
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23-11402 Opinion of the Court 5
Cir. 2009) (rejecting argument that district court failed to make ex-
press determination of no just reason for delay because the Rule
54(b) motion asserted there was no just cause for delay and “the
court accepted [that] representation in granting the motion as
framed,” notwithstanding that the court’s order “failed to contain
the magic words, ‘no just reason for delay’”).
If a district court makes a Rule 54(b) certification, we must
consider whether the certification “fit[s] within the scope of the
rule,” for only a proper certification can provide this Court with
jurisdiction. Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Tenet Health Care Corp., 483
F.3d 773, 777 (11th Cir. 2007). Thus, we are obligated to review
the propriety of Rule 54(b) certifications sua sponte when there is
no other basis for appellate jurisdiction. See Scott v. Advanced Pharm.
Consultants, Inc., 84 F.4th 952, 958, 962 (11th Cir. 2023).
A district court “must follow a two-step analysis” in certify-
ing a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b). Lloyd Noland Found.,
Inc., 483 F.3d at 777. First, it must conclude that the “final judg-
ment” it is entering is both “final” and a “judgment.” Id. Second,
it must determine that there is no just reason for delay. Id. We can
dismiss an appeal because the district court failed to satisfy one of
Rule 54(b)’s requirements without addressing the other require-
ment. Peden v. Stephens, 50 F.4th 972, 978 (11th Cir. 2022).
We ordinarily will review for abuse of discretion the district
court’s determination that there is no just reason for delay in certi-
fying a partial final judgment. Scott, 84 F.4th at 959. But this stand-
ard of review requires that the district court “clearly and cogently
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11402
articulate[d] its reasoning.” Id. (quotation marks and brackets
omitted). When the district court fails to explain its “no just reason
for delay” determination, we do not defer to the determination and
instead will dismiss the appeal unless it presents the rare circum-
stance where obvious reasons warranted the Rule 54(b) certifica-
tion. Id. at 959, 962.
Here, the district court made a determination that there was
no just reason for delay by granting the plaintiffs’ motion, but it
provided no explanation of its reasoning to which we can defer. See
id.; Denson, 574 F.3d at 1335 n.52. And no obvious reasons warrant
Rule 54(b) certification here. The below proceedings have substan-
tially progressed: discovery is complete, and a relatively small num-
ber of the total claims remain pending. See Peden, 50 F.4th at 978-79
(explaining that special circumstances that can warrant Rule 54(b)
certification may be present where the proceedings are at an early
stage). Given the later stage of the proceedings, an immediate ap-
peal is unlikely to meaningfully streamline the district court pro-
ceedings. See id. (explaining that Rule 54(b) certification is more
likely to be warranted where an immediate appeal makes the re-
maining litigation substantially more efficient). Furthermore, an
interlocutory appeal could require multiple panels of this Court to
review the immense district court docket, including two separate
reviews of factually similar claims. Ebrahimi v. City of Huntsville Bd.
of Educ., 114 F.3d 162, 167 (11th Cir. 1997) (providing that adjudi-
cating claims based on the same, or overlapping, operative facts in
separate appeals is wasteful of judicial resources).
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23-11402 Opinion of the Court 7
Moreover, the appellants have not identified a pressing need
for an immediate appeal. For instance, their argument that an im-
mediate appeal could facilitate settlement appears speculative. And
their argument that an immediate appeal could avoid inefficiency
by allowing for appellate review before the separate actions in the
below proceedings may be transferred to their originating district
courts in other circuits can be said of most multidistrict litigation
cases. Given the procedural posture of this case and the lack of a
pressing need for an immediate appeal, we conclude that there are
no “obvious reasons” supporting the district court’s determination
that there was no just reason for delay. Thus, the Rule 54(b) certi-
fication was improper, and because the appeal is not otherwise
taken from a final or appealable order, it must be dismissed.
Accordingly, this appeal is DISMISSED for lack of jurisdic-
tion.
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