United States v. Liounis

24-2138
United States v. Liounis
In the
United States Court of Appeals
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
A UGUST TERM 2025
No. 24-2138
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA,
Appellee,
v.
PETER L IOUNIS ,
Defendant-Appellant.*
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of New York
S UBMITTED: A PRIL 30, 2026
D ECIDED: JUNE 15, 2026
Before: L YNCH , MENASHI, and K AHN, Circuit Judges.
The Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act provides that if
“the debtor so requests … the action or proceeding in which the writ,
order, or judgment was issued shall be transferred to the district court
for the district in which the debtor resides.” 28 U.S.C. § 3004(b)(2). The
* The Clerk of Court is directed to amend the caption as set forth above.

-- 1 of 13 --

2
district court interpreted the statute to afford discretion to deny a
motion to transfer. We conclude, however, that the word “shall”
means that transfer is mandatory when the debtor requests it.
Pursuant to the reasoning of the Supreme Court in Lexecon Inc. v.
Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26 (1998), the denial of
the transfer is not subject to harmless error review. We therefore
vacate the judgment and remand for the district court to entertain a
renewed motion to transfer the proceedings to the district in which
Liounis resides.
Peter Liounis, pro se, Butner, NC.
Varuni Nelson (Daniel G. Saavedra, on the brief),
Assistant United States Attorneys, for Joseph Nocella, Jr.,
United States Attorney for the Eastern District of New
York, Brooklyn, NY, for Appellee.
MENASHI, Circuit Judge:
Peter Liounis timely moved the district court to transfer a
pending garnishment action to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, the federal district court for the district in
which Liounis then resided. The district court denied the motion and
resolved the merits of the action. In the Federal Debt Collection
Procedures Act, however, Congress provided that if “the debtor so
requests,” the action “shall be transferred to the district court for the
district in which the debtor resides.” 28 U.S.C. § 3004(b)(2) (emphasis
added). This language means that transfer is mandatory when the
debtor requests it. The Supreme Court has said that an erroneous
failure to transfer venue is not subject to harmless error review. We

-- 2 of 13 --

3
reach the same conclusion with respect to the failure of the district
court to transfer the garnishment action in this case. We vacate the
judgment and remand for the district court to consider a renewed
motion to transfer the action to the district in which Liounis resides.
I
In 2014, Liounis was convicted on nine counts of fraud and
sentenced to 292 months of imprisonment and restitution of
approximately $3.8 million.1 Ten years later, the government moved
pursuant to the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act for a writ of
garnishment to collect the required restitution payments from
Liounis.2 The government explained that Liounis had defaulted on
his restitution payments and that it believed the law firm of Cannata,
Hendele & Cannata, LLP would soon receive funds in which Liounis
had a substantial nonexempt interest.3 Those funds resulted from a
settlement award from the September 11th Victims Compensation
Fund relating to medical complications Liounis suffered from being
incarcerated at the Metropolitan Correctional Center on September
11, 2001, in connection with an earlier fraud case.4
In accordance with the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act,
the clerk of court issued the writ of garnishment against the law firm
1 See Judgment, United States v. Liounis, No. 12-CR-350 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 26,
2014), ECF No. 249.
2 See Application for a Writ of Continuing Garnishment, United States v.
Liounis, No. 12-CR-350 (E.D.N.Y. May 2, 2024), ECF No. 327.
3 See Letter, United States v. Liounis, No. 12-CR-350 (E.D.N.Y. June 10, 2024),
ECF No. 333.
4 See Answer of the Garnishee, United States v. Liounis, No. 12-CR-350
(E.D.N.Y. May 16, 2024), ECF No. 329.

