Coda Development S.r.o., Coda Innovations S.r.o., Frantisek Hrabal v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company, Robert Benedict

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
CODA DEVELOPMENT S.R.O., CODA
INNOVATIONS S.R.O., FRANTISEK HRABAL,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY, ROBERT
BENEDICT,
Defendants-Appellees
______________________
2023-1880
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Ohio in No. 5:15-cv-01572-SL, Judge
Sara Lioi.
______________________
Decided: December 8, 2025
______________________
BOYD C LOERN , Steptoe LLP, Washington, DC, argued
for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by JOSEPH F.
ECKER, L EAH M ARGARET Q UADRINO , SCOTT RICHEY,
CHRISTOPHER A LAN S UAREZ .
G REGORY A. CASTANIAS , Jones Day, Washington, DC,
argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented by
TRACY A. STITT; JOHN CHARLES EVANS , C ALVIN G RIFFITH ,
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THOMAS K OGLMAN , D AVID M ICHAEL M AIORANA , Cleveland,
OH.
______________________
Before LOURIE, D YK , and CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judges.
CUNNINGHAM, Circuit Judge.
Coda Development s.r.o., Coda Innovations s.r.o., and
Frantisek Hrabal (collectively, “Coda”) appeal a decision of
the United States District Court for the Northern District
of Ohio holding that Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company and
Robert Benedict (collectively, “Goodyear”) were entitled to
judgment as a matter of law of no trade secret misappro-
priation and denying correction of inventorship of Good-
year’s U.S. Patent No. 8,042,586 (the “’586 patent”). See
Coda Dev. s.r.o. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
667 F. Supp. 3d 590, 611 (N.D. Ohio 2023) (“JMOL Deci-
sion”); Coda Dev. s.r.o. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.,
667 F. Supp. 3d 567, 589 (N.D. Ohio 2023) (“Bench Deci-
sion”). For the reasons below, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Coda sued Goodyear in the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Ohio, raising, among
other things, claims for trade secret misappropriation un-
der Ohio state law and correction of inventorship of the ’586
patent.1 JMOL Decision at 593; J.A. 158–96. Both the as-
serted trade secrets and the ’586 patent relate to self-
1 This appeal marks the second time that this case is
before this court. Previously, we vacated the district
court’s dismissal and remanded the case to the district
court to allow Coda to amend its complaint. CODA Dev.
s.r.o. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 916 F.3d 1350, 1362
(Fed. Cir. 2019). The amended complaint similarly raised
trade secret and correction of inventorship claims. See
JMOL Decision at 594 & n.3; J.A. 1120; J.A. 1943–2131.
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inflating tire (“SIT”) technology. See, e.g., JMOL Decision
at 595–97; ’586 patent col. 1 ll. 5–7; id. at col. 10 ll. 29–54.
The district court held a jury trial on Coda’s trade se-
cret claims in September 2022. JMOL Decision at 598.
The jury found that Goodyear had misappropriated five of
Coda’s alleged trade secrets and awarded Coda $2.8 million
in compensatory damages and $61.2 million in punitive
damages. Id. at 598–99; J.A. 17997–8001. These five al-
leged trade secrets, the only ones at issue on appeal, were
defined by Coda as described below:
TS 7: Coda’s design and development of a multi-
purpose interface for transporting air in a self-in-
flating tire that can connect to the air source, con-
nect to the tire interior, connect to the peristaltic
pump, serve as an end to the peristaltic pump, con-
nect to the regulator, carry the regulator, go
around or through the bead, go around or through
the tire layers, click to the bead and hold the filter;
TS 11: Coda’s knowledge of how to design and de-
velop self-inflating tire pump and groove solutions,
consisting of round pump tubing in an outward-fac-
ing groove with straight, angled interior geometry;
pump tubing with geometry that interlocks with its
seat; pump tubing with elliptical interior cross-sec-
tion; variant pump tube, groove and chamber di-
mensions, size and materials; pump tube and
groove design to minimize internal friction; a “tube-
less” pump solution (i.e., a pump that may compose
an integral part of tire); cross-section designs that
minimize stress on compression in order to improve
durability; and tubing with reinforced wall;
TS 20: Coda’s knowledge of how to design and de-
velop self-inflating tire systems with circulating
and non-circulating pump variations, comprised of
the disclosure of technical information through ob-
servations and descriptions of the three-way valve
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regulator, and explanations of the function and air-
paths for the states of recirculation and inflation;
