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24-1203•Federal Circuit disposition — 24-1203
24-1203Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit13.01.2026
N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
IN RE: LAUREL DESIGNS, LLC,
Appellant
______________________
2024-1203
______________________
Appeal from the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, Trademark Trial and Appeal Board in No.
90482744.
______________________
Decided: January 13, 2026
______________________
SETH MARTIN N EHRBASS , Garvey, Smith & Nehrbass,
Patent Attorneys, LLC, New Orleans, LA, for appellant.
Also represented by JULIE RABALAIS CHAUVIN, VANESSA M.
D'SOUZA.
MARY L. K ELLY , Office of the Solicitor, United States
Patent and Trademark Office, Alexandria, VA, for appellee
Coke Morgan Stewart. Also represented by AMY J.
N ELSON.
______________________
Case: 24-1203 Document: 54 Page: 1 Filed: 01/13/2026
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IN RE: LAUREL DESIGNS, LLC 2
Before M OORE, Chief Judge, STOLL , Circuit Judge, and
BUMB, Chief District Judge.1
P ER CURIAM .
Laurel Designs, LLC appeals the decision of the Trade-
mark Trial and Appeal Board affirming the refusal to reg-
ister Laurel Designs’ SAZERAC STITCHES mark. Laurel
Designs challenges the Board’s determination that its
mark is likely to be confused with registered mark
SAZERAC. For the following reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Laurel Designs sought registration of its mark
SAZERAC STITCHES for services identified as:
Retail store services and online retail store services
featuring lighting, and light fixtures, namely,
sconces, chandeliers, flush mount ceiling fixtures,
pendants, and table lamps; Retail store services
and online retail store services featuring lighting
accessories, namely, light bulbs, switches and
cords, replacement glass, downrods, hang
straights, and backplates; Retail store services and
online retail store services featuring hardware,
namely, knobs; Retail store services and online re-
tail store services featuring home decor, namely,
candle holders, tree skirts, planters, vases, rainbow
decor items, serving trays; Retail store services and
online retail store services featuring night lights,
ornaments, bookends, tree skirts, and serving trays
in the shape of a bear; Retail store services and
online retail store services featuring furniture,
namely, chairs, sofas, rockers, and ottomans;
1 Honorable Renée Marie Bumb, Chief Judge,
United States District Court for the District of New Jersey,
sitting by designation.
Case: 24-1203 Document: 54 Page: 2 Filed: 01/13/2026
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IN RE: LAUREL DESIGNS, LLC 3
Retail store services and online retail store services
featuring textiles, all in International Class 35.
J.A. 1–2 (internal quotations omitted). The Examining At-
torney refused to register the mark, on the ground that the
mark SAZERAC STITCHES, used in connection with the
services above, was likely to be confused with the mark
SAZERAC2 registered for, among other things, “‘Online re-
tail store services featuring distilled spirits, beverage
glassware, cocktail accessories, T-shirts, caps, postcards,
and cocktail recipe books,’ in International Class 35.”3
J.A. 2.
Laurel Designs appealed the final refusal by the Exam-
ining Attorney to the Board. The Board affirmed the re-
fusal after conducting “an analysis of all of the probative
evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion.”
J.A. 3 (citing In re E.I. DuPont DeNemours & Co., 476 F.2d
1357 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”)). The Board deemed three
of the thirteen DuPont factors relevant to its analy-
sis: “[t]he similarity or dissimilarity of the marks in their
entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation[,] and com-
mercial impression” (factor 1); “[t]he similarity or dissimi-
larity and nature of the goods or services as described in an
application or registration or in connection with which a
prior mark is in use” (factor 2); and “[t]he similarity or dis-
similarity of established, likely-to-continue trade chan-
nels” (factor 3). DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361 (providing full
2 Reg. No. 4,368,934, issued on July 16, 2013 (the
“Cited Registration”), registered in the name of Sazerac
Brands LLC, the “cited registrant.” J.A. 2.
