Dee Monbo v. United States

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
DEE MONBO,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2025-1489
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:24-cv-01368-CNL, Judge Carolyn N. Lerner.
______________________
Decided: May 15, 2026
______________________
D EE MONBO, Owings Mills, MD, pro se.
K RISTIN ELAINE O LSON, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
S TEVEN J OHN G ILLINGHAM , P ATRICIA M. MC CARTHY , BRETT
SHUMATE.
______________________
Before P ROST , SCHALL , and STOLL , Circuit Judges.
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MONBO v. US 2
P ER CURIAM .
Dee Monbo appeals the United States Court of Federal
Claims’ order (1) dismissing her bid protest complaint un-
der Court of Federal Claims Rules 41(b), 12(b)(1),
and 12(b)(6); (2) denying her motion to amend her com-
plaint; and (3) denying her motions to stay the proceeding.
For the reasons explained below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
Ms. Monbo is the owner and president of Monbo Group
International, Ltd. MGI is registered in the federal gov-
ernment’s System for Award Management (SAM) and has
the unique entity ID FKYVCHTRAMU8 in that system.
Ms. Monbo also holds a sole proprietorship registered un-
der her name that has the unique entity
ID XQ6KZY77S5F8 in SAM. Ms. Monbo alleges “that her
sole proprietorship and corporation are ‘two separate fed-
eral contractors operating together for a common goal’ un-
der a ‘joint collaboration agreement.’” SAppx 21 (citation
omitted).2
On June 15, 2023, the General Services Administra-
tion issued Request for Proposal No. 47QRCA23001, solic-
iting a variety of services for the One Acquisition Solution
for Integrated Services Plus small business program.
Ms. Monbo “claims that her sole proprietorship and her
corporation submitted a joint proposal in accordance with
1 “SAppx” refers to the Supplemental Appendix filed
with the Government’s Informal Brief. See ECF No. 32.
2 “[A] document titled ‘Joint Collaboration Agree-
ment Between Monbo Group International, LTD and Dee
Monbo (A Sole Proprietor),’” was part of the Amended Com-
plaint record, but “the document purport[ing] to record an
agreement . . . includes only the first and fifth pages, and
all substantive language is redacted.” SAppx 2 (citation
omitted).
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MONBO v. US 3
the solicitation’s instructions on October 20, 2023.”
SAppx 4 (citation omitted). On July 30, 2024, GSA emailed
an “Unsuccessful Offeror Notification” letter—with both
the email and the letter addressed only to “Monbo Group
International, LTD–FKYVCHTRAMU8”—explaining that
MGI’s proposal “did not include sufficient past performance
information” and that it had been eliminated from consid-
eration. Id. (citation omitted). Ms. Monbo responded to the
letter multiple times from her email address
“dmonbo@monbogroup.com” and used the signature “Dee
Monbo, CPA, MBA, Monbo Group International.” Id. (cita-
tion omitted). On August 20, 2024, GSA sent an updated
letter, again addressed only to MGI and describing MGI as
the “Offeror.” Id. (citation omitted). The updated letter
contained the same information as the first letter and
added that MGI and Ms. Monbo had been debarred, which
was an additional ground for disqualification.3
Ms. Monbo filed suit in the Court of Federal Claims on
September 9, 2024. In her Amended Complaint,
Ms. Monbo alleged that (1) “she has Article III standing
and statutory standing as an ‘interested party’ under
[28 U.S.C.] § 1491(b)(1) because her ‘joint proposal’ with
MGI makes her an ‘actual bidder’”; (2) “her proposal con-
tained the requisite past performance information”; and
(3) but for GSA’s “erroneous past performance decision, her
joint proposal with MGI ‘would have been awarded the
3 SAM “‘contains exclusion records’ of ‘the entities
debarred, suspended, [and] proposed for debarment’ from
federal contracting pursuant to Federal Acquisition Regu-
lation (‘FAR’) Subpart 9.4.” SAppx 3 (alteration in origi-
nal) (quoting FAR § 9.404). “[B]oth MGI and the Dee
Monbo sole proprietorship are subject to active exclusions
from federal contracting as a result of unrelated proceed-
ings conducted by the Department of the Navy.” Id. (cita-
tion omitted).
