Eva Carmack v. Gary Carmack

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11817
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
In Re: EVA-DJINA GRANT-CARMACK,
Debtor,
_________________________________________________
EVA CARMACK,
a.k.a. Eva-Dijna Grant,
a.k.a Eva-Djina Grant-Carmack,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
GARY CARMACK,
Defendant-Appellee.
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11817
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 6:22-cv-00731-RBD,
Bkcy No. 6:20-bk-02408-GER
____________________
Before R OSENBAUM , J ILL PRYOR , and G RANT, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Eva-Djina Grant-Carmack, proceeding pro se, sought sanc-
tions in her bankruptcy case against her ex-husband, Gary Car-
mack. The bankruptcy court refused to sanction Gary. Eva then
appealed to the district court, which affirmed. Eva now appeals the
district court’s decision. After careful consideration, we affirm.
I.
In Eva and Gary’s divorce proceedings, a Florida state court
issued a “Final Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage.” The judg-
ment addressed, among other things, the terms of Eva and Gary’s
shared custody of their children. In post-judgment proceedings, the
state court found that Eva failed to honor the judgment’s shared
custody arrangement and held her in indirect civil contempt of
court. The court awarded Gary additional time with the children
as well as $15,350.10 for the attorney’s fees he incurred as a result
of Eva’s contempt of court. Eva appealed the order awarding Gary
attorney’s fees.
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23-11817 Opinion of the Court 3
In April 2020, a few months after the state court awarded
Gary attorney’s fees and while Eva’s appeal of that order was pend-
ing, Eva filed a petition for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. On the schedules
filed with her petition, Eva listed Gary as a creditor who had an
unsecured claim for $15,350.10 but noted that she had appealed the
fee award. In August 2020, the bankruptcy court granted Eva a dis-
charge and closed her bankruptcy case.
In April 2020, Gary filed his own petition for Chapter 7 bank-
ruptcy. On the schedules filed with his petition, Gary listed his as-
sets but did not include the debt that Eva owed him for attorney’s
fees. At the meeting with his creditors, he disclosed Eva’s debt. He
explained that he had not listed it on his bankruptcy schedules be-
cause the award was on appeal and it was unclear whether Eva
would be able to pay it. In July 2020, the bankruptcy court granted
Gary a discharge.
In April 2021, a Florida appellate court affirmed the state
court’s order awarding Gary attorney’s fees. See Carmack v. Car-
mack, 316 So. 3d 396, 398 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021). After this deci-
sion issued, Gary tried to collect the attorney’s fee award from Eva.
She refused to pay. Gary then filed a motion in state court to hold
Eva in contempt for failing to pay the fee award.
Eva, proceeding pro se, removed the state court case to bank-
ruptcy court as an adversary proceeding in Gary’s bankruptcy case.
Eva then filed a motion to dismiss the adversary proceeding, argu-
ing that Gary could not collect the debt for the attorney’s fees
award because it had been discharged in her bankruptcy. Gary
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11817
moved to remand the case to state court. The bankruptcy court
granted Gary’s motion, noting that the state court could determine
whether Eva’s debt had been discharged in her bankruptcy.
Eva also moved to reopen her bankruptcy case and filed a
motion for sanctions against Gary.1 We liberally construe these fil-
ings as raising three arguments why Gary should be sanctioned.
First, Eva argued that Gary violated the discharge injunction
in her bankruptcy case when he tried to collect the attorney’s fees
award. She acknowledged that under the Bankruptcy Code a debt
“for a domestic support obligation” or to a “former spouse . . . in
connection with . . . a divorce decree” generally was not discharged
in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5), (15). But she took the po-
sition that the debt for the attorney’s fees did not fall within either
of these exceptions and thus had been discharged. She asserted that
Gary should be sanctioned for violating the discharge injunction.
Second, Eva argued that Gary should be sanctioned for vio-
lating the automatic stay in her bankruptcy case. According to Eva,
Gary violated the stay because he failed to notify the state appellate
court about her bankruptcy.
Third, Eva argued that even if her debt for attorney’s fees
had not been discharged in her bankruptcy, Gary should be sanc-
tioned because he no longer had a right to collect the debt. Because
1 In addition, Eva filed an adversary proceeding against Gary in her bankruptcy
case seeking a declaration that the debt she owed for the attorney’s fees had
been discharged in her bankruptcy.
