United States of America v. Sheila Margaret Hayford

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT
OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
NO. 08-4404
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
SHEILA MARGARET HAYFORD,
Appellant
On Appeal From the United States
District Court
For the District of Delaware
(D.C. Crim. Action No. 1-06-cr-00108-001)
District Judge: Hon. Joseph J. Farnan, Jr.
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
December 2, 2009
BEFORE: FISHER, HARDIMAN and STAPLETON,
Circuit Judges
(Opinion Filed : December 7, 2009)

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Section 152(3) of Title 18 of the United States Code provides that whoever1
“knowingly and fraudulently makes a false declaration, certificate, verification or
statement under penalty of perjury” within the meaning of section 1746 of Title 28 “in or
in relation to any case under title 11 [the Bankruptcy Code]” shall be guilty of an offense
against the laws of the United States.
Section 157(1) of Title 18 of the United States Code states that: “A person who,2
having devised or intending to devise a scheme or artifice to defraud and for the purpose
of executing or concealing such a scheme or artifice or attempting to do so – (1) files a
petition under title 11 . . . shall be fined under this title, imprisoned not more than 5 years,
or both.”
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OPINION OF THE COURT
STAPLETON, Circuit Judge:
A jury found appellant Sheila Margaret Hayford guilty on five counts of making a
false statement under penalty of perjury in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 152(3) and five1
counts of bankruptcy fraud under 18 U.S.C. § 157(1). She appeals, insisting that the2
evidence was insufficient to support each of the ten verdicts. Hayford did not challenge
the sufficiency of the evidence in the District Court and we, accordingly, review for
“plain error.” “A conviction based on insufficient evidence is plain error only if the
verdict ‘constitutes a fundamental miscarriage of justice.’” United States v. Thayer, 201
F.3d 214, 219 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting from United States v. Barel, 939 F.2d 26, 37 (3d
Cir. 1991)). There is ample evidence supporting each of the challenged verdicts, and we

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will affirm. Because we write only for the parties, we will assume knowledge of the
record and the proceedings.
I.
By February 20, 2002, Hayford was delinquent on her mortgage, and CitiCorp
Trust Bank FSB (“Citi”) filed a foreclosure action. A default judgment was entered
against Hayford on April 15, 2002. Between that date and September 7, 2006, seven
separate sheriff’s sales were scheduled on her residence. All seven were stopped by
operation of the automatic stay in bankruptcy occasioned by Hayford’s filing of a series
of seven bankruptcy petitions, five of which were subjects of the indictment. She
admitted at trial that her purpose in filing this series of petitions was to prevent the
scheduled sale.
II.
With respect to the Section 157(1) bankruptcy fraud charge, the government
proved that Hayford devised and executed a scheme to defraud Citi of its legal right to
sell her residence to satisfy its judgment by delaying and defeating scheduled sheriff’s
sales over a period of more than four years. The government did this by offering
evidence, inter alia, of (1) the timing of the five petitions relative to the scheduled sales;
(2) the fact that Hayford did not pursue any of her bankruptcy cases as would someone
who sought bankruptcy protection in good faith; (3) Hayford’s own admission that a goal
of her repeated petition filings was to delay the scheduled sheriff’s sales; and (4) the fact

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that Hayford lived in her residence without making mortgage payments for the entire
period of her filings. A rational jury could clearly draw an inference from the
government’s evidence that Hayford’s intention was to trigger the automatic stay and
thereby defraud Citi through abuse of the bankruptcy system.
Hayford argues that the jury unreasonably found that she had an intent to defraud
Citi. She points to evidence tending to show that she was attempting to sell her residence
and repay Citi, insisting that her “actions were consistent with her attempt to pay the
financial institution, not an attempt to defraud” it. Appellant’s Br. at 24. However, Citi
had the legal right to have Hayford’s residence immediately sold to satisfy her debt to it in
the Spring of 2002 and at all times over the next four plus years. A reasonable jury could,
and did, determine that she devised a scheme to defraud Citi of that right whether or not it
believed that she hoped to repay Citi at some point in the future.
III.
Hayford signed each of her bankruptcy petitions “under penalty of perjury.” App.
at 154-55. Like all debtors, she was required to list prior bankruptcy petitions she had
filed within the relevant time period, either the preceding six years or, since October
2005, the preceding eight years. Instead of providing an accurate statement of her
bankruptcy filing history, Hayford falsely listed only one prior bankruptcy per petition.
Hayford argues before us that there was insufficient evidence that she acted
knowingly and with fraudulent intent and that her representations were material. She

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acknowledges, of course, that she was aware in each instance that she had previously filed
more than one petition. Because Hayford’s admitted purpose in filing the petitions was to
delay the imminent sheriff’s sale, a rational jury could infer that her repeated falsehoods
were designed to accomplish her stated objective. The government’s evidence
demonstrates that new cases by debtors who have filed more than two prior petitions
receive different treatment from the Bankruptcy Court, including possible review to
determine whether the proceeding should be dismissed. To delay the sales by operation
of the automatic stay, Hayford needed only to be certain that the petition would be filed
and served on her creditors. The only place on the petitions where Hayford risked failing
in her purpose – by drawing the scrutiny of the Bankruptcy Court – was with respect to
her filing history. That was the only place on the petitions where she provided false
information time after time. A rational jury could have inferred from the targeted nature
of her false representations and from the evidence concerning the bankruptcy process that
those misrepresentations were material, knowing, and made with fraudulent intent.
IV.
The judgment of the District Court will be affirmed.

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