-- 3 of 13 --

4
and sent a notice to Liounis as the judgment debtor.5 Seventeen days
after that, Liounis, proceeding pro se, sent a letter objecting to the
garnishment order.6 In the letter, Liounis made several substantive
objections to the garnishment order. He argued that the funds were
statutorily exempt from garnishment, that the award of restitution
was not included in the indictment, and that the district judge who
had presided over his criminal case had a conflict of interest. Liounis
also requested that the district court appoint counsel, afford him a
hearing, and transfer the action and all further proceedings regarding
the garnishment order to the U.S. District Court for the Eastern
District of North Carolina, the federal district court for the district
where Liounis was then incarcerated.
The district court denied Liounis’s requests and objections. It
held that the September 11th settlement funds were “not exempt from
garnishment” under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. United
States v. Liounis, No. 12-CR-350, 2024 WL 3470592, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. July
19, 2024); see 18 U.S.C. § 3613(a)(1) (providing that “property exempt
from levy for taxes” pursuant to specified provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code “shall be exempt from enforcement of the judgment
under Federal law”). It further held that Liounis was not entitled to a
hearing or to a transfer to the Eastern District of North Carolina. It
denied the hearing because “Liounis’s objection is baseless,”
concerned an issue that “is plain as a matter of statutory
interpretation,” and required “no factfinding.” Liounis, 2024 WL
5 See Order, United States v. Liounis, No. 12-CR-350 (E.D.N.Y. May 3, 2024),
ECF No. 328.
6 See Letter, United States v. Liounis, No. 12-CR-350 (E.D.N.Y. May 29, 2024),
ECF No. 332 (objecting to the garnishment order in a letter mailed on May
20, 2024).

-- 4 of 13 --

5
3470592, at *2. The district court said that “[a]n evidentiary hearing is
therefore unnecessary.” Id.
Interpreting the transfer-of-venue provision in the Federal Debt
Collection Procedures Act, 28 U.S.C. § 3004(b)(2), the district court
decided “that transfer ‘is not mandatory,’ and ‘that venue can be
denied under Section 3004(b)(2) if the government shows good cause
to do so.’” Id. at *3 (alterations omitted) (quoting United States v.
O’Brien, 851 F. App’x 236, 238 (2d Cir. 2021)). The district court
explained that the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act contains a
separate provision that “grants district courts plenary authority to
‘make an order denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating,
extending, or modifying the use of any enforcement procedure under
the statute.’” Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 3013). According to the district
court, that provision authorizes the denial of a motion to transfer
under § 3004(b)(2).
Liounis timely appealed. He argues, among other things, that
the district court erred by denying his motion to transfer.7
II
This appeal concerns the interpretation of the transfer-of-venue
provision of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act. When we
resolve an appeal, we “consider questions of statutory interpretation
de novo.” Giovinco v. Pullen, 118 F.4th 527, 530 (2d Cir. 2024).
7 An order of garnishment is final and appealable. See United States v.
Yalincak, 853 F.3d 629, 637-38 (2d Cir. 2017); United States v. Shkreli, 47 F.4th
65, 70 (2d Cir. 2022).

-- 5 of 13 --

6
A
Before Congress enacted the Federal Debt Collection
Procedures Act, the government could collect on the debts it was
owed through state law procedures as modified by a federal statute
that allowed nationwide execution. See United States v. Thornton,
672 F.2d 101, 103-04 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Congress aimed through the
Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act “to create a comprehensive
statutory framework for the collection of debts owed to the United
States.” Small Bus. Ass’n v. Bensal, 853 F.3d 992, 994 (9th Cir. 2017). The
government may use the uniform procedures of the Act to collect
payments owed pursuant to an order of restitution issued in a
criminal case under the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act. See United
States v. Cohan, 798 F.3d 84, 89 (2d Cir. 2015).
The Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act authorizes three
forms of postjudgment relief for the government to collect debts it is
owed: a writ of execution, a judgment ordering the debtor to make
installment payments, and a writ of garnishment against property in
possession of someone other than the debtor. 28 U.S.C. §§ 3203-05.8
Regardless of the form of relief, in any “action or proceeding … to
obtain a remedy, the counsel for the United States shall prepare, and
[the] clerk of the court shall issue, a notice” that describes the action
taken to collect the debt and the rights of the debtor or the garnishee
to oppose it. 28 U.S.C. § 3202(b). The Act further provides that “[i]f
the debtor so requests, within 20 days after receiving the notice
described in section … 3202(b), the action or proceeding in which the
8 The government may also utilize writs available under the All Writs Act.
See 28 U.S.C. § 3202(a).

