Ahmad Aljindi v. United States

N OTE: This disposition is nonprecedential.
United States Court of Appeals
for the Federal Circuit
______________________
AHMAD ALJINDI,
Plaintiff-Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES,
Defendant-Appellee
______________________
2026-1180
______________________
Appeal from the United States Court of Federal Claims
in No. 1:25-cv-01288-PSH, Judge Philip S. Hadji.
______________________
Decided: June 8, 2026
______________________
AHMAD J AMALEDDIN A LJINDI, Irvine, CA, pro se.
SUZANNE J OHNSON, Commercial Litigation Branch,
Civil Division, United States Department of Justice, Wash-
ington, DC, for defendant-appellee. Also represented by
S COTT D AVID BOLDEN, BRETT SHUMATE.
______________________
P ER CURIAM .
Dr. Ahmad Aljindi has filed several suits against the
United States in which he asserted that the government
Case: 26-1180 Document: 16 Page: 1 Filed: 06/08/2026

-- 1 of 10 --

ALJINDI v. US 2
has appropriated certain of his intellectual property re-
lated to artificial intelligence. As now relevant, he filed a
2021 suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims
(Claims Court) that, as interpreted, invoked the Claims
Court’s jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b) to hear
claims of copyright infringement by the government. The
Claims Court dismissed the copyright-infringement claim
for failure to state a claim on which relief could be granted,
and that dismissal became final. In 2025, Dr. Aljindi filed
a new complaint in the Claims Court alleging uncompen-
sated takings of property in his copyright. S. Appx. 1010.1
The Claims Court construed the complaint as invoking
only the court’s jurisdiction under the Tucker Act, 28
U.S.C. § 1491, citing language in the complaint that affirm-
atively distinguished the suit under § 1498(b). Aljindi
v. United States, No. 25-1288, at 4 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 25,
2025).2 The Claims Court then dismissed the 2025 action
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, ruling that it had no
Tucker Act jurisdiction to hear Dr. Aljindi’s “takings claims
based on alleged copyright infringement” because such
claims can be pursued only under § 1498(b) (as he had al-
ready done). S. Appx. 1004. Dr. Aljindi appeals. We af-
firm.
I
Dr. Aljindi purports to own the copyright to a 2015 dis-
sertation about artificial intelligence. S. Appx. 1010 (com-
plaint). He has filed many unsuccessful suits in the Claims
Court and in district court relating to his allegations that
the government has stolen his intellectual property, at
least some of which, he claims, is reflected in his disserta-
tion. See S. Appx. 1025–28 (Dr. Aljindi describing his prior
1 “S. Appx.” refers to the supplemental appendix
submitted with the government’s brief.
2 A copy of the Claims Court’s decision is at S. Appx.
1001–05.
Case: 26-1180 Document: 16 Page: 2 Filed: 06/08/2026

-- 2 of 10 --

ALJINDI v. US 3
litigation); Aljindi v. United States, No. 26-1031, 2026 WL
1001470, at *1 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 14, 2026) (recounting Dr.
Aljindi’s history of litigation and collecting cases).
As relevant to the present appeal, in 2021, Dr. Aljindi,
proceeding pro se, filed suit in the Claims Court alleging,
among other things, “theft of [his] intellectual property” by
the government. See Aljindi v. United States, No. 21-1295,
2021 WL 4807205, at *1 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 15, 2021) (2021 CFC
Decision). He included a mention of “‘copyright[ ] law [ ]
violations.’” Aljindi v. United States, No. 22-1117, 2022
WL 1464476, at *1 n.2, *3 (Fed. Cir. May 10, 2022) (2022
CAFC Decision). The Claims Court dismissed the com-
plaint, ruling that it had lacked Tucker Act jurisdiction
over Dr. Aljindi’s allegations of theft because they sounded
in tort or criminal conduct. 2021 CFC Decision, at *2. On
Dr. Aljindi’s appeal in that case, we interpreted his com-
plaint as invoking the Claims Court’s jurisdiction over
claims for copyright infringement by the government under
§ 1498(b), and we remanded for the Claims Court to con-
sider whether Dr. Aljindi had stated such a claim. 2022
CAFC Decision, at *3–4. On remand, the Claims Court
ruled that Dr. Aljindi’s complaint did not plausibly state a
copyright-infringement claim and dismissed the suit with
prejudice. See Aljindi v. United States, No. 21-1295, 2022
WL 17330006, at *2–3 (Fed. Cl. Nov. 28, 2022). We af-
firmed that dismissal. Aljindi v. United States, No. 23-
1230, 2023 WL 2778689 (Fed. Cir. Apr. 5, 2023), cert. de-
nied, 144 S. Ct. 362 (2023).
Dr. Aljindi, still unrepresented, filed the complaint in
this suit in August 2025, alleging that between 2021 and
2025 the government “systematically appropriated” his
“copyrighted [intellectual property]” “for public use without
just compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment.”
S. Appx. 1010. The gravamen of the complaint is the alle-
gation that Dr. Aljindi’s 2015 dissertation describes “spe-
cific methodologies” related to artificial intelligence and
that the government used those methodologies in “twenty-
Case: 26-1180 Document: 16 Page: 3 Filed: 06/08/2026

