CARLEN URIEL HIGGS, AKA Cardel Higgs, AKA Cordell Dayes v. Attorney General of the United States

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PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-3128
___________
CARLEN URIEL HIGGS,
AKA Cardel Higgs,
AKA Cordell Dayes,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES,
Respondent
____________________________________
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
(Agency No. 046-018-938)
Immigration Judge: Hon. Walter A. Durling
____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
May 24, 2011
Before: FUENTES, FISHER, and NYGAARD, Circuit
Judges
(Opinion filed August 25, 2011)

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Thomas S. Jones, Esq.
Ryan M. Christian, Esq.
Alison M. Kilmartin, Esq.
Jones Day
500 Grant Street, Suite 4500
Pittsburgh, PA 15219
Counsel for Petitioner
Kate Balaban, Esq.
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation, Civil Division
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
Counsel for Respondent
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
___________
Fuentes, Circuit Judge.
Carlen Higgs is the subject of a final order of removal
from the United States issued by an Immigration Judge.
Higgs filed a notice of appeal with the Board of Immigration
Appeals (“BIA” or “Board”) incorrectly identifying the
appeal as one from an interlocutory ruling, rather than from a
final order of removal. As a result, the Board dismissed
Higgs‟s appeal as moot. Higgs filed the instant petition for
review, challenging the Board‟s dismissal of his notice of
appeal, the merits of the IJ‟s decision, and the enforceability
of the order of removal.

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For the reasons below, we conclude the Board‟s order
is a “final order” within the meaning of 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1)
and that the Board erred by failing to liberally construe
Higgs‟s petition for review. We will therefore grant Higgs‟s
petition for review and remand to the BIA for further
proceedings.
I.
Carlen Higgs was born in the Bahamas in 1981 and in
1999 was lawfully admitted into the United States as a
permanent resident. In 2005, Higgs was charged with
possession of and intent to deliver marijuana, in violation of
Pennsylvania law 35 Pa. Con. Stat. § 780-113(a)(30), and
knowing and intentional possession of a controlled substance,
in violation of 35 Pa. Con. Stat. § 780-113(a)(16). Three
years later, the Government sought to remove Higgs under
two provisions of the Immigration and Naturalization Act
(“INA”). Under the INA, the Government “has the burden of
establishing by clear and convincing evidence that . . . the
alien is deportable.” 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(c)(3)(A). The
Government also sought removal pursuant to INA §
237(a)(2)(B)(i) which states:
Any alien who at any time after admission has
been convicted of a violation of (or a conspiracy
or attempt to violate) any law or regulation of a
State [or] the United States . . . relating to a
controlled substance (as defined in section 802
of Title 21), other than a single offense
involving possession for one‟s own use of 30
grams or less of marijuana, is deportable.

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8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(B)(i). In addition, the Government
also invoked INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii), which authorizes
removal of “[a]ny alien . . . convicted of an aggravated
felony.” 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(A)(iii).
Represented by counsel, Higgs contested his removal
on the ground that his prior convictions did not satisfy either
provision. The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) agreed, finding that
Higgs sustained only a conviction for possession of marijuana
and thus was not removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(A)(iii).
After examining the state trial testimony, the IJ also found
that Higgs was not removable under subsection (B)(i) because
he possessed less than 30 grams of marijuana. On November
13, 2008, the IJ issued an order terminating the removal
proceedings against Higgs.
The Government moved for reconsideration, and on
November 24, 2008 the IJ granted the motion. In so ruling,
the IJ explained that he had misunderstood the arresting
officer‟s trial testimony, and that in fact, he testified that
Higgs was arrested “with 38 bags of marijuana containing
between .83 grams and 2 grams.” A.R. 114.1 Therefore,
Higgs was removable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i). Higgs
then moved for reconsideration, arguing that the trial
testimony was “vague and confusing” and did not “establish
the exact amount of marijuana.” A.R. at 79.
On February 4, 2009, the IJ issued a third order,
described as an “interlocutory ruling,” noting the uncertainty
regarding the weight of the marijuana attributable to Higgs.
1 “A.R” refers to the administrative record in this case.

