National Steel Car Ltd. v. Greenbrier-Concarril LLC, Greenbrier Leasing Company, LLC, Greenbrier-Gimsa, LLC

NOTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD.,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
GREENBRIER-CONCARRIL LLC, GREENBRIER
LEASING COMPANY, LLC, GREENBRIER-GIMSA,
LLC,
Defendants-Appellees
______________________
2024-1453
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of Oregon in No. 3:20-cv-01275-YY, Magistrate
Judge Youlee Yim You.
______________________
Decided: November 19, 2025
______________________
CRAIG D. LEAVELL, Barnes & Thornburg LLP, Chicago,
IL, argued for plaintiff-appellant. Also represented by
M EGAN M. NEW ; LAUREN ULRICH BAKER , ANNA WHITACRE ,
Atlanta, GA; D ANIEL A. VALENZUELA , Dallas, TX.
JONATHAN PIETER VAN ES , Banner & Witcoff, Ltd., Chi-
cago, IL, argued for defendants-appellees. Also represented
by BRIAN APEL, M ARC COOPERMAN , JANICE V. M ITRIUS .
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 2
______________________
Before M OORE, Chief Judge, CHEN , Circuit Judge, and
ANDREWS , District Judge.1
ANDREWS , District Judge.
Plaintiff National Steel Car (NSC) appeals the United
States District Court for the District of Oregon’s grant of
summary judgment of non-infringement of U.S. Patent
Numbers 7,434,519 (’519 patent) and 7,878,125 (’125 pa-
tent). We affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
NSC owns the ’519 patent and the ’125 patent. These
patents cover the designs of railroad gondolas, open-topped
railroad cars used to transport bulk materials, with a uni-
body design. J.A. 7–10. NSC sued Greenbrier-Concarril,
Greenbrier Leasing Company, and Greenbrier-Gimsa
(Greenbrier) for infringement of nineteen claims between
the ’519 patent and the ’125 patent.2 J.A. 10.
Claim 22 of the ’519 patent is representative of the as-
serted claims for each patent. Claim 22 reads:
22. A rail road gondola car comprising: a gon-
dola car body carried by railroad car trucks for
rolling motion along rail road tracks; said gon-
dola car body having a longitudinal center-
line; said gondola car body having a floor and
a wall structure standing upwardly of said
1 Honorable Richard G. Andrews, District Judge,
United States District Court for the District of Delaware,
sitting by designation.
2 NSC alleges that four of Greenbrier’s railroad cars in-
fringed claims 2–4, 8, 9, 11, 13–15, 18, 19, and 22–24 of the
’519 patent, and claims 1, 15, 16, 18, and 19 of the ’125 pa-
tent. J.A. 10.
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 3
floor, said floor and said wall structure defin-
ing a lading receptacle; said gondola car body
including a pair of lengthwise running side
beams, said side beams defining portions of
said wall structure; said side beams each hav-
ing an upper margin, and a longitudinally
running shear web member extending pre-
dominantly downwardly of said upper mar-
gin; said floor including at least one floor
panel; said at least one floor panel and said
shear web member being directly mated to-
gether; a centersill; said [centersill] has a pair
of spaced apart webs extending downwardly
from said at least one floor panel, said webs
each have an upper margin mated to said at
least one floor panel; said gondola car includes
at least one cross-bearer, said at least one
cross-bearer has at least one web, said web of
said at least one cross-bearer has an upper
margin mated directly to said at least one floor
panel; and said at least one floor panel defines
an upper flange of said centersill and said at
least one cross-bearer, and a bottom flange of
at least one of said side beams.
’519 patent, col. 42, l. 54 – col. 43, l. 14 (emphasis added).
Each asserted claim requires that some part of the “side
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 4
wall web”3 be in physical contact4 with the “floor panel” or
“deck” of the car. J.A. 11. The parties agreed that the
terms “floor panel,” as used in the ’519 patent, and “deck,”
used in the ’125 patent, should be construed the same.5
After briefing and argument, the District Court con-
strued “floor panel” as “floor sheet, or floor sheets joined
together, that may have one or more integral floor exten-
sions.” J.A. 45–48.