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23-11817 Opinion of the Court 5
Gary failed to disclose the debt for attorney’s fees on his bank-
ruptcy schedules, Eva argued, he surrendered the claim to his bank-
ruptcy estate and had “no standing . . . to pursue the claim.” Doc.
4-8 at 3.2
The bankruptcy court reopened Eva’s bankruptcy case for
the limited purpose of resolving her motion for sanctions. It ulti-
mately denied that motion.
The bankruptcy court considered Eva’s argument that Gary
should be sanctioned for violating the discharge injunction. It ex-
plained that he could be held in civil contempt for violating a dis-
charge injunction only if (1) he attempted to collect a discharged
debt, and (2) there was “no fair ground of doubt as to whether the
[discharge] order barred [his] conduct.” Doc. 4-17 at 5 (emphasis
omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The bankruptcy
court did not address whether Eva’s debt for the attorney’s fees had
been discharged in her bankruptcy. Instead, it refused to sanction
Gary because, even assuming the debt had been discharged, he had
an “objectively reasonable basis for concluding that his conduct
might be lawful under the discharge order.” Id. at 6 (alteration
adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). The court explained
that it was “arguable” that Eva’s debt was not discharged under the
Bankruptcy Code because it was either a domestic support obliga-
tion or incurred in the course of a divorce. Id. at 7 (citing 11 U.S.C.
§ 523(a)(5), (15)).
2 “Doc.” numbers refer to the district court’s docket entries.
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11817
The bankruptcy court also rejected Eva’s argument that
Gary should be sanctioned for violating the automatic stay in her
bankruptcy. It explained that the “automatic stay was terminated
upon the entry of [Eva’s] discharge.” Id. Because Gary attempted
to collect the attorney’s fees only after the entry of the discharge in
Eva’s bankruptcy case, the bankruptcy court concluded that he had
not violated the stay. In denying the motion for sanctions, the
bankruptcy court did not expressly address Eva’s argument that
Gary lacked “standing” to collect the debt for the attorney’s fees
after failing to disclose it in his bankruptcy case.
Eva moved for reconsideration of the order denying her mo-
tion for sanctions. The bankruptcy court denied that motion, too.
Eva then appealed to the district court, which affirmed the
bankruptcy court. It began by addressing Eva’s argument seeking
sanctions based on Gary’s purported violation of the discharge in-
junction entered in her bankruptcy. Because Gary had “an objec-
tively reasonable basis for believing that the fee award” had not
been discharged, the district court concluded that the bankruptcy
court did not err in denying the motion for sanctions. Doc. 21 at 4.
The district court noted that it was not deciding the question of
whether this debt had actually been discharged, saying that the
state court had “concurrent jurisdiction” to address that issue. Id.
The district court also considered Eva’s argument that Gary
had violated the automatic stay in her bankruptcy when he tried to
collect the fee award. The district court agreed with the bankruptcy
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23-11817 Opinion of the Court 7
court that there was no violation because the stay had automati-
cally terminated by the time Gary tried to collect.
The district court also rejected Eva’s argument that Gary
should be sanctioned because he lacked “standing” to collect the
debt. The district court quickly disposed of this argument, saying
that the standing question “was not germane to the bankruptcy
court’s disposition of the motion for sanctions.” Id. at 5. After the
district court issued its decision, Eva filed a motion for reconsider-
ation, which the district court denied.
Eva now appeals the district court’s decision affirming the
bankruptcy court.3
II.
In bankruptcy cases, we “sit[] as a second court of review
and thus examine[] independently the factual and legal determina-
tions of the bankruptcy court and employ[] the same standards of
review as the district court.” In re Ocean Warrior, Inc., 835 F.3d 1310,
1315 (11th Cir. 2016) (internal quotation marks omitted). When the
district court, sitting as an appellate court, affirms a bankruptcy
court’s order, we “review the bankruptcy court’s decision.” In re
Fisher Island Invs., Inc., 778 F.3d 1172, 1189 (11th Cir. 2015). In doing
so, “[w]e review the bankruptcy court’s factual findings for clear
error and its legal conclusions de novo.” Id.
3 Gary did not file a brief in this appeal. “When an appellee fails to file a brief
by the due date . . . the appeal will be submitted to the court for decision with-
out further delay.” 11th Cir. R. 42-2(f).
