Wolfgang Halbig v. Lake County, Florida, et al.

[DO NOT PUBLISH]
In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Eleventh Circuit
____________________
No. 23-11875
Non-Argument Calendar
____________________
WOLFGANG W. HALBIG,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
LAKE COUNTY, FLORIDA,
LAKE COUNTY, FLORIDA SHERIFF,
Individual and Official Capacity,
ELLORY OSTERBERG,
Individual andOfficial Capacity as
Former Deputy,
COREY WINGO,
Individual and Official Capacity as Deputy,
DANIEL CONLEE,
Individual and Official Capacity as Deputy,
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2 Opinion of the Court 23-11875
ERICA RODRIGUEZ,
Individual and Official Capacity as Corporal,
Defendants-Appellees,
TODD ENGLISH,
Individual and Official Capacity as Major,
et al.,
Defendants.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
D.C. Docket No. 5:22-cv-00106-JA-PRL
____________________
Before WILSON , L UCK, and ANDERSON , Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Wolfgang Halbig, a pro se litigant, appeals the dismissal of
his second amended 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaint against Lake
County, Florida, the Lake County, Florida, Sheriff, and officers El-
lory Osterberg, Corey Wingo, Erica Rodriguez, and Dan Conlee in
their individual and official capacities, alleging that his constitu-
tional rights were violated when he was arrested and prosecuted
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23-11875 Opinion of the Court 3
for committing a state crime. He argues that the district court
abused its discretion by dismissing his second amended complaint
as a “shotgun” pleading because the magistrate judge, in drafting
the report and recommendation that recommended dismissing the
filing, had no trouble interpreting the facts and claims contained
within the complaint and attributing the facts to their respective
causes of action.
We review the district court’s dismissal of a complaint on
“shotgun” pleading grounds for abuse of discretion. Weiland
v. Palm Beach Cnty. Sheriff’s Off., 792 F.3d 1313, 1320 (11th Cir. 2015).
A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain “a short
and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is enti-
tled to relief.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2). This short and plain statement
must “give the defendant fair notice of what the . . . claim is and
the grounds upon which it rests.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S.
544, 555 (2007) (quotation marks omitted, alteration in original).
An adequate complaint requires more than bare conclusions and
labels. Id. A plaintiff must also “state its claims or defenses in num-
bered paragraphs, each limited as far as practicable to a single set
of circumstances.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 10(b). Moreover, “[i]f doing so
would promote clarity, each claim founded on a separate transac-
tion or occurrence . . . must be stated in a separate count or de-
fense.” Id. “A dismissal under Rules 8(a)(2) and 10(b) is appropriate
where it is virtually impossible to know which allegations of fact are
intended to support which claim(s) for relief.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at
1325 (quotation marks omitted).
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4 Opinion of the Court 23-11875
So-called “shotgun” pleadings do not provide a short and
plain statement of a claim under Rule 8. Magluta v. Samples, 256
F.3d 1282, 1284 (11th Cir. 2001). We have “little tolerance for shot-
gun pleadings,” given that “[t]hey waste scarce judicial resources,
inexorably broaden[] the scope of discovery, wreak havoc on appel-
late court dockets, and undermine[] the public’s respect for the
courts.” Vibe Micro, Inc. v. Shabanets, 878 F.3d 1291, 1295 (11th Cir.
2018) (quotation marks omitted, second and third alterations in
original).
“Shotgun” pleadings include complaints that: (1) contain
multiple counts where each count adopts the allegations of all pre-
ceding counts; (2) are “replete with conclusory, vague, and imma-
terial facts not obviously connected to any particular cause of ac-
tion”; (3) do not separate each cause of action or claim for relief
into separate counts; or (4) assert multiple claims against multiple
defendants without specifying which of the defendants are respon-
sible for which acts or omissions. Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1321-23. All
these types of “shotgun” pleadings are characterized by their fail-
ure “to give the defendants adequate notice of the claims against
them and the grounds upon which each claim rests.” Id. at 1323.