-- 6 of 13 --

7
writ, order, or judgment was issued shall be transferred to the district
court for the district in which the debtor resides.” Id. § 3004(b)(2).
B
The Supreme Court has said that “the word ‘shall’ imposes a
mandatory command” because “‘[s]hall’ means ‘must.’” Bufkin v.
Collins, 604 U.S. 369, 379 (2025). The Court has even emphasized this
point in the context of a statutory provision about venue. The
multidistrict litigation statute allows the judicial panel on
multidistrict litigation to transfer “civil actions involving one or more
common questions of fact” to “any district for coordinated or
consolidated pretrial proceedings.” 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a). The statute
provides that “[e]ach action so transferred shall be remanded by the
panel at or before the conclusion of such pretrial proceedings to the
district from which it was transferred.” Id. (emphasis added).
The Supreme Court has explained that the “instruction” for the
panel to remand “comes in terms of the mandatory ‘shall,’ which
normally creates an obligation impervious to judicial discretion.”
Lexecon Inc. v. Milberg Weiss Bershad Hynes & Lerach, 523 U.S. 26, 35
(1998). The Court said that it needed “to give effect to this plain
command even if doing that will reverse the longstanding practice
under the statute and the rule.” Id. (citation omitted). The Court
acknowledged that the argument “may or may not be correct that
permitting transferee courts to make self-assignments would be more
desirable than preserving a plaintiff’s choice of venue … but the
proper venue for resolving that issue remains the floor of Congress.”
Id. at 40. The policy argument cannot “unsettle the straightforward
language imposing the [p]anel’s responsibility to remand, which bars
recognizing any self-assignment power in a transferee court.” Id.
Courts are “bound by a venue statute” that “categorically limits the

-- 7 of 13 --

8
authority of courts … to override a plaintiff’s choice.” Id. at 42. “[I]n
the circumstances described in the statute no discretion is to be left to
a court faced with an objection” to the improper venue. Id.
Indeed, as a general matter, “[t]he requirement of venue is
specific and unambiguous; it is not one of those vague principles
which, in the interest of some overriding policy, is to be given a
‘liberal’ construction.” Olberding v. Illinois Cent. R. Co., 346 U.S. 338,
340 (1953). A party who has not “consented” to venue “has a right to
invoke the protection which Congress has afforded him.” Id.
In the transfer-of-venue provision of the Federal Debt
Collection Procedures Act, Congress similarly used the mandatory
“shall,” and we accordingly must give effect to that plain command.
28 U.S.C. § 3004(b)(2). We agree with those circuits that have held that
“because the plain language of this statute is mandatory, the district
court must grant such a transfer as long as it is made in a timely
manner.” United States v. Nash, 175 F.3d 440, 442 (6th Cir. 1999); see
also United States v. Peters, 783 F.3d 1361, 1364 (11th Cir. 2015) (“‘Shall’
creates an obligation not subject to judicial discretion.”); United States
v. Brumbaugh, 139 F.4th 1077, 1082 (9th Cir. 2025) (“We agree with our
colleagues on the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits.”). As it did in the
multidistrict litigation statute, Congress provided in § 3004(b)(2) that
“no discretion is to be left to a court faced with an objection” from the
debtor to a venue outside the district in which he resides. Lexecon, 523
U.S. at 42.9
9 The Seventh Circuit has held in an unpublished opinion that a district
court may deny a debtor’s “request to transfer the collection proceedings”
because “in postjudgment proceedings, it is ‘logical’ and sound judicial
administration to defer to the rendering court which is familiar with the
underlying issues.” United States v. Furkin, 165 F.3d 33, 1998 WL 846873, at
*4 (7th Cir. 1998) (quoting In re Joint E. & S. Districts Asbestos Litig., 22 F.3d