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MONBO v. US 4
contract.’” SAppx 5 (citation omitted). Ms. Monbo re-
quested that the Court of Federal Claims “set aside [GSA]’s
finding on the past performance question”; she did not re-
quest that the court “review her debarment or contest
MGI’s disqualification on those grounds.” Id.
On September 19, 2024, the Court of Federal Claims
held a status conference where it informed Ms. Monbo that,
under Court of Federal Claims Rule 83.1(a)(3), corpora-
tions must be represented by counsel and cannot be repre-
sented by a pro se litigant. The Court of Federal Claims
gave Ms. Monbo an opportunity to seek counsel for MGI,
which she did not do.
In November 2024, the Government moved to dismiss
Ms. Monbo’s Amended Complaint under Court of Federal
Claims Rules 41(b), 12(b)(1), and 12(b)(6). Ms. Monbo re-
quested three extensions of time to respond to the motion,
each of which the Court of Federal Claims granted.
Ms. Monbo did not file a response to the motion; instead,
she filed (1) a request to suspend her response date to the
Government’s motion, which did not include an explana-
tion; and (2) a motion to stay the proceeding pending reso-
lution of a separate case in the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia challenging her debarment.
The Court of Federal Claims denied her request to suspend
the response date and ordered her to respond to the Gov-
ernment’s motion to dismiss by January 21, 2025. Instead
of filing a response by the ordered date, Ms. Monbo filed a
second motion to stay on February 7, 2025, an identical
third motion to stay on February 11, 2025, and a motion to
amend her complaint for a second time under Court of Fed-
eral Claims Rule 15(a)(2), also on February 11, 2025.
In December 2025, the Court of Federal Claims
granted the Government’s motion to dismiss and denied
Ms. Monbo’s stay motions and motion to amend. Regard-
ing the Government’s motion to dismiss, the Court of Fed-
eral Claims first explained that, while “Ms. Monbo claims
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MONBO v. US 5
this suit is brought on her own behalf, the facts[, as as-
sessed under Rule 12(b)(1),] instead indicate she seeks to
prosecute claims on behalf of MGI.” SAppx 9. However,
Ms. Monbo is not an attorney, and under Rule 83.1(a)(3),
“[a]n individual who is not an attorney may represent one-
self or a member of one’s immediate family, but may not
represent a corporation, an entity, or any other person.” As
Ms. Monbo had multiple opportunities to obtain counsel
and did not do so, the Court of Federal Claims held that,
“insofar as the [Amended] Complaint alleges MGI’s claims,
it must be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b).” SAppx 11
(cleaned up) (citation omitted); see also RCFC 41(b) (“If the
plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or
a court order, the court may dismiss on its own motion or
the defendant may move to dismiss the action or any claim
against it.”).
The Court of Federal Claims then went on to consider
Ms. Monbo’s allegations on behalf of her sole proprietor-
ship, finding that any such allegations fail for both lack of
Article III standing and lack of statutory standing under
§ 1491(b)(1). For Article III standing, the Court of Federal
Claims determined that Ms. Monbo could not show an in-
jury-in-fact because the materials attached to her com-
plaint and the Government’s motion to dismiss indicated
that (1) only MGI was the offeror that GSA rejected, and
(2) there were “no facts” to determine that her sole propri-
etorship’s collaboration agreement with MGI led to “eco-
nomic exposure” for the proprietorship that was
“imminent” or more than “conjectural.” SAppx 12. Fur-
thermore, the Court of Federal Claims determined that
there was no redressability for any purported injury to
Ms. Monbo. Even with a favorable decision, neither MGI
nor Ms. Monbo could bid or receive a contract from GSA, as
both are debarred, and Ms. Monbo did not challenge these
debarments at the Court of Federal Claims. As to statutory
standing, the Court of Federal Claims determined that
Ms. Monbo was not an actual or prospective bidder and did
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MONBO v. US 6
not have a direct economic interest that would be affected
by the award of the contract, as required for standing un-
der § 1491(b)(1).