-- 3 of 10 --

ALJINDI v. US 4
three major artificial intelligence [ ] initiatives.” S. Appx.
1010–11; see S. Appx. 1013–22.
The complaint describes the facts as showing a “viola-
tion of 28 U.S.C. § 1498(b),” which provides a right of action
against the United States for its copyright infringement.
S. Appx. 1010. But the complaint expressly invokes only
the Claims Court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction. S. Appx. 1026
(describing suit as “grounded solely in the Tucker Act and
Fifth Amendment takings”). S. Appx. 1004. It also asserts
that the adverse judgment on Dr. Aljindi’s earlier copy-
right-infringement claim should not have preclusive effect
because that claim “was dismissed primarily as sounding
in copyright infringement . . ., not Tucker Act takings,” in
contrast to the present suit. S. Appx. 1026. The complaint
requests a declaratory judgment that “the United States
has taken Dr. Aljindi’s [intellectual property] for public use
without just compensation” and seeks approximately $1.8
billion in damages, without reference to the statutory dam-
ages available for copyright infringement under § 1498(b)
and the Copyright Act. See S. Appx. 1031.
In September 2025, the government moved to dismiss
the complaint for failure to state a claim under Rule
12(b)(6) of the Rules of the Court of Federal Claims
(RCFC). See S. Appx. 1009. Shortly thereafter, the Claims
Court sua sponte dismissed the complaint under RCFC
12(h)(3) for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and denied
the government’s motion as moot. S. Appx. 1001–05.
The Claims Court held that it lacks jurisdiction under
the Tucker Act “to hear takings claims based on alleged
copyright infringement.” S. Appx. 1003–04. It analogized
to the decision of this court in Golden v. United States, 955
F.3d 981, 986–88 (Fed. Cir. 2020), in which, interpreting
the language of § 1498(a), which provides a right of action
against the government for patent infringement, we held
that the Claims Court lacks Tucker Act jurisdiction “to
hear takings claims based on alleged patent infringement
Case: 26-1180 Document: 16 Page: 4 Filed: 06/08/2026

-- 4 of 10 --

ALJINDI v. US 5
by the government” because such claims “are to be pursued
exclusively under . . . § 1498.” The Claims Court further
reasoned that it “need not consider whether [Dr. Aljindi]
states a claim for copyright infringement,” because it inter-
preted the complaint, notwithstanding its one reference to
§ 1498(b), as asserting only a taking-based cause of action
under the Tucker Act, citing the complaint’s “express[ ]”
and “unequivocal” statement that its sole basis is the
Tucker Act. S. Appx. 1004 (citing S. Appx. 1010, 1026).
Having thus concluded that it lacked jurisdiction on the
only basis properly raised by Dr. Aljindi’s complaint, the
Claims Court dismissed the complaint. S. Appx. 1005.
Dr. Aljindi timely appealed. We have jurisdiction un-
der 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3).
II
Dr. Aljindi challenges the dismissal of the complaint on
two grounds. He argues that the Claims Court erred in
interpreting the complaint as asserting jurisdiction only
under the Tucker Act. E.g., Aljindi Informal Br. at 17, 21,
23. He also insists that, even if the court was right to so
read his complaint, it erred in holding that it lacked Tucker
Act jurisdiction over his claims. E.g., id. at 15–16, 21–23.
We are unpersuaded by Dr. Aljindi’s arguments.
We review the Claims Court’s dismissal for lack of sub-
ject-matter jurisdiction without deference. Allen v. United
States, 88 F.4th 983, 986 (Fed. Cir. 2023). A plaintiff has
the burden to establish the Claims Court’s jurisdiction.
Taylor v. United States, 303 F.3d 1357, 1359 (Fed. Cir.
2002). The complaint of an unrepresented plaintiff is held
to a less stringent pleading standard than one drafted by a
lawyer. Matthews v. United States, 750 F.3d 1320, 1322
(Fed. Cir. 2014) (citing Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520
(1972)). That principle does not, however, relieve an un-
represented plaintiff of his burden to establish jurisdiction.
Kelley v. Secretary, United States Department of Labor, 812
F.2d 1378, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1987).
Case: 26-1180 Document: 16 Page: 5 Filed: 06/08/2026

