Robert A. Pressly v. United States

United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
ROBERT A. PRESSLY, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs
JASON BREHM, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs-Appellees
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellant
______________________
2024-1823
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in Nos. 1:18-cv-01964-MMS, 1:19-cv-01375-MMS, Senior
Judge Margaret M. Sweeney.
______________________
Decided: April 30, 2026
______________________
MICHAEL J AMES SMITH , Stewart, Wald & Smith, LLC,
St. Louis, MO, argued for plaintiffs-appellees. Also repre-
sented by STEVEN WALD.
J OHN K ENNETH ADAMS , Environment and Natural Re-
sources Division, United States Department of Justice,
Washington, DC, argued for defendant-appellant. Also
represented by AMBER BETH BLAHA , ADAM R.F.
G USTAFSON.
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PRESSLY v. US 2
______________________
Before M OORE, Chief Judge, CHEN and STARK, Circuit
Judges.
STARK, Circuit Judge.
This appeal arises from a rails-to-trails land conversion
in Indiana carried out under the National Trails System
Act Amendments of 1983 (the “Trails Act”). Plaintiffs-Ap-
pellees own land adjacent to rail corridors on which the
Peru and Indianapolis Railroad Company (“PIRC”) histor-
ically operated a railroad. Before the Court of Fed-
eral Claims, Plaintiffs asserted that they also own the land
underlying the rail corridors. On that basis, they argued
that the Surface Transportation Boards’s (“STB”) issuance,
to PIRC’s successors-in-interest, of Notices of In-
terim Trail Use (“NITUs”) – which authorize conversion of
the rail corridors for public trail use – constituted a taking
of their property without just compensation, in violation of
their rights under the Fifth Amendment.
The Court of Federal Claims agreed with Plaintiffs. It
determined that PIRC’s interests in the rail corridors were
limited to easements, which were extinguished when PIRC
ceased operating the railroad, thereby causing fee simple
title of the land parcels to revert to Plaintiffs under Indiana
law. Hence, the court reasoned, the government’s issuance
of NITUs to PIRC’s successors, and the plan to use the cor-
ridors for trails without providing just compensation to
Plaintiffs, resulted in an unconstitutional taking.
The government now appeals. It argues that the Court
of Federal Claims erred by determining that PIRC held
easements, rather than fee simple title, in the land under-
lying the corridors at issue. Because the record demon-
strates that PIRC’s interests in the corridors were limited
to easements, and Plaintiffs hold fee simple title to the land
underlying those corridors, we affirm.
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PRESSLY v. US 3
I
Under the Trails Act, railroad operators may, upon dis-
continuing rail service, opt to convert their rail corridors to
trails rather than abandon them altogether. See Na-
tional Trails System Act Amendments, Pub. L. No. 98-11,
§ 208(2), 97 Stat. 42, 48 (1983) (codified at 16 U.S.C.
§ 1247(d)). A railroad operator wishing to pursue such a
conversion must seek abandonment authorization from the
STB. See 16 U.S.C. § 1247(d); 49 U.S.C. § 10903. When a
railroad does so, potential trail sponsors may file a request
with the STB expressing interest in establishing an in-
terim trail, subject to the potential restoration of rail use
in the future. See 49 C.F.R. § 1152.29(a)-(c). If the railroad
operator agrees to interim trail use, STB will issue an
NITU. See id. at § 1152.29(d)(1).
“When an NITU is issued and state law . . . interests
that would otherwise take effect pursuant to normal aban-
donment proceedings are forestalled,” an unconstitutional
Fifth Amendment taking has occurred, unless the holder of
the interest receives just compensation. Caldwell v.
United States, 391 F.3d 1226, 1236 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For
example, a taking occurs when a railroad holds only an
easement1 for railroad purposes that would, under state
law, be extinguished upon cessation of railroad operations,
yet an NITU creates an easement for trail purposes, pre-
venting the fee title to the underlying corridor – which the
1 “[A]n easement merely gives the grantee the right
to enter and use the grantor’s land for a certain purpose,
but does not give the grantee any possessory interest in the
land. . . . Because the grantor of an easement has not trans-
ferred his estate or possessory interest, . . . [h]e retains all
his ownership interest, subject to an easement.” Marvin
M. Brandt Revocable Tr. v. United States, 572 U.S. 93, 105
n.4 (2014) (emphasis added).