Regarding Ms. Monbo’s motions to stay, the Court of
Federal Claims explained that Ms. Monbo is a “sophisti-
cated party” who “has filed eight cases in” the Court of Fed-
eral Claims and has not shown that proceeding with both
this case and a case at the D.C. District Court “would be a
‘hardship or inequity’ given the slate of concurrent litiga-
tion she has initiated.” SAppx 8 (citations omitted). And
while Ms. Monbo argued that the D.C. District Court’s de-
cision would impact the Court of Federal Claims’ decision,
the Court of Federal Claims explained “that rationale is
unpersuasive because the claims are based on different
law,” “[a]nd to the extent that [Ms. Monbo] is concerned
about losing an opportunity for a bid protest remedy if her
debarment challenge is successful, any future impact on
her ability to bring a challenge is a result of ‘the interplay
of statutes regulating federal government procurement.’”
Id. (citations omitted). Additionally, the Court of Federal
Claims noted that it has previously “held that jurisdic-
tional limitations that might prevent challenges to agency
action in the future do not present a pressing need for a
stay of proceedings.” SAppx 9 (cleaned up) (citation omit-
ted). The Court of Federal Claims also explained that this
“case is ripe for review on the jurisdictional issues and
threshold matters the Government has raised. Further,
the [Court of Federal Claims’] disposition of these thresh-
old issues may impact other pending bid protest cases
[Ms. Monbo] has filed in this [c]ourt.” Id.
Regarding Ms. Monbo’s motion to amend, the Court of
Federal Claims explained that “[a]ll of the factors that cau-
tion against granting leave to amend under Rule 15(a)(2)
are present here, including undue delay, dilatory motive,
and undue burden to the Government.” SAppx 17 (citation
omitted). Further, Ms. Monbo’s “proposed amendments
present no new facts, only legal conclusions. And although
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MONBO v. US 7
it might have been appropriate to present such arguments
in a response to the [Government’s] [m]otion to [d]ismiss,
Ms. Monbo has repeatedly failed to do so despite multiple
extensions and [c]ourt orders.” Id. Finally, the Court of
Federal Claims explained that Ms. Monbo’s proposed
amendments would be futile.
Ms. Monbo appeals. We have jurisdiction under
28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
D ISCUSSION
Ms. Monbo presents several arguments on ap-
peal: (1) “the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal order is
erroneous because the argument that the sole proprietor-
ship named Dee Monbo is not an interested party is barred
by the law of the case doctrine[,] . . . the doctrine of res ju-
dicata[,] . . . [and] the doctrine of collateral estoppel”;
(2) “the Court of Federal Claims’ dismissal order is errone-
ous because the [Government] is judicial estoppel [sic] from
arguing that the Court of Federal Claims does not have ju-
risdiction over bid protest claims brought by the sole pro-
prietorship named Dee Monbo”; (3) “the Court of Federal
Claims’ dismissal order is erroneous and arbitrary because
the Court of Federal Claims prematurely dismissed the bid
protest without the Court of Federal Claims ever seeing or
reviewing the administrative record”; (4) “the Court of Fed-
eral Claims erred in denying [Ms. Monbo’s] motion to
amend the bid protest complaint pursuant to . . .
Rule 15(a)”; (5) “the Court of Federal Claims erred in deny-
ing [Ms. Monbo’s] motion to stay proceedings pending res-
olution of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
complaint in the district court which challenges the arbi-
trary and capricious debarment”; and (6) “the Court of Fed-
eral Claims [should have] transfer[red] the case to the
purported appropriate forum pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1631.” Appellant’s Inf. Br. 2–4 (cleaned up) (capitaliza-
tion normalized). We address each challenge below.
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MONBO v. US 8
I
We turn first to Ms. Monbo’s challenges to the dismis-
sal of her Amended Complaint. We note at the outset that
each of these challenges were forfeited by Ms. Monbo based
on her failure to respond to the Government’s motion to
dismiss, and thus she did not properly present these argu-
ments to the trial court. See Boyd v. United States,
134 F.4th 1348, 1354 (Fed. Cir. 2025) (“Arguments not
raised in the Court of Federal Claims are forfeited.”). We
are also not persuaded as to the merits of her challenges.