-- 5 of 10 --

ALJINDI v. US 6
We reject Dr. Aljindi’s argument that his complaint’s
one reference to § 1498(b) undermines the Claims Court’s
conclusion that the complaint invokes only Tucker Act ju-
risdiction. Aljindi Informal Br. at 21. The complaint com-
municates in no uncertain terms that Dr. Aljindi’s suit “is
grounded solely in the Tucker Act and Fifth Amendment
takings.” S. Appx. 1026. It refers to uncompensated tak-
ings pervasively. See, e.g., S. Appx. 1010, 1011, 1012, 1013,
1014, 1022, 1031. And the complaint’s sole mention of “cop-
yright infringement” is to distinguish Dr. Aljindi’s earlier
copyright suit which, the complaint says, was different
from the present “Tucker Act takings” suit, apparently to
preempt a preclusion defense. S. Appx. 1026 (“Prior cases
. . . do not preclude this action.”). In these circumstances,
the complaint’s single passing reference to the govern-
ment’s alleged “violation of § 1498(b),” followed by the ex-
press disclaimer of a § 1498 theory of jurisdiction for an
indicated reason, was not a sufficient basis for the Claims
Court to exercise jurisdiction pursuant to § 1498, even for
an unrepresented litigant. See RCFC 8(a) (requiring “plain
statement of the grounds for court’s jurisdiction” (emphasis
added)).
The question that remains is whether the Claims Court
had Tucker Act jurisdiction over Dr. Aljindi’s claims for un-
compensated takings of his property in a copyright. The
Claims Court answered “no,” because § 1498 is the sole
means for pursuing relief for a copyright violation.
Section 1498 reads, in relevant part:
(a) Whenever an invention described in and cov-
ered by a patent of the United States is used or
manufactured by or for the United States without
license of the owner thereof or lawful right to use
or manufacture the same, the owner’s remedy shall
be by action against the United States in the
[Claims Court] for the recovery of his reasonable
Case: 26-1180 Document: 16 Page: 6 Filed: 06/08/2026

-- 6 of 10 --

ALJINDI v. US 7
and entire compensation for such use and manu-
facture. . . .
(b) Hereafter, whenever the copyright in any work
protected under the copyright laws of the United
States shall be infringed by the United States, by a
corporation owned or controlled by the United
States, or by a contractor, subcontractor, or any
person, firm, or corporation acting for the Govern-
ment and with the authorization or consent of the
Government, the exclusive action which may be
brought for such infringement shall be an action by
the copyright owner against the United States in
the [Claims Court] for the recovery of his reasona-
ble and entire compensation as damages for such
infringement, including the minimum statutory
damages as set forth in section 504(c) of title 17,
United States Code[.] . . .
Except as otherwise provided by law, no recovery
shall be had for any infringement of a copyright
covered by this subsection committed more than
three years prior to the filing of the complaint or
counterclaim for infringement in the action, . . . .
Dr. Aljindi argues at length that copyrights are prop-
erty and that they can be the subject of a taking. Aljindi
Informal Br. at 6–8, 15–18, 21–23; see, e.g., id. at 16 (incor-
rectly characterizing basis for dismissal as that “copyrights
are not compensable property” (cleaned up)). But the
Claims Court did not disagree with that proposition. It
held only that the Tucker Act does not give it jurisdiction
over that type of taking because the § 1498 remedy is ex-
clusive. Dr. Aljindi presents no meaningful argument di-
rected at that conclusion.
The Claims Court’s reasoning is persuasive. The
Claims Court has Tucker Act jurisdiction over a claim for
just compensation under the Fifth Amendment’s Takings
Clause “unless Congress has withdrawn the Tucker Act
Case: 26-1180 Document: 16 Page: 7 Filed: 06/08/2026

