Yogeshwar Seeraj v. Attorney General of the United States

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 08-3730
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YOGESHWAR SEERAJ,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A098-493-430)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Annie S. Garcy
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
September 24, 2009
Before: SLOVITER, STAPLETON and COWEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: September 24, 2009 )
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Yogeshwar Seeraj petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’
(“BIA”) final order of removal. For the following reasons, we will deny his petition.

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I.
Seeraj, a citizen of Guyana, entered the United States unlawfully in 1995. Soon
thereafter, he was served with a Notice to Appear charging him with removability as an
alien not in possession of a valid unexpired immigrant visa or other valid entry document.
See INA § 237(a)(1)(A) [8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(7)(A)]. The government later charged him
with removability on an additional ground—that he had falsely represented himself to be
a United States citizen; specifically, the government claimed that, on two prior occasions,
Seeraj had attempted to obtain a United States passport based on a fraudulent identity.
See INA § 237(a)(3)(D) [8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D)].
At his removal hearing, Seeraj admitted the allegations against him, but sought to
adjust his status on the ground that he was the beneficiary of an approved I-130 petition
filed by his father, who is a lawful permanent resident. See INA § 245(i) [8 U.S.C. §
1255(I)]. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) determined, however, that he was ineligible to
adjust his status because he was inadmissible under INA § 245(a) for having falsely
represented himself as a United States citizen in violation of INA § 237(a)(3)(D) [8
U.S.C. § 1227(a)(3)(D)]. The IJ further found that there were no waivers available to
Seeraj for this particular ground of inadmissibility. By order entered August 8, 2008, the
BIA affirmed, without opinion, the IJ’s decision and ordered Seeraj to voluntarily depart
the United States.
Seeraj now petitions for review of the BIA’s order.

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II.
We have jurisdiction to review the BIA’s final order of removal pursuant to 8
U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). When, as in this case, the BIA adopts the decision of the IJ without
opinion, we review the IJ’s decision as the final agency decision. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353
F.3d 228, 249 (3d Cir. 2003). We review Seeraj’s legal and constitutional questions de
novo, but defer to the agency’s reasonable interpretations of statutes it is charged with
administering. Silva-Rengifo v. Attorney General, 473 F.3d 58, 63 (3d Cir. 2007).
Seeraj first argues that the government failed to provide sufficient evidence to
sustain the charges against him. Seeraj admits that he conceded removability on both of
the charges, but argues that the IJ “cannot simply rely upon an alien’s admissions in
proceedings as a basis to sustain the charges.” (Petitioner’s Br. 8.) Contrary to Seeraj’s
contention, however, the applicable regulations clearly permit the IJ to determine
removability on the basis of an alien’s admissions. Specifically, 8 C.F.R. § 1240.10,
which sets forth the procedures governing removal hearings, provides as follows:
If the respondent admits the factual allegations and admits his or her
removability under the charges and the immigration judge is satisfied
that no issues of law or fact remain, the immigration judge may
determine that removability as charged has been established by the
admissions of the respondent.
8 C.F.R. § 1240.10(c). Thus, once Seeraj admitted his removability, the IJ was free to
conclude that the government had met its burden. See, e.g., Selimi v. INS, 312 F.3d 854,
860 (7th Cir. 2002) (rejecting alien’s claim that INS failed to establish excludability

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Pursuant to 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(a)(7)(ii), a single member of the BIA may affirm1
the IJ’s decision without authoring a separate opinion if:
[T]he Board Member determines that the result reached in the decision under
review was correct; that any errors in the decision under review were harmless
or nonmaterial; and that (A) the issue on appeal is squarely controlled by
existing Board or federal court precedent and does not involve the application
of precedent to a novel fact situation; or (B) the factual and legal questions
raised on appeal are so insubstantial that three-Member review is not
warranted.
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because alien conceded that he was excludable); Florez-de Solis v. INS, 796 F.2d 330,
333 (9th Cir. 1986) (explaining that the government’s burden of proving that an alien is
deportable is satisfied when the alien concedes deportability). Seeraj then bore the
burden of establishing his eligibility for adjustment of status. Because Seeraj failed to do
so, the IJ correctly determined that he was removable as charged.
Next, Seeraj contends that the BIA violated his right to due process by affirming
the IJ’s decision without opinion. This Court has previously held, however, that the
streamlining regulations that allow the BIA to affirm an IJ’s decision by issuing an order
without a separate opinion do not violate due process. Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228,1
234–45 (3d Cir. 2003) (“The fact that the . . . decision is not accompanied by a fully
reasoned BIA decision may be less desirable from the petitioner’s point of view, but it
does not make the process constitutionally unfair.”)
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.

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