A
The Court of Federal Claims found that Ms. Monbo
brought claims on behalf of MGI and dismissed those
claims under Rule 41(b). Under Rule 41(b), the Court of
Federal Claims may dismiss a case “[i]f the plaintiff fails to
prosecute or to comply with the[ court’s] rules or a court
order.” We apply an abuse of discretion standard in review-
ing a court’s decision to dismiss for failure to prosecute or
comply with court orders under Rule 41(b). Claude E. At-
kins Enters., Inc. v. United States, 899 F.2d 1180, 1183
(Fed. Cir. 1990). An abuse of discretion occurs when a
court “made a clear error of judgment . . . or exercised its
discretion based on an error of law or clearly erroneous fact
finding.” Qingdao Taifa Grp. Co. v. United States,
581 F.3d 1375, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2009) (citation omitted).
The Court of Federal Claims did not abuse its discre-
tion by dismissing Ms. Monbo’s allegations as to MGI un-
der Rule 41(b). Ms. Monbo did not comply with the trial
court’s clear and unambiguous orders. Ms. Monbo was
warned that under Rule 83.1(a)(3), counsel was needed to
represent MGI. She did not find such counsel. In dismiss-
ing her claims under Rule 41(b), the Court of Federal
Claims also noted that Ms. Monbo has been involved in at
least one other case that was dismissed under Rule 41(b)
because she failed to comply with Rule 83.1(a)(3) and did
not find counsel for MGI. See SAppx 10–11. Additionally,
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MONBO v. US 9
the Court of Federal Claims relied on Ms. Monbo’s failure
to respond to the Government’s motion to dismiss despite
receiving multiple extensions. On this record, we cannot
say that the trial court abused its discretion when
Ms. Monbo “repeatedly and without valid justification ig-
nored both court-imposed deadlines and court rules.” Ka-
din Corp. v. United States, 782 F.2d 175, 176 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
B
To the extent Ms. Monbo brought claims on behalf of
her sole proprietorship, the Court of Federal Claims dis-
missed those claims for lack of Article III standing among
other things. We review the question of whether a party
has Article III standing to sue de novo. Associated Energy
Grp., LLC v. United States, 131 F.4th 1312, 1317 (Fed. Cir.
2025). The plaintiff bears the burden of establishing juris-
diction by a preponderance of the evidence. Brandt
v. United States, 710 F.3d 1369, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2013). We
review any underlying factual findings made by the trial
court for clear error. Associated Energy, 131 F.4th at 1317.
“The Court of Federal Claims, though an Article I
court, . . . applies the same standing requirements enforced
by other federal courts created under Article III.” Weeks
Marine, Inc. v. United States, 575 F.3d 1352, 1359
(Fed. Cir. 2009) (omission in original) (citation omitted).
“Article III standing requires that a plaintiff have: ‘(1) suf-
fered an injury in fact, (2) that is fairly traceable to the
challenged conduct of the defendant, and (3) that is likely
to be redressed by a favorable judicial decision.’” Associ-
ated Energy, 131 F.4th at 1318 (citation omitted). An al-
leged injury is redressable if it is “likely, as opposed to
merely speculative, that the injury will be redressed by a
favorable decision.” Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S.
555, 561 (1992) (cleaned up) (citation omitted).
We agree with the Court of Federal Claims that “[h]ere,
a favorable decision would not redress Ms. Monbo’s alleged
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MONBO v. US 10
harm because both her sole proprietorship and MGI are de-
barred.” SAppx 13. “[E]ven if [GSA]’s past performance
analysis erred, ‘the outcome of this suit would not affect
[Ms. Monbo’s] future’ profits because MGI is ineligible to
receive the contract.” Id. (quoting Thole v. U.S. Bank N.A.,
590 U.S. 538, 541 (2020)). Moreover, even if Ms. Monbo’s
allegations about her purported collaboration with MGI
are true, her separate challenge to her debarment would
need to succeed for her to receive any profits. See id. (citing
FAR § 9.405). And “a decision on her Amended Complaint
would not redress this issue because Ms. Monbo d[id] not
challenge her or MGI’s debarments” in front of the Court of
Federal Claims.4 Id. Accordingly, even if Ms. Monbo could
4 On appeal, Ms. Monbo raises multiple challenges
to her debarment that are not properly before this court.