Both parties filed motions seeking reconsideration and
clarification of the claim construction. J.A. 28; J.A. 2491–
96 (NSC’s motion); J.A. 2497–503 (Greenbrier’s motion).
The District Court denied Greenbrier’s request to specify
that the floor panel extensions must be “abutting” the floor
panel sheet or another floor panel. J.A. 30–32. NSC’s mo-
tion urged the court to construe “floor panel” in a way that
3 The asserted claims use “shear web member,” ’519 pa-
tent, claim 22, “upstanding web,” ’125 patent, claim 1, and
“side wall web,” ’125 patent, claim 18. After NSC identified
each of these three terms as satisfying the claim limita-
tions, Greenbrier began referring to all three terms as “side
wall web.” J.A. 2565 n.2. In its summary judgment opin-
ion, the court used “side wall web” to refer to all three terms
as well. J.A. 11. As the parties do not dispute the use of
“side wall web” to refer to all three terms, we too use “side
wall web” to encompass all three claim terms.
4 Although the wording in each asserted claim is
slightly different, the parties agree that each claim re-
quires “that some part of the ‘side web wall’ of the car is in
physical contact with the ‘floor panel’ or ‘deck’ of the car.”
J.A. 11 (citing J.A. 2565 (Def. Mot. Summ. J.) and J.A.
10012–14 (Pl. Resp.)).
5 The parties agreed that “floor panel” and “deck”
should be construed to have the same meaning. The par-
ties often used “floor panel” to refer to both terms. We do
too.
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 5
would permit the floor panel extensions to be “separate”
from the floor sheets or other floor panel extensions. J.A.
2493–94. The court granted NSC’s motion. J.A. 28–32.
In its reconsideration and clarification opinion, the
court followed NSC’s proposed construction and construed
the term as: “A ‘deck’ or ‘floor panel’ can be one sheet, or a
plurality of sheets joined together, and may also include
one or more extensions, which may be integral, or which
can be separate.”6 J.A. 32. The court explained that noth-
ing requires the floor sheets and/or extensions to be “abut-
ting.” J.A. 30–31. The court recognized that its previous
construction left “out the possibility that an extension may
be separate from the floor panel, which certainly was not
what the court intended.” J.A. 32.
Greenbrier moved for summary judgment of non-in-
fringement.
One issue at summary judgment involved “side post
gussets.” J.A. 18–21. A side post gusset is a small hori-
zontal steel plate “located outside the lading container, or
outboard of the side wall.” J.A. 18–20. As established dur-
ing summary judgment and confirmed during oral argu-
ments, “the side post gussets do not physically contact the
‘floor sheets’ or ‘floor panel’ because of the intervening ‘side
still.’” J.A. 19. Greenbrier argued the side post gussets are
not “floor extensions” because the gussets do not touch the
floor sheet. J.A. 20. NSC argued the side post gussets are
floor extensions because the claim construction contem-
plates “one or more extensions, which may be integral, or
which can be separate.” J.A. 20–21, 32. Greenbrier
6 NSC’s proposal used the word “piece” rather than
“sheet” to describe what the floor was made of. J.A. 29.
The court determined that “sheet,” a more specific term de-
scribing the material, accurately described the patent’s
claims. J.A. 29–30.
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 6
disagreed and asked the court to exclude NSC’s interpreta-
tion and to require the floor extensions to physically touch
the floor panel or another floor panel extension. J.A. 14–
15.
A second issue at summary judgment was whether the
construction of “floor panel” allowed “floor extensions” or if
the claim was limited to “floor panel extensions.” J.A. 21–
25. NSC argued the claim construction should include
“floor extensions” without the limitation, and Greenbrier
argued that the claim was limited to floor panel extensions.
J.A. 21–23. The court took supplemental briefing on “the
effect of the court’s previous claim construction orders on
defendants’’’ summary judgment motion. J.A. 11. The par-
ties fully briefed summary judgment and the court held
multiple days of oral argument.