3 While the Examining Attorney provided other
marks likely to be confused with SAZERAC STITCHES,
only the mark SAZERAC is relevant on appeal because the
Board found “this mark and the recited services most sim-
ilar to [Laurel Designs’] mark and services.” J.A. 4.
Case: 24-1203 Document: 54 Page: 3 Filed: 01/13/2026
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IN RE: LAUREL DESIGNS, LLC 4
list of factors); see also J.A. 4, 11 (identifying relevant fac-
tors).
The Board began its analysis with a combined discus-
sion of DuPont factors 2 and 3, finding they weighed in fa-
vor of confusion, since the evidence presented was
“sufficient to establish relatedness . . . in that a number of
home-goods-focused stores offer online retail store services
featuring the types of goods in the involved application and
Cited Registration,” and the evidence “show[ed] that online
retailers feature the products offered by both [Laurel De-
signs] and the cited registrant . . . all under a single mark
to the same classes of consumers.” J.A. 8. The Board next
considered DuPont factor 1, finding that the marks, when
“considered in their entireties,” are “similar in appearance,
sound, connotation, and commercial impression due to the
shared term SAZERAC.” J.A. 19. Then, having found that
the relevant three factors favored confusion, the Board con-
cluded that Laurel Designs’ mark “SAZERAC STITCHES
[was] likely to cause confusion with the mark SAZERAC.”
Id.
Laurel Designs appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(4).
D ISCUSSION
On appeal, Laurel Designs argues that the Board erred
in determining there was a likelihood of confusion. “We
review the [B]oard’s legal conclusions de novo, and its find-
ings of fact for substantial evidence.” Dollar Fin. Grp., Inc.
v. Brittex Fin., Inc., 132 F.4th 1363, 1368 (Fed. Cir. 2025)
(alteration in original) (citation omitted). “Likelihood of
confusion is a question of law, based on findings of relevant
underlying facts, namely findings under the DuPont fac-
tors . . . .” Id. at 1369 (citation omitted). “We review the
Board’s weighing of the DuPont factors de novo, but we re-
view the Board’s factual findings on each DuPont factor for
substantial evidence.” In re Charger Ventures LLC,
64 F.4th 1375, 1381 (Fed. Cir. 2023) (internal citations
Case: 24-1203 Document: 54 Page: 4 Filed: 01/13/2026
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IN RE: LAUREL DESIGNS, LLC 5
omitted). “Substantial evidence is ‘such relevant evidence
as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support
a conclusion.’” Dollar Fin. Grp., 132 F.4th at 1368–69
(quoting Consol. Edison Co. of N.Y. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197,
229 (1938)).
“In any given case, different DuPont factors may play
a dominant role and some factors may not be relevant to
the analysis.” Charger Ventures, 64 F.4th at 1381 (citing
Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods., Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 1370
(Fed. Cir. 2002)). “The Board is required to consider each
factor for which it has evidence, but it can focus its analysis
on dispositive factors.” Id. (citing In re Dixie Rests., Inc.,
105 F.3d 1405, 1406–07 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). The Board
deemed the first, second, and third DuPont factors relevant
to its analysis. We proceed in the same order as the
Board: first by reviewing the Board’s findings with respect
to factors 2 and 3, then by reviewing those with respect to
factor 1.
I
We begin by addressing whether substantial evidence
supports the Board’s findings with respect to DuPont fac-
tors 2 and 3: “the similarity of the services, channels of
trade, and classes of customers.” J.A. 4 (citing DuPont,
476 F.2d at 1361). Laurel Designs argues that the evi-
dence presented for factor 2 is insufficient to establish that
“the goods / services are related in some manner and/or the
circumstances that surround their marketing are such that
consumers could have the mistaken belief that the
goods / services emanate from the same source.” Appel-
lant’s Br. 23–24. As for factor 3, Laurel Designs argues
that “the Board failed to properly weigh the evidence before
it regarding the actual trade channels of the cited ser-
vices . . . , as well as the class of customers and the items
listed under each respective set of services.” Appellant’s
Br. 25. We conclude that the Board’s factual findings on
Case: 24-1203 Document: 54 Page: 5 Filed: 01/13/2026
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IN RE: LAUREL DESIGNS, LLC 6
DuPont factors 2 and 3 are supported by substantial evi-
dence.