-- 7 of 10 --

ALJINDI v. US 8
grant of jurisdiction.” Horne v. Department of Agriculture,
569 U.S. 513, 526–27 (2013) (citation omitted). In United
States v. Bormes, 568 U.S. 6 (2012), the Supreme Court
held that “[t]he Tucker Act is displaced [ ] when a law as-
sertedly imposing monetary liability on the United States
contains its own judicial remedies,” emphasizing that a
“specific remedial scheme” (there, a statute providing for
redress for certain violations of consumer privacy under
the Fair Credit Reporting Act) “supersedes the gap-filling
role of the Tucker Act.” Id. at 12–13; see id. at 13 (citing
Hinck v. United States, 550 U.S. 501, 506 (2007) (no Tucker
Act jurisdiction over claims for erroneously assessed tax in-
terest where “precisely drawn, detailed statute” provides
for relief in Tax Court (citation omitted)), United States
v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439, 454 (1988) (no Tucker Act jurisdic-
tion over back pay claims for which the Civil Service Re-
form Act provides “comprehensive and integrated review
scheme”), and United States v. Erika, Inc., 456 U.S. 201,
206–08 (1982) (no Tucker Act jurisdiction to hear dispute
over amount of Medicare Part B payments, where Medicare
statute provides review scheme)).
In determining whether § 1498(b) ousts Tucker Act ju-
risdiction, our “lodestar” must be “the language of the stat-
ute.” Erika, 456 U.S. at 206. The statute unambiguously
states that “whenever the copyright in any work protected
under the copyright laws . . . shall be infringed by the
United States, . . . the exclusive action which may be
brought for such infringement shall be an action by the cop-
yright owner . . . in the [Claims Court] for the recovery of
. . . damages for such infringement[.]” § 1498(b) (emphasis
added). It, further, incorporates by reference the “mini-
mum statutory damages” and (impliedly) the definition of
copyright infringement found in the Copyright Act, and it
duplicates that Act’s three-year statute of limitations. See
§ 1498(b) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 504(c)). Section 1498(b) thus
sets out a detailed remedial scheme: It defines the forum,
proper plaintiff, liable acts, limitations period, and remedy,
Case: 26-1180 Document: 16 Page: 8 Filed: 06/08/2026

-- 8 of 10 --

ALJINDI v. US 9
and it authorizes judicial relief. Cf. Bormes, 506 U.S. at
13–14. What is more, it does so in language explicitly em-
phasizing the “exclusive” nature of its right of action, which
strongly indicates Congress’s intent that simultaneous
Tucker Act jurisdiction not be available. See id.; Hinck, 550
U.S. at 506 (finding Tucker Act jurisdiction displaced even
without express language of exclusivity); see also Lehman
v. Nakshian, 453 U.S. 156, 161 (1981) (explaining that
waivers of sovereign immunity are to be strictly construed).
As the Claims Court rightly observed, S. Appx. 1004,
that analysis accords with our decision in Golden, 955 F.3d
at 986–88, concerning § 1498(a), which addresses patents.
In Golden, we held that “the Claims Court does not have
jurisdiction to hear takings claims based on alleged patent
infringement by the government” because such claims are
“to be pursued exclusively under 28 U.S.C. § 1498[(a)],”
which provision, we recognized, “was intended alone to pro-
vide for . . . a right to sue [the government] for [patent] in-
fringement.” Id. at 987–88 (internal quotation marks and
citations omitted). Section 1498(a), although not expressly
exclusive, defines a proper plaintiff (a patent owner), a fo-
rum (the Claims Court), a liable act (patent infringement
by use or manufacture of a patented article by the United
States), and a remedy (reasonable compensation). Section
1498(b) is more detailed insofar as it includes a statute of
limitations different from the general time-bar of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2501, and it actually is expressly exclusive. If § 1498(a)
displaces Tucker Act jurisdiction for takings claims based
in patent infringement, the case is even stronger that
§ 1498(b) does the same for takings claims based in copy-
right infringement. See Gaylord v. United States, 678 F.3d
1339, 1343 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (interpreting § 1498(b) in view
of § 1498(a)); Auerbach v. Sverdrup Corp., 829 F.2d 175,
180–81 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (same).
In light of the foregoing, we see no error in the Claims
Court’s conclusion that it lacked jurisdiction over Dr.
Aljindi’s copyright-infringement takings claims. Dr.
Case: 26-1180 Document: 16 Page: 9 Filed: 06/08/2026

-- 9 of 10 --

ALJINDI v. US 10
Aljindi complains that the Claims Court “mischarac-
teriz[ed]” his claims as “mere copyright infringement,”
Aljindi Informal Br. at 6, but does not explain how the
Claims Court was wrong to say that the complaint asserts
“takings claims based on copyright infringement,” S. Appx.
1004. The complaint itself refers to underlying acts of re-
production as supporting its allegations of uncompensated
takings. See, e.g., S. Appx. 1015 (asserting that govern-
ment documents are “identical to Dr. Aljindi’s dissertation
expressions”). Dr. Aljindi does not identify a taking apart
from the asserted underlying acts of infringement. Dr.
Aljindi has thus failed to show error in the Claims Court’s
holding that his claims were of the kind that must be
brought under § 1498(b) and therefore outside the Claims
Court’s Tucker Act jurisdiction.
III
We have considered Dr. Aljindi’s remaining arguments
and find them unpersuasive. The judgment of the Claims
Court is affirmed.
The parties shall bear their own costs.
AFFIRMED
Case: 26-1180 Document: 16 Page: 10 Filed: 06/08/2026

-- 10 of 10 --