See Appellant’s Inf. Br. 3 (challenging whether (1) the Gov-
ernment “can propose the sole proprietorship . . . for debar-
ment in an attempt to win the challenge to the unlawful
contract award”; and (2) “the Court of Federal Claims erred
in dismissing the bid protest where the [Government] pur-
ported defense of debarment rests entirely upon evidence
that is a product of an illegal violation of the Fifth Amend-
ment Due Process Clause and the Debarment Procedures”
(capitalization normalized)). Our jurisdiction in this case
is limited to final decisions of the Court of Federal Claims,
and Ms. Monbo did not challenge her or MGI’s debarments
in the Court of Federal Claims. See 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3)
(“The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Cir-
cuit shall have exclusive jurisdiction . . . of an appeal from
a final decision of the United States Court of Federal
Claims.”); SAppx 3 (“[Ms. Monbo’s] Amended Complaint
does not mention the debarments of MGI or her sole pro-
prietorship. Ms. Monbo has since asserted that she is
bringing a separate lawsuit to challenge her debarment in
the United States District Court for the District of
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MONBO v. US 11
show an injury-in-fact sufficient to support Article III
standing, she has failed to present a redressable injury.5
On appeal, Ms. Monbo argues that the Court of Federal
Claims erred in dismissing her case based on several legal
principles (i.e., law of the case, res judicata, collateral es-
toppel, judicial estoppel) all stemming from the idea that
she cannot bring a bid protest complaint in a district court.
See Appellant’s Inf. Br. 13–21; see also Appx 16 (attaching
a decision from the D.C. District Court dismissing
Ms. Monbo’s bid protest over a solicitation from the Air
Force). These challenges lack merit. The Court of Federal
Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over bid protest com-
plaints. See 28 U.S.C. § 1491(b)(1); PGBA, LLC v. United
States, 389 F.3d 1219, 1227 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“In 1996,
Columbia.” (citations omitted)). We will not consider issues
not properly before us.
5 Because we affirm the Court of Federal Claims’
holding that, to the extent any claim was brought by
Ms. Monbo on behalf of her sole proprietorship, that claim
must be dismissed for lack of Article III standing, we do not
reach either the Court of Federal Claims’ finding that MGI
was the real party in interest in this suit (and thus the en-
tire Amended Complaint could be dismissed under
Rule 41(b)), or the Court of Federal Claims’ holding on lack
of statutory standing for the sole proprietorship. We addi-
tionally note that, although both parties are asking us to
review the Court of Federal Claims’ legal holdings and fac-
tual findings on jurisdiction based on the complaint and
motion to dismiss records, neither side included the
Amended Complaint, motion to dismiss, or those docu-
ments’ exhibits in the appendices submitted to this court.
To satisfy ourselves of our duty to review the decision of the
trial court, we requested and reviewed these documents.
6 “Appx” refers to the appendices Ms. Monbo at-
tached to her Informal Brief. See ECF No. 26.
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MONBO v. US 12
however, Congress amended the Tucker Act by enacting
[the Administrative Dispute Resolution Act (ADRA)]. In
addition to section 1491(b)(4), the amending statute con-
tained a sunset provision which gave the Court of Federal
Claims exclusive jurisdiction over bid protests on Janu-
ary 1, 2001.” (citation omitted)). Neither the Court of Fed-
eral Claims nor the Government were bound by a district
court dismissing a different case brought by Ms. Monbo
based on this basic principle. Furthermore, merely because
the Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over
bid protests does not mean that filing a bid protest com-
plaint is enough to bring a case within the subject matter
jurisdiction of the court. Here, Ms. Monbo’s allegations did
not fail because she brought them in the wrong forum but
because those allegations did not meet the requirements of
Article III standing. And for the same reason—that the
Court of Federal Claims has exclusive jurisdiction over bid
protest complaints—there was no court to which the Court
of Federal Claims could transfer Ms. Monbo’s case.
Finally, Ms. Monbo argues that the Court of Federal
Claims erred in not waiting to receive the administrative
record before dismissing her Amended Complaint. But
when considering whether to dismiss for lack of Article III
standing, “[a] plaintiff’s complaint must establish that
[s]he has a ‘personal stake’ in the alleged dispute . . . .” As-
sociated Energy, 131 F.4th at 1318 (omission in original)
(citation omitted). Accordingly, Ms. Monbo was not enti-
tled to have the Court of Federal Claims review GSA’s de-
cision based on the administrative record.
