Wyoming Trust Co., Trustee of Dean W. Hall Mineral Trust Dated September 25, 1981 v. United States

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
WYOMING TRUST CO., TRUSTEE OF DEAN W.
HALL MINERAL TRUST DATED SEPTEMBER 25,
1981; DEAN W. HALL IRREVOCABLE TRUST
DATED JULY 1, 1982; AND JOY LUCILLE HALL
AND DEAN W. HALL TRUST DATED JULY 10, 1973,
NANCY BUTCHER, TRUSTEE OF DEAN W. HALL
MINERAL TRUST DATED SEPTEMBER 25, 1981
AND DEAN W. HALL IRREVOCABLE TRUST
DATED JULY 1, 1982, KURT HALL, TRUSTEE OF
DEAN W. HALL MINERAL TRUST DATED
SEPTEMBER 25, 1981 AND DEAN W. HALL
IRREVOCABLE TRUST DATED JULY 1, 1982,
HALL ATLAS, LLC,
Plaintiffs-Appellants
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2024-1544
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:23-cv-01341-PSH, Judge Philip S. Hadji.
______________________
Decided: March 6, 2026
______________________
Case: 24-1544 Document: 58 Page: 1 Filed: 03/06/2026

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WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US 2
REZA D IBADJ , Park & Dibadj, LLP, San Francisco, CA,
argued for plaintiffs-appellants. Also represented by
D OUGLAS P ARK, Menlo Park, CA.
BRIAN R. HERMAN, Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellee. Also rep-
resented by ADAM R.F. G USTAFSON.
______________________
Before M OORE, Chief Judge, D YK and CUNNINGHAM ,
Circuit Judges.
MOORE, Chief Judge.
Wyoming Trust Co.; Nancy Butcher; Kurt Hall; and
Hall Atlas, LLC (jointly, Appellants) appeal a United
States Court of Federal Claims decision dismissing their
takings claim relating to the right to mine certain coal de-
posits on property located in Wyoming. For the following
reasons, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
I. Statutory Background
In 1977, Congress enacted the Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act (SMCRA) “to provide for the coopera-
tion between the Secretary of the Interior and the States
with respect to the regulation of surface coal mining oper-
ations, and the acquisition and reclamation of abandoned
mines, and for other purposes.” Surface Mining Control
and Reclamation Act, Pub. L. No. 95-87, 91 Stat. 445, 445
(1977) (codified at 30 U.S.C. § 1201 et seq.). In relevant
part, SMCRA requires any applicant for a permit to oper-
ate a surface coal mining operation west of the 100th me-
ridian west longitude to show the proposed operations
would not cause certain negative impacts on “alluvial val-
ley floors” (AVFs) or the water supplying AVFs. 30 U.S.C.
§ 1260(b)(5). To remedy the loss of mining rights, SMCRA
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WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US 3
instructs the Secretary of the Interior to “develop and carry
out a coal exchange program” under which landowners can
exchange “private fee coal precluded from being mined by
[SMCRA]” for “Federal coal which is not so precluded.”
30 U.S.C. § 1260(b)(5). Such exchanges are required to be
made on “an equal value basis.” 43 C.F.R. § 3436.2-3(e).
SMCRA also gives States the option to develop their
own regulatory programs, which, if approved by the Secre-
tary of the Interior, allows the State to assume exclusive
jurisdiction over the regulation of surface coal mining and
reclamation operations. 30 U.S.C. § 1253. Wyoming has
exercised this regulatory authority since 1980 through the
Wyoming Department of Environmental Quality (WDEQ).
30 C.F.R. § 950.10; see also Whitney Benefits, Inc. v. United
States, 752 F.2d 1554, 1555 (Fed. Cir. 1985).
II. Procedural Background
Appellants are trustees of various trusts holding rights
to the Hall Ranch, a nearly 12,000-acre property in Wyo-
ming containing over 138 million tons of coal.1 J.A. 11. In
1985, WDEQ determined that 1,634 acres of the Hall
Ranch were in an AVF. J.A. 12–13. For more than 25
years, neither Appellants nor Exxon Coal Resources
(Exxon), which leased the Hall Ranch’s coal rights in 1967,
pursued a coal exchange in response to WDEQ’s determi-
nation. J.A. 11–12. In 2010, however, Appellant Hall At-
las applied to the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) for
a coal exchange. J.A. 12. BLM rejected WDEQ’s 1985 AVF
decision for years, but changed its position in 2014, after
1 The facts summarized here are as alleged in Appel-
lants’ complaint before the Court of Federal Claims.