In Weiland and Pinson, we concluded that the district court
erred in dismissing a complaint as a “shotgun” pleading. See id. at
1326; Pinson v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, Nat’l Ass’n, 942 F.3d 1200, 1208
(11th Cir. 2019). In Weiland, the plaintiff appealed the district
court’s dismissal with prejudice of his § 1983 claims after the dis-
trict court determined that those counts “(1) incorporated all of
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23-11875 Opinion of the Court 5
the factual allegations contained in paragraphs 1 through 49 inclu-
sive; and (2) failed to identify which allegations [were] relevant to
the elements of which legal theories and which constitutional
amendments govern which counts.” 792 F.3d at 1324 (quotation
marks omitted). In beginning our analysis, we noted that the dis-
trict court dismissed the claims because the plaintiff had failed to
remedy the violations despite previously having the opportunity to
amend “even though [the district court] was able to determine
from the complaint that [the plaintiff] had stated a claim for relief
against the two deputies under the Fourth Amendment and for
conspiracy to violate his constitutional rights.” Id. In reversing the
district court’s order, we determined that although the complaint
appeared to be a common “shotgun” pleading on its face, the plain-
tiff did not simply reallege irrelevant factual allegations and legal
conclusions in each claim. Id.
We further explained that “this [was] not a situation where
a failure to more precisely parcel out and identify the facts relevant
to each claim materially increased the burden of understanding the
factual allegations underlying each count.” Id.� � Specifically, we de-
termined that both the defendants, who did not make a motion for
a more definite statement under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(e), did not have
any trouble understanding the claim against them, and we stated
that the same could be said for the district court. Id. We undertook
an analysis of each count and found no issue in relating the factual
allegations to their claims. Id. at 1324-25. We further noted that
while the defendant included constitutional amendments in his
complaints under which he was not entitled to relief, that was not
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6 Opinion of the Court 23-11875
an appropriate ground for dismissal under Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) and
10(b). Id. at 1325. Accordingly, we held that the district court
abused its discretion by dismissing two counts of the defendant’s
complaint as a “shotgun” pleading. Id. at 1326.
In Pinson, reviewing the district court’s grant of a motion to
dismiss for failure to state a claim de novo, we similarly reversed the
district court’s dismissal of the plaintiff’s pro se complaint as a “shot-
gun” pleading. See 942 F.3d at 1206-08. Although the plaintiff’s
complaint adopted the allegations of the preceding counts and was
“perhaps longer than it need[ed] to be[,]” we stated that that “it
d[id] not contain endless irrelevancies.” Id. at 1208. We explained
that the complaint did what it “must do” by giving the defendant
adequate notice of the claims against it and the allegations upon
which those claims rested. Id. We had “no trouble” understanding
the plaintiff’s allegations and there was no indication that the de-
fendant had any trouble understanding the complaint, which
would explain why it failed to move for a more definite statement
before the district court. Id. We further emphasized that the de-
fendant and the district court understood the claims contained in
the complaint “well enough to address the[] merits” in the motion
to dismiss and the order granting that motion. Id. We ultimately
decided to address the plaintiff’s complaint on the merits because,
although the “shotgun-pleading rule applies to everyone,” we lib-
erally construe pro se pleadings. Id.
“Where a more carefully drafted complaint might state a
claim, a plaintiff must be given at least one chance to amend the
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23-11875 Opinion of the Court 7
complaint before the district court dismisses the action with preju-
dice.” Woldeab v. Dekalb Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 885 F.3d 1289, 1291 (11th
Cir. 2018). However, a district court need not allow amendment in
the event of undue delay, bad faith, repeated failure to cure defi-
ciencies, undue prejudice to the opposing party, or futility of the
amendment. Foman v. Davis, 371 U.S. 178, 182 (1962). A district
court can dismiss a complaint on “shotgun” pleading grounds un-
der its “inherent authority to control its docket and ensure the
prompt resolution of lawsuits.” Vibe Micro Inc., 878 F.3d at 1295
(quotation marks omitted).