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PRESSLY v. US 4
landowner holds subject to the railroad easement – from
becoming unencumbered upon abandonment. If, however,
the railroad company holds fee simple title2 to the land over
which the railroad operated, no taking can occur because
no third party holds underlying fee simple title that would
otherwise become unencumbered upon the railroad’s aban-
donment of operations.
Here, Plaintiffs allege that STB’s issuance of NITUs re-
sulted in unconstitutional takings. In order to prevail on
those takings claims, Plaintiffs need to prove that (1) they
owned the parcels of land comprising the rail corridors in
fee simple; and (2) (a) the railroads’ interests were limited
to easements for railroad purposes or (b) if those easements
were instead broad enough to encompass trail use, the
easements had already terminated prior to the issuance of
the NITUs, such that the NITUs encumber Plaintiffs’ fee
simple title. See Preseault v. United States, 100 F.3d 1525,
1533 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (en banc). In the Court of Federal
Claims, the government disputed Plaintiffs’ showing only
with respect to the contention that Plaintiffs hold fee sim-
ple title to the contested parcels, subject to the railroads’
property interests, which Plaintiffs insist consisted of ease-
ments. On cross-motions for summary judgment, the
Court of Federal Claims concluded that the only finding the
evidence could reasonably support was that Plaintiffs were
correct.
Two sets of land parcels are at issue in this ap-
peal: (i) those whose ownership depends on interpretation
of a 1907 Indiana Circuit Court quiet title judgment, which
we, like the parties, call the “Manship Decree” (and the
2 “Fee simple,” or “title in fee simple,” “enables the
owner to exercise absolute and exclusive control of it as
against all others.” Adams v. Henderson, 168 U.S. 573,
580 (1897).
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PRESSLY v. US 5
pertinent parcels the “Manship Parcels”);3 and (ii) those
whose ownership relates to a deed, the “Vanlaningham In-
strument” (relating to the “Vanlaningham Parcels”).4 The
only issue we must decide is whether the Court of Federal
Claims erred in granting summary judgment that Plain-
tiffs hold fee simple title in both the Manship and Vanlan-
ingham Parcels.
The Court of Federal Claims had jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1). We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). For the reasons we explain below,
the trial court correctly granted summary judgment for
Plaintiffs.
II
We review a grant of summary judgment by the Court
of Federal Claims de novo. See Barlow v. United States,
86 F.4th 1347, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2023). Summary judgment
is appropriate only where, when drawing all reasonable in-
ferences in favor of the non-moving party, there are no gen-
uine issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law. See id.
“Whether a taking has occurred is a question of law
based on factual underpinnings.” Chi. Coating Co., LLC v.
United States, 892 F.3d 1164, 1169 (Fed. Cir. 2018). The
acquisition of property rights is governed by the law of the
3 The Manship Parcels have been labeled by the par-
ties and the trial court as 1a-b, 56, 83, 93, 109a-b, 110, 124,
130, 151, 153, 215, 216, 249, 270a-e, 278, and 290. The
parties agree that Plaintiffs’ takings claims with respect to
all of these parcels can be resolved together.
4 The Vanlaningham Parcels are all part of the rail
corridor segment demarcated as valuation parcel V9-2/6.
The parties agree that Plaintiffs’ takings claims with re-
spect to all of these parcels can be resolved together.
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PRESSLY v. US 6
state in which the property sits. See Hash v. United States,
403 F.3d 1308, 1312, 1315 (Fed. Cir. 2005). In Indiana,
“[t]he language used in a grant to a railroad controls the
nature and extent of the interest acquired by it.” Con-
sol. Rail Corp. v. Lewellen, 666 N.E.2d 958, 962
(Ind. Ct. App. 1996). When reviewing the language in an
Indiana deed to a railroad, the grant “is to be construed in
its entirety and the parts are to be construed together so
that no part is rejected.” Id.