closure elements related to recirculation systems
and a pressurized air reservoir that would permit
the storage of air within the system without the
need to engage the pump tube with each tire revo-
lution; recirculation at different pressures, such as
ambient pressure; recirculation through various
paths, such as through the tire, the atmosphere
and the pump tube; the safety benefit of recirculat-
ing around the pump tube isolated from the tire
cavity; a check valve on intake (between the pump
tube and the atmosphere) to only permit air in
when pressure in the pump tube falls below atmos-
pheric pressure; and a check valve on output (be-
tween the pump tube and tire interior) to only
allow air into the tire when pressure in the pump
tube exceeds the tire pressure;
TS 23: Coda’s development of a functional self-in-
flating tire as demonstrated by the test results con-
firming that the tire pump can generate pressure
higher than the pressure in the tire cavity, through
the test results showing that the pump placed on
the tread could generate 6.5 absolute atmospheres
of pressure (5.5 relative atmospheres); the test re-
sults showing that the tube-in-groove pump of the
prototype could generate 3.3 absolute atmospheres
of pressure; and test results that demonstrated
that the Flap Tubes could generate 1 relative at-
mosphere of pressure;
TS 24: Coda’s knowledge regarding the optimal lo-
cation for placement of a pump in a tire for tire
manufacturers, namely, in the sidewall close to,
and above, the rim where the tire cyclically deforms
in response to deformation.
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JMOL Decision at 596–98, 611 (cleaned up); Appellants’
Br. 16–40.
Following trial, the district court granted Goodyear’s
motion for judgment as a matter of law under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 50(b), concluding that (1) TS 7, TS 11,
TS 20, and TS 24 are not sufficiently definite; (2) TS 11,
TS 20, TS 23, and TS 24 are not “secret;” (3) TS 7, TS 11,
TS 20, and TS 23 had never been used or disclosed by Good-
year; and (4) TS 11 and TS 20 were never conveyed by Coda
to Goodyear. JMOL Decision at 602–11. After considering
the parties’ briefs in lieu of a bench trial, see Bench Decision
at 572–73; see also id. at 571 (citing Fed. R. Civ.
P. 52(a)(1)), the trial court denied Coda’s correction of in-
ventorship claim and denied its other pertinent requests
for relief. Id. at 589.
Coda timely appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
II. STANDARD OF R EVIEW
“In reviewing district court judgments, we apply the
law of the circuit in which the district court sits with re-
spect to nonpatent issues, but we apply our own law to is-
sues of substantive patent law.” In re Spalding Sports
Worldwide, Inc., 203 F.3d 800, 803 (Fed. Cir. 2000). Under
Sixth Circuit law, a district court’s grant of judgment as a
matter of law under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 50 is
reviewed de novo. Kusens v. Pascal Co., 448 F.3d 349, 360
(6th Cir. 2006). “The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure au-
thorize courts to enter judgment as a matter of law against
a plaintiff upon finding that ‘a reasonable jury would not
have a legally sufficient evidentiary basis to find’ in [its]
favor.” Mosby-Meachem v. Memphis Light, Gas & Water
Div., 883 F.3d 595, 602 (6th Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ.
P. 50). “In making such a determination, the courts must
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
movant, granting all reasonable inferences in [its] favor.”
Id. In reviewing decisions issued pursuant to Federal Rule
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of Civil Procedure 52(a), the Sixth Circuit reviews the dis-
trict court’s conclusions of law de novo, and its findings of
fact for clear error. S.C. v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville,
86 F.4th 707, 714 (6th Cir. 2023).
III. D ISCUSSION
On appeal, Coda argues that the district court erred by
(1) setting aside the jury’s verdict that Coda had five valid
trade secrets that were misappropriated by Goodyear, Ap-
pellants’ Br. 16–40; (2) rejecting Coda’s equitable claims
for injunctive relief and correction of inventorship of the
’586 patent, id. at 50–52; (3) concluding that Coda had not
raised a reasonable royalty damages theory and declining
to give a corresponding jury instruction, id. at 40–50; and
(4) “suggesting” that laches barred Coda’s claims, id.
at 52–56. Coda also requested that the case be reassigned
to another district court judge in the event of a remand. Id.
at 56–61. Because we affirm the district court’s judgment
with respect to the trade secret and correction of inventor-
ship claims, we do not address Coda’s arguments relating
to damages, injunctive relief, laches, and case reassign-
ment. See id. at 40–61.
