United States of America v. Jeffrey Riggins

The Honorable A. Wallace Tashima, Senior United States Circuit Judge, United*
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting by designation.
NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-2084
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JEFFREY RIGGINS,
Appellant
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 06-cr-700-1)
District Judge: Honorable Juan R. Sanchez
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 13, 2009
Before: Fuentes, Chagares, Tashima, Circuit Judges*
(Filed: April 1, 2009)
OPINION
TASHIMA, Circuit Judge.
On October 24, 2007, a jury convicted Appellant Jeffrey Riggins of 25 counts of
possession of cocaine base with intent to distribute, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1),

-- 1 of 3 --

Franks v. Delaware, 438 U.S. 154 (1978).1
2
and one count of possession of a firearm by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. §
922(g)(1). Riggins argues that his conviction should be vacated because the District
Court erred when it denied him a Franks hearing to determine the validity of the affidavit1
submitted in support of his arrest.
I.
Because we write for the parties, we recite only those facts necessary to our
analysis of the issue presented on appeal. Riggins was the target of a long-term drug
investigation by the federal government. On December 5, 2006, agents executed a search
warrant at Riggins’ apartment. Riggins was present during the search and was taken into
custody after the agents found drug paraphernalia and a firearm. Later that same day, a
federal magistrate judge issued a criminal complaint and arrest warrant for Riggins. On
July 12, 2007, Riggins moved for a Franks hearing, contending that the affidavit in
support of the arrest warrant contained false statements made deliberately or with reckless
disregard for the truth. The District Court denied the motion, holding that the affidavit
contained no deliberately or recklessly false statements, and that, even if all the contested
language were excised from the affidavit, there remained probable cause for Riggins’
arrest. The jury found Riggins guilty, and this appeal followed.
II.
The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have

-- 2 of 3 --

3
jurisdiction review the District Court’s decision pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
III.
Riggins challenges only the validity of the arrest warrant; he does not argue that
any evidence introduced against him at trial was obtained as a fruit of the allegedly illegal
arrest. The arrest warrant was issued only after federal agents gathered evidence from
Riggins’ apartment pursuant to a search warrant whose validity Riggins does not
challenge. Nor did Riggins make a post-arrest statement or otherwise suffer prejudice as
a result of the arrest.
A conviction may not be overturned simply because the defendant was illegally
arrested:
An illegal arrest, without more, has never been viewed as a bar to
subsequent prosecution, nor as a defense to a valid conviction . . . . The
exclusionary principle of Wong Sun and Silverthorne Lumber Co. delimits
what proof the Government may offer against the accused at trial, closing
the courtroom door to evidence secured by official lawlessness.
Respondent is not himself a suppressible “fruit,” and the illegality of his
detention cannot deprive the Government of the opportunity to prove his
guilt through the introduction of evidence wholly untainted by the police
misconduct.
U. S. v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463, 474 (1980) (citations and footnote omitted); accord Virgin
Islands v. Josiah, 641 F.2d 1103, 1105 (3d Cir. 1981). Because Riggins’ conviction
would not be overturned even if the District Court erred in denying him a Franks hearing,
we need not determine whether the denial of such a hearing was erroneous.
For the forgoing reasons we will AFFIRM the judgment of the District Court.

-- 3 of 3 --