III
We begin with the Manship Parcels. In 1907, the Indi-
ana Circuit Court resolved a quiet title action brought by
Lake Erie and Western Railroad against “Noah G. Man-
ship et al.” J.A. 1098-124. The resulting “Manship Decree”
recognizes the railroad’s property interest in the rail corri-
dor at issue (an interest whose exact nature is disputed on
appeal) and quiets the abutting landowners’ claims to a
competing interest. Plaintiffs’ takings claims with respect
to the Manship Parcels turn on the precise nature of the
property interest the Manship Decree recognized the rail-
road as having in those parcels. Plaintiffs, who are succes-
sors-in-interest to the landowners in Manship, can prevail
on their takings claims only if the Manship Decree recog-
nized the railroads as holding a mere easement in, rather
than fee simple ownership of, the land over which they
were operating. Drawing all reasonable inferences in favor
of the government as non-movant, our de novo review leads
us to agree with Plaintiffs and the Court of Federal Claims
that the Manship Decree recognized the railroads held only
an easement.
The Manship Decree recites the following findings of
fact:
4. . . . [P]rior to the year 1852, said Peru and In-
dianapolis Railroad Company located and con-
structed said line of railroad from Peru to
Indianapolis, and as so located and constructed the
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PRESSLY v. US 7
same passed through the northeast quarter of sec-
tion one, in township seventeen north, range four
east, in Hamilton County, Indiana, running in a
straight line south 27 degrees west through said
entire quarter section.
5. At the time said railroad was so located and
constructed, said quarter section of land was a for-
est and wholly unimproved, and said railroad com-
pany entered upon and cut and removed the timber
from a strip of ground forty feet in width on each
side of the center line of the railroad track so lo-
cated entirely across said quarter section, and con-
structed and maintained a single track railroad in
the center of said strip, and the same has ever since
been maintained and operated on the same line
. . . .
8. On the 2nd day of June 1880, one J.C. Kimber-
lin was the owner in fee of all the said north east
quarter of said section one except such portions
thereof and such rights and interests therein as
were held by the said Indianapolis, Peru and Chi-
cago Railroad Company for its railroad and right of
way aforesaid . . . .
27. That the plaintiff [railroad] and its predecessor
railroad companies ever since the location and con-
struction of said line of railroad as aforesaid by said
Peru & Indianapolis Railroad Company have con-
tinuously and successively and for more than forty
years operated said line of railroad and here had
the continuous and uninterrupted use of all the
ground on each side thereof through said entire
quarter section for right of way between the fences
along the boundaries thereof located as in this find-
ing set forth, and have been in the open use and oc-
cupancy of the same for railroad purposes to the
full width of 39 to 40 feet on each side of the
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PRESSLY v. US 8
centerline of said main track for more than twenty
years prior to the commencement of this suit under
claim of right . . . .
J.A. 14-15 (emphasis added).
The Manship Decree also announces the following con-
clusion of law:
It is therefore considered, adjudged and decreed by
the Court that the plaintiff [railroad] is the owner
in fee simple, and its title be and the same is hereby
quieted as against the defendant, Noah G. Man-
ship, or any person claiming through, from or un-
der him, to the following described real estate . . . ,
to wit,–
– Its right of way . . . .
Id. at 15 (emphasis added).
The government, emphasizing the Manship Decree’s
language that the railroad “is the owner in fee simple,” in-
sists that the Indiana court recognized PIRC’s predecessors
held “fee simple absolute” in the segments of rail corridor
at issue in the Manship quiet title action. Open. Br. at 8.
According to the government, the Court of Federal Claims
erred by failing to accord full faith and credit to this state
court judgment. The government further asserts that
claim preclusion and issue preclusion estop Plaintiffs from
claiming any interest in the Manship Parcels, since those
claims were resolved by the quiet title action that resulted
in the Manship Decree.
We are not persuaded. As the Court of Federal Claims
explained, reading the Manship Decree against the back-
drop of Indiana property law as it existed in 1907 confirms
that the Indiana court concluded that the railroad’s inter-
est was limited to an easement in the segment of land com-
prising PIRC’s rail corridors.
