David Rivera v. JULIO M. ALGARIN, Warden

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-1360
___________
DAVID RIVERA,
Appellant
v.
JULIO M. ALGARIN, Warden; LAWSON LAMER, State District Attorney’s Office;
ANGELA M. SAMONTE, Orange County Sheriff Office; KAREN G. RICCA,
Montgomery County District Attorney; NINTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT COURT,
for Orlando, Florida; EDWARD RENDELL, Governor
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:07-cv-01116)
District Judge: Honorable Anita B. Brody
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
August 14, 2009
Before: MCKEE, HARDIMAN and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 26, 2009)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
David Rivera appeals pro se from a District Court order granting Defendants’
motions to dismiss the complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). For the reasons that follow, we will affirm the

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In Florida in 2002, Rivera was charged with various crimes. After he was released1
on bond, Rivera failed to appear for trial.
The Court of Common Pleas held that the UCEA, 42 Pa.C.S. § 9121 et seq., rather2
than the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (“IAD”), 42 Pa.C.S. § 9101 et seq., applied,
because Rivera was not yet serving a sentence when Florida issued the detainers. See 42
Pa.C.S. § 9140 (“If a criminal prosecution has been instituted against such person under
the laws of this Commonwealth and is still pending, the Governor . . . [may] hold him
until he has been tried and discharged or convicted and punished in this
Commonwealth.”).
Rivera appealed, arguing that the Court of Common Pleas should have dismissed the3
Florida charges because Florida violated his right to a speedy trial. The Superior Court
held that it lacked jurisdiction to dismiss criminal charges filed in Florida.
2
District Court’s judgment.
I. Background
In June 2003, Rivera was arrested in Northumberland County, Pennsylvania and
incarcerated in county prison on theft and related charges. The day after his arrest, the
State of Florida issued detainers requesting Rivera’s return to Florida in connection with
criminal charges pending there. Rivera pleaded guilty to the Pennsylvania charges. Prior1
to his Pennsylvania sentencing, in March 2004, Rivera filed a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus in Pennsylvania state court, seeking dismissal of the Florida detainers.
The Northumberland County Court of Common Pleas held that Rivera had not
been brought before the court on the Florida detainers in a timely manner pursuant to the
thirty-day requirement of Pennsylvania’s Uniform Criminal Extradition Act (“UCEA”),
42 Pa.C.S. § 9136. The state court therefore granted Rivera’s habeas corpus petition and2
dismissed the Florida detainers. At that time, Rivera was incarcerated in Pennsylvania3

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Rivera moved in Florida state court for consideration nolle prosequi, claiming that4
the Florida criminal charges should have been dismissed because Florida violated his
right to a speedy trial. The Florida court denied the motion, holding that Rivera was not
entitled to the benefit of the speedy trial rule until he either returned to Florida or
requested disposition of the charges in compliance with the IAD. Rivera also sought
mandamus relief, which the Florida court denied for essentially the same reasons.
Rivera was held under the UCEA because he was no longer serving a sentence on5
June 5, 2006.
Although the District Court refers to the commitment order’s date as June 2, 2006,6
this appears to be an error.
3
state prison at Graterford, serving the sentence on his Pennsylvania conviction.
In May 2005, while Rivera was still imprisoned in Pennsylvania, Florida issued
new detainers under the IAD. Rivera was scheduled to complete his sentence and be4
released from SCI-Graterford on June 4, 2006, but he was not released. Instead, he
appeared before the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas on June 5, 2006, which
issued a commitment order against him under the UCEA, 42 Pa. C.S. § 9134, for fleeing5
the charges pending in Florida. The Court of Common Pleas remanded Rivera to the6
Montgomery County prison.
At the end of the UCEA’s thirty-day confinement period, see 42 Pa.C.S. § 9136,
the Commonwealth sought and was granted ex parte permission to confine Rivera for an
additional sixty days, to await Rivera’s extradition papers from Florida. Rivera filed
another state court petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The Montgomery County Court
of Common Pleas granted the petition on August 11, 2006, holding that Rivera’s
confinement should not have been extended without affording Rivera a hearing. The