The court granted summary judgment of non-infringe-
ment. J.A. 27. In its summary judgment opinion, the court
explained that it had adopted the term “separate” to make
it clear that the claim construction did not require “abut-
ting” pieces; it did not adopt “separate” to mean “not touch-
ing.” J.A. 21. The court then clarified that the construction
of “floor panel” requires a “floor panel extension” to physi-
cally touch the floor panel. J.A. 21–24. After making these
clarifications, the court explained that the side post gusset
was not a floor panel extension because it did not touch the
floor panel. J.A. 25. This finding is dispositive of all in-
fringement claims because each of NSC’s asserted claims
require that some part of the “side wall web” physically
contact the floor panel. J.A. 20. The side wall webbing in
Greenbrier’s accused cars is not connected directly to the
floor panel. J.A. 18. Instead, Greenbrier’s accused cars use
the side post gussets to support vertical “side posts” to
which the “side wall webbing” is connected. J.A. 18–19.
Thus, there was no dispute of fact that Greenbrier’s cars
did not infringe the ’519 or ’125 patents as construed by the
court.
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 7
NSC timely appealed. We have jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1295(a)(1).
II. LEGAL S TANDARD
We review matters not unique to patent law according
to the law of the regional circuit, here the Ninth Circuit.
MAG Aerospace Indus., Inc. v. B/E Aerospace, Inc., 816
F.3d 1374, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Ninth Circuit re-
views a grant of summary judgment de novo. Id. (citing
Greater Yellowstone Coalition v. Lewis, 628 F.3d 1143,
1148 (9th Cir. 2010)). Summary judgment is properly
granted only when, drawing all reasonable inferences in
the nonmovant’s favor, there exists no genuine issue of ma-
terial fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a mat-
ter of law. Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby,
Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255–57 (1986).
A court makes a two-part inquiry to determine whether
to grant summary judgment of non-infringement. Med-
graph, Inc. v. Medtronic, Inc., 843 F.3d 942, 949 (Fed. Cir.
2016). “[F]irst, a court construes the scope and meaning of
the asserted patent claims.” Id. Then it “compares the con-
strued claims to the accused product or process.” Id. “We
review claim construction based on intrinsic evidence de
novo and review any findings of fact regarding extrinsic ev-
idence for clear error.” SpeedTrack, Inc. v. Amazon.com,
998 F.3d 1373, 1378 (Fed. Cir. 2021).
The Ninth Circuit reviews the denial of a motion for
reconsideration for an abuse of discretion. Pasatiempo ex
rel. Pasatiempo v. Aizawa, 103 F.3d 796, 801 (9th Cir.
1996). A motion to reconsider “should not be granted, ab-
sent highly unusual circumstances,” and “may not be used
to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time
when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the
litigation.” Kona Enterprises., Inc. v. Estate of Bishop, 229
F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000) (internal citations omitted).
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 8
III. D ISCUSSION
NSC argues that the court erred by granting sum-
mary judgment of non-infringement. NSC asserts two er-
rors. One, that the court “reinterpreted” its construction of
“floor panel” to require that an “extension” be a “floor panel
extension.” Appellant Opening Br. at 26–32. Two, that the
court required that the floor panel extension touch the floor
panel. Id. at 26–27, 32–38. NSC argues that, in the ab-
sence of the “reinterpretation,” it had two theories under
which Greenbrier infringed. Id. at 38–44.7 NSC argues
that, even with the “reinterpretation,” the court should not
have granted summary judgment of non-infringement. Id.
at 44–47. Even if the court’s “reinterpretation” was correct,
NSC argues that at the least we should remand the case to
afford NSC an opportunity to assert infringement under
the “new” construction. Id. at 48–51.
Greenbrier responds by arguing that the court’s
claim construction was correct. Appellee Resp. Br. at 49–
58. Greenbrier argues that summary judgment was appro-
priate under the court’s construction and would be appro-
priate even if one of NSC’s claim construction arguments
succeeds. Id. at 59–68, 71–79. Greenbrier argues that, if
the court’s summary judgment decision was correct, the
7 NSC’s briefing about the two theories reads as an ar-
gument that the “reinterpretation” makes a difference to
the outcome of the infringement analysis. In other words,
NSC has an infringement case if its understandings of the
disputed claim constructions are correct. The heading of
the relevant section of the briefing is, “Greenbrier infringes
under an appropriate construction.” Appellant Opening
Br. at 38. The section concludes with, “Greenbrier in-
fringes . . . under a proper construction . . . .” Id. at 44.
