Ahmad Jamaleddin Aljindi v. United States

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
AHMAD JAMALEDDIN ALJINDI,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant
______________________
2026-1031
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:24-cv-00242-DAT, Judge David A. Tapp.
______________________
Decided: April 14, 2026
______________________
AHMAD J AMALEDDIN A LJINDI, Irvine, CA, pro se.
______________________
P ER CURIAM .
Dr. Ahmad Aljindi comes before us, as he has several
times before, seeking recovery from the United States
based on allegations that he created, and the government
stole from him, certain artificial-intelligence technology.
In 2024, after other (related) suits brought by Dr. Aljindi
had been dismissed, the Court of Federal Claims (Claims
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ALJINDI v. US 2
Court) dismissed Dr. Aljindi’s present complaint, and the
next year we affirmed that dismissal. Aljindi v. United
States, No. 24-1997, 2025 WL 440123, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Feb.
10, 2025) (2025 CAFC Decision). Dr. Aljindi then returned
to the Claims Court and filed a motion under the Claims
Court’s Rule 60(b) seeking relief from the judgment. The
Claims Court denied the motion, and after providing notice
and an opportunity to respond, it entered an anti-filing in-
junction against him—forbidding new filings unless he was
represented by counsel or got permission from the Chief
Judge—and it certified, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3),
that no appeal from that injunction would be taken in good
faith. Aljindi v. United States, 178 Fed. Cl. 256, 264 (2025)
(Injunction). Dr. Aljindi appeals and moves to proceed in
forma pauperis on appeal. Construing his motion as chal-
lenging the Claims Court’s § 1915(a)(3) certification, we
conclude that Dr. Aljindi’s appeal is frivolous, and we
therefore dismiss.
I
The history of this case has been recounted in detail in
prior decisions. See generally 2025 CAFC Decision; see also
Injunction at 260–61 & n.3; Aljindi v. United States,
No. 24-242, 2024 WL 3024654, at *2–3 & n.2 (Fed. Cl. June
17, 2024) (2024 CFC Dismissal). We briefly recount some
now-relevant aspects of the case.
Dr. Aljindi claims to have “developed groundbreaking
intellectual property in artificial intelligence” that the
“government systematically appropriated . . . without just
compensation.” Aljindi Informal Br. at 18. He brought civil
rights claims against the government based on similar al-
legations in the District Court for the Central District of
California in 2018, but the district court dismissed his com-
plaint sua sponte for failure to state a claim. See 2024 CFC
Dismissal, at *2 n.2. He filed additional, similar district
court complaints, which were also rejected, and Dr.
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ALJINDI v. US 3
Aljindi’s appeals to the Ninth Circuit were dismissed as
frivolous. See id.; Injunction at 261 n.3.
In 2021, Dr. Aljindi filed two complaints in the Claims
Court. As we recounted in our 2025 decision, one of those
complaints asserted takings, civil rights, tort, and copy-
right claims, alleging similar operative facts to those al-
leged in his district court complaints. 2025 CAFC Decision,
at *1–2. The second asserted, among other things, judicial
misconduct and conspiracy to obstruct justice by the dis-
trict court and the Ninth Circuit. Id., at *2. The Claims
Court dismissed both complaints. See id., at *1–2. Dr.
Aljindi did not appeal the dismissal of the second complaint
but did appeal the dismissal of the first complaint, and in
that appeal, we affirmed the dismissal with one exception:
We vacated the Claims Court’s jurisdictional dismissal of
the claim of copyright infringement. See id. The Claims
Court, on remand, dismissed the copyright claim for failure
to state a claim, and we affirmed. See id. at *2.
Dr. Aljindi filed a third complaint—the operative com-
plaint in this appeal—in the Claims Court in early 2024,
again grounded in essentially the same allegations, and
again asserting takings claims, among others. Id., at *2–
3. The Claims Court again dismissed in June 2024, in part
on the basis of claim preclusion, and we again affirmed. Id.
at *4.
That brings us to the present appeal: In July 2025, af-
ter we affirmed the dismissal of his third Claims Court
complaint, Dr. Aljindi returned to the Claims Court and
moved under Rule 60(b) of the Rules of the Court of Federal
Claims to vacate the judgment for fraud on the court. In-
junction at 261. In his view, the dismissal of his claims
manifested “a brazen pattern of judicial crimes” and a con-
spiracy by the Claims Court, this court, and other courts
involving “docket tampering, evidence suppression, [and]
factual fabrication.” Id. The Claims Court denied the mo-
tion as untimely to the extent it invoked Rule 60(b)(3)
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ALJINDI v. US 4
because it was filed more than a year after the judgment of
dismissal, and denied the motion as frivolous to the extent
it invoked Rule 60(b)(6). See id.; R. Ct. Fed. Cl. 60(c) (es-
tablishing deadlines).
In view of the frivolous nature of his motion and Dr.
Aljindi’s history of repetitive pleadings, the Claims Court
also ordered Dr. Aljindi to show cause why he should not
be subject to an anti-filing injunction. Injunction at 262.
Dr. Aljindi responded by rearguing the merits of his claims,
making lengthy allegations of criminality against the
court, and he also filed a new motion, now under Rule 60(a),
running to nearly two hundred pages and repeating similar
allegations. See id. at 262–63. The Claims Court, besides
denying the Rule 60(a) motion, determined that Dr. Aljindi
had engaged in a pattern of vexatious litigation, that his
filings were not in good faith and were a burden on the
court (and hence harmful to other litigants in the court),
and that nothing less than an injunction would deter him
from continuing to waste the court’s resources. Id. at 264.