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PRESSLY v. US 9
The Manship Decree states that “the [railroad] is the
owner in fee simple . . . [to the] described real estate . . . to
wit, – Its right of way.” J.A. 15 (emphasis added). The
phrase “‘right of way’ has a two-fold signification:” it is
sometimes used to describe a right of passage over a tract
of land, but it can “also [be] used to describe [the] strip of
land which railroad companies take upon which to con-
struct their road-bed.” Joy v. City of St. Louis, 138 U.S. 1,
44 (1891). In other words, when one has interest in a “right
of way,” one may hold a property interest either in an ease-
ment (to use the land for a particular purpose) or in the
segment of land itself. The government seizes on the Man-
ship Decree’s reference to “owner[ship] in fee simple” to ar-
gue that the decree must be using “right of way” in the
latter sense and, thus, must have recognized the railroad’s
fee simple title to the land upon which it operated.
In Indiana, however, “[t]he general rule is that . . . ref-
erence to a right-of-way in [a deed to a railroad] generally
leads to its construction as conveying only an easement.”
Brown v. Penn Cent. Corp., 510 N.E.2d 641, 644 (Ind.
1987); see also Ross, Inc. v. Legler, 199 N.E.2d 346, 348
(Ind. 1964) (“A deed, when the interest conveyed is defined
or described as a ‘right of way,’ conveys only an easement
in which title reverts to the grantor, his heirs or assigns
upon the abandonment of such right-of-way.”); Tazian
v. Cline, 673 N.E.2d 485, 489 (Ind. Ct. App. 1996) (same in
case involving interpretation of deed from 1873). The Man-
ship Decree’s use of the phrase “in fee simple” does not
carry the weight the government asserts, as at the time of
the Manship Decree (and now) Indiana law provided that
one could hold a fee simple interest in an easement. See
Calumet Nat’l Bank v. AT&T, 682 N.E.2d 785, 788 (Ind.
1997) (finding railroad owned “fee simple interest in [a]
right-of-way”); see also Branson v. Studebaker, 33 N.E. 98,
104 (Ind. 1892) (“[N]or is there anything novel or strange
in the doctrine that there may be a fee in an easement, for
an easement is an estate in land.”). Furthermore, the
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PRESSLY v. US 10
Manship Decree expressly described the railroads’ use of
the at-issue land as being “for railroad purposes.” J.A. 15.
Indiana law is clear that when a property grant to a rail-
road includes the term “for railroad purposes” it is typically
construed as “specific language limiting the grant of the
property to an easement.” Tazian, 673 N.E.2d at 489.
Additionally, had the Indiana court issuing the Man-
ship Decree intended to recognize fee simple ownership in
the railroad, the court would have had no reason to make
findings of fact to the effect that the railroad obtained a
property interest by virtue of having “continuously and suc-
cessively and for more than forty years operated said line of
railroad and here had the continuous and uninterrupted
use of all the ground on each side thereof,” which is quin-
tessential language describing adverse possession. J.A. 15
(emphasis added); see also id. (“have been in the open use
and occupancy of the same for railroad purposes . . . for
more than twenty years prior to the commencement of this
suit”) (emphasis added); see also May v. Dobbins,
77 N.E. 353, 354-55 (Ind. 1906) (discussing elements of ad-
verse possession). Under Indiana law, a railroad can only
acquire an easement, not fee simple ownership, by adverse
possession. See Consumers’ Gas Tr. Co. v.
Am. Plate Glass Co., 68 N.E. 1020, 1021 (Ind. 1903) (“[I]f [a
railroad] enters without title and constructs its main line .
. . nothing more than an easement is acquired.”).5
5 The government’s reliance on ATS Ford Drive In-
vestment, LLC v. United States, 136 F.4th 1066 (Fed. Cir.