Since we do not agree with NSC’s claim construction argu-
ments, we do not need to reach the arguments in this sec-
tion of the briefing.
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 9
case should not be remanded because the court followed all
procedural requirements. Id. at 68–70, 80–83.8
A. Summary Judgment of Non-Infringement
NSC argues that, with “proper” claim construction,
there are two theories under which Greenbrier infringes.
Appellant Opening Br. at 38–47. In the alternative, NSC
argues there are genuine questions of material fact
whether Greenbrier infringes the asserted patents. Id.
These two theories depend on the claim construction of
“floor panel.”
1. Claim Construction
a. Use of Extrinsic Evidence
The parties dispute whether the court relied on extrin-
sic evidence or not, Appellant Opening Br. at 25; Appellee
Resp. Br. at 37, a dispute that is relevant for determining
this Court’s standard of review. Teva Pharmaceuticals
USA, Inc. v. Sandoz, Inc., 574 U.S. 318, 331–32 (2015). The
court referenced two pieces of extrinsic evidence while con-
struing “floor panel,” but the court did not rely on either
piece.
First, the court discussed the expert testimony of one
of Greenbrier’s experts. J.A. 47. NSC cited this testimony
in its claim construction reply brief to argue that a “floor
panel” may be made of wood and thus, NSC argued, the
construction of “floor panel” should not be limited to
“sheets.” Id. (citing J.A. 1056). The court determined that
“sheet” was consistent with the intrinsic evidence and
8 Greenbrier also argues its position with an invited er-
ror argument, Appellee Resp. Br. at 40–42, and a series of
waiver arguments, id. at 42–49. In light of our resolution
of the claim construction disputes, we do not need to ad-
dress these arguments.
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 10
disregarded NSC’s arguments based on extrinsic evidence.
Id. This was simply a reference to extrinsic evidence—it
was not an instance where the court made a factual finding
based on extrinsic evidence.
Second, the court cited a dictionary definition for the
word “weld.” J.A. 47. This definition was used as addi-
tional support for the court’s response to NSC’s argument
regarding Greenbrier’s expert’s testimony about the possi-
bility of wooden floor material. Id. Unlike the reference to
the discounted expert testimony, the court did use this def-
inition to set forth the meaning of “weld.” It was not con-
struing “weld,” but it did use its understanding of “weld” in
connection with construing “floor panel.” Id. In its opinion
clarifying or reconsidering the construction of “floor panel,”
the court cited this definition of “weld” again. J.A. 29–30.
The court used the definition to further explain its initial
construction. At most, the definition was used to provide a
clear understanding of the word “weld.” There is no claim
that it was an erroneous finding of fact. To the extent it
involved a subsidiary finding of fact, it was not clearly er-
roneous.
Every aspect of the claim construction other than the
use of a dictionary to define “weld” was solely based on in-
trinsic evidence. Aside from determining the material of
the “floor panel,” a portion of the claim construction that is
not in dispute, the intrinsic evidence used throughout the
rest of the court’s construction did not rely on the definition
of weld.
Thus, this Court must review the claim construction de
novo.
b. Construction of “Floor Panel”
Neither party challenges the court’s revised claim
construction of “floor panel” to be “one sheet, or a plurality
of sheets joined together, and may include one or more
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 11
extensions, which may be integral, or which can be sepa-
rate.” J.A. 32. We agree with the district court’s construc-
tion.
The specifications of the patents state that the flooring
of the rail car may include a “floor panel[,] which may be
made of a plurality of floor sheets joined together, in an
abutting fashion such as may yield a continuous lading
containing surface, or, in one embodiment, may be made
from a single, monolithic steel sheet.” ’519 patent, col. 9,
ll. 14–18; ’125 patent, col. 9, ll. 20–24. The floor panel “may
include floor panel extensions . . . . Extensions . . . may be
formed by trimming the floor panel stock, such that exten-
sions . . . are integral parts of [the] floor panel . . ., rather
than being joined after-the-fact as gussets welded in place.”