A.
We first address Coda’s argument that the district
court erred in concluding that Goodyear was not liable for
trade secret misappropriation. Appellants’ Br. 23–40.
Specifically, Coda challenges the district court’s determi-
nation that each trade secret was not sufficiently definite,
not secret, and/or not used or disclosed by Goodyear. Id.
We agree with the district court that no reasonable jury
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could find that all elements of a trade secret misappropri-
ation claim were satisfied for each asserted trade secret.2
We first provide an overview of the Ohio Uniform
Trade Secrets Act (“OUTSA”), which governs the trade se-
cret claims in this case. The OUTSA defines “trade secret”
as:
(D) “Trade secret” means information, including
the whole or any portion or phase of any scientific
or technical information, design, process, proce-
dure, formula, pattern, compilation, program, de-
vice, method, technique, or improvement, or any
business information or plans, financial infor-
mation, or listing of names, addresses, or telephone
numbers, that satisfies both of the following:
(1) It derives independent economic value, actual
or potential, from not being generally known to,
and not being readily ascertainable by proper
means by, other persons who can obtain economic
value from its disclosure or use.
(2) It is the subject of efforts that are reasonable
under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy.
Ohio Rev. Code. § 1333.61(D).
To succeed on a trade secrets misappropriation claim,
a plaintiff must show: “(1) the existence of a trade secret;
(2) acquisition of the trade secret as the result of a
2 The parties dispute whether trade secret definite-
ness under the Ohio Uniform Trade Secrets Act is an issue
of fact or an issue of law. See Appellants’ Br. 18–22; Appel-
lees’ Br. 44–46. Because we conclude that TS 7, TS 11,
TS 20, and TS 24 are not sufficiently definite even under a
no reasonable jury standard, resolution of this issue does
not affect our conclusion regarding the definiteness of these
asserted trade secrets, and we decline to address this issue.
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confidential relationship or through improper means; and
(3) an unauthorized use of the trade secret.” Novus Grp.,
LLC v. Prudential Fin., Inc., 74 F.4th 424, 427–28 (6th Cir.
2023) (citing Tomaydo-Tomahhdo L.L.C. v. Vozary,
82 N.E.3d 1180, 1184 (Ohio Ct. App. 2017); Ohio Rev.
Code. § 1333.61(B)(1)).3 In addition, a trade secret plaintiff
must “defin[e] the information for which protection is
sought with sufficient definiteness to permit a court to ap-
ply the criteria for protection . . . and to determine the fact
of an appropriation.” Caudill Seed & Warehouse Co. v. Jar-
row Formulas, Inc., 53 F.4th 368, 380–81 (6th Cir. 2022)
(quoting Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition § 39
cmt. d) (addressing claims under the Kentucky Uniform
Trade Secrets Act); see also Ohio Rev. Code § 1333.68 (stat-
ing the sections of the act “shall be applied and construed
to effectuate their general purpose to make uniform the law
with respect to their subject among states enacting them.”).
i.
We begin with TS 24, the trade secret that served as
the primary focus in the parties’ briefing and during oral
argument. Coda argues that the district court erred in con-
cluding that TS 24 was not defined with sufficient
3 While a regional circuit court’s interpretation of
the law of states within their borders does not serve as
binding precedent upon this court, it is entitled to weight
as the court “‘better schooled in’ the law of the particular
State involved.” Whitewater W. Indus., Ltd. v. Alleshouse,
981 F.3d 1045, 1051 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (quoting Brockett
v. Spokane Arcades, Inc., 472 U.S. 491, 500 (1985)); see In
re Dow Corning Corp., 778 F.3d 545, 549 (6th Cir. 2015)
(“Unless the home circuit has ‘disregarded clear signals
emanating from the state’s highest court pointing towards
a different rule’ we will avoid creating ‘the oddity of a split
in the circuits over the correct application’ of one state’s
law.” (citation omitted)).