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Based on this uncertainty, the IJ ordered the Government “to
obtain a copy of the property receipt” that itemized the seized
marijuana, in the hopes that the receipt would conclusively
prove the amount of marijuana at issue. A.R. at 80. The
Government submitted the receipt, and on March 19, 2009,
the IJ issued a fourth order, styled as an “Interlocutory Ruling
on Motion,” finding in the Government‟s favor. The IJ
explained that:
The trial transcript was certainly not the
modicum of clarity. A review of the chemistry
report verifies the substance confiscated from
[Higgs] as marijuana, but only verified a total
amount of 15.77 grams of marijuana from five
(5) separate baggies out of a total of 38 baggies
found on [Higgs‟s] person.
. . .
[T]he court is constrained to concur with
government counsel that there was no need for
the laboratory to perform an analysis on all of
the baggies once the marijuana was confirmed. .
. . [O]ne may reasonably presume that the
remainder of the baggies which were not tested
by the laboratory also contained marijuana.
That is, it stretches credulity to believe that only
the 5 baggies chosen for random testing
contained marijuana and the remainder might
not have.
A.R. at 61.
Thus the IJ concluded that Higgs possessed over 30
grams of marijuana at the time of his arrest. Following this

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fourth ruling, the IJ issued a Final Order of Removal on May
21, 2009. This fifth, and last, order was purely administrative
in nature and did not contain any reasoning or further
explanation of the IJ‟s decision. It also noted that Higgs was
reserving his right to appeal, and that his notice of appeal was
due by June 22, 2009.
On May 26, 2009, proceeding pro se,2 Higgs filed a
Notice of Appeal and a Motion for Emergency Stay of
Removal. In the section of the notice asking for the date of
the “decision in a merits proceeding” being appealed, Higgs
wrote “March-19-2009.” A.R. at 6. Higgs also identified
three reasons for his appeal: (1) the IJ‟s erroneous factual
determination that Higgs possessed over 30 grams of
marijuana, thus making him eligible for removal under INA §
237(a)(2)(B)(i); (2) the need for clarification of the
Government‟s burden under the “clear and convincing
evidence” standard; and, relatedly, (3) clarification on the
relationship between the government‟s burden of proof, the
rule of lenity and the rule “granting presumption to [a]liens.”
A.R. at 7.
Higgs‟s first notice of appeal was rejected by the BIA
as non-compliant because the form lacked the necessary first
page. Higgs re-submitted his notice of appeal, but that appeal
too was dismissed. In its ruling—issued July 2, 2009—the
BIA determined that, because Higgs‟s Notice of Appeal
identified the IJ‟s March 19, 2009 interlocutory ruling as the
subject of its appeal, the petitioner had “filed an interlocutory
appeal.” Noting that the basis for the interlocutory appeal had
2 On May 21, 2009, Higgs‟s counsel successfully moved for
permission to withdraw his representation.

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been superceded by a final order of removal, the Board found
Higgs‟s “interlocutory appeal [to be] moot” and dismissed it.
A.R. at 2.
Higgs timely filed this petition for review. He also
sought a stay of the removal proceedings, which this Court
granted. In this petition for review, Higgs argues that the BIA
erred in failing to construe his notice of appeal liberally. As
to the merits of his removal, Higgs first submits that the IJ
erred in finding that there was clear and convincing evidence
that he possessed more than 30 grams of marijuana and was
therefore ineligible for removal pursuant to INA §
237(a)(2)(B)(i). Next, Higgs contends that the order
removing him to the Bahamas cannot be enforced because, by
operation of law, he is not a Bahamian citizen.3
3 At the time he was born, Higgs‟s parents were not married.
His mother was a Jamaican citizen and his father a citizen of
the Bahamas. Higgs wrote to the Embassy of the
Commonwealth of the Bahamas inquiring about his
citizenship status on July 22, 2009. The Consul responded on
July 29, 2009, informing him that:
Under the constitution of the Bahamas, persons
born after 10 July, 1973 in the Bahamas to a
non-Bahamian single mother, may apply for
Bahamian citizenship at the age of 18 and
before their 19th birthday. Until such time as
they apply for and are granted citizenship, such
persons are deemed to have the nationality of
their mother.

