Julian R. Hood, Jr. v. Merit Systems Protection Board

N OTE: This order is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
JULIAN R. HOOD, JR.,
Petitioner
v.
MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD,
Respondent
______________________
2026-1099
______________________
Petition for review of the Merit Systems Protection
Board in No. CH-0353-24-0299-I-1.
______________________
Decided: April 16, 2026
______________________
J ULIAN H OOD, J R., Escondido, CA, pro se.
K ELLY WINSHIP , Office of the General Counsel, United
States Merit Systems Protection Board, Washington, DC,
for respondent. Also represented by K ATHERINE MICHELLE
SMITH .
______________________
Before CHEN, CUNNINGHAM , and STARK, Circuit Judges.
P ER CURIAM .
Case: 26-1099 Document: 35 Page: 1 Filed: 04/16/2026

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HOOD v. MSPB 2
Julian R. Hood Jr., a pro se litigant, appeals from a fi-
nal decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board (Board)
dismissing his appeal for lack of jurisdiction. Julian Hood
Jr. v. U.S. Postal Serv., No. CH-0353-24-0299-I-1, 2025 WL
3241066 (M.S.P.B. Sept. 30, 2025) (Decision) (SAppx 1–
17).1 The Board held that Mr. Hood’s appeal, contending
that he should be restored to duty after partially recovering
from an injury, was barred by collateral estoppel because
the dispositive issues had previously been fully litigated
before the Board. The Board further held that Mr. Hood
failed to present new evidence that would change the juris-
dictional analysis as to his restoration appeal. For the rea-
sons discussed below, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In 1999, Mr. Hood began working as a part-time Flexi-
ble Mail Processing Clerk for the Postal Service in Grand
Rapids, Michigan. He filed an Office of Worker’s Compen-
sation Programs (OWCP) claim for workplace stress that
occurred in December 2000. The OWCP partially accepted
his claim and awarded him compensation for an episode of
Major Depressive Disorder from December 21, 2000 to Jan-
uary 12, 2001. The OWCP awarded him compensation for
subsequent periods in 2001 and 2002.
On October 30, 2002, Mr. Hood and the Postal Service
entered into a Last Chance Agreement (LCA) to resolve a
fourteen-day suspension and a Notice of Removal. He was
subsequently removed in August 2003 for “failure to be reg-
ular in attendance/violation of [LCA],” based on his un-
scheduled absences between April 1, 2003, and July 17,
2003. Decision, 2025 WL 3241066, at 1–2.
1 Because the online version of the Initial Decision
lacks pagination, we use the pagination employed in the
Board’s original document. “Decision, 2025 WL 3241066,
at 1,” for example, corresponds to the first page of the deci-
sion, located at SAppx 1.
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HOOD v. MSPB 3
In November 2005, Mr. Hood signed a settlement
agreement to resolve an Equal Employment Opportunity
(EEO) complaint he had filed. The agreement paid
Mr. Hood monetary compensation and changed his re-
moval to a “resignation.” In exchange, Mr. Hood agreed to
waive his right to pursue “all other employment claims and
grievances that are pending or could have been brought”
against the Postal Service, except for his then-pending
OWCP claim, and he agreed not to apply for employment
with the Postal Service. On December 14, 2007, the Office
of Personnel Management (OPM) approved Mr. Hood’s ap-
plication for disability retirement.
In 2014, Mr. Hood filed a Board appeal alleging that
the agency failed to restore him to duty after he partially
recovered from an injury. The administrative judge (AJ)
dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, finding that
Mr. Hood failed to establish that his removal in 2003 was
due to a compensable injury because the dates of unsched-
uled absences the Postal Service cited in Mr. Hood’s re-
moval did not correspond to OWCP-covered dates.
In 2016, the Board dismissed Mr. Hood’s subsequent
restoration-related claims, including challenges to his res-
ignation and disability retirement. The Board explained
that those claims did not confer jurisdiction absent a valid
restoration claim. In a subsequent appeal in 2017, the
Board also rejected reliance on a 2016 letter from OWCP,
which stated that Mr. Hood was partially recovered and
able to return to work, finding that the letter did not give
him a renewed right to restoration. Mr. Hood did not ap-
peal this decision and it became final on October 18, 2017.
In the current proceedings, Mr. Hood filed an appeal
with the Board in March 2024, again seeking restoration
and claiming that he was separated because of a compen-
sable injury and now partially recovered. The AJ dis-
missed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, holding that
Mr. Hood’s claims were barred by collateral estoppel and
that he failed to provide new evidence that changed the
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HOOD v. MSPB 4
restoration analysis. Decision, 2025 WL 3241066, at 5–9.
On November 4, 2025, the AJ’s initial decision became fi-
nal. Mr. Hood timely appealed. We have jurisdiction un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(9).
D ISCUSSION
We set aside a final decision of the Board only if it is:
“(1) arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discretion, or other-
wise not in accordance with law; (2) obtained without pro-
cedures required by law, rule, or regulation having been
followed; or (3) unsupported by substantial evidence.”