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particularity and was not kept secret. Appellants’ Br. 23–
31. We disagree that the district court erred.
We conclude that the district court correctly deter-
mined that (1) Coda publicly disclosed the information cov-
ered by TS 24, and (2) to the extent that TS 24 covered
knowledge not disclosed in Coda’s publications, Coda failed
to identify TS 24 with sufficient particularity. TS 24 is di-
rected to “Coda’s knowledge regarding the optimal location
for placement of a pump in a tire,” which the trade secret
explains is “in the sidewall close to, and above, the rim.”
JMOL Decision at 598. However, Coda disclosed this
placement in a 2007 PCT application and a 2008 article
published in Tire Technology. See id. at 603–04; J.A. 252–
96 (International Patent Application Publication No. WO
2007/134556 (filed May 23, 2007; published November 29,
2007)); J.A. 23863–67. For example, the 2007 PCT appli-
cation discloses that a pump can be located “at any place in
the wall of the tire . . . or in its vicinity, so for example, in
the tread or side wall of the tire.” J.A. 274 at col. 21 ll. 1–
3; see, e.g., J.A. 289 at Fig. 2(c); J.A. 271–72 at col. 18 l. 27
to col. 19 l. 3 (explaining that the pump can be located in a
“lug boss on the tire . . . wall” as shown in Fig. 2(c)). Simi-
larly, the 2008 Tire Technology article discloses that “[t]he
peristaltic tubing can be implemented in the tire
wall . . . as a crevice in the tire sidewall.” J.A. 23865; see,
e.g., J.A. 23866 at Fig. 4. Mr. Hrabal confirmed this under-
standing of the two publications at trial. See, e.g.,
J.A. 15756 at 624:14 (“The lug boss is part of the tire side-
wall.”); J.A. 15795 at 663:2 (“The lug boss is on the rim
near and above the rim.”); J.A. 15757 at 625:9–12 (“Q. So
locating a peristaltic pump in the tire sidewall near the rim
in an area where it cyclically deforms was not a trade se-
cret? A. This is public.”). Thus, the district court did not
err in concluding that no reasonable jury could find that
the information contained in TS 24, as defined by Coda,
qualified as a trade secret.
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Coda’s attempt to differentiate TS 24 from the disclo-
sures in the publications runs into a different obstacle—
definiteness. Relying on Mr. Hrabal’s trial testimony,
Coda asserts that the 2007 PCT application and the 2008
Tire Technology article do not disclose a pump that was
“part of a conventional tire sidewall,” Appellants’ Br. 26–
27 (citing J.A. 15748) (emphasis added), or in the sidewall
of a “standard tire . . . as they look today, or at the time of
this application.” J.A. 15956 at 824:8–9; Appellants’
Br. 30–31 (citing J.A. 15956–58) (emphasis added). How-
ever, these limiting terms are not present in the definition
of TS 24, as set forth in Coda’s interrogatory responses in
compliance with the district court’s order to provide “a com-
plete list of the trade secrets (with particularity).”4
J.A. 2343; JMOL Decision at 594–95, 604. We reject
Coda’s attempt to belatedly introduce additional specificity
into the trade secret based on Mr. Hrabal’s trial testimony
and attorney argument. Coda’s insistence that TS 24 con-
tains these additional limitations demonstrates Coda’s fail-
ure to identify TS 24 with sufficient specificity to “separate
the purported trade secret from the other information that
was known to the trade.” TLS Mgmt. & Mktg. Servs., LLC
v. Rodríguez-Toledo, 966 F.3d 46, 54 (1st Cir. 2020)
(cleaned up); see Mallet & Co. v. Lacayo, 16 F.4th 364, 384
(3d Cir. 2021) (“When the breadth of a trade secret descrip-
tion is so far-reaching that it includes publicly available in-
formation (like patent disclosures) and admitted industry
knowledge, that information is not specific enough to be ac-
corded trade secret status.”). We find no reversible error in
the district court’s determination that TS 24 is not entitled
to trade secret status.