II
Ms. Monbo also challenges the Court of Federal
Claims’ decision denying her motion to amend her com-
plaint under Rule 15(a)(2). We review the Court of Federal
Claims’ denial of a motion to amend a complaint for an
abuse of discretion. Steffen v. United States, 995 F.3d
1377, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). Here, in
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MONBO v. US 13
denying Ms. Monbo’s motion, the Court of Federal Claims
explained that her request to amend (1) showed “undue de-
lay, dilatory motive,” and presented an “undue burden to
the Government”; (2) “present[ed] no new facts, only legal
conclusions”; and (3) would be futile. SAppx 17 (citation
omitted). We see no abuse of discretion in this decision on
this record.
On appeal, Ms. Monbo states without explanation that
her new “Amended Complaint add[ed] new claims, [sic] and
new allegations.” Appellant’s Inf. Br. 23. Such conclusory
statements without explanation for how the trial court
erred in finding that her proposed amendments were “legal
conclusions” that “cannot ‘withstand a motion to dismiss’
and [were] thus futile,” do not persuade us that the Court
of Federal Claims abused its discretion. SAppx 17 (citation
omitted). Nor does Ms. Monbo address the Court of Fed-
eral Claims’ finding that her request to amend was unduly
delayed—coming weeks after she failed to respond by the
court-ordered deadline to the Government’s motion to dis-
miss—and thus showed dilatory motive and was unduly
prejudicial to the Government.7
III
Ms. Monbo further challenges the Court of Federal
Claims’ decision not to stay this matter pending the out-
come of her case in the D.C. District Court. “When and how
7 Ms. Monbo also argues that an “amended com-
plaint automatically moots the defendant’s motion to dis-
miss and creates a duty to respond to the amended
complaint,” and thus, the Government’s motion to dismiss
here was mooted. Appellant’s Inf. Br. 23. This argument
fails because Ms. Monbo merely moved for leave to amend
her complaint for the second time, but this motion was de-
nied and a second amended complaint superseding her op-
erative pleading was not entered into the record.
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MONBO v. US 14
to stay proceedings is within the sound discretion of the
trial court.” Cherokee Nation of Okla. v. United States,
124 F.3d 1413, 1416 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (citation omitted).
Here, the Court of Federal Claims explained that
Ms. Monbo, someone who has filed many cases at the Court
of Federal Claims, had not shown that carrying on concur-
rent litigation between this case and the D.C. District
Court case was burdensome, and had not shown the D.C.
District Court case necessarily impacted this matter. The
Court of Federal Claims also weighed this against “the
need for timely resolution of [Ms. Monbo’s] claims.”
SAppx 9 (citation omitted). We see no abuse of discretion
on this record.
On appeal, Ms. Monbo states that GSA’s “solicitation,
proposed award[,] and award do not comply with procure-
ment statute and regulations[, so she] is likely [to] prevail
on the merits of the bid protest,” and the Government’s “de-
barment is unlawful and void because the Sole Proprietor-
ship-Plaintiff (Dee Monbo) and MGI’s name was [sic]
placed on the debarment list in a manner inconsistent with
due process.” Appellant’s Inf. Br. 30 (capitalization nor-
malized). These conclusory statements do not persuade us
that the trial court “made a clear error of judgment[,] . . .
error of law[,] or clearly erroneous fact finding.” Qingdao,
581 F.3d at 1379 (citation omitted).
IV
Finally, Ms. Monbo makes several requests for relief
that are awarded to prevailing parties or parties who are
likely to succeed on the merits of their claims, which
Ms. Monbo is not. See Appellant’s Inf. Br. 3–4 (requesting
(1) “[GSA be] required to pay the sole proprietorship’s bid
and proposal preparation costs”; (2) “the court award fees
and protest costs pursuant to the Equal Access to Justice
Act”; (3) “preliminary injunctive relief to ensure that [GSA]
complies with statutes and regulations”; and (4) “the Court
of Federal Claims . . . use[] its common sense to recommend
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MONBO v. US 15
that [GSA] implement[] any combination of the following
remedies to promote compliance with statute and regula-
tion[, including] . . . refrain from exercising options under
the contract[,] . . . terminate the contract[,] . . . recompete
the contract[, or] . . . issue a new solicitation” (capitaliza-
tion normalized)). We thus do not consider these requests.
CONCLUSION
We have considered Ms. Monbo’s remaining arguments
but find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm the Court of Federal Claims’ decision dismissing
Ms. Monbo’s bid protest complaint, denying her motion to
amend her complaint, and denying her motions to stay.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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