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8 Opinion of the Court 23-11817
We review a bankruptcy court’s denial of a motion for sanc-
tions for abuse of discretion. In re Roth, 935 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th
Cir. 2019). Under this standard, we must affirm unless the bank-
ruptcy court “made a clear error of judgment[] or has applied the
wrong legal standard.” Ocean Warrior, 835 F.3d at 1315 (internal
quotation marks omitted).
We liberally construe the pleadings of a pro se litigant. Camp-
bell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014).
III.
On appeal, Eva challenges the bankruptcy court’s denial of
her motion for sanctions. We liberally construe Eva’s filings as rais-
ing three arguments about why Gary should have been sanctioned:
(1) he violated the discharge injunction in her bankruptcy case;
(2) he violated the automatic stay in her bankruptcy case; and (3) he
could not collect the attorney’s fee award after he failed to disclose
the debt in the schedules to his bankruptcy petition. We consider
each argument in turn.
We begin with Eva’s argument that Gary violated the dis-
charge injunction in her bankruptcy case. A discharge in a Chapter
7 case generally releases a debtor from personal liability for pre-
petition debts. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). When a debt is discharged,
the discharge order generally “operates as an injunction against the
commencement or continuation of . . . an act[] to collect . . . any
such debt as a personal liability of the debtor.” Id. § 524(a)(2). The
discharge injunction plays an “important role in achieving the
Bankruptcy Code’s overall policy aim of giving a debtor a fresh
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23-11817 Opinion of the Court 9
start.” In re McLean, 794 F.3d 1313, 1321 (11th Cir. 2015) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
To ensure that a debtor receives a fresh start, a bankruptcy
court may “impose civil contempt sanctions” on a creditor who
“attempt[s] to collect a discharged debt when there is no objec-
tively reasonable basis for concluding that the creditor’s conduct
might be lawful under the discharge order.” Roth, 935 F.3d at 1275
(alteration adopted) (internal quotation marks omitted). We have
explained that to sanction a creditor for violating a discharge in-
junction, the bankruptcy court must find that (1) the creditor at-
tempted to collect a discharged debt and (2) “there was no fair
ground of doubt as to whether the discharge order barred” the
creditor’s conduct. Sellers v. Rushmore Loan Mgmt. Servs., LLC, 941
F.3d 1031, 1041 n.6 (11th Cir. 2019) (internal quotation marks omit-
ted).
The bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion when it
declined to sanction Gary because there was a fair ground of doubt
as to whether the discharge injunction in Eva’s bankruptcy case
barred him from collecting the debt. Although a discharge releases
a debtor from personal liability for many pre-petition debts, the
Bankruptcy Code provides that certain types of debts are not dis-
chargeable in bankruptcy. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(b). The types of debts
that are not dischargeable include any debt for “a domestic support
obligation” or a debt to a “former spouse . . . that is incurred by the
debtor in the course of a divorce . . . or in connection with a . . .
divorce decree.” Id. § 523(a)(5), (15).
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10 Opinion of the Court 23-11817
Here, Gary had an objectively reasonable basis to believe
that he could collect the debt because it was non-dischargeable un-
der § 523(a)(15). After all, Eva owed the debt to Gary, a former
spouse. And the debt was arguably “in connection with . . . a di-
vorce decree” because the state court awarded Gary attorney’s fees
he incurred as a result of Eva’s violation of the terms of the divorce
decree. See id. § 523(a)(15). Although this Court has not addressed
whether such a debt falls within the exception for discharge set
forth at § 523(a)(15), other courts have addressed the question and
concluded that this type of debt is not dischargeable. See, e.g., In re
Rackley, 502 B.R. 615, 625–26 (N.D. Ga. Bankr. 2013); In re Schen-
kein, No. 09-14658, 2010 WL 3219464, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Bankr. Aug.
9, 2010). Given the plain language of § 523(a)(15) as well as the case
law interpreting this provision, Gary had at least a fair ground of
doubt as to whether Eva’s discharge injunction barred him from
attempting to collect the attorney’s fee award. See Sellers, 941 F.3d
at 1041 n.6.
To be clear, we do not decide today whether Eva’s debt for
the attorney’s fees award was in fact discharged in her bankruptcy.
We need not decide this issue because even assuming that the debt
was discharged, Gary could not be sanctioned because he had a rea-
sonable basis for believing that he could lawfully attempt to collect
it.4 See id.