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4
court again dismissed the Florida detainers. In the interim, on July 31, 2006, Governor
Rendell signed a Governor’s Warrant for Rivera’s detention based on an extradition
request sent by Florida’s governor.
On August 15, 2006, Rivera’s release paperwork was completed, but he was not
permitted to leave the Montgomery County prison. Based upon information provided by
ADA Ricca concerning the pending Florida charges and the Governor’s Warrant, police
issued a criminal complaint charging Rivera with being a fugitive from justice in Florida.
On that basis, Rivera continued to be detained.
Rivera filed yet another state court petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Rivera’s
counsel argued that the detention after the August 11, 2006, grant of habeas relief was
illegal, and that the Commonwealth should have discharged Rivera from custody and
obtained a new Governor’s Warrant. On September 18, 2006, the Court of Common
Pleas granted Rivera’s petition and dismissed and vacated the Governor’s Warrant
without prejudice. Among other things, the court indicated that, under Commonwealth ex
rel. Coffman v. Aytch, 361 A.2d 652, 654 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1976), Rivera should have been
released and immediately rearrested, rather than held continuously.
Pursuant to the September 18, 2006, grant of habeas corpus relief, Rivera was
discharged from the Montgomery County prison on September 20, 2006. He was
immediately re-arrested in a nearby prison parking lot on a new criminal complaint, again
charging him as a fugitive from justice in Florida. On October 12, 2006, within the

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5
permissible thirty-day detention period under the UCEA, Governor Rendell issued a new
Governor’s Warrant.
Rivera filed another state court petition for a writ of habeas corpus. This time, the
Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas denied the writ and ordered Rivera’s
extradition to Florida. Rivera is now serving a sentence in Florida.
Rivera then filed a civil action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania. The District Court appointed
Rivera counsel, and through counsel, Rivera filed an amended complaint. In it, Rivera
alleges that Julio Algarin (warden of the Montgomery County prison), Karen Ricca
(Assistant District Attorney for Montgomery County), and Governor Edward Rendell
violated Rivera’s constitutional rights under the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments by
detaining him after the expiration of his Pennsylvania sentence on June 4, 2006, and
pursuant to the Governor’s Warrant issued on July 31, 2006.
Rivera does not dispute that, at all relevant times, criminal charges were pending
against him in Florida and he was a fugitive from justice there. Rivera also does not
dispute his September 20, 2006, arrest and subsequent detention pursuant to the second
Governor’s Warrant, which ultimately led to his extradition to Florida. Rather, Rivera’s
amended complaint claims that authorities failed to adhere to proper procedures at various
times from June 5, 2006 (the day after he completed his Pennsylvania sentence), through
September 19, 2006, rendering his detention unconstitutional for some or all of that

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“[T]he abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis for § 19837
damages.” Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308 (1986).
Rather, “substantial damages may only be awarded to compensate for actual injury
suffered as a result of the violation of a constitutional right.” Allah v. Al-Hafeez, 226
F.3d 247, 250 (3d Cir. 2000), citing Stachura, 477 U.S. at 308. Although we need not
reach the issue, we express serious doubt as to whether Rivera pled any entitlement to
compensatory damages.
Punitive damages are available under § 1983 “when the defendant’s conduct is8
shown to be motivated by evil motive or intent, or when it involves reckless or callous
indifference to the federally protected rights of others.” Smith v. Wade, 461 U.S. 30, 56,
(1983). Rivera’s amended complaint raised no allegations to support a punitive damages
award.
6
approximately three-month period. He seeks compensatory and punitive damages, as7 8
well as injunctive relief.
On January 10, 2008, the District Court dismissed Rivera’s § 1983 complaint for
failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. It explained that Rivera was
legally detained after June 4, 2006, pursuant to a commitment order. The District Court
further explained that Rivera’s detention pursuant to the first Governor’s Warrant was
likewise legal, because the warrant was validly issued.
Rivera filed a timely notice of appeal.
II. Analysis
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s grant of Defendants’ motion
to dismiss pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Taliaferro v. Darby
Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006). “[W]hen ruling on a defendant’s
motion to dismiss, a judge must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in