2025), is misplaced. See Appellant’s Citation of Supple-
mental Authority, ECF No. 60. In ATS Ford, 136 F.4th at
1070, the court held that certain conveyances labeled “Re-
leases” transferred fee simple estates based on the plain
language of the railroad’s charter, which expressly pro-
vided that land acquired through release or condemnation
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PRESSLY v. US 11
To the extent there were any remaining doubt, Indiana
public policy supports finding that the interests held by
PIRC’s predecessors, as recognized in the Manship Decree,
were easements and nothing more. As the Supreme Court
of Indiana stated in Ross, 199 N.E.2d at 348:
Public policy does not favor the conveyance of strips
of land by simple titles to railroad companies for
right-of-way purposes, either by deed or condemna-
tion. This policy is based upon the fact that the al-
ienation of such strips or belts of land from and
across the primary or parent bodies of the land
from which they are severed, is obviously not nec-
essary to the purpose for which such conveyances
are made after abandonment of the intended uses
as expressed in the conveyance, and that thereafter
such severance generally operates adversely to the
normal and best use of all the property involved.
Therefore, where there is ambiguity as to the char-
acter of the interest or title conveyed such ambigu-
ity will generally be construed in favor of the
original grantors, their heirs and assigns [and
against the railroads].
As applied here, these principles of Indiana law provide
that any ambiguity in the interest or title conveyed by an
instrument to a railroad is construed in favor of Plaintiffs,
the adjacent landowners, as having retained fee simple ti-
tle in the Manship Parcels.
Thus, we agree with the Court of Federal Claims that
PIRC held only an easement in the Manship Parcels, leav-
ing Plaintiffs as the holders of fee simple title to the
would vest in fee simple. By contrast, the land here was
acquired through adverse possession, not by release or con-
demnation, making ATS Ford inapposite.
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PRESSLY v. US 12
underlying corridor, title that became fully unencumbered
upon the cessation of the railroad’s operations. It follows,
then, that Plaintiffs established their ownership of the land
segments at issue and, because no other elements of their
claims are contested, they have proven a taking. Accord-
ingly, we affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ judgment for
Plaintiffs as to the Manship Parcels.6
IV
We turn next to the Vanlaningham Parcels. Once
again, we reach the same conclusion as the Court of Fed-
eral Claims: Plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment
on their takings claims.
A
In 1913, Congress enacted the Federal Valuation of
Common Carriers Act, which required the Interstate Com-
merce Commission (“ICC”), the predecessor to the STB, to
“investigate, ascertain, and report the value of all the prop-
erty owned or used by every common carrier subject to” the
Act. Acts of March 1, 1913, ch. 92, 37 Stat. 701. These re-
ports were required to include, among other information,
“the grants of land to any such common carrier.” Id. at 702.
To enable the ICC to meet this obligation, the agency re-
quired railroad companies to submit valuation schedules
6 The government’s full faith and credit and preclu-
sion arguments, as well as its criticism of the Court of Fed-
eral Claims’ purported reliance on “a later Indiana court of
appeals decision in a different case involving a different
railroad and a different corridor,” Open. Br. at 13-14, 18-19
(citing Meyer v. Pittsburgh, Cincinnati, Chi. &
St. Louis Ry. Co., 113 N.E. 443 (Ind. Ct. App. 1916)), are
all premised on the Manship Decree having granted the
railroad fee simple title in the Manship Parcels, rather
than an easement. As that premise is flawed, the govern-
ment’s arguments necessarily lack merit.
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PRESSLY v. US 13
and maps that identified, as pertinent here, whether the
railroad’s corridors were owned by the railroad via deeds,
came to be possessed by the railroads through adverse pos-
session, or were instead “not owned.” J.A. 21.
With respect to the Vanlaningham Parcels, PIRC’s ICC
valuation schedules noted: “[d]eed to this parcel has been
lost but mention is made of it in Complaint in Gen. Atty.
file 3025.” J.A. 1091. Plaintiffs and the government agree
that the “deed” referenced in this entry is “an unknown
type of instrument executed by Carlisle Vanlaningham in
1849;” that is, the Vanlaningham Instrument. Open. Br.
at 10; see also Resp. Br. at 33 (describing Vanlaningham
Instrument as “an 1849 instrument with Carlisle Vanlan-
ingham as grantor”).