5 U.S.C. § 7703(c). We review the Board’s jurisdictional de-
terminations de novo and its underlying factual findings
for substantial evidence. Bryant v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd.,
878 F.3d 1320, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2017).
Mr. Hood argues that the Board erred in applying col-
lateral estoppel to his restoration claim, which was prem-
ised on his alleged partial recovery from a compensable
injury. To establish Board jurisdiction over such claim un-
der 5 C.F.R. § 353.304(c), a petitioner must show that: (1)
he was absent from his position due to a compensable in-
jury; (2) he recovered sufficiently to return to duty on a
part-time basis, or to return to work in a position with less
demanding physical requirements than those previously
required of him; (3) the agency denied his request for res-
toration; and (4) the denial was arbitrary and capricious.
Bledsoe v. Merit Sys. Prot. Bd., 659 F.3d 1097, 1104 (Fed.
Cir. 2011) (citation omitted).
Collateral estoppel applies when an issue previously
adjudicated is identical with the one now presented, was
actually litigated and necessary to the prior judgment, and
the party precluded was fully represented in the prior ac-
tion. Morgan v. Dep’t of Energy, 424 F.3d 1271, 1274–75
(Fed. Cir. 2005) (citation omitted).
Mr. Hood contends that collateral estoppel is inappli-
cable because neither the 2002 LCA nor the 2005 settle-
ment contained any adjudication of his restoration rights
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HOOD v. MSPB 5
or whether his separation was due to a compensable injury.
The government responds that preclusion arises not from
those agreements, but from Mr. Hood’s prior Board resto-
ration appeals in 2014 and 2017.
We agree with the government. In 2014 and 2017, the
Board adjudicated Mr. Hood’s restoration claims and re-
jected them. As the AJ properly held, the previous issue in
those proceedings—whether Mr. Hood’s separation was
due to absences caused by a compensable injury—is identi-
cal to the issue he seeks to relitigate here. Decision, 2025
WL 3241066, at 5–7.
In 2014, the AJ found that Mr. Hood failed to satisfy
the first element of a restoration claim because he did not
show that his absences were due to a compensable injury.
SAppx 51–52. Specifically, the dates of his separation did
not correspond to the dates covered by his accepted OWCP
claims. Id. In 2017, the AJ again addressed the issue, con-
cluding that a later OWCP letter did not provide him with
restoration rights. SAppx 36–37. Accordingly, the issue of
whether Mr. Hood’s absences were due to a compensable
injury was actually litigated, necessary to the prior deci-
sions, and resolved against him.
Mr. Hood argues that he lacked a “full and fair oppor-
tunity to litigate” because material facts relating to the
2005 settlement agreement were allegedly concealed until
2024. But the AJ in 2017 did not rely on the 2005 settle-
ment agreement nor any waiver arising from such agree-
ment in determining that the Board lacked jurisdiction
over Mr. Hood’s restoration claim. See SAppx 40 n.6. And,
the AJ in 2025 properly concluded that Mr. Hood’s restora-
tion claims had already been litigated in his 2014 and 2017
appeals and were barred by collateral estoppel. Decision,
2025 WL 3241066, at 5–7. Any alleged fraud or conceal-
ment related to the 2005 settlement agreement therefore
does not undermine the preclusive effect of the prior deci-
sion because it did not rely on the agreement in finding a
lack of jurisdiction.
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HOOD v. MSPB 6
Accordingly, the requirements for collateral estoppel
are satisfied, and the Board did not err in concluding that
Mr. Hood is precluded from relitigating his restoration
claim.
Mr. Hood also contends that newly discovered evidence
defeats preclusion. But the AJ reasonably found that the
additional OWCP benefit statements Mr. Hood submitted
did not address whether he suffered a compensable injury
during the relevant period. Id. at 7–8. Nor does the record
show that OWCP accepted claims covering those dates. Id.
Thus, the purported new evidence does not alter the
Board’s conclusion.
Mr. Hood further argues that the previous Board deci-
sions were legally erroneous. But even assuming error,
which we do not find, collateral estoppel applies “even
though the determination was reached upon an erroneous
view or by an erroneous application of the law.” Morgan,
424 F.3d at 1274 (internal quotations and citation omitted).
Mr. Hood’s contention that OWCP’s acceptance of a claim
alone satisfies the first element of a restoration claim is
likewise incorrect. Our law requires that Mr. Hood show
that he was absent from his position “due to a compensable
injury” to establish jurisdiction under 5 C.F.R.
§ 353.304(c). Bledsoe, 659 F.3d at 1104 (emphasis added).
That determination was previously resolved against him,
and the Board therefore properly applied collateral estop-
pel and dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.
We have considered Mr. Hood’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. For the foregoing reasons, we
affirm the decision of the Board.
AFFIRMED
COSTS
No costs.
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