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II.
The Government raises two challenges to our
jurisdiction in this case, which we review de novo. Hoxha v.
Holder, 559 F.3d 157, 159 (3d Cir. 2009) (citing Singh v.
Ashcroft, 383 F.3d 144, 151 (3d Cir. 2004)). In its motion to
dismiss, the Government maintains that we lack jurisdiction
over this petition because the BIA‟s order of dismissal is not a
“final order” within Section 1252(a)(1) because it “did not
adjudicate [Higgs‟s] removability” and did not “affirm the . . .
May 21, 2009 decision, which was the final order of removal
in the instant case.” Gov‟t Mot. Dismiss at 4. In addition, the
Government contends that we lack jurisdiction because Higgs
has not exhausted his administrative remedies. We disagree.
Our jurisdiction to review a final order of removal is
set forth in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1). Under that provision, we
may review only “a final order of removal.” Id. (emphasis
added); see also Khouzam v. Att’y Gen., 549 F.3d 235, 247
(3d Cir. 2008). We have taken a broad view of what
constitutes a “final order of removal” under Section 1252. In
Yusupov v. Attorney General, we stated our “agree[ment]
with” the decisions of “several of our sister circuit courts of
appeals . . . conclud[ing] that an order is final for
jurisdictional purposes when a removability determination
has been made that is no longer appealable to the BIA,
Since you did not apply for citizenship under
the terms mentioned, you are not a Bahamian
citizen . . . .
Pet. Ex. A.

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regardless [of] whether a formal order of removal has been
entered.” 518 F.3d 185, 195 (3d Cir. 2008); see also Shehu v.
Att’y Gen., 482 F.3d 652, 656 (3d Cir. 2007) (“denial of a . . .
petition for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under
the [Convention Against Torture] constitutes „a final order of
removal‟ within the meaning of [section 1252], [because] the
alien is entitled to no further process before deportation”).
In Khouzam, we found an agency action that made the
deportation of an alien a certainty constituted a final order of
removal. 549 F.3d at 247. In that case, following a ruling by
the Second Circuit granting the petitioner a “deferral of
removal,” the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”)
“decided to terminate the deferral of removal.” Id. As a
result, the petitioner became “eligible for, and apparently
subject to, imminent removal to Egypt.” Id. Applying the
“common sense application of the term‟s plain meaning,” we
found that DHS‟s decision was appealable because the
petitioner was arrested and detained and “was going to be
removed, and that was final.” Id. at 248-49.
Therefore, the Government‟s argument that only an
order affirming the IJ or adjudicating Higgs‟s removal is a
“final order of removal” under Section 1252 is not supported
by our case law. In this case, the IJ came to the conclusion
that Higgs was deportable under INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i)
because he possessed more than 30 grams of marijuana. The
IJ then issued a separate, final order of removal. The BIA
never reviewed that order, having concluded that Higgs was
appealing from a different order. Therefore, the IJ‟s final
order of removal still stands, and the Board‟s July 2 order
which mooted Higgs‟s appeal has the same effect as an order
of removal.

