Bin Di Chen v. ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES On

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-4585
___________
BIN DI CHEN,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. A097-949-533)
Immigration Judge: Honorable Alberto Riefkohl
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
January 4, 2010
Before: BARRY, STAPLETON and NYGAARD, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 15, 2010)
___________
OPINION
___________
PER CURIAM
Bin Chen, a citizen of China, entered the United States in 2004 without valid travel
documents. He filed a timely application for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He now petitions for review

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At the removal hearing, Chen explained that although his asylum application1
indicated that there was only one friend present at the time, there were actually two
friends there.
2
of the Board of Immigration Appeals order upholding the denial of relief.
I
At his first immigration hearing in February 2005, Chen testified that he began
practicing Falun Gong in 2001, on the advice of his grandmother. Chen asserted that in
May 2002, police officers barged into his home, where he had been practicing Falun
Gong with his grandmother and one or two friends. Although Chen and his friends were1
able to escape the police, his grandmother was arrested and detained for ten days. Chen
claimed that he went into hiding following the arrest of his grandmother and subsequently
fled China. Chen’s father and grandmother remain in China.
Although Chen was able to identify some of the basic principles of Falun Gong
and name the meditation exercises that Falun Gong adherents practice, his ability to
elaborate on other aspects of Falun Gong was limited. Chen explained that this resulted
from his illiteracy. Chen also submitted a letter from his father, which contained an
account of the events leading Chen to practice Falun Gong and of the circumstances
surrounding the police raid, the grandmother’s arrest, and Chen’s subsequent flight to the
United States. Notably, Chen’s father admitted in the letter that he was not present when
police raided the home and arrested Chen’s grandmother.
The IJ denied Chen’s applications for relief, noting that Chen’s testimony did not

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3
demonstrate anything beyond a general understanding of Falun Gong, and that Chen
provided insufficient evidence to corroborate the claims that he practices Falun Gong and
that he and his family faced persecution in China. Chen appealed, and the BIA remanded
the matter so that Chen could have the opportunity to either present corroborative
evidence or explain his failure to do so.
The IJ conducted another hearing in May 2007. Chen testified that since his
arrival in the United States, he often practiced Falun Gong in a park with a group of about
20 people. He also submitted some photographs of himself practicing Falun Gong
exercises in the United States in front of other people, who were presumably other
practitioners, and general literature about Falun Gong. However, the photographs did not
identify any of the other people depicted as practitioners of Falun Gong. And, as the IJ
noted, Chen failed to offer any testimony from others corroborating his practice of Falun
Gong, despite the fact that he claimed to practice regularly with other people. Nor did
Chen present any new evidence at the second hearing to corroborate the claim that his
grandmother had been arrested. The IJ again denied relief, reasoning that Chen failed to
provide sufficient evidence to corroborate his claims that he practiced Falun Gong or that
his grandmother was arrested. Chen appealed, and the BIA affirmed, agreeing with the
IJ’s corroboration analysis.
II
We have jurisdiction over Chen’s petition pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a).

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We note that the IJ’s February 2005 opinion omitted any discussion of the letter2
submitted by Chen’s father, and simply concluded that Chen “made reference to his
grandmother’s arrest and her release ten days later, but failed to document that
4
Because the BIA issued its own opinion, we review its decision rather than that of the IJ.
See Li v. Att’y Gen., 400 F.3d 157, 162 (3d Cir. 2005). However, we review the decision
of the IJ to the extent that the BIA defers to or adopts the IJ’s reasoning. See Chavarria v.
Gonzalez, 446 F.3d 508, 515 (3d Cir. 2006). We review agency factual determinations
for substantial evidence, and will uphold such determinations “unless the evidence not
only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.” Zhang v. Gonzales, 405 F.3d 150,
155 (3d Cir. 2005) (internal citations omitted). Chen argues that the Agency erred in
concluding that he failed to adequately corroborate his claim, and contends that he is
entitled to asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT relief. We disagree.
Even when an applicant is considered otherwise credible, a failure to corroborate
may be relied on to deny relief when “(1) the IJ identifies facts for which it is reasonable
to expect the applicant to produce corroboration, (2) the applicant fails to corroborate, and
(3) the applicant fails to adequately explain that failure.” Chukwu v. Att’y Gen., 484 F.3d
185, 191-92 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 542, 554 (3d Cir.
2001)). “It is reasonable to expect corroboration where the facts are central to the
applicant’s claim and easily subject to verification.” Id. at 192.
Here, the IJ initially faulted Chen for failing to demonstrate that he practiced Falun
Gong and for failing to present sufficient evidence of his grandmother’s arrest. The BIA2

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information in order to make it credible.” A.R. 113. However, the IJ expressly
considered the letter on remand, noting that its corroborative value was weak because
Chen’s father did not witness the police raid. See A.R. 41.
The Government argues that because Chen provided no substantive argument to the3
BIA regarding his CAT claim, we lack jurisdiction over his challenge to the BIA’s denial
of CAT relief. We disagree. A petitioner is deemed to have exhausted all administrative
remedies if he raises all issues before the BIA. See Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 120-
21 (3d Cir. 2008). “Indeed, ‘so long as an immigration petitioner makes some effort,
however insufficient, to place the Board on notice of a straightforward issue being raised
on appeal, a petitioner is deemed to have exhausted her administrative remedies.’” Id.
(quoting Joseph v. Att’y Gen., 465 F.3d 123, 126 (3d Cir. 2006)). Here, Chen challenged
5
remanded the case and afforded him the opportunity to present additional evidence to
support his claims. Despite having nearly a year between the Board’s decision and his
second hearing before the IJ, Chen produced only minimal evidence to corroborate his
claims. Specifically, Chen failed to produce any evidence – beyond his father’s letter –
that his grandmother was ever arrested. And although Chen submitted some photographs
showing him publicly practicing what appeared to be Falun Gong exercises, Chen offered
no testimony from his purported fellow practitioners to demonstrate that he actually
continued to practice. Nor did he present evidence corroborating his claim that he
practiced Falun Gong while in China. It was reasonable for the Agency to require Chen
to adequately corroborate his claims, and we agree that Chen’s failure to do so was
unreasonable.
Because Chen’s failure to corroborate rendered him ineligible for asylum, we also
agree that he was unable to meet the higher standards applicable to applications for
withholding of removal and CAT protection. See Sioe Tjen Wong v. Att’y Gen., 5393

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the IJ’s CAT determination in both his notice of appeal and brief to the BIA, albeit with
no additional argument. We therefore conclude that he satisfied the Immigration and
Nationality Act’s exhaustion requirement. Even if Chen’s filings were insufficient to do
so, the claim is exhausted because the BIA expressly considered the merits of his request
for CAT relief. See id. at 123-24.
F.3d 225, 236 (3d Cir. 2008) (withholding of removal); Kamara v. Att’y Gen., 420 F.3d
202, 212-13 (3d Cir. 2005) (CAT relief).
Accordingly, we will deny the petition for review.

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