-- 8 of 13 --

9
The district court decided that the mandatory language of
§ 3004(b)(2) could be overridden through a separate provision of the
Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act that allows a district court to
“at any time on its own initiative or the motion of any interested
person, and after such notice as it may require, make an order
denying, limiting, conditioning, regulating, extending, or modifying
the use of any enforcement procedure under this chapter.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 3013. The district court followed other district courts in concluding
that § 3013 authorizes a departure from the otherwise mandatory
transfer rule of § 3004(b)(2). See, e.g., United States v. Montijo, No. 17-
CR-518, 2021 WL 2470507, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 19, 2021) (concluding
that Ҥ 3004(b)(2) does not deprive this [c]ourt of its authority, under
§ 3013, to vary ‘the use of any enforcement procedure under the
statute’” and that “in this case there is good cause for denying the
transfer request”).10
But those courts are wrong. The authority to “make an order”
limiting or modifying “the use of any enforcement procedure”
empowers the district court to regulate how the government enforces
755, 763 n.16 (7th Cir. 1994)). In that case the Seventh Circuit “paid
insufficient attention to the language of [the] statutory provisions,” so we
decline to follow it. Louisiana v. Callais, 146 S. Ct. 1131, 1146 (2026).
10 See also EEOC v. 5042 Holdings Ltd., No. 09-CV-61, 2013 WL 1636577, at *6
(N.D. W. Va. Apr. 16, 2013) (“[A] transfer is not mandatory.”); FTC v.
Affiliate Strategies, Inc., No. 09-4104, 2012 WL 2449869, at *1 (D. Kan. June 26,
2012) (holding that “[t]he FDCPA contains a transfer provision” but “this
language is not mandatory”); United States v. Mathews, 793 F. Supp. 2d 72,
75 (D.D.C. 2011) (“[T]he FDCPA’s transfer provision is not mandatory.”);
United States v. Gipson, 714 F. Supp. 2d 571, 576 (E.D. Va. 2010)
(“[N]otwithstanding the ‘shall be granted’ language of § 3004(b)(2), the
FDCPA vests courts with discretion to deny transfer where retaining
jurisdiction would best effectuate the objectives of the MVRA.”).

-- 9 of 13 --

10
its debt obligations. 28 U.S.C. § 3013. Courts have held, for example,
that the district court may modify the joinder provision of the Federal
Debt Collection Procedures Act, which contemplates joinder on the
motion of “the United States or the debtor,” by joining necessary
parties sua sponte. FTC v. Nat’l Bus. Consultants, Inc., 376 F.3d 317, 320-
21 (5th Cir. 2004) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 3012). The district court may
also be able to modify the final order of garnishment to limit or to
expand the mechanisms for enforcing compliance. See, e.g., United
States v. Lawrence, 538 F. Supp. 2d 1188, 1195 (D.S.D. 2008); United
States v. Ogburn, 499 F. Supp. 2d 28, 30-31 (D.D.C. 2007); United States
v. Kaye, 93 F. Supp. 2d 196, 198 (D. Conn. 2000).
But the transfer-of-venue provision does not implicate the use
of an enforcement procedure. It instead “places a specific restriction
on the court: to refrain from hearing the case and transfer the
proceeding at the debtor’s request.” Brumbaugh, 139 F.4th at 1085
(emphasis added). The provision restricts how a court must
adjudicate disputes that arise from the government’s use of the
enforcement procedures. It would eviscerate the protection that
Congress afforded to debtors if the general authority of the court to
modify the use of enforcement procedures were understood to
override the specific restriction on the authority of the court to deny
the debtor his choice of forum. The language of the statute does not
require that contradictory result.
Even if the adjudicatory process could be considered the use of
an enforcement procedure, “[i]t is a commonplace of statutory
construction that the specific governs the general,” RadLAX Gateway
Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 645 (2012) (quoting
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 384 (1992)),
especially when “Congress has enacted a comprehensive scheme and
has deliberately targeted specific problems with specific solutions,”