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There is also little doubt that the BIA‟s July 2 order is
“final.” The time for Higgs to remedy the error and properly
appeal from the fifth, and “dispositive,” order has passed. As
a result, Higgs has no other administrative recourse to
challenge his removability and is “entitled to no further
process before deportation.” 4 Shehu, 482 F.3d at 656. The
short of it is that “[Higgs] [i]s going to be removed, and that
[i]s final.” Khouzam, 549 F.3d at 248.
The Government‟s second argument—that we lack
jurisdiction because Higgs has failed to exhaust his
administrative remedies—is also unavailing. To the extent
the Government‟s position is premised on the contention that,
because Higgs appealed only the interlocutory order and not
the final order of removal, he did not exhaust his
administrative remedies, this argument fails because, as we
conclude below, the BIA erred in its reading of Higgs‟s notice
of appeal. Moreover, Higgs‟s notice of appeal—which
unequivocally stated the reasons for his appeal, including the
factual and legal errors committed by the BIA—clearly
complied with the principle that a petitioner has satisfied his
administrative remedies if he made “some effort, however
insufficient, to place the Board on notice of a straightforward
issue being raised on appeal.” Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d
4 Higgs states in his brief that “by the time the BIA dismissed
his [Notice of] Appeal, the time to re-file an appeal of [the
final order of removal] had been expired for eleven days.”
Pet. Br. at 21. Therefore he has “no further means of
administrative redress.” Pet. Br. at 21. The Government does
not contend otherwise.

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114, 120 (3d Cir. 2008) (citing Joseph v. Att’y Gen., 465 F.3d
123, 126 (3d Cir. 2006)).5
For these reasons, we conclude that we have
jurisdiction over Higgs‟s petition for review under 8 U.S.C. §
1252.
III.
We now turn to the heart of Higgs‟s claim on appeal,
that the BIA erred in failing to construe his notice of appeal
as seeking review of the IJ‟s final order of removal. The
Government contends that the Board had no obligation to
liberally construe Higgs‟s notice of appeal and thus that his
appeal was properly dismissed.
A.
In failing to afford Higgs a liberal construction of his
notice of appeal, the BIA erred.6 The obligation to liberally
5 The Government also argues that the claim that Higgs is not
a Bahamanian citizen is unexhausted because it was never
presented to the IJ or to the BIA at all. Because we decline to
reach the merits of this claim, the Board will have an
opportunity to consider it for the first time on remand, thus
allowing Higgs to properly exhaust this claim. We note,
however, that Higgs only learned that he was not a Bahamian
citizen after he had filed his notice, and thus, he was unable to
raise that issue in his notice of appeal.
6 Whether the Board applied the wrong standard in construing
petitioner‟s notice of appeal is a question of law that we

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construe a pro se litigant‟s pleadings is well-established.
Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976); Haines v. Kerner,
404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972); see also Capogrosso v. The
Supreme Court of New Jersey, 588 F.3d 180, 184 n.1 (3d Cir.
2009) (“[W]e remain mindful of our obligation to construe a
pro se litigant‟s pleadings liberally.”) (citing Haines, 404
U.S. at 520-21). This Court‟s jurisprudence has avoided
formalism “in favor of a contextual approach that construes
appeal notices liberally, especially in cases that, like this one,
involve pro se appellants.” Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Mills,
634 F.3d 746, 754 (3d Cir. 2011); see also Tabron v. Grace, 6
F.3d 147, 153 n.2 (3d Cir. 1993) (noting that “we have
traditionally given pro se litigants greater leeway where they
have not followed the technical rules of pleading and
procedure”). Our policy of liberally construing pro se
submissions is “driven by the understanding that „[i]mplicit in
the right of self-representation is an obligation on the part of
the court to make reasonable allowances to protect pro se
litigants from inadvertent forfeiture of important rights
because of their lack of legal training.‟” Triestman v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 470 F.3d 471, 475 (2d Cir. 2006) (quoting
Traguth v. Zuck, 710 F.2d 90, 95 (2d Cir. 1983)).
In support for its argument that the BIA does not have
an obligation to liberally construe pro se petitioners‟ notices
of appeal, the Government directs us to the practical obstacles
of doing so. The Government maintains that it is
“unreasonable” to expect the Board to “read between the
lines” of a notice of appeal, given the number of cases the
Board reviews. Gov‟t Br. 13. In addition, the Government
review de novo. Alaka v. Att’y Gen., 456 F.3d 88, 94 n.8 (3d
Cir. 2006).