In evaluating these factors, the Board first recognized
that the services in the application versus “the Cited Reg-
istration do not have to be identical or directly competitive
to support a finding of a likelihood of confusion.” J.A. 5
(citing Online Careline, Inc. v. Am. Online, Inc., 229 F.3d
1080, 1086 (Fed. Cir. 2000)). Rather:
It is sufficient if the respective services are related
in some manner and/or that the conditions sur-
rounding their marketing are such that they could
be encountered by the same persons under circum-
stances that could, because of the similarity of the
marks . . . used in connection therewith, give rise
to the mistaken belief that they emanate from or
are associated with a single source.
Id. (citing Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC,
668 F.3d 1356, 1369 (Fed. Cir. 2012)).
Substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding on
DuPont factor 2. The Board identified evidence showing
that “at least ten third-party providers of online retail store
services featuring sconces, chandeliers, flush mount ceiling
fixtures, pendants, table lamps, knobs, candle holders,
vases, serving trays, bookends, ornaments, chairs, sofas, or
textiles”—i.e., goods identified in Laurel Designs’ applica-
tion—“also offer online retail store services featuring bev-
erage glassware or cocktail accessories, such as coasters”—
i.e., goods identified in the Cited Registration—“all under
the same mark.” J.A. 6. The Board then listed, along with
the respective goods offered, the identified third-party
online retailers: Zara Home, Pottery Barn, Ballard De-
signs, At Home, Bed Bath & Beyond, Crate & Barrel, Ikea,
Inspire Me!, Kirkland’s, and West Elm. J.A. 6–8. And the
Board specifically found that, while some of the identified
retailers “offer a wide range of home furnishings,” the
range of offered goods was not so wide as to render those
Case: 24-1203 Document: 54 Page: 6 Filed: 01/13/2026
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IN RE: LAUREL DESIGNS, LLC 7
retailers “department stores,” further supporting its reli-
ance on those specific retailers, since “large department
stores sell a wide variety of goods and services and, there-
fore, . . . have little probative value in showing that goods
are related.” J.A. 6 n.8.
Substantial evidence also supports the Board’s finding
on DuPont factor 3. The Board found that the evidence of
the identified retail websites “shows that online retailers
feature the products offered by both [Laurel Designs] and
the cited registrant.” J.A. 8. “Thus, consumers are used to
seeing the types of goods featured by [Laurel Designs] and
the cited registrant offered under a single mark via online
retail store services,” and therefore, “the similarity or dis-
similarity of established, likely-to-continue trade chan-
nels . . . favor[ed] a finding of likelihood of confusion.”
J.A. 8–9. Considering the website evidence identified by
the Board, we determine that a reasonable mind could ac-
cept that evidence as adequate to find that the consuming
public is likely to be confused as to the origin of the goods
and services, due to the marks’ similarities of goods/ser-
vices and similarities of trade channels.
On appeal, Laurel Designs argues that “there is no spe-
cific overlap between [its] services and those of the [C]ited
[R]egistration.” Appellant’s Br. 18 (“[Laurel Designs’]
store services do not include the goods listed under the reg-
istered mark’s store services. And, the registered mark’s
store services do not include the goods listed under [Laurel
Designs’] store services.”). But our law does not require a
specific overlap between services to find that DuPont fac-
tor 2 weighs in favor of a likelihood of confusion. See Shen
Mfg. Co. v. The Ritz Hotel Ltd., 393 F.3d 1238, 1244
(Fed. Cir. 2004) (“[G]oods that are neither used together
nor related to one another in kind may still ‘be related in
the mind of the consuming public as to the origin of the
goods. It is this sense of relatedness that matters in the
likelihood of confusion analysis.’” (quoting Recot, Inc.
v. Becton, 214 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000)).