-- 10 of 13 --

11
id. (quoting Varity Corp. v. Howe, 516 U.S. 489, 519 (1996) (Thomas, J.,
dissenting)). The specific provision here reflects “a congressional
judgment that in the circumstances described in the statute no
discretion is to be left to a court.” Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 42.
C
In Lexecon, the Supreme Court held that a violation of the
remand requirement in the multidistrict litigation statute could not be
subjected to “the harmless-error doctrine.” Id. at 41. The Court
explained that “the § 1407(a) mandate would lose all meaning if a
party who continuously objected to an uncorrected categorical
violation of the mandate could obtain no relief at the end of the day.”
Id. at 43.
For parallel reasons, the “mandate” to transfer venue at the
debtor’s request “would also ‘lose all meaning’ if a debtor who timely
requested a transfer could obtain no meaningful relief after the
district court denied the request.” Brumbaugh, 139 F.4th at 1086
(quoting Lexecon, 523 U.S. at 43). Courts have applied the logic of
Lexecon to hold that “when venue is improper in a district court under
other statutes, the proper remedy is to reverse rather than review for
harmless error.” Id.11 We agree with the Ninth and Eleventh Circuits
11 See In re HTC Corp., 889 F.3d 1349, 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“[I]f after
judgment venue is determined to have been improper, and the improper-
venue objection was not waived, the appellants will be entitled to assert it
on appeal and, if the objection is sustained, obtain from the appeals court
an order vacating the judgment.”) (internal quotation marks and alteration
omitted); SEC v. Johnson, 650 F.3d 710, 716 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (“[R]eversal is
the appropriate remedy for improper venue, even after a jury trial.”); United
States ex rel. Harvey Gulf Int’l Marine, Inc. v. Md. Cas. Co., 573 F.2d 245, 247-
48 (5th Cir. 1978) (“To embark upon the search for ‘harmless error’ would
be to disregard the unambiguous [c]ongressional mandate that Miller Act

-- 11 of 13 --

12
that a violation of the transfer-of-venue provision is not subject to
harmless error review. See Brumbaugh, 138 F.4th at 1086-87; Peters, 783
F.3d at 1364.
The contrary decision of the Sixth Circuit is not persuasive.
First, the Sixth Circuit did not address the Lexecon decision that
resolved a closely related question. See Nash, 175 F.3d at 443. Second,
the Sixth Circuit considered the factually idiosyncratic circumstance
in which, “[a]t the government’s expense, [the debtor] was
transported from the federal correctional institution in El Reno,
Oklahoma to the hearing” in the Eastern District of Michigan. Id. at
442. Because the debtor “suffered no financial hardship,” the Sixth
Circuit concluded that the purpose of the transfer-of-venue
provision—to provide “the opportunity for a hearing” without
imposing the “inconvenience or undue financial hardship” of
traveling “far distances to attend”—was satisfied, and so the error
was harmless. Id. at 443.12
D
When we have previously considered an appeal involving a
case that should have been transferred, we have exercised “our
statutory and inherent authority to transfer [the] case.” Minette v. Time
Warner, 997 F.2d 1023, 1026 (2d Cir. 1993) (citing Bolar v. Frank, 938
suits be brought in the district in which the contract was to be performed
‘and not elsewhere.’”).
12 In light of our conclusion that the remedy for the erroneous denial of the
motion to transfer is a remand for the district court to entertain a renewed
motion, we do not address Liounis’s argument that the district court erred
by holding that he was not entitled to a hearing. That issue will be decided
by the district court to which the action is transferred. See, e.g., United States
v. Jennings, 755 F. Supp. 3d 922, 928-29 (E.D.N.C. 2024) (denying a hearing
when the debtor raised only legal objections).

-- 12 of 13 --

13
F.2d 377, 379-80 (2d Cir. 1991)). We do not exercise that authority here,
however, because Liounis may no longer reside in the Eastern District
of North Carolina. According to the inmate locator of the Federal
Bureau of Prisons, he has since moved to a residential reentry
facility.13 Rather than order a transfer to North Carolina, therefore,
we vacate the judgment and remand for the district court to consider
a renewed motion to transfer the proceedings to the district in which
Liounis resides.
* * *
The district court might be correct that when a debtor “has not
asserted any meritorious basis for contesting the garnishment
proceedings … granting his request for a transfer would not be an
efficient use of judicial resources.” Liounis, 2024 WL 3470592, at *3. But
“[n]o court can disregard any statutory provisions … on the ground
that in its judgment they are unwise or prejudicial to the interests of
the public.” United States v. Am. Bell Tel. Co., 167 U.S. 224, 247 (1897).
Congress “may amend the statutory language,” but “[u]ntil then, ‘it
is of course our job to apply faithfully the law Congress has written.’”
Lackey v. Stinnie, 604 U.S. 192, 205 (2025) (quoting Henson v. Santander
Consumer USA Inc., 582 U.S. 79, 89 (2017)). We vacate the judgment
and remand for the district court to consider a renewed motion to
transfer.
13 See Federal Bureau of Prisons, Inmate Locator, https://perma.cc/ZQY5-
YFGQ.

-- 13 of 13 --