4 Notably, the trial court ordered that Coda provide
a “closed” recital of the trade secrets in its interrogatory
responses. See J.A. 2349–50. Coda’s briefing contains no
indication that it is appealing this order.
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ii.
Turning to TS 7, TS 11, and TS 20, Coda argues that
the district court erred in concluding that these trade se-
crets are not identified with sufficient specificity and were
not used by Goodyear. Appellants’ Br. 31–37. Coda also
challenges the determination that TS 11 and TS 20 were
also not secret. Id. We find no reversible error in the dis-
trict court’s determination that these trade secrets are not
sufficiently definite and were not used by Goodyear.5
The district court did not err in determining that Coda
failed to define TS 7, TS 11, and TS 20 with sufficient par-
ticularity. TS 7 covers “Coda’s design and development of
a multi-purpose interface for transporting air in a self-in-
flating tire that can” perform a list of ten functions, includ-
ing “connect[ing],” “go[ing] around or through,” and
“hold[ing]” other components. JMOL Decision at 596. Ab-
sent from TS 7, however, is any description of the infor-
mation for which trade secret protection is sought—the
“design and development” knowledge that would enable
someone to develop this interface. Id. Rather, TS 7 merely
describes the functions that can be performed by the final
product created by the knowledge in TS 7. Coda’s emphasis
of Mr. Hrabal’s testimony regarding the “specific value” of
the interface is misguided as this testimony fails to address
the relevant issue at hand—whether the articulation of
TS 7 sufficiently defines the “design and development” in-
formation. See Appellants’ Br. 31 (citing J.A. 15559–61;
5 With respect to TS 11 and TS 20, we need not reach
the issue of disclosure by Goodyear or secrecy due to our
conclusion that Coda fails to prove other required elements
of its trade secret misappropriation claim. For the same
reason, we do not address the parties’ dispute over whether
the district court concluded that TS 7 was not secret. See
Appellants’ Br. 32 n.1; Appellees’ Br. 51–52; Appellants’
Reply Br. 11.
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J.A. 15591). Furthermore, the listed functions are de-
scribed in vague terms with no detail regarding how those
functions are carried out. See, e.g., Caudill Seed, 53 F.4th
at 381 (“[A] plaintiff asserting a combination trade secret
over highly complex technical information cannot merely
offer ‘lists of broad technical concepts identifying categories
of information’ without showing which information con-
tained within those categories constituted a trade secret.”
(cleaned up)); BondPro Corp. v. Siemens Power Generation,
Inc., 463 F.3d 702, 710 (7th Cir. 2006) (explaining that a
trade secret “described in general terms . . . will usually be
widely known and thus not worth incurring costs to try to
conceal and so not a trade secret”). Thus, Coda failed to
fully articulate what aspects of TS 7 constituted a protect-
able trade secret.
As the district court correctly recognized, TS 11 and
TS 20 face similar definiteness problems, including that
they are “articulated [as] no more than an undifferentiated
list of components” described in vague terms and that they
contain “no disclosure of what [the claimed] knowledge is
and/or what the design or development is.” JMOL Decision
at 606–07; see id. at 596–97. For the same reasons ex-
plained above with respect to TS 7, the district court did
not err in concluding that TS 11 and TS 20 are not suffi-
ciently definite.
Even if TS 7, TS 11, and TS 20 were valid trade secrets,
the district court correctly concluded no reasonable jury
could find that Goodyear used these trade secrets. As ex-
plained, the descriptions of TS 7, TS 11, and TS 20 all in-
clude lists of components or functions. With respect to
TS 7, Coda challenges the district court’s finding that the
testimony of its expert, Mr. Coughlin, was vague and failed
to identify all ten TS 7 functions in the Goodyear patent
that allegedly disclosed TS 7, see JMOL Decision at 605, on
the basis that “[t]he unauthorized use need not extend to
every aspect or feature of the trade secret; use of any sub-
stantial portion of the secret is sufficient.” Appellants’
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Br. 32 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Unfair Competition
§ 40 cmt. c); see also Caudill Seed, 53 F.4th at 385 (reject-
ing the argument “that trade-secrets law requires showing
acquisition of each atom of a combination trade secret”).