Case: 24-1203 Document: 54 Page: 7 Filed: 01/13/2026
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IN RE: LAUREL DESIGNS, LLC 8
Accordingly, there is substantial evidence in the record to
support the Board’s fact finding that ten online retailers
carrying goods found in both the Application and the Cited
Registration supported a finding of likelihood of confusion,
and we see no legal error in its analysis.
Laurel Designs also makes two arguments related to
the real-world conditions in which various goods are pur-
chased and sold under the respective marks. First, Laurel
Designs argues that because the glassware sold by Sazerac
Brands LLC “is glassware featuring the mark SAZERAC
prominently displayed on the glassware, unlike the cited
[ten retail] websites which do not feature any such orna-
mental use of the respective marks,” this evidence weighs
against a likelihood of confusion. Appellant’s Br. 24 (inter-
nal citation omitted). Second, Laurel Designs argues that
because “[t]he ‘SAZERAC STITCHES’ consumer is making
a much more calculated decision on committing to a much
more substantial, permanent item (a piece of furniture, a
light fixture, fabric) than the ‘SAZERAC’ consumer who is
buying a coaster or a glass,” the differences between those
actual consumers “supports a finding that the trade chan-
nels and class of consumers associated with each mark are
dissimilar.” Appellant’s Br. 27. These arguments, how-
ever, are unpersuasive given the inquiry at hand. “The rel-
evant inquiry in an ex parte proceeding focuses on the
goods and services described in the application and regis-
tration, and not on real-world conditions.” In re Detroit
Athletic Co., 903 F.3d 1297, 1307 (Fed. Cir. 2018). Here,
the goods and services described in the application include
more casually purchased goods analogous to coasters and
glasses, such as light bulbs, switches and cords, knobs, can-
dle holders, tree skirts, planters, vases, rainbow decor
items, serving trays, night lights, ornaments, bookends,
and serving trays. Accordingly, the Board did not legally
err when it focused on the goods and services in the Appli-
cation and Cited Registration, rather than on real-world
conditions.
Case: 24-1203 Document: 54 Page: 8 Filed: 01/13/2026
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IN RE: LAUREL DESIGNS, LLC 9
For these reasons, we conclude that the Board’s factual
findings for DuPont factors 2 and 3 are supported by sub-
stantial evidence.
II
We now address whether substantial evidence sup-
ports the Board’s finding that, under the first DuPont fac-
tor, the marks in their entireties are similar in appearance,
sound, connotation, and commercial impression. J.A. 11
(citing Palm Bay Imps., Inc. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin
Maison Fondee en 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 1371 (Fed. Cir.
2005)); DuPont, 476 F.2d at 1361. We conclude that sub-
stantial evidence supports the Board’s factual findings.
The Board first recognized that its analysis “cannot be
predicated on dissecting the marks into their various com-
ponents; the decision must be based on the entirety of the
marks, not just part of the marks.” J.A. 12 (citing In re
Nat’l Data Corp., 753 F.2d 1056, 1058 (Fed. Cir. 1985)).
The Board ultimately found the marks similar under
DuPont factor 1, and therefore likely to be confused, based
on (1) the similarity “in sight and sound [of the marks] to
the extent that they share the term SAZERAC,” and (2) the
marks’ use “on related services . . . , engender[ing] the
same connotation and commercial impression in each
mark.” J.A. 13.
In evaluating the similarity in sight and sound of the
marks, the Board found that the mark SAZERAC is both
subsumed into SAZERAC STITCHES and is the dominant
portion of SAZERAC STITCHES. J.A. 12–13. And the
Board found that, “because [SAZERAC STITCHES] sub-
sumes [SAZERAC], consumers may very well perceive
[SAZERAC STITCHES] as a variation of [SAZERAC], es-
pecially where Applicant’s and Registrant’s identified
online retail store services are similar.” J.A. 14.