J.A. 8–39. Because the court dismissed the case at the
pleadings stage, the Government does not dispute Appel-
lants’ allegations for the purposes of this appeal. Gov’t
Br. 7 n.1.
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WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US 4
which Hall Atlas proceeded with the exchange process and
submitted a conceptual mine plan (CMP) to extract the
Hall Ranch coal. J.A. 13–20. On October 4, 2016, BLM for-
mally rejected Hall Atlas’ CMP valuations and determined
the Hall Ranch AVF coal had a value of $0 based on a val-
uation provided by the Department of Minerals Evalua-
tions (DME), a division of the Office of Valuation Services
(OVS). J.A. 20–21. On August 17, 2017, BLM issued a let-
ter repeating the $0 valuation, rejecting a tract proposed
by Appellants for an exchange based on the $0 valuation,
and proposing three alternative tracts having a “$0.00 per
net minerals acre valuation.” J.A. 41–43 (letter); see also
J.A. 29.
Hall Atlas did not find BLM’s proposed tracts accepta-
ble and brought a takings claim against the United States
in the Court of Federal Claims on August 16, 2023—one
day short of six years after the August 2017 BLM letter.
J.A. 8–39. The United States moved to dismiss the com-
plaint under Court of Federal Claims Rules 12(b)(1)
and 12(b)(6). J.A. 2. The court granted the 12(b)(1) motion,
dismissing for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, and de-
nied the 12(b)(6) motion as moot. Id. Appellants appeal.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
D ISCUSSION
We review de novo the Court of Federal Claims’ deci-
sion to dismiss a case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Trusted Integration, Inc. v. United States, 659 F.3d 1159,
1163 (Fed. Cir. 2011). “In determining jurisdiction, a court
must accept as true all undisputed facts asserted in the
plaintiff[s’] complaint and draw all reasonable inferences
in favor of the plaintiff[s].” Id.
The Court of Federal Claims dismissed Appellants’
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because it
held Appellants’ claim was time-barred for not being filed
within six years after the claim accrued. J.A. 5–7; see also
28 U.S.C. § 2501 (establishing six-year jurisdictional time-
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WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US 5
bar). Appellants argue the court erred because their tak-
ings claim did not accrue until BLM issued its 2017 letter
and was thus filed within the six-year limit. The Govern-
ment responds with several earlier dates on which Appel-
lants’ claim could have first accrued, all of which would
result in Appellants’ claim being time-barred. We conclude
any takings claim Appellants could have brought against
the United States accrued at least by 2016 when BLM had
both accepted WDEQ’s AVF determination and determined
that the Hall Ranch AVF coal had a value of $0. To be
clear, because we conclude that the 2016 BLM decision suf-
ficed for claim accrual purposes, we need not reach the
question of whether actions which occurred earlier were
likewise sufficient to trigger the statute of limitations. We
also reject Appellants’ remaining jurisdictional arguments
as unpersuasive and accordingly affirm the Court of Fed-
eral Claims’ dismissal of Appellants’ complaint.
I. BLM’s 2016 Letter
Appellants argue their takings claim did not accrue un-
til August 17, 2017, when BLM communicated to Appel-
lants its “‘final decision’ on the exchange value” of the Hall
Ranch coal. Appellants’ Br. 19. According to Appellants,
it was not until this point that they could ascertain they
would not receive just compensation for the taking of their
mining rights. See Appellants’ Br. 12–19. Appellants’ com-
plaint, however, tells a different story.
Appellants’ complaint does not allege that the August
2017 BLM letter was a final decision on the Hall Ranch
coal’s exchange value. Instead, the complaint alleges that
it was BLM’s 2016 letter in which “BLM formally rejected
Hall-Atlas’ CMP valuations” and communicated that
“DME found . . . that the Hall Ranch AVF Coal has a value
of $0.” J.A. 20. As for the August 2017 letter, Appellants’
complaint merely alleges it “repeat[ed] the fatal [valuation]
flaw in the DME analysis,” rejected a tract proposed by
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WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US 6
Appellants for an exchange, and proposed three alternative
tracts. J.A. 29 (emphasis added).