However, Coda’s assertion that the few TS 7 functions
identified by Mr. Coughlin as allegedly being in unauthor-
ized use constitute a “substantial portion of the secret”
rests on Mr. Coughlin’s conclusory assertions that “Good-
year patented a configuration that is essentially a concept
of [TS 7’s] concept” and a “perfect knock-off of that technol-
ogy.” Appellants’ Br. 32 (quoting and modifying J.A. 16250
at 1118:4–9). As Mr. Coughlin’s conclusory testimony “is
not supported by sufficient facts . . . it cannot support a
jury’s verdict.” Brooke Grp. Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson
Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209, 242 (1993).
Coda’s arguments regarding Goodyear’s use of TS 11
and TS 20 fail for similar reasons. With respect to TS 11,
Coda argues that Goodyear disclosed substantial aspects of
TS 11 in Goodyear’s patents and other documents. Appel-
lants’ Br. 33 (citing J.A. 16763; J.A. 80–81; J.A. 20017–100
as “disclosing ‘passageway’ pump, i.e., a tubeless solution”;
then citing J.A. 16766–67; J.A. 21664 as disclosing “an el-
liptical cross section was easiest to pinch”; then citing
J.A. 20163; J.A. 20257 (Figure 5-1); J.A. 22193; J.A. 22262
(Figure 5-2) as “showing tubeless solution”). Coda’s cita-
tions, however, only speak to usage of two of TS 11’s eight
components. Even if we ignore the lack of evidentiary sup-
port for Goodyear’s assertion that these two elements con-
stitute “substantial aspects of TS 11,” Appellants’ Br. 33,
Coda fails to refute Goodyear’s assertion that these ele-
ments were previously publicly disclosed. See Appellees’
Br. 55; id. at 15–16 (citing J.A. 290 (Figs. 3(d)–(f)); J.A. 271
at 18:27–29; J.A. 15768–69 at 636:23–637:4; J.A. 15933
at 801:6–25); Appellants’ Reply Br. 11–14. With respect to
TS 20, Coda again alleges use of only two of the seven ele-
ments in the combination. See Appellants’ Br. 36–37
(“Goodyear used both the dead space and the recirculation
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concepts . . . .” (citing J.A. 15621; J.A. 16762–63)). And
Coda similarly fails to refute Goodyear’s assertion that
these concepts were disclosed in Coda’s patent applications
and public presentations. See Appellees’ Br. 16–18 (citing
J.A. 24021–63; J.A. 23960; J.A. 23970; J.A. 16258
at 1126:19–25); Appellants’ Reply Br. 14–15. For the rea-
sons stated, we conclude that the district court did not err
by concluding that no reasonable jury could find that Coda
met its burden of proving all elements of its trade secret
misappropriation claim based on TS 7, TS 11, and TS 20.
iii.
We now turn to the last trade secret, TS 23. Coda ar-
gues that the district court erred in concluding that TS 23
was not used by Goodyear. Appellants’ Br. 37–40. We dis-
agree.
Coda presents insufficient evidence for a reasonable
jury to find that Goodyear used TS 23. At trial, the only
alleged evidence of use presented by Coda was a January
21, 2009 email that did not contain the test results de-
scribed in TS 23.6 See JMOL Decision at 609; J.A. 23469
(disclosing only the test results of “approximately 6.5A ab-
solute pressure (or 5.5A relative pressure)” (cleaned up));
J.A. 15546 at 414:9–24 (Mr. Hrabal corroborating the test
results disclosed in the email).
Coda argues that it is irrelevant “that the specific test-
ing results described in the email and those in TS 23 do not
6 Goodyear claims that none of the test results be-
tween TS 23 and the email match. See Appellees’ Br. 58
(arguing that the email discloses the test result of achiev-
ing “6.5A of pressure in Coda’s prototype tire,” but TS 23
discloses “6.5A from a pump in the tread”). As it does not
affect our disposition, we assume for the sake of our analy-
sis that matching numerical measurements are indicative
of matching test results.
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CODA DEVELOPMENT S .R. O . v.