Pro se pleadings are held to a less stringent standard than for-
mal pleadings drafted by lawyers and will be liberally construed.
Campbell v. Air Jam. Ltd., 760 F.3d 1165, 1168 (11th Cir. 2014). Nev-
ertheless, pro se litigants are required to comply with applicable pro-
cedural rules. Albra v. Advan, Inc., 490 F.3d 826, 829 (11th Cir. 2007).
The leniency afforded pro se litigants with liberal construction
“does not give a court license to serve as de facto counsel for a party,
or to rewrite an otherwise deficient pleading in order to sustain an
action.” Campbell, 760 F.3d at 1168-69 (quotation marks omitted).
Moreover, although we liberally construe pro se pleadings, “issues
not briefed on appeal by a pro se litigant are deemed abandoned.”
Timson v. Sampson, 518 F.3d 870, 874 (11th Cir. 2008). An appellant
fails to adequately brief a claim when he does not “plainly and
prominently raise it,” such as by making only passing references to
the court’s holding without advancing any arguments or citing any
authorities to establish that there was error. Sapuppo v. Allstate
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8 Opinion of the Court 23-11875
Floridian Ins. Co., 739 F.3d 678, 681 (11th Cir. 2014) (quotation marks
omitted).
As a preliminary matter, Halbig has abandoned any chal-
lenge to the district court’s determination that he failed to state a
claim for relief in his Count Seven Monell claim because he failed to
raise such an argument in his brief. Timson, 518 F.3d at 874. Liber-
ally construed, Halbig only broadly argues that his second
amended complaint was not a “shotgun” pleading because the
magistrate judge had no trouble interpreting the facts and claims
contained within the filing. Accordingly, this Court need not ad-
dress whether the district court erred in dismissing Count Seven of
Halbig’s second amended complaint for failure to state a claim.
Turning to the merits of the remaining counts, the district
court did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Halbig’s second
amended complaint as a “shotgun” pleading. Specifically, this case
can be distinguished from Weiland and Pinson, the cases primarily
relied upon by Halbig. First, it is true that none of the Defendants
here moved for a more definite statement in the district court, and
this Court has found the failure to do so is some indication that the
Defendants understood the claims against them. See Weiland, 792
F.3d at 1324; Pinson, 942 F.3d at 1208. Further, Halbig is correct that
the magistrate judge attempted to summarize his second amended
complaint at the beginning of the Report and Recommendation
(“R&R”). However, the magistrate judge was unable to conduct as
thorough of an examination of the facts alleged by Halbig as this
Court and the district courts appeared to have been able to do in
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23-11875 Opinion of the Court 9
Weiland and Pinson. See Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1324-25; Pinson, 942
F.3d at 1207-08. The magistrate judge was only able to give a gen-
eral overview drawn from the second amended complaint’s state-
ment of facts and was unable to name any specific Defendants as
responsible in the allegations. When it came to summarizing the
causes of action, the magistrate judge simply recited the titles Hal-
big had given to each count and pointed out the deficiencies in the
context of Count One, showing that the second amended com-
plaint failed to “present more than labels and bare conclusions.”
Dist. Ct. Doc. 88 at 3, 5; Twombly, 550 U.S. at 555. Additionally, in
his objections to the R&R, Halbig pointed out that the magistrate
judge had misstated one of the allegations in his complaint, further
evidencing the magistrate judge’s difficulty in interpreting Halbig’s
claims.
