N.v. Siravo v. Siravo

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 07-4108
___________
N.V. SIRAVO; *F.A. SIRAVO
vs.
COUNTRY WIDE HOME LOAN; DEUTSCHE BANK NATIONAL TRUST
COMPANY, Trustee; MORGAN STANLEY ABS CAPITAL I, INC., TRUST 2004-
NCZ, MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES, SERIES 2004-NCZ
N.V. SIRAVO, Appellant
*(Dismissed per Clerk’s Order of 12/4/07)
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-07-cv-01112)
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 14, 2009
Before: SCIRICA, Chief Judge, CHAGARES and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: October 1, 2009)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM.
Appellant Nicholas V. Siravo appeals from the dismissal of his civil suit

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pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). For the following reasons, we will
affirm.
On June 28, 2007, Nicholas and Felicia Siravo filed suit in federal district
court against Appellees Countrywide Home Loan (“Countrywide”), Deutsche Bank
National Trust Company and Morgan Stanley ABS Capital I., Inc. alleging breach of
contract, predatory lending, negligence, and unspecified civil rights and due process
violations. Their claims arose out of Countrywide’s alleged misrepresentations about their
mortgage, including Countrywide’s alleged failure to properly notify them of the change
in mortgage servicers and their resultant problems in obtaining credit and financing.
Ultimately, the Siravos lost their home to a foreclosure action.
Prior to the initiation of their federal suit, the Siravos had filed three
lawsuits in state court alleging harm arising out of the same initial set of facts alleged
here. The November 2004 suit, filed by Nicholas Siravo only, sought damages against
Countrywide for lack of notice regarding the change in the company servicing the
mortgage. Siravo claimed that the lack of notice resulted in a missed mortgage payment.
Siravo v. Deutsche Bank National Trust Co., November Term, 2004, No. 1774 (Pa. Ct.
Com. Pl. Nov. 2004). That lawsuit settled on March 3, 2005, with an agreement by
Siravo to a general release of all existing claims against Countrywide arising out of the
mortgage loan. The second suit, filed in July 2005, sought damages against Countrywide
for breach of the settlement agreement. Siravo v. Deutsche Countrywide Home Loans,

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Inc., July Term, 2005, No. 1914 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. July 2005). The court dismissed the
case without prejudice for Siravo’s failure to substantiate breach of the settlement
agreement and for his failure to demonstrate what damages were suffered. Apparently,
Siravo did not appeal or seek reconsideration of the court’s order.
In December 2005, the Siravos filed a third lawsuit. The complaint once
again sought damages for Countrywide’s failure to notify and breach of the settlement
agreement. See Siravo v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. et. al., December Term, 2005,
No. 2259 (Pa. Ct. Com. Pl. Dec. 2005). In addition to naming Countrywide, the Siravos
sought damages against Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley with regard to the mortgage
foreclosure resulting from the missed loan payments. On August 21, 2006, the Court of
Common Pleas dismissed the suit as repetitive of the first. The court also advised the
Siravos that their proper remedy was to re-open the order disposing of the 2004 suit.
Taking the court’s suggestion, Siravo attempted to re-open his first case against
Countrywide, arguing that Appellees breached the settlement agreement resolving that
action. Siravo also filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The Court of
Common Pleas denied both of motions and Siravo did not appeal those orders.
Following dismissal of their third lawsuit in state court, the Siravos filed the
instant complaint alleging that Appellees violated their civil rights and various federal
laws. Countrywide moved to dismiss the complaint arguing that it was barred by res
judicata and the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. The District Court granted its motion and,

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Felicia Siravo has been dismissed from this appeal pursuant to a Clerk’s order.1
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citing the doctrine of res judicata, dismissed the case. This appeal followed.1
We have jurisdiction over final orders of district courts under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291. Our review of the district court’s dismissal of a complaint pursuant to Rule
12(b)(6) is plenary. McGovern v. City of Phila., 554 F.3d 114, 115 (3d Cir. 2009).
We agree with Appellees that Siravo’s claims are barred by the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine and therefore the District Court should have dismissed the case for lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine “prohibits District Courts
from adjudicating actions in which the relief requested requires determining whether the
state court’s decision is wrong or voiding the state court’s ruling.” Walker v. Horn, 385
F.3d 321, 329 (3d Cir. 2004) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted.) Here, to
the extent that Siravo attempts to challenge Countrywide’s servicing of his loan, those
claims were resolved in a state court settlement agreement. Siravo attempted to file a
separate lawsuit concerning the agreement and, when that failed, attempted to re-open the
original case and also filed a motion to enforce the settlement agreement. The Court of
Common Pleas denied both motions and Siravo did not appeal. (Supp. App. 12-13.) The
relief Siravo now seeks would require a federal court to either invalidate the settlement
agreement or determine that the state court’s refusal to re-examine the parties’
compliance with the agreement was wrong. Under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, neither
is permissible. See Desi’s Pizza, Inc. v. City of Wilkes-Barre, 321 F.3d 411, 419 (3d Cir.

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2003).
Further, even if Siravo’s claims were not barred by Rooker-Feldman, they
would be barred by the doctrine of res judicata. The principle of res judicata bars claims
that were brought, or could have been brought, in a previous action. In re Mullarkey, 536
F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008). The District Court properly applied the same factors a
Pennsylvania court would apply in determining whether res judicata bars Siravo’s federal
claims, namely: 1) whether the action in the Court of Common Pleas involved the same
“cause of action” as the federal claims; 2) whether the parties had the capacities to sue or
be sued in the Court of Common Pleas; and 3) whether the litigation in the Court of
Common Pleas resulted in a decision on the merits. See Lance v. Dennis, 546 U.S. 459,
466 (2006); Turner v. Crawford Square Apartments III, L.P., 449 F.3d 542, 548 (3d Cir.
2006) (listing factors necessary for res judicata inquiry).
Here, the first element is satisfied inasmuch as Siravo’s first complaint,
which led to the settlement agreement, contained the same allegation as his federal
complaint: that miscommunications regarding his loan and errors Countrywide committed
led to the foreclosure of his house. (Supp. App. 61-67.) Further, Siravo’s third lawsuit
brought claims related to Countrywide’s breach of the settlement agreement. Second,
while Siravo named only Countrywide in the first complaint, he could have named both
Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley and did so in the third lawsuit. In any event, though
he names both Deutsche Bank and Morgan Stanley in the caption, it does not appear that

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Siravo makes any claims against either of these defendants in his federal complaint.
Third, under Pennsylvania law, a court-approved settlement, such as the one Siravo
agreed to, constitutes a final, valid judgment for purposes of claim preclusion. Bearoff v.
Bearoff Bros., Inc., 327 A.2d 72, 75 (Pa. 1974). Finally, the Court of Common Pleas
dismissed Siravo’s third state court lawsuit with prejudice but noted that Siravo had an
option to re-open the 2004 action. As discussed above, Siravo’s attempts to re-open that
action were unsuccessful. We therefore find that the state courts also rejected the merits
of Siravo’s claims based on breach of the settlement agreement. See Gambocz v.
Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837, 840 (3d Cir. 1972) (“[d]ismissal with prejudice constitutes an
adjudication of the merits as fully and completely as if the order had been entered after
trial”) (citation omitted). Thus, even if not barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine,
Siravo’s claims are barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District
Court.
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