On appeal, Laurel Designs argues that the Board erred
because it did not “weigh [the] mark in its entirety as
Case: 24-1203 Document: 54 Page: 9 Filed: 01/13/2026
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IN RE: LAUREL DESIGNS, LLC 10
precedent dictates.” Appellant’s Br. 11. It is true that
marks must be weighed in their entireties, but as long as
the Board’s “ultimate conclusion regarding the likelihood
of confusion rests on a consideration of the marks in their
entireties,” “[i]t is not improper for the Board to determine
that, for rational reasons, it should give more or less weight
to a particular feature” of a mark. QuikTrip W., Inc. v. Wei-
gel Stores, Inc., 984 F.3d 1031, 1035 (Fed. Cir. 2021)
(cleaned up) (citation omitted). After review, we determine
that the Board weighed SAZERAC STITCHES in its en-
tirety and did not legally err by making a reasonable fac-
tual determination that SAZERAC is “dominant in
[SAZERAC STITCHES] because it is the first term and the
element most likely to be remembered.” J.A. 12 (citing,
e.g., Palm Bay, 396 F.3d at 1372 (finding the term VEUVE
was the “‘prominent feature’ as the first word in the mark
and the first word to appear on the label”)).
Relatedly, we find Laurel Designs’ reliance on Shen un-
availing. Laurel Designs relies extensively on Shen to ar-
gue the Board improperly dissected its mark and failed to
give “STITCHES” adequate weight. See Appellant’s Br. 8–
13. In Shen, when comparing marks “RITZ” and
“PUTTING ON THE RITZ,” the Board made a factual find-
ing that the phrase “PUTTING ON THE RITZ” left con-
sumers “with a distinct impression, specifically that of
getting dressed up or of the song composed by Irving Ber-
lin,” and the Board ultimately determined there was no
likelihood of confusion. 393 F.3d at 1242. We affirmed the
Board, concluding that “PUTTING ON THE RITZ, when
evaluated as a whole, conveys a strong commercial impres-
sion” that differed from the commercial impression con-
veyed by “RITZ” alone. Id. Here, the Board did not make
a similar finding that SAZERAC STITCHES, when evalu-
ated as a whole, has a strong commercial impression unlike
that of SAZERAC alone, nor did Laurel Designs present
such evidence. Given the evidence presented and the
Board’s finding that “SAZERAC” is dominant in SAZERAC
Case: 24-1203 Document: 54 Page: 10 Filed: 01/13/2026
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IN RE: LAUREL DESIGNS, LLC 11
STITCHES because it is “the first term and the element
most likely to be remembered,” J.A. 12, we cannot say the
Board’s decision to accord “SAZERAC” more weight than
“STITCHES” is unreasonable. And substantial evidence
review requires only such relevant evidence as a reasona-
ble mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion,
even if another reasonable mind could differ in its conclu-
sion. Therefore, we conclude that the Board’s factual find-
ings for DuPont factor 1 are supported by substantial
evidence.
III
We now review the Board’s weighing of the DuPont fac-
tors. Since the Board’s factual findings for each DuPont
factor considered are supported by substantial evidence,
and all factors favored a likelihood of confusion, we affirm
the Board’s ultimate conclusion that “[Laurel Designs’]
mark SAZERAC STITCHES is likely to cause confusion
with the mark SAZERAC of the Cited Registration.”
J.A. 19; see Dollar Fin. Grp., 132 F.4th at 1374 (affirming
the Board’s conclusion of likelihood of confusion when the
Board determined each relevant DuPont factor either
weighed in favor of confusion or was neutral).
CONCLUSION
We have considered Laurel Designs’ remaining argu-
ments and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing rea-
sons, we affirm the Board’s decision.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
Case: 24-1203 Document: 54 Page: 11 Filed: 01/13/2026
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