Further, Halbig’s second amended complaint had several ad-
ditional deficiencies that made it “virtually impossible” for the De-
fendants “to know which allegations of fact are intended to support
which claim(s) for relief.” Weiland, 792 F.3d at 1325 (quotation
marks omitted). Although Halbig had corrected his complaint in
some ways from the previous filings, the second amended com-
plaint still did not meet the requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a) be-
cause, despite not specifically reincorporating each count’s factual
allegations, it still failed to give the Defendants notice of the
grounds upon which each claim rests. Id. at 1323. While Halbig
made specific allegations against specific defendants regarding
some counts, he asserted many of his claims generally and did not
identify which claims he was bringing against which Defendant or
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10 Opinion of the Court 23-11875
what each specific Defendant did with respect to that count. First,
aside from Officers Osterberg and Wingo, Halbig failed to name
any of the Defendants who participated in his alleged unlawful ar-
rest and prosecution in his statement of facts. Moreover, his reci-
tation of the facts ends with his arrest, and he fails to elaborate in
the second amended complaint how his constitutional rights were
particularly infringed upon by the Defendants in the time that fol-
lowed his arrest.
Additionally, the causes of action in Halbig’s second
amended complaint were “replete with conclusory, vague, and im-
material facts,” as he failed to describe with specificity what consti-
tutional violations he suffered and only alleged the Defendants gen-
erally participated in “the actions” described in the second
amended complaint, whether physically present at the scene of his
arrest or through “[c]ollusion and [c]onspiracy.” Weiland, 792 F.3d
at 1322. Halbig further failed to separate each cause of action or
claim for relief into separate counts and asserted several claims
against multiple defendants in the same counts without specifying
which of the Defendants is responsible for the action. Weiland, 792
F.3d at 1322 23. For instance, as the government argues, Count One
asserted four different causes of action under the Fourth and Four-
teenth Amendments but failed to specify which facts related to each
of these claims or name all the Defendants responsible for the al-
leged excessive force, false imprisonment, false arrest, and abridge-
ment of privilege. Moreover, in several counts, Halbig specifically
named some Defendants but then pointed to unnamed “helpers”
and nameless “officers” as jointly responsible for the claimed
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23-11875 Opinion of the Court 11
violations, which, as the magistrate judge identified, left the reader
“to guess as to what role, if any” many of the Defendants had in
each of the allegations.
Also, despite Halbig’s argument that he should have been
given the opportunity to amend his second amended complaint
and was not instructed on how to avoid filing future “shotgun”
pleadings, the record shows he was given two chances to amend
before having it dismissed with prejudice. Woldeab, 885 F.3d at
1291. The instant complaint represented his second attempt to
cure his defective pleading. In asking the court for leave to amend
after receiving the Defendants’ motion to dismiss that explained, in
part, that he had filed a “shotgun” pleading by alleging multiple
causes of action against all the Defendants without specifying
which factual allegations related to each party, Halbig recognized
that his original complaint was procedurally flawed. He told the
court he would be more precise in future filings by “nam[ing] the
individuals and their misdeeds that require[d] answers and possibly
withdraw[ing] the names of individuals [he] c[ould not] tie to spe-
cific allegations.”
Also, when recommending the dismissal of his amended
complaint, the magistrate judge provided Halbig with ample guid-
ance of what deficiencies caused his amended complaint to be dis-
missed as a “shotgun” pleading. As relevant to the deficiencies that
reappeared in the second amended complaint, the magistrate judge
explained that Halbig improperly brought Counts One through Six
against all the Defendants without specifically alleging how each
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12 Opinion of the Court 23-11875
were individually involved in the claims. The magistrate judge con-
ducted a step by step analysis of the shortcomings of Count One.
With this in mind, the district court stated when dismissing the sec-
ond amended complaint that Halbig had “be[en] on notice from
early in the case of the pleading deficiencies” and “ha[d] not,
through two amendments, cured those deficiencies.” Therefore,
the district court, exercising its inherent authority to control its
dockets, did not abuse its discretion by dismissing Halbig’s second
amended complaint on “shotgun” pleading grounds without giv-
ing him another opportunity to amend, as he had repeatedly failed
to cure the procedural defects in his filings. See Vibe Micro Inc., 878
F.3d at 1295; Foman, 371 U.S. at 182.
AFFIRMED.
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