B
As we have already explained, Plaintiffs, in order to
prevail on their takings claims, need to “prove that [their]
state law . . . interests in the property at issue are effec-
tively eliminated in connection with a conversion of a rail-
road right-of-way to trail use.” Chi. Coating, 892 F.3d
at 1170 (internal quotation marks and alteration omitted);
see also Casitas Mun. Water Dist. v. United States,
708 F.3d 1340, 1348 (Fed. Cir. 2013) (explaining that tak-
ings plaintiffs must “identif[y] a cognizable Fifth Amend-
ment property interest that is asserted to be the subject of
the taking”). As to the Vanlaningham Parcels, Plaintiffs
seek to prove their fee simple ownership interests by invok-
ing Indiana’s “centerline presumption.” J.A. 26-27.
Indiana’s centerline presumption provides that where
“a deed [to the rail corridor] . . . does not exist, then the
railroad’s interest vests in the owner of the adjoining
fee . . . for the part of the right-of-way from the center line
of the right-of-way to the adjoining property line.”
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PRESSLY v. US 14
Ind. Code § 32-23-11-10(c).7 Plaintiffs contend that they
may rely on the centerline presumption, notwithstanding
the Vanlaningham Instrument, because the Vanlaning-
ham Instrument is a lost deed whose contents cannot be
proven and, therefore, should be treated as if it does not
exist.
The government attempts to refute Plaintiffs’ conten-
tion on several bases. First, the government insists that
Plaintiffs have failed to prove that the Vanlaningham In-
strument is lost. Second, the government argues that even
if the Vanlaningham Instrument is lost, it indisputably ex-
ists, and the centerline presumption does not apply where
a deed exists. Third, again assuming the Vanlaningham
Instrument is lost, Plaintiffs failed to take advantage of the
resulting opportunity to prove its contents, leaving the rec-
ord devoid of evidence that the railroads held only an ease-
ment, thus resulting in Plaintiffs failing to meet their
burden of proof. We disagree with the government’s rea-
soning, as we explain below.
1
We first address the government’s argument that
Plaintiffs failed to establish that the Vanlaningham Instru-
ment is lost. Whether a deed is lost controls whether parol
evidence of its contents is admissible; it does not inde-
pendently establish what the deed actually conveyed. See
Howe v. Fleming, 24 N.E. 238, 238 (Ind. 1890) (“To entitle
a party to give parol evidence of the contents of a paper
alleged to be lost, it is incumbent upon him to show that a
diligent and careful search was made at the proper places,
and by the proper persons, and that it could not be found.”).
7 Indiana Code § 32-23-11-10(b) defines such a deed
as one “that contains a description of the real property that
includes the right-of-way.” We presume, as the parties do,
that the Vanlaningham Instrument meets this definition.
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PRESSLY v. US 15
Because, here, neither party has attempted to prove the
contents of the Vanlaningham Instrument through parol
evidence, it is arguably unnecessary to determine if Plain-
tiffs proved that the deed is lost. Nevertheless, assuming
Plaintiffs were required to establish the Vanlaningham In-
strument is lost, we agree with the Court of Federal Claims
that Plaintiffs did so.
Under Indiana law, a party seeking to show that a deed
has been lost must prove that the deed once existed, and
that a bona fide and diligent search for the deed has been
undertaken but failed to locate it. See Thompson v.
Thompson, 9 Ind. 323, 333 (Ind. 1857). The existence of the
Vanlaningham Instrument is not in dispute; it is estab-
lished by the ICC valuation schedules, which note the in-
strument “has been lost.” J.A. 1091; see also Open. Br.
at 29 (“There is no dispute that the Vanlaningham
[I]nstrument once existed.”).
