United States of America v. Steven Jackson

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 08-4871
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
STEVEN JACKSON,
Appellant
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Criminal. No. 07-cr-00338-001)
District Judge: Honorable Stanley R. Chesler
Submitted under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
on January 26, 2010
Before: RENDELL and JORDAN, Circuit Judges
and PADOVA, Senior District Judge*
(Filed: January 29, 2010)
OPINION OF THE COURT
*Honorable John R. Padova, Senior District Judge for the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, sitting by designation.

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We review the District Court’s decision whether to hold an evidentiary hearing on a1
motion to suppress under an abuse of discretion standard. Padillas v. Stork-Gamco, Inc.,
186 F.3d 412, 418 (3d Cir. 1999) (stating that whether to hold evidentiary hearing on
admissibility of contested evidence “rests in the sound discretion of the district court.”).
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PADOVA, Senior District Judge
Steven Jackson appeals his conviction on one count of possessing controlled
substances with intent to deliver in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a) & (b)(1)(c) and 18 U.S.C.
§ 2, one count of possessing a firearm and ammunition in furtherance of a drug trafficking
offense in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(1), and one count of possessing that firearm
as a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)(A). The District Court had subject
matter jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 3231; we have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1291. We affirm the conviction.
Because we write only for the parties, we dispense with any lengthy discussion of the
facts. Jackson argues that the district court’s refusal to conduct an evidentiary hearing on his
suppression motion was improper. He argues that “once the defendant has established a1
basis for his motion, i.e., the search or seizure was conducted without a warrant, the burden
shifts to the government to show that the search or seizure was reasonable.” United States
v. Johnson, 63 F.3d 242, 245 (3d Cir. 1995). Jackson contends that once he demonstrated
in his suppression motion that the evidence was seized without a warrant, the District Court
was required to hold an evidentiary hearing because the burden shifted to the Government
to prove the search and seizure was reasonable, without him having to make any further

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Other Courts of Appeals likewise require a defendant to raise significant factual2
disputes in order to receive a pretrial evidentiary hearing. See United States v. Howell,
231 F.3d 615, 620 (9th Cir. 2000) (stating “An evidentiary hearing on a motion to
suppress need be held only when the moving papers allege facts with sufficient
definiteness, clarity, and specificity to enable the trial court to conclude that contested
issues of fact exist.”); United States v. Glass, 128 F.3d 1398, 1408- 1409 (10th Cir.1997)
(holding that defendant bears the burden of showing there are material facts in dispute,
and an evidentiary hearing is only required when the motion to suppress raises factual
allegations that are sufficiently definite, specific, detailed, and nonconjectural to enable
the court to conclude that contested issues of fact going to the validity of the search are in
issue); United States v. Sophie, 900 F.2d 1064, 1070-71 (7 Cir. 1990) (holding that anth
evidentiary hearing is necessary only if the party requesting the hearing raises a
significant, disputed factual issue); United States v. Panitz, 907 F.2d 1267, 1273-74 (1st
Cir. 1990) (holding that “[t]he test for granting an evidentiary hearing in a criminal case
should be substantive: did the defendant make a sufficient threshold showing that
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evidentiary production. We do not agree.
The standard for when a hearing is required is well settled in our case law. As a
general matter, an evidentiary hearing is required in circumstances in which a defendant
advances a “colorable claim” that his or her constitutional rights have been violated. United
States v. Brink, 39 F.3d 419 (3d Cir. 1994) (holding that the District Court erred in failing
to hold an evidentiary hearing where the defendant stated “a colorable claim that the
government violated his constitutional right to counsel by placing him in a cell with a known
informant who may have been acting as a government agent”). A claim is “colorable” if it
consists “of more than mere bald-faced allegations of misconduct.” United States v. Voigt,
89 F.3d 1050, 1067 (3d Cir. 1996). Thus, to warrant an evidentiary hearing, a defendant’s
motion must contain “issues of fact material to the resolution of the defendant’s
constitutional claim.” Id., 89 F.3d at 1067.2

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material facts were in doubt or dispute?”); Wojtowicz v. United States, 550 F.2d 786, 790
(2d Cir. 1977) (holding that a defendant must present “sufficiently detailed and
controverted factual allegations” in order to receive an evidentiary hearing).
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Jackson did not offer any version of events contrary to the version contained in the
police reports he attached to his motion. He based his request for an evidentiary hearing only
on alleged discrepancies in the reports, which he argued raised questions about the
truthfulness of the account provided, and raised the suggestion that the events leading to his
arrest may have unfolded differently. This was not a sufficient showing under Brink and
Voigt. Accordingly, there was no abuse of discretion in the District Court’s decision to deny
an evidentiary hearing.
Jackson also argues that the District Court erred when it determined that he lacked
standing to challenge the lawfulness of the search. The record cannot support any such
interpretation of the District Court’s ruling. The Court stated at the end of its ruling that the
“defendant furthermore has indeed not proffered any evidence that he has standing to warrant
a suppression hearing in this case.” A 71. Plainly, the District Court found that Jackson had
failed to put forth any alternative version of the facts to warrant a hearing, not that he lacked
standing to challenge the search. Because the district court actually determined the
suppression issue on its merits, Jackson’s standing argument must be rejected.
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment of conviction.

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