United States of America v. Aaron Camacho-Villarreal, a/k/a Aaron, a/k/a Feleipe Alberto Villaverde Aaron…

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NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-4718
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
AARON CAMACHO-VILLARREAL,
a/k/a Aaron, a/k/a Feleipe Alberto Villaverde
Aaron Camacho- Villarreal, Appellant
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APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA
(D.C. Crim. No. 3-05-cr-00299-1)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Nealon
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Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
September 30, 2009
Before: RENDELL, AMBRO, and WEIS, Circuit Judges
(Filed: October 14, 2009)
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OPINION
WEIS, Circuit Judge.
Defendant Aaron Camacho-Villarreal, a Mexican national who had been
ordered removed from the United States following each of his three prior drug

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convictions, was arrested for selling crack cocaine in April 2005, and a grand jury
returned a six-count indictment against him. He pleaded guilty to Count I, charging
conspiracy to distribute more than 50 grams of cocaine base (crack) and one kilogram of
cocaine, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846. He also pleaded guilty to Count VI, asserting
illegal re-entry of an aggravated felon, a violation of 8. U.S.C. § 1326(b)(2).
On January 4, 2006, the District Court sentenced defendant to 188 months’
imprisonment. Although the Presentence Investigation Report calculated a base offense
level of 32 for the crack cocaine count pursuant to § 2D1.1 of the Sentencing Guidelines,
the defendant’s sentence was determined instead by his status under the Guidelines as a
“career offender.” See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b) (“[I]f the offense level for a career offender
from the table in this subsection is greater than the offense level otherwise applicable, the
offense level from the table in this subsection shall apply.”).
In October 2008, defendant moved for modification of his sentence
pursuant to the Sentencing Reform Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2), and Amendments 706
and 713 to the Guidelines, which retroactively reduced the base offense levels for certain
crack cocaine crimes listed at § 2D1.1. See U.S.S.G. App. C, Amend. 706 (Nov. 1,
2007); id. App. C, Amend. 713 (Supp. March 3, 2008) (declaring that Amendment 706
would operate retroactively). The District Court denied the motion, noting that, because
defendant had been sentenced as a career offender, § 2D1.1 played no role in calculating
his sentence. In addition, the Court held Amendment 706 would not have the effect of

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lowering the defendant’s sentencing range such that 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(2) would apply.
The facts of this case, and the arguments advanced by defendant, are
virtually identical to those in United States v. Mateo, 560 F.3d 152 (3d Cir. 2009). In
essence, defendant argues that, because the District Court examined both the crack
cocaine and the career offender Guideline ranges in determining that the latter should
apply, his sentence was necessarily “based on” the former. We have rejected this
reasoning, see Mateo, 560 F.3d at 155, and hold that the District Court was correct in
declining to adopt the defendant’s proposed interpretation of § 3582(c).
Defendant further contends that the District Court erred in refusing to
reduce his sentence pursuant to United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). The
District Court’s ruling was correct. As we confirmed in Mateo, “this Court has rejected
the argument that Booker provides a basis for reduction of sentence not otherwise
allowable under § 3582(c).” 560 F.3d at 155.
As we find no merit in the defendant’s remaining arguments, the Order of
the District Court will be affirmed.

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