’519 patent, col. 14, ll. 40–44; ’125 patent, col. 14, ll. 48–52.
As the court pointed out, this permissive wording allows
the extensions to abut the floor panel, but it does not re-
quire that they do so. Thus, the district court’s construc-
tion allowing the extensions to “be integral, or [to] be
separate” is correct.
i. “floor panel extension”
NSC argues that the court erred by “reinterpret[ing]”
its construction of “floor panel” in the summary judgment
ruling. This “reinterpretation,” NSC argues, created a new
limitation that narrowed the scope of an “extension” from
a “floor extension” to a “floor panel extension.” Appellant
Opening Br. at 28–29. NSC cites examples from the court’s
earlier constructions and from the parties’ briefing which
used the phrase “floor extension” rather than “floor panel
extension.” Id. at 29–30. NSC argues that these references
demonstrate the phrase had previously been understood by
the court and parties to include any floor extensions with-
out the limitation that an extension be a floor panel exten-
sion. Id.
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 12
The court did not reconstrue the claim. Nor did the
court “reinterpret[]” its prior construction to impose a new
limitation. “Extension” is not a claim term; it is a phrase
within the construction of the claim term “floor panel.” J.A.
29–32, 45–48. When the court was construing “floor
panel,” it was not construing “floor.” J.A. 29–32, 45–48.
Thus, the “extension” is not an extension of the floor; it is
an extension of the floor panel. That is, the extension is a
floor panel extension. The court’s construction did not ex-
pressly modify “extension” with either “floor” or “floor
panel.” It was understood, or should have been understood,
that the extension referred to the term being construed and
not to some other term that was not being construed. The
court did not improperly add a limitation into the claim
construction at summary judgment. The court correctly de-
termined that an “extension” must be a “floor panel exten-
sion.”
ii. “separate”
NSC argues that the court erred by “reinter-
pret[ing]” the phrase “separate” such that it required a
floor panel extension to touch the floor panel. Appellant
Opening Br. at 32. Like the dispute over “extension,” this
is not a matter of claim construction or even reinterpreta-
tion of a term within a construction.
The import of the word “separate” in the “floor panel”
construction was clear. It was that the floor panel exten-
sion did not have to be “integral.” To understand why this
is so, it is necessary to review the history of the parties’
dispute over the construction of “floor panel.”
In their initial proposed claim constructions, both par-
ties required that the sheets be “joined together.” NSC pro-
posed that “floor panel” be construed as “one piece, or a
plurality of pieces joined together, and may also include
one or more extensions, which may be integral, or which
may be separate.” Greenbrier proposed that the term be
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 13
construed as “floor sheet, or abutting floor sheets joined to-
gether, that may have one or more integral or abutting
floor extensions.” J.A. 45.
The parties simply disagreed on how the sheets must
be joined. Id. During the claim construction hearing, NSC
argued against using the word “abutting” because it would
require that the sheets be arranged “end-to-end,” with a
butt joint or butt weld, and would exclude other sheets that
were combined with a lap joint or were otherwise overlap-
ping. J.A. 16. The dispute around “abutting” was not a
dispute over if the sheets must touch or join; it was a dis-
pute over how the sheets must touch or be joined. To re-
solve the dispute, the court removed the word “abutting” to
allow for sheets that were joined by an overlapping connec-
tion rather than limiting the claim to floor panel extensions
that were joined with an end-to-end connection. Thus, the
court’s first construction was that a “floor panel” was a
“floor sheet, or floor sheets joined together, that may have
one or more integral floor extensions.” J.A. 32.
On reconsideration, the court acknowledged that the
removal of the word “abutting” unintentionally required a
sheet to be “integral” to the floor panel for it to qualify as a
floor panel extension as initially construed by the court.
