Norman Cadmus v. UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Individually

DLD-055 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 09-3117
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NORMAN CADMUS,
Appellant
v.
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Individually and in their official capacities;
GEORGE W. BUSH, Individually and in their official capacities
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 08-cv-1273)
District Judge: Honorable John E. Jones III
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
November 25, 2009
Before: FUENTES, JORDAN and HARDIMAN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 15, 2009)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Appellant Norman Cadmus appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing
his complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm. See I.O.P.

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The District Court construed Cadmus’ claim against former President Bush as one
properly raised under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of
Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
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10.6.
I.
In July 2008, Cadmus, a pro se prisoner, filed a civil rights action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Defendants George W. Bush and The United States of
America.1 In his complaint, Cadmus challenged the constitutionality of the Antiterrorism
and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat.
1214. Specifically, he alleged that its prescribed one-year statute of limitations for filing
a federal habeas challenge to a state court conviction improperly overlaps with
Pennsylvania’s one-year statute of limitations for filing a petition under its Post-
Conviction Relief Act (“PCRA”), 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 9541 et seq. (2009). Cadmus
claimed that this overlapping violates his rights under the First, Fifth, and Fourteenth
Amendments.
The District Court dismissed Cadmus’ complaint as to both defendants and
Cadmus filed a timely appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Our review of
the District Court’s sua sponte dismissal of Cadmus’ complaint is plenary. See Allah v.
Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). We may affirm the District Court on any

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basis supported by the record. See Fairview Twp. v. EPA, 773 F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d
Cir. 1985).
Cadmus’ complaint was properly dismissed. In March 2008, Cadmus filed a
habeas petition pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in the District Court which remains pending,
see Cadmus v. Warden, SCI Coal Twp., Civ. No. 08-cv-473. Cadmus does not allege that
he has been precluded from seeking federal habeas relief and the District Court has yet to
consider how the limitations period under AEDPA applies to his case. Accordingly, he
has suffered no actual injury under the statute for which he may seek redress at this time.
See Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).
Furthermore, Cadmus provides no authority supporting his claim that AEDPA is
unconstitutional as a result of its alleged “overlapping” with the PCRA. In fact, as the
District Court pointed out, the limitations period under AEDPA has survived numerous
constitutional challenges. See Green v. White, 223 F.3d 1001, 1003-04 (9th Cir. 2000);
Miller v. Marr, 141 F.3d 976, 977-78 (10th Cir. 1998); Tinker v. Moore, 255 F.3d 1331,
1334 (11th Cir. 2001). Should Cadmus wish to further challenge the constitutionality of
AEDPA as it applies to his case, he should do so in the context of his pending habeas
action.
As Cadmus’ appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm.
See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.

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