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER COMPANY
15
exactly match, because [Mr.] Hrabal testified that he dis-
closed TS 23 to Goodyear, and Goodyear plainly relied on
Coda’s testing data.” Appellants’ Br. 39–40 (citing
J.A. 15546–47; J.A. 15584). The testimony Coda relies on,
however, does not indicate that Mr. Hrabal disclosed all
the testing results in TS 23 to Goodyear. Rather, Mr. Hra-
bal testified that TS 23 was “related to [the] testing results
communicated to Goodyear” and was being asserted in this
case, J.A. 15584 at 452:19–24, and that the “post meeting
e-mail . . . shows this information about the results” that
were discussed at the meeting. J.A. 15546 at 414:9–16 (ref-
erencing J.A. 23469). As already discussed, the testing re-
sults reflected in the email do not encompass all results
covered in TS 23. See J.A. 23469. Coda nevertheless ar-
gues that there were “numerous other reasonable infer-
ences” that support the jury verdict. Appellants’ Br. 39.
Namely, Coda argues that the “testing results gave Good-
year further reason to believe in the technology,” pointing
to a Goodyear presentation that noted that Goodyear had
plans to “[i]nitiate next steps from a technology point of
view” for its SIT project on January 30, 2009 and subse-
quently “confirmed that the project was a ‘Go’” in late
March 2009. Id. (citing J.A. 22170–71). We do not agree
with Coda that the timing of Goodyear’s project launch
alone constitutes sufficient evidence from which a reason-
able jury could find Goodyear’s usage of TS 23, especially
when there is no evidence tying TS 23 to the project and no
evidence indicating all the information in TS 23 was con-
veyed to Goodyear.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s
judgment as a matter of law with respect to the trade secret
claims.
B.
Lastly, we address Coda’s challenge to the district
court’s denial of its claim for correction of inventorship of
the ’586 patent. Coda argues that the district court erred
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16
with respect to its correction of inventorship claim because
it erroneously threw out the jury’s verdict under Rule 50(b),
and that the district court is bound by any pertinent fact-
finding of the jury when deciding equitable claims. See Ap-
pellants’ Br. 50–52. Accordingly, Coda’s challenges to the
district court’s judgments regarding the correction of in-
ventorship and trade secret claims rise and fall together
because Coda’s sole argument supporting reversal of the
district court’s denial of correction of inventorship is that
the district court improperly granted judgment as a matter
of law with respect to Coda’s trade secret claims. See id.
at 50–52 (raising only the argument that the district
court’s judgment regarding correction of inventorship must
be reversed because the district court erred in granting
Goodyear’s Rule 50(b) motion with respect to the trade se-
cret claims). As we affirmed the district court’s judgment
that no reasonable jury could find Goodyear liable for trade
secret misappropriation, we conclude that the district
court’s denial of the correction of inventorship claim also
was not erroneous.
Moreover, Coda’s challenge separately fails because it
is premised on the position that the district court improp-
erly ignored the jury’s factual findings. See id. at 51–52;
Appellants’ Reply Br. 21–24. In reaching its conclusion
that Coda failed to show it was entitled to correction of in-
ventorship of the ’586 patent, the district court noted dif-
ferences between the locations of the pump assembly
covered by TS 24 and by the ’586 patent claims and deter-
mined that the trade secret and patent claims do not cover
the same scope. See Bench Decision at 587–89. The jury,
however, was never asked to compare the scopes of the ’586
patent claims and TS 24. See J.A. 17996–18002. Accord-
ingly, the district court’s finding that TS 24 and the ’586
patent claims have different scopes does not conflict with
the jury’s findings. The district court did not err in con-
cluding that Coda’s alleged trade secret is insufficient evi-
dence to show that Mr. Hrabal was the sole inventor of the
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17
’586 patent. See Fina Oil & Chem. Co. v. Ewen, 123 F.3d
1466, 1473 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“Conception is the touchstone
to determining inventorship.”); REG Synthetic Fuels, LLC
v. Neste Oil Oyj, 841 F.3d 954, 962 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (“Con-
ception must include every feature or limitation of the
claimed invention.”). Thus, the district court’s conclusion
did not result from erroneously ignoring factual findings
made by the jury.
For the reasons stated, we affirm the district court’s
judgment regarding Coda’s correction of inventorship
claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have considered Coda’s remaining arguments and
find them unpersuasive. We affirm the district court’s
judgment.
AFFIRMED
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