The government questions Plaintiffs’ showing as to the
required bona fide, diligent search for the deed, pointing
out that Plaintiffs themselves never searched for the Van-
laningham Instrument in the pertinent county recorder’s
office, “the place where it was most likely to be found,”
Thompson, 9 Ind. at 333. Open. Br. at 29 (citing
Ind. Rev. Stat. ch. 28, § 25 (1843)). “Where a paper which
the law requires to be filed and kept by a public officer as
part of the records or papers of his office is alleged to be
lost, the court has a right to require, before receiving parol
evidence of its contents, that careful and diligent search
was made in the office, and by one so fully acquainted with
the office, records and papers, as to make it probable that,
if the paper was in the office he would find it.” Howe,
24 N.E. at 238. We agree with the Court of Federal Claims
that there is, however, “no requirement that the bona fide
and diligent search be performed by the party seeking to
have a conveyance instrument declared lost,” J.A. 24-25
(internal quotation marks omitted), so long as the search is
conducted “by one so fully acquainted with the office,
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PRESSLY v. US 16
records, and papers” as to make it likely he or she would
find it, Howe, 24 N.E. at 238.
Plaintiffs were therefore entitled to rely on the search
PIRC is presumed to have undertaken before PIRC de-
clared to the ICC that the Vanlaningham Instrument was
lost. To avoid potential liability for making a false state-
ment to a federal agency, PIRC is presumed to have com-
plied with its obligation under the law to have made a
reasonable, diligent search justifying its representation
that the Vanlaningham Instrument was lost. See
United States v. Norton, 97 U.S. 164, 168-69 (1877) (“It is a
presumption of law that officials and citizens obey the law
and do their duty.”). Additionally, Plaintiffs issued subpoe-
nas for the Vanlaningham Instrument to PIRC’s succes-
sors-in-interest. J.A. 431-688. This reasonable effort also
failed to result in production of the deed. Thus, we discern
no error in the Court of Federal Claims’ conclusion that,
under Indiana law, the Vanlaningham Instrument is a lost
deed. J.A. 25; see also generally Barlow, 86 F.4th
at 1358-59 (applying Illinois law and concluding that tak-
ings plaintiffs proved deed to railroad was lost based on
“evidence of a diligent search, including valuation sched-
ules, written requests, and subpoenas to acquire docu-
ments related to [a railroad’s] acquisition of use rights”).
2
Next, the government argues that even if the Vanlan-
ingham Instrument is lost, it nonetheless exists, depriving
Plaintiffs of the ability to rely on the centerline presump-
tion which, according to the government, is only available
when no deed exists. Plaintiffs counter that the scope of
Indiana’s centerline presumption is not so circumscribed.
In their view, the presumption applies and is only “rebut-
ted if there is proof that the fee is in possession of another.”
Resp. Br. at 44. We agree with Plaintiffs.
In 1865, the Supreme Court noted “[i]t is a familiar
principle of . . . law, that a grant of land bordering on a road
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PRESSLY v. US 17
or river, carries the title to the centre of the river or road,
unless the terms or circumstances of the grant indicate a
limitation of its extent by the exterior lines.” Banks v. Og-
den, 69 U.S. 57, 68 (1865) (emphasis added). Indiana’s cen-
terline presumption is in accord with this general
understanding and applies “unless a contrary intention is
manifest from the grant or conveyance itself.” Irvin v.
Crammond, 108 N.E. 539, 540 (Ind. Ct. App. 1915) (“A
grant or conveyance of land bounded by a nonnavigable
stream carries with it the bed of the stream to its center,
unless a contrary intention is manifest from the grant or
conveyance itself.”) (emphasis added); see also McDonald v.
Payne, 16 N.E. 795, 796-97 (Ind. 1888) (“Ordinarily, it is
true, the line described . . . in giving the course of a public
highway . . . is presumed to be the center line of the high-
way, but this presumption may be excluded by the very de-
scription itself, in case that shows a contrary intent.”)
(emphasis added). The government has not directed us to
any provision of Indiana law that would limit this proposi-
tion to land abutting nonnavigable streams and highways
and preclude it from applying to land abutting a railroad;
nor have we ourselves found any support for such a re-
striction.
Therefore, the mere existence (at one time) of the Van-
laningham Instrument does not overcome the centerline
presumption and, hence, does not defeat Plaintiffs’ reliance
on that presumption.
3
This brings us to the government’s final argument.