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the complaint.” Erickson v. Pardus, 127 S.Ct. 2197, 2200 (2007), citing Bell Atlantic
Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556 (2007). To survive dismissal, a complaint must
contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to “state a claim to relief that is
plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009), citing Twombly,
550 U.S. at 570. In deciding a motion to dismiss, we may consider the allegations of the
complaint, exhibits attached thereto, and matters of public record. See Pension Benefit
Guar. Corp. v. White Consol. Indus. Inc., 998 F.2d 1192, 1196 (3d Cir. 1993).
A. Claims Against Governor Rendell
Rivera contends that Governor Rendell violated his constitutional rights when
Rivera was detained on July 31, 2006, pursuant to the first Governor’s Warrant. Rivera
claims that Governor Rendell issued the warrant “with the knowledge that it had no basis
in law or fact.” Amended Complaint ¶ 52.
The District Court properly dismissed Rivera’s claims against Governor Rendell.
As the District Court correctly observed, there is no dispute that Florida’s extradition
demand was facially valid. See 42 Pa. C.S. § 9124. Pursuant to Pennsylvania law,
Governor Rendell was required to accept that facially valid extradition request and issue a
Governor’s Warrant. See 42 Pa. C.S. §§ 9123, 9128; see also Puerto Rico v. Branstad,
483 U.S. 219, 227 (1987) (“[T]he commands of the Extradition Clause are mandatory,
and afford no discretion to the executive officers or courts of the asylum State.”). A
“governor’s role in evaluating extradition requests and issuing arrest warrants consequent

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to them is judicial in nature and therefore entitled to absolute immunity from suit.” White
v. Armontrout, 29 F.3d 357, 360 (8th Cir. 1994); see also, e.g., Overall v. Univ. of
Penna., 412 F.3d 492, 497 (3d Cir. 2005) (discussing the meaning of “quasi-judicial”
proceedings, and providing as one example “the governor of a State of the United States
engaged in an extradition hearing”); Miller v. Davis, 521 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2008)
(governor entitled to absolute immunity when acting in a quasi-judicial role); Dababnah
v. Keller-Burnside, 208 F.3d 467, 471-72 (4th Cir. 2000) (extradition is intimately
associated with judicial phase of criminal process).
B. Claims Against Defendant Ricca
Prosecutors are generally immune from liability for damages in actions brought
pursuant to § 1983. See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 430 (1976). Although
prosecutorial immunity is not unlimited in scope, it clearly applies when prosecutors are
acting in the role of advocates on behalf of the state. See id.; see also Odd v. Malone, 538
F.3d 202, 208 (3d Cir. 2008).
Based upon our review of the amended complaint, Rivera’s allegations against
Defendant Ricca are limited to actions concerning the initiation (and, after the state
court’s grant of habeas corpus relief, re-initiation) of extradition proceedings concerning
the charges pending against Rivera in Florida. See Amended Complaint ¶¶ 20, 33.
Ricca’s efforts to initiate extradition proceedings against Rivera are prosecutorial in
nature and entitle her to immunity from liability. See Ross v. Meagan, 638 F.2d 646,

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648-49 (3d Cir. 1981), overruled on other grounds by Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319,
328 (1989); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 205 (3d Cir. 1975); see also, e.g.,
Dababnah, 208 F.3d at 471-72.
In addition to monetary damages, Rivera seeks injunctive relief against Defendant
Ricca, requesting that “all future detentions . . . be done lawfully and in a manner
consistent with the preservation of Mr. Rivera’s constitutional rights.” See Amended
Complaint ¶¶ 50(c), 59(c). To the extent Rivera’s claim for injunctive relief attempts to
obtain an immediate or a speedier release from incarceration, it is barred by Preiser v.
Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 476-77 (1973). In addition, the claim is moot. In general, a
claim becomes moot “when the issues presented are no longer ‘live’ or the parties lack a
legally cognizable interest in the outcome.” Murphy v. Hunt, 455 U.S. 478, 481 (1982).
Because there is no dispute that Rivera’s extradition proceedings are concluded, Rivera
no longer has a cognizable interest in avoiding unconstitutional detentions while awaiting
extradition to Florida. Any unrelated future prosecutions or detentions that Rivera might
face are far too speculative to warrant an award of injunctive relief.
C. Claims Against Defendant Algarin
Rivera alleges that Defendant Algarin unconstitutionally detained him after June 4,
2006. Through June 4, 2006, Rivera had been serving a Pennsylvania sentence at SCI-
Graterford. On June 5, 2006, Rivera was ordered to appear before the Montgomery
County Court of Common Pleas, which ordered him remanded to Montgomery County