Accordingly, it enjoined Dr. Aljindi from filing new com-
plaints in the Claims Court without being represented by
counsel or (if proceeding pro se) obtaining leave of the Chief
Judge. Id. The court also certified, under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(a)(3), that any appeal from its order would not be
taken in good faith. Id.
Dr. Aljindi appeals the injunction and the denial of
Rule 60(b) relief.1 Within the allowed time, he moved un-
der Federal Circuit Rule 24(a) to proceed in forma pau-
peris. We have statutory jurisdiction to hear the appeal
under 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
1 Dr. Aljindi has not presented any argument re-
garding the denial of the Rule 60(a) motion that requires
separate discussion.
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ALJINDI v. US 5
II
We review the denial of a Rule 60(b) motion and the
imposition of the sanction of an anti-filing injunction for
abuse of discretion. Progressive Industries, Inc. v. United
States, 888 F.3d 1248, 1255 (Fed. Cir. 2018); Allen
v. United States, 88 F.4th 983, 986–89 (Fed. Cir. 2023). A
motion to proceed in forma pauperis on appeal over the
trial court’s § 1915(a)(3) certification is treated as a chal-
lenge to the trial court’s determination that the appeal is
frivolous. See Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. App.
P. 24(a). An appeal is frivolous at least if it does not pre-
sent “any . . . legal points arguable on their merits,” Anders
v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967), and even consider-
ing the frivolousness issue without deference to the trial
court, we agree that Dr. Aljindi’s appeal is frivolous.
This appeal presents three issues, the first two of which
are subsumed into the third. Dr. Aljindi argues that the
Claims Court erred, first, in denying his Rule 60(b) motion
and, second, in enjoining him from filing new complaints.
Third, he claims that he is entitled to proceed on appeal in
forma pauperis. All three issues are resolved if we deter-
mine that his appeal is frivolous. Such a determination
answers the first two arguments and simultaneously
means that the Claims Court’s certification was not in er-
ror, so that Dr. Aljindi’s appeal must be dismissed whether
or not he has paid the docketing fee. See Fed. Cir. R. 52(d);
Advisory Committee Notes to Fed. R. App. P. 24(a); cf. 28
U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) (“[T]he court shall dismiss the case at
any time if the court determines that . . . the action or ap-
peal . . . is frivolous[.]”); Mallard v. United States District
Court for the Southern District of Iowa, 490 U.S. 296, 307–
08 (1989). We conclude that the Claims Court was correct
that this appeal is frivolous, so we dismiss.
We have previously made clear to Dr. Aljindi that the
Claims Court did not err in dismissing his complaint, and
to the extent he attempts to relitigate that decision, his
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ALJINDI v. US 6
arguments are squarely foreclosed. See generally 2025
CAFC Decision. And Dr. Aljindi presents no colorable basis
for disturbing either the Claim’s Court’s denial of relief
from judgment under Rule 60(b) or its entry of an anti-fil-
ing injunction against him.
The crux of Dr. Aljindi’s argument on appeal, going to
both his Rule 60(b) motion and the injunction, is his appar-
ent belief that, when he has made allegations in this case
or his previous cases, all the allegations must be treated as
establishing facts for purposes of the Rule 60(b) motion to
set aside the judgment at issue and the motion must be
granted based on that treatment. See, e.g., Aljindi Informal
Br. at 13, 14, 19, 20, 24, 26, 28. There is no support offered
or legal foundation for such a view. An adverse judgment
may rest on any number of different bases, including juris-
dictional, preclusion, implausibility of pleading, and other
bases, some of which justify an adverse judgment without
questioning the facts alleged, while others justify an ad-
verse judgment because the law allows or requires deeming
allegations of fact insufficient. Appeal is the route for
showing error in an adverse judgment, with Rule 60(b)
providing a narrow set of grounds for later granting relief
from the judgment. Nothing about the Rule 60(b) standard
provides for relief, after appeals have been unsuccessful,
based on assuming the truth of the losing litigant’s factual
assertions. Accordingly, Dr. Aljindi’s appeal is frivolous in-
sofar as he challenges the denial of his Rule 60(b) motion.
With respect to the anti-filing injunction, Dr. Aljindi
additionally argues that the Claims Court’s order was mo-
tivated by religious animus. Id. at 26–27. But Dr. Aljindi
offers no support whatever for this allegation: He relies en-
tirely on the bare fact that his similar complaints have
been repeatedly dismissed, see id. at 27, but that fact pro-
vides no basis for an inference of bias where, as here, dis-
missal of Dr. Aljindi’s claims was justified on the merits,
see 2025 CAFC Decision, at *5–6. There is simply no evi-
dence of bias. The Claims Court recounted the history of
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ALJINDI v. US 7
Dr. Aljindi’s repetitive litigation, noting that even after be-
ing warned of sanctions Dr. Aljindi filed a lengthy, merit-
less motion, and it properly determined that an anti-filing
injunction was appropriate. Injunction at 262–64. It is ev-
ident that the anti-filing injunction was the product of a
justified concern for wasting the court’s resources, and we
thus conclude that Dr. Aljindi’s challenge to the injunction
is also frivolous.
Because Dr. Aljindi raises no arguable legal question
on appeal, he has failed to show error in the Claims Court’s
§ 1915(a)(3) certification. We deny his motion to proceed in
forma pauperis, and we dismiss his appeal. Given the ra-
tionale for our dismissal, we add, the same result would be
reached if Dr. Aljindi now paid the docketing fee.
III
We have considered all of Dr. Aljindi’s arguments and
find them wholly without merit. Accordingly, we dismiss.
DISMISSED
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