The government contends that, even assuming the Vanlan-
ingham Instrument is a lost deed and its one-time exist-
ence does not deprive Plaintiffs of the benefit of the
centerline presumption, Plaintiffs were still required to
produce evidence of the contents of the Vanlaningham In-
strument in order to prove that PIRC’s interest in the
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PRESSLY v. US 18
Vanlaningham Parcels consisted of only an easement.
Once again, we disagree with the government.
In Indiana, “where a party has the burden of proof upon
a given issue and a presumption . . . arises in his favor . . .
such presumption will prevail in his favor until it is met
and rebutted by evidence.” North v. Jones, 100 N.E. 84, 87-
88 (Ind. Ct. App. 1912). Here, because Plaintiffs were
properly permitted to rely on the centerline presumption to
establish their property interests, and because Indiana law
provides that the centerline presumption is only displaced
by evidence of a “contrary intention” in the relevant deed,
it was the government that had to produce evidence of the
contents of the Vanlaningham Instrument in order to meet
its burden to rebut the centerline presumption. See Irvin,
108 N.E. at 541.
As the Indiana Court of Appeals stated in W. Un-
ion Tel. Co. v. Krueger, 74 N.E. 25, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 1905),
a party seeking to establish fee simple title as against an
abutting landowner invoking the centerline presumption
must point to something “in the evidence . . . which neces-
sarily overcomes the presumption that the [abutting land-
owner is] the owner in fee simple to the center line.” In
that case, the Indiana court found owners of land abutting
a highway proved, based on the centerline presumption,
that they held a fee simple interest in the land to the center
of the highway, notwithstanding the existence of a deed, as
the challenging party did not establish that the deed un-
ambiguously conveyed fee simple ownership of the con-
tested land to it. See id.
Indiana law further provides that a lost deed carries no
operative legal weight unless its contents have been
proven. See Hitt v. Carr, 109 N.E. 456, 466 (Ind. Ct. App.
1915) (“[A] lost deed, the contents of which have been
proven, may give color of title.”) (emphasis added); see also
Armstrong v. Azimow, 76 N.E.2d 692, 693 (Ind. Ct. App.
1948) (“We are aware of the fact that extreme caution
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PRESSLY v. US 19
should be exercised in decreeing the existence of a lost deed
and thus establishing title to real estate. . . . [Therefore,]
the contents and execution of such a deed must be proven
with reasonable certainty.”) (emphasis added). If a lost
deed can have no legal effect unless its contents are proven
with reasonable certainty, it follows that a lost deed whose
contents remain a matter of conjecture also cannot supply
the affirmative contrary intent that Indiana law requires
to rebut the centerline presumption and establish fee title
in a party other than the abutting landowner. See Colton
v. Lewis, 21 N.E. 475, 476 (Ind. 1889) (“[A] court will only
declare a deed void for uncertainty when, after resorting to
oral proof, it still remains mere matter of conjecture what
was intended by the instrument.”).8
Neither side presented any evidence as to the contents
of the Vanlaningham Instrument. Because its contents
have not been proven, the instrument cannot supply the
affirmative contrary intent that Indiana law requires in or-
der for the government to overcome the centerline pre-
sumption. Indiana law does not permit us to speculate, on
the government’s behalf, that the contents of the lost deed
clearly delineate that, contrary to the centerline presump-
tion, PIRC’s interest in the corridor was not limited to an
easement. Therefore, on this record, the only reasonable
conclusion to be drawn is that Plaintiffs own the land to
the center of the rail corridors at issue, and PIRC’s interest
in the Vanlaningham Parcels was, hence, limited to an
easement. Thus, Plaintiffs are entitled to judgment on
their takings claims.
8 Our conclusion is in line with how other states
treat lost deeds. See, e.g., Barlow, 86 F.4th at 1357-59 (ap-
plying Illinois law and holding that where contents of lost
deeds were not proven by clear and convincing evidence,
railroad failed to establish fee simple title and could hold,
at most, an easement).
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PRESSLY v. US 20
V
We have considered the government’s remaining argu-
ments and find they lack merit. Accordingly, we affirm the
judgment of the Court of Federal Claims.
AFFIRMED
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