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We address only Rivera’s damages claims. Rivera has no viable claim for injunctive9
relief against Defendant Algarin, for the same reasons he has no viable claim for
injunctive relief against Defendant Ricca. See supra.
The Court of Common Pleas struggled with Pennsylvania case law holding that an10
individual cannot be “re-arrested” if not first discharged from custody. See Coffman, 361
A.2d at 654. For purposes of Rivera’s § 1983 action, we question whether this technical
requirement of Pennsylvania procedure rises to the level of a due process deprivation.
See, e.g., Barton v. Norrod, 106 F.3d 1289, 1295 (6th Cir. 1997) (“[F]ailure to comply
with established procedures does not deprive the fugitive of any protected right.”).
Moreover, there is no dispute that the Commonwealth could have cured the arguable
procedural flaw by releasing and immediately re-arresting Rivera. “[T]o establish a
§ 1983 claim for monetary relief, including a showing of damages, [plaintiff] will have to
prove that he suffered some deprivation of liberty greater than that which he would have
suffered through extradition in full compliance with the UCEA.” Knowlin v. Thompson,
207 F.3d 907, 909 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, if Rivera stated a due process claim at all, it
appears he would be entitled to no more than nominal damages. See Farrar v. Hobby, 506
U.S. 103, 112 (1992); see also, e.g., Harden v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 1289, 1300-01 (11th Cir.
2003).
10
prison to await extradition to Florida. When Rivera arrived at the Montgomery County
prison on June 5, 2006, Algarin could not permissibly release him. As warden of that
facility, Algarin was bound to act pursuant to the state court’s commitment order. An
“action taken pursuant to a facially valid court order receives absolute immunity from
§ 1983 lawsuits for damages.” Hamilton v. Leavy, 322 F.3d 776, 782-83 (3d Cir. 2003);9
see also Lockhart v. Hoenstine, 411 F.2d 455, 460 (3d Cir. 1969). Thus, the District
Court properly dismissed Rivera’s § 1983 damages claim concerning this detention.
Rivera successfully challenged this detention in a petition for a writ of habeas
corpus, which the Montgomery County Court of Common Pleas granted on August 11,
2006. Thus, as of August 11, 2006, the commitment order was no longer facially valid,10

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We surmise that the completion of Rivera’s release paperwork was an effort to11
satisfy Pennsylvania’s procedural requirements under Coffman, 361 A.2d at 654.
Rivera challenged this detention via another successful state court petition for a writ12
of habeas corpus. Once he was granted habeas corpus relief, the Governor’s Warrant no
longer provided a facially valid basis for detaining Rivera. As a result of the grant of
habeas corpus relief, Rivera was discharged from the Montgomery County prison on
September 20, 2006. Although he was immediately re-arrested in a nearby prison parking
lot and detained on another criminal complaint charging him with being a fugitive from
justice in Florida, Rivera does not challenge the September 20, 2006, detention that
ultimately led to his extradition to Florida.
11
and did not provide a further basis for detaining Rivera. Presumably pursuant to that
order, Rivera’s release paperwork was completed on Tuesday, August 15, 2006.
However, on July 31, 2006, prior to the grant of habeas corpus relief, Governor
Rendell issued a Governor’s Warrant for Rivera’s detention based upon an extradition
package sent by Florida’s governor. Therefore, the July 31, 2006, Governor’s Warrant
provided an independent basis for continuing to detain Rivera. Rivera claims that this11
detention was unconstitutional. Once again, however, Defendant Algarin is entitled to
immunity from Rivera’s § 1983 claim. Under the circumstances, it was reasonable to
detain Rivera pursuant to the facially valid Governor’s Warrant. See Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 815-16 (1982); Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 142-145
(1979).12
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we agree with the District Court’s conclusion that
Rivera’s amended complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We

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will affirm the District Court’s order dismissing the complaint.

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