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argues that because Higgs had a right to file an interlocutory
appeal with the Board, “there was no reason for the Board to
have known or surmised that the Petitioner intended to do
something” else—that is, appeal the final order rather than the
interlocutory order. Gov‟t Br. 12-13.
Neither of these arguments is persuasive. We have
never held that, because it is difficult to interpret a pro se
litigant‟s pleadings, it is not necessary to do so. Rather, when
presented with a pro se litigant, we “have a special obligation
to construe his complaint liberally.” United States v. Miller,
197 F.3d 644, 648 (3d Cir. 1999) (quoting Zilich v. Lucht,
981 F.2d 694, 694 (3d Cir. 1992)). The Government‟s
argument runs counter to the principles underpinning the
policy of liberally construing pro se admissions. There is no
question that pro se pleadings present particular challenges.
See Jonathan D. Rosenbloom, Exploring Methods to Improve
Management and Fairness in Pro Se Cases: A Study of the
Pro Se Docket in the Southern District of New York, 30
Fordham Urb. L. J. 305, 308 (2002) (“Court personnel
reviewing pro se pleadings are charged with the responsibility
of deciphering why the submission was filed, what the litigant
is seeking, and what claims she may be making. This task is
particularly difficult because the submission may be rambling
and illogical, if not completely illegible.”).
These difficulties are compounded in the immigration
system. Pro se pleadings are often submitted by individuals
with limited skills and technical expertise in the law. See
Lurana S. Snow, Prisoners in the Federal Courts, 9 St.
Thomas L. Rev. 295, 301 (1997) (noting that “[m]any [pro se
litigants are] illiterate, most are unschooled in the law, and
some are in need of mental health counseling”) (quoting

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conference members at Judicial Conference of the U.S., Long
Range Plan for the Federal Courts 65 (1995)). In immigration
cases, pro se pleadings are often written by individuals with
limited fluency in English. See Robert A. Katzmann, The
Legal Profession and the Unmet Needs of the Immigrant
Poor, 21 Geo. J. Legal Ethics 3, 9-10 (2008) (“An immigrant
often has limited fluency with the English language . . . . An
immigrant who appears pro se or does not have the benefit of
adequate counsel will be at a disadvantage in such
proceedings.”). Moreover, the law itself is complicated and
difficult to navigate. See Baltazar-Alcazar v. I.N.S., 386 F.3d
940, 948 (9th Cir. 2004) (“With only a small degree of
hyperbole, the immigration laws have been termed second
only to the Internal Revenue Code in complexity. A lawyer is
often the only person who could thread the labyrinth.”); see
also Dia v. Ashcroft, 353 F.3d 228, 277 (3d Cir. 2003)
(“[C]ross-cultural misunderstandings about the veracity of
petitioners‟ testimony can be exacerbated by difficulty
understanding the procedure and structure of immigration
proceedings.”).
But if anything, the intricacy of this legal system
accentuates the need to liberally construe pro se submissions
or immigration petitioners. Like other administrative
systems, the immigration system “must be accessible to
individuals who have no detailed knowledge of the relevant
statutory mechanisms and agency processes.” Fed. Express
Corp. v. Holowecki, 552 U.S. 389, 403 (2008). The
obligation to construe these pleadings liberally—no matter
how difficult the “practical reality of administrative
practice”—must be taken seriously.
B.