The 2017 letter itself shows the same. J.A. 41–42. The
letter gives no indication that there was any reconsidera-
tion of DME’s $0 valuation to “finalize” it. On the contrary,
the letter noted that “OVS [which includes DME] is the fi-
nal arbiter of the valuation necessary to assess an equal
value exchange,” and then referred to DME’s previous $0
valuation in proposing certain tracts for an exchange. Id.
(emphasis added). It defies reason to interpret BLM’s 2017
letter as a final decision on the exchange value of the Hall
Ranch coal when it explicitly states a different agency is
the final arbiter of such valuations.
In their reply brief on appeal, Appellants argue the
2016 letter stated the “valuation and exchange needs to be
reviewed, finalized, and approved by BLM.” Reply Br. 13.
But Appellants’ complaint did not allege this, see J.A. 8–39,
and Appellants provide no citation to support this state-
ment, see Reply Br. 13. Nor did Appellants ever provide
this court the 2016 letter throughout the course of this ap-
peal. We cannot and will not save Appellants from plead-
ing themselves out of court based on unsupported attorney
argument in a reply brief on appeal.
Accepting as true all undisputed facts asserted in Ap-
pellants’ complaint and drawing all reasonable inferences
in Appellants’ favor, we conclude the complaint, at best,
suggests Appellants received a final valuation decision in
2016. Accordingly, even if Appellants’ claim did not accrue
until they were aware of the Government’s valuation, their
takings claim would still be time-barred when it was filed
in 2023—more than six years later.
II. Appellants’ Remaining Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Arguments
Appellants next argue that even if their claim first ac-
crued before the issuance of BLM’s 2017 letter, the Court
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WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US 7
of Federal Claims still had jurisdiction because of (1) the
self-executing nature of the Takings Clause and (2) the ap-
plication of the equitable tolling, continuing claim, and sta-
bilization doctrines due to the Government’s conduct
during the exchange process beginning in 2010. Appel-
lants’ Br. 27–33. We reject both arguments.
Regarding the self-executing nature of the Takings
Clause, Appellants’ complaint relied solely on the Tucker
Act for jurisdiction without raising any freestanding Fifth
Amendment claim. J.A. 9. And while the Tucker Act pro-
vides for jurisdiction over claims founded “upon the Consti-
tution,” 28 U.S.C. § 1491, those claims are necessarily
subject to the Tucker Act’s six-year statute of limitations.
See Chambers v. United States, 417 F.3d 1218, 1223
(Fed. Cir. 2005). As we explained in Hair v. United States,
350 F.3d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2003), “[a] constitutional
claim can become time-barred just as any other claim can.
Nothing in the Constitution requires otherwise.” Id. (quot-
ing Block v. North Dakota, 461 U.S. 273, 292 (1983)). We
see no reason why the Tucker Act’s six-year statute of lim-
itations should not bar the Court of Federal Claims’ juris-
diction over Appellants’ takings claim.
The equitable tolling, continuing claim, and stabiliza-
tion doctrines do not compel a different conclusion. Equi-
table tolling does not apply because 28 U.S.C. § 2501’s
time-bar is jurisdictional. See John R. Sand & Gravel Co.
v. United States, 552 U.S. 130, 133–34 (2008) (The Su-
preme Court “has long interpreted the [C]ourt of [Federal]
[C]laims limitations statute as setting forth . . . [a] more
absolute[] kind of limitations period” that “forbid[s] a court
to consider whether certain equitable considerations war-
rant extending a limitations period.”). And the continuing
claim and stabilization doctrines do not apply because Ap-
pellants’ claim: (1) is not “inherently susceptible to being
broken down into a series of independent and distinct
events or wrongs, each having its own associated dam-
ages,” Brown Park Ests.-Fairfield Dev. Co. v. United States,
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WYOMING TRUST CO. v. US 8
127 F.3d 1449, 1456 (Fed. Cir. 1997), and (2) does not in-
volve a gradual process in which there was uncertainty
whether a permanent taking had resulted, Boling
v. United States, 220 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2000). As
explained above, the Government’s 2016 determination
that the Hall Ranch AVF coal had a value of $0, J.A. 20,
was a singular event that left open no question as to the
Government’s view of the compensation it owed Appellants
for the taking of its mining rights. The Court of Federal
Claims did not err by declining to apply the equitable toll-
ing, continuing claim, or stabilization doctrines because
none applies to Appellants’ claim.
CONCLUSION
We have considered the parties’ remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
Costs to Appellee.
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