Cynthia Patricia Keyrupan v. Attorney General of the United States

IMG-117 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 08-2991
___________
CYNTHIA PATRICIA KEYRUPAN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A95-369-629)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Charles M. Honeyman
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
July 15, 2009
Before: BARRY, SMITH AND HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: July 20, 2009)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Petitioner Cynthia Keyrupan petitions for review of the Board of Immigration
Appeals’ (“BIA”) June 6, 2008 order denying her motion to reopen her immigration
proceedings. We will deny the petition.

-- 1 of 5 --

2
I.
Cynthia Keyrupan is a practicing Christian and citizen of Indonesia. She entered
the United States on September 10, 2001, as a non-immigrant B-2 visitor. On December
26, 2001, Keyrupan filed an application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).
At an April 19, 2004 evidentiary hearing, Keyrupan stated that she came to the
United States to escape violence and discrimination directed against her because she is an
ethnic Chinese Christian. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied Keyrupan’s application
for asylum, finding that the harm demonstrated did not rise to the level of past
persecution. With no presumption due to past persecution, Keyrupan was unable to
demonstrate that she would be targeted for future persecution. Keyrupan appealed the
IJ’s ruling and, on December 28, 2005, the BIA affirmed. Keyrupan did not petition this
Court for review of that decision.
On January 11, 2008, Keyrupan filed a motion to reopen based on changed country
conditions in Indonesia. The BIA denied the motion to reopen, finding that Keyrupan
failed to establish changed country conditions sufficient to allow her to file beyond the
ninety-day filing requirement for motions to reopen. Specifically, the BIA held that a
2007 United States Department of State Travel Warning (“2007 Travel Warning”) that
Keyrupan offered as evidence in support of changed country conditions did not connect to
her initial asylum claim. In addition, the 2007 Travel Warning did not apply to her

-- 2 of 5 --

Keyrupan’s son, a United States citizen, was born on July 12, 2007.1
3
because she is not a United States citizen. The BIA further noted that to the extent
Keyrupan’s motion could be construed as requesting asylum for her son, such a request
was not relevant to her motion to reopen. As a result, the BIA dismissed the motion to1
reopen as untimely.
II.
Although we have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s order denying Keyrupan’s
motion to reopen, see, e.g., Ezeagwuna v. Ashcroft, 325 F.3d 396, 405 (3d Cir. 2003), the
scope of our review is quite limited. INS v. Doherty, 502 U.S. 314, 323 (1992). Under
the regulations, the BIA “has discretion to deny a motion to reopen even if the party
moving has made out a prima facie case for relief.” 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(a). As the
Supreme Court has stated, the regulations “plainly disfavor” such motions. INS v.
Abudu, 485 U.S. 94, 110 (1988). Accordingly, the Court reviews the BIA’s denial of a
motion to reopen for abuse of discretion with “broad deference” to its decision.
Ezeagwuna, 325 F.3d at 409. Thus, in order to succeed on the petition for review,
Keyrupan must ultimately show that the BIA’s discretionary decision was somehow
arbitrary, irrational, or contrary to law. See Tipu v. INS, 20 F.3d 580, 582 (3d Cir. 1994)
(quotation omitted). Keyrupan has failed to make such a showing.
III.
Keyrupan does not dispute that she filed an untimely motion to reopen. Instead,

-- 3 of 5 --

4
she argues that her motion should be considered pursuant to one of the exceptions to the
time and number restrictions applicable to such motions. See 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(2). As
mentioned above, the BIA found that Keyrupan was unable to demonstrate that there had
been a “material change in circumstances in Indonesia since the date of the last hearing,”
as required by 8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c)(3)(ii) in order to avoid application of the time and
numerical limitations.
Keyrupan argues that the BIA abused its discretion in denying the motion to
reopen because the evidence of changed conditions set forth in her motion was both
material and could not have been discovered at the previous hearing. First, we agree with
the BIA that Keyrupan’s changed personal circumstance, i.e. the birth of her son, is
distinct from changed circumstances arising in Indonesia. See Wang v. Board of
Immigration Appeals, 437 F.3d 270, 273 (2d Cir. 2006); see also Liu v. Attorney General,
555 F.3d 145, 150-51 (3d Cir. 2009). Relief is appropriately denied “where a petitioner is
seeking to reopen [her] asylum case due to circumstances entirely of [her] own making
after being ordered to leave the United States.” Wang, 437 F.3d at 274.
We further agree with the BIA that Keyrupan did not demonstrate changed country
conditions in Indonesia as required by the regulations governing motions to reopen. The
sole document that Keyrupan produced with her motion in support of this argument – a
2007 Travel Warning – does not demonstrate that conditions for non-Muslims in
Indonesia have significantly deteriorated since she was denied asylum. The 2007 Travel

-- 4 of 5 --

5
Warning warns of potential terrorist attacks directed against “American or other Western
citizens and interests.” The warning does not extend to Indonesian citizens nor does it
discuss the treatment of Chinese Christians living in Indonesia.
Although Keyrupan now claims that “[t]here is no question that none of the
evidence of changed circumstances was available at the time of [her] initial hearing,” a
review of the administrative record shows that her attorney advanced essentially the same
argument in support of her April 2005 appeal to the BIA. (See A.R. 58, 62) (“a travel
advisory from our government advises Americans to keep clear of Indonesia” and “[o]ur
government believes Indonesia is a dangerous place and has issued travel warnings for
Americans to keep away.”) Therefore, it is clear that United States citizens were being
warned about travel to Indonesia during the pendency of Keyrupan’s earlier appeal to the
BIA. Accordingly, Keyrupan’s sole argument supporting her motion to reopen is only
cumulative to the previous proceedings. Furthermore, even if the 2007 Travel Warning
described increased risk for United States citizens traveling to Indonesia as compared to
earlier warnings, such information alone would not amount to a material change in
country conditions.
Having found no abuse of discretion on the part of the BIA in denying Keyrupan’s
untimely filed motion to reopen, we will deny the petition for review.

-- 5 of 5 --