J.A. 32. Once again, the parties did not dispute whether a
sheet must touch the floor panel to be classified as an ex-
tension. The question in dispute was whether a sheet must
touch the floor panel in a way that made it integral with
the floor panel for it to meet the definition of a floor panel
extension. “Integral” was used by the parties and the court
to refer to a floor panel that was either cut from one sheet
of steel or was welded to, or otherwise physically combined
with, the floor panel to create a continuous and uniform
sheet. J.A. 22–23; Appellee Resp. Br. at 50 (citing J.A. 279–
80 (NSC’s claim construction brief)). Thus, the word “sep-
arate” is used to expand the definition of “floor panel exten-
sion” to include all sheets that are directly touching the
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 14
floor panel regardless of how they are making direct con-
tact.
The use of the word “separate” in the construction is
clear even when setting aside the context of the court’s
analysis. As used in the construction of “floor panel,” “sep-
arate” follows as an alternative to “integral,” such that
“separate” essentially means “non-integral.” When read
overall, the claim requires that the floor panel be made of
a single sheet or sheets joined together. Nothing in the
claim allows for a floor panel extension to be unconnected
to the rest of the floor panel.
2. Summary Judgment
On appeal, NSC presents multiple arguments alleg-
ing that, under the claim constructions as NSC interprets
them, Greenbrier either infringed or there are genuine
questions of material fact that preclude summary judg-
ment. Appellant Opening Br. at 38–47. Having rejected
NSC’s interpretations of the claim constructions, these ar-
guments fail. Under the proper claim construction, there
is no dispute that the side post gussets do not directly con-
tact the floor panel. Each of NSC’s asserted claims require
that some part of the car’s “side wall web” physically con-
tact the floor panel. J.A. 20. The parties do not dispute
that the side wall web of each of Greenbrier’s accused cars
is connected to the side posts, which are supported by the
side post gussets. Id. The side wall web is not directly
“mated” to the floor panel, as required by the asserted
claims. J.A. 20, 27. Thus, the court correctly granted sum-
mary judgment of non-infringement.
B. Remand
NSC argues that the summary judgment ruling
should be vacated and the case remanded to allow NSC the
proper opportunity to assess any new claim constructions
and to advance arguments to support its infringement
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 15
claim under the new constructions. Appellant Opening Br.
at 48–51. NSC notes that it previously sought this oppor-
tunity by filing a motion for reconsideration and/or clarifi-
cation of the summary judgment order, but the court
denied NSC’s request. Id. at 50.
The court did not abuse its discretion in denying
NSC’s motion for reconsideration and/or clarification. The
court explained:
The analysis of the “side post gusset” of de-
fendants’ cars and the terms “floor panel” and
“deck” in plaintiff’s patents has been exten-
sively litigated including though claim con-
struction briefing and a hearing, a
reconsideration of the court’s construction of
the terms “floor panel” and “deck,” a revised
claim construction order, briefing on sum-
mary judgment, supplemental briefing on this
specific issue as ordered by the court, and oral
argument on the issue at two different hear-
ings. Both parties have had ample oppor-
tunity to be heard on this issue, and plaintiff
has not explained why the arguments raised
in its currently pending motions could not
have been raised earlier, especially in light of
the court’s previous order requesting supple-
mental briefing on the precise issue on which
it now seeks reconsideration.
J.A. 3. The court elaborated that the summary judgment
order “explained in detail the reason underlying the court’s
construction of the claim terms.” J.A. 4. The court found
that further explanation was “not necessary,” particularly
as NSC had not “identified which parts of the court’s order
is in need of clarification.” Id. It was not an abuse of dis-
cretion for the court to deny NSC’s motion for reconsidera-
tion and/or clarification.
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NATIONAL STEEL CAR LTD . v. GREENBRIER- CONCARRIL LLC 16
This is not a case where the court granted summary
judgment sua sponte. Nor is this a case where there was
limited discovery prior to the summary judgment motion.
Both parties fully briefed and argued their positions
throughout the three rounds of claim construction hear-
ings. J.A. 10–11. There were no new constructions after
the second round of claim construction hearings. NSC was
given plenty of opportunities to defend its infringement
claims and was provided more than adequate process
throughout this litigation. There are no grounds that war-
rant remand in this case.
IV. CONCLUSION
We have considered NSC’s arguments and find them
unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we affirm.
AFFIRMED
Case: 24-1453 Document: 44 Page: 16 Filed: 11/19/2025

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