4 In denying Eva’s motion for sanctions, the bankruptcy court concluded that
the state court could resolve the question of whether Eva’s debt had been dis-
charged. Eva disagrees, arguing that the bankruptcy court alone may
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23-11817 Opinion of the Court 11
We next consider Eva’s argument that the bankruptcy court
abused its discretion by failing to sanction Gary for violating the
automatic stay in her bankruptcy. The filing of a bankruptcy peti-
tion automatically stays all efforts outside of bankruptcy to collect
debts from a debtor who is under the protection of the bankruptcy
court. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(6). When a Chapter 7 debtor receives
a discharge, the automatic stay is terminated. Id. § 362(c)(2)(C).
Eva argues that Gary violated the automatic stay when, after
she filed bankruptcy, he “persisted” in the appeal in state court in
which she challenged the fee award. Appellant’s Br. 28. Notably,
Eva does not dispute that once the bankruptcy court entered the
discharge order in August 2020 in her bankruptcy case, the auto-
matic stay dissolved. Even if it’s true that the automatic stay barred
the parties from litigating Eva’s appeal of the contempt award dur-
ing the relatively short period between when she filed her bank-
ruptcy petition and received her Chapter 7 discharge, we cannot
say that the bankruptcy court abused its considerable discretion
when it declined to sanction Gary for this violation, particularly be-
cause it appears that both Gary and Eva violated the automatic stay
by litigating Eva’s appeal of the contempt order. See Harris v.
determine whether the debt was discharged. We agree with the bankruptcy
court. Although the question of whether a particular debt can be discharged
in bankruptcy is a question of federal law, see Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279,
284 (1991), state courts generally may decide the issue, see Taggart v. Lorenzen,
139 S. Ct. 1795, 1803 (2019); see also Cummings v. Cummings, 244 F.3d 1263, 1267
(11th Cir. 2001) (recognizing that state courts generally have concurrent juris-
diction to determine whether a debt was non-dischargeable under § 523(a)).
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12 Opinion of the Court 23-11817
Chapman, 97 F.3d 499, 506 (11th Cir. 1996) (discussing “wide discre-
tion” afforded a judge when deciding whether a party’s conduct
merits imposition of sanctions).
We conclude with Eva’s argument that the bankruptcy
court abused its discretion by failing to sanction Gary for attempt-
ing to collect a debt that he did not list as an asset on his bankruptcy
schedules. She says that when Gary petitioned for bankruptcy un-
der Chapter 7, he forfeited all his prepetition assets, including Eva’s
debt, to his bankruptcy estate. Because Gary failed to list the debt
as an asset in his bankruptcy schedules, she asserts, the debt re-
mained in Gary’s bankruptcy estate, and the Chapter 7 trustee
alone is the real party in interest who may try to collect the debt.
See Parker v. Wendy’s Int’l, Inc., 365 F.3d 1268, 1272 (11th Cir. 2004).
Even assuming that Eva is correct the debt belongs to Gary’s
bankruptcy estate and can be collected only by the Chapter 7 trus-
tee, we again cannot say that the bankruptcy court abused its “wide
discretion” when it declined to sanction Gary for this conduct. Har-
ris, 97 F.3d at 506.5
5 When discussing that a Chapter 7 trustee is the real party in interest who
may sue to collect a debt a debtor failed to disclose in his bankruptcy sched-
ules, we have sometimes stated that the trustee is the person with “standing”
to collect the debt. See Parker, 365 F.3d at 1272. Focusing on our use of the
word “standing,” Eva argues at length that Gary’s attempt to collect a debt
that belonged to his bankruptcy estate implicates subject matter jurisdiction.
But in stating that a trustee has “standing” to collect a debt, we were not ad-
dressing the constitutional requirement that a plaintiff must have Article III
standing to pursue a claim. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560
(1992). Instead, we were referring to what has sometimes been called
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23-11817 Opinion of the Court 13
IV.
For the above reasons, we affirm the district court.
AFFIRMED.
“statutory standing” or “prudential standing,” the question of who has a
“cause of action under [a] statute.” Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static Control Compo-
nents, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 128 & n.4 (2014). To be clear, Eva’s argument that
Gary could not collect the debt because he failed to disclose it in his bank-
ruptcy does not implicate subject matter jurisdiction. See id. at 128; Highland
Consulting Grp. v. Minjares, 74 F.4th 1352, 1359 (11th Cir. 2023).
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