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Had the Board applied this principle to Higgs‟s notice
of appeal, several aspects of the notice would have revealed
that Higgs was in fact seeking review of the May 21 final
order of removal.
First, although Higgs wrote in his notice of appeal that
he was appealing the IJ‟s “March-19-2009” decision, his
statement of the reasons for the appeal made it clear that what
he wanted was for the BIA to review the determination that
he was removable. Higgs explained that the reasons for his
appeal were, inter alia, (1) “the need to review a clearly
erroneous factual determination . . . where [Higgs] . . . did not
possess over 30 grams[,] which [INA § 237(a)(2)(B)(i)]
clearly exclude[s] for deportation purposes,” and (2) whether
the Government met its burden of proof by proving the
ground for removal by clear and convincing evidence. A. R.
7. In addition, the addendum Higgs attached stated that he
“[wa]s not deportable under section 237(a)(2)(b)(i) of the
Immigration and [N]ationality [A]ct, and has not committed
[a] deportable offense because the respondent State
conviction presentence report does not verify marijuana to
weigh over 30 grams.” A.R. at 11. Thus, although Higgs
identified the March 19 interlocutory ruling as the subject of
his notice of appeal, the substance of his submission revealed
that Higgs was challenging the IJ‟s determination that he was
removable.
Second, the timing of Higgs‟s filing of his notice of
appeal also demonstrates that Higgs sought review of the May
21 final order of removal. Under 8 C.F.R. § 1003.3(a)(2), an
appeal must be filed with the BIA “within 30 days of the
service of the decision being appealed.” Higgs‟s notice of

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appeal was therefore untimely as to the March 19 decision,
but it was timely as to the May 21 final order of removal, and
was filed only five days after the final order of removal was
issued. The temporal proximity between Higgs‟s appeal and
the final order of removal issued against him, in light of the
notice‟s untimeliness as to the fourth interlocutory ruling,
should have alerted the BIA to the fact that Higgs sought an
appeal from that actual removal order, and not the
interlocutory ruling issued sixty-eight days earlier. Cf. Mills,
634 F.3d at 753 (noting that because defendant had already
“completed service of the sentence he received” on an earlier
assault conviction and “had just been convicted in [a new]
murder case” offense . . . the government should have known
that [the defendant] was appealing the murder conviction, not
the dusty old assault conviction”).
Third, given the BIA‟s own policy disfavoring
interlocutory appeals, it would have made sense for the BIA
to construe Higgs‟s notice of appeal as challenging the final
order of removal. The BIA‟s Practice Manual states: “The
Board does not normally entertain interlocutory appeals and
generally limits interlocutory appeals to instances involving
either important jurisdictional questions regarding the
administration of the immigration laws or recurring questions
in the handling of cases by Immigration Judges.” BIA
Practice Manual § 4.14(c). Therefore, it would seem
anomalous for the BIA to designate Higgs‟s notice of appeal
as an interlocutory appeal and rule that it is moot, particularly
since Higgs did not write “interlocutory appeal” on his notice
of appeal, as the Practice Manual commands. BIA Practice
Manual § 4.14(d) (“Next to the words „What decision are you
appealing?‟ in box 5, type or write in the words
„INTERLOCUTORY APPEAL.‟”).

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Finally, given the nature of the two orders at issue, it is
understandable that Higgs erroneously identified the earlier
ruling as the subject of his appeal. Only the March 19
interlocutory ruling contained an explanation of the IJ‟s
determination that Higgs was removable. That order
concluded that “the government ha[d] met its burden of proof
by clear and convincing evidence” of a violation under INA §
237(a)(2)(B)(i). The May 21 final order of removal, on the
other hand, is a one-page administrative order that contains
no explanation of the IJ‟s decision. Thus, we find it
understandable that a layperson such as Higgs, who was
challenging the merits of the IJ‟s determination that the
evidence showed that he possessed more than 30 grams of
marijuana, would identify the order setting forth that
determination, rather than the administrative order enforcing
that decision.
IV.
In conclusion, while the circumstances of Higgs‟s
notice of appeal demonstrate that he intended to appeal from
the final order of removal issued on May 21, 2009, the Board
never reached the merits of his appeal. Therefore, consistent
with our policy that an “agency is given an opportunity to
resolve issues raised before it prior to any judicial
intervention,” Hoxha, 559 F.3d at 163, we will remand this
case to the BIA for further proceedings to consider Higgs‟s
remaining two claims, that the IJ erred in finding that there
was clear and convincing evidence that he possessed more
than 30 grams of marijuana and that the final order of
removal is unenforceable because of his citizenship status.

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