Bruce Murray v. SUPT. D. DIGUGLIELMO, Graterford Prison

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AMENDED CLD-074 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 09-3994
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BRUCE MURRAY,
Appellant
v.
SUPT. D. DIGUGLIELMO, Graterford Prison;
CAPTAIN THOMAS DOHMAN;
LIEUTENANT JOHN MOYER, Graterford Prison;
JOHN DOE’S; MARY CANINO, Hearing Examiner
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 09-cv-2310)
District Judge: Honorable Stewart Dalzell
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 17, 2009
Before: BARRY, FISHER AND VAN ANTWERPEN, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed :February 4, 2010)
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OPINION
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PER CURIAM
Bruce Murray appeals from an order of the District Court dismissing his amended

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complaint. For the reasons set forth below, we will summarily affirm. See I.O.P. 10.6.
I.
In May 2009, Murray, a pro se prisoner, filed a civil action pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 1983 against David DiGuglielmo (“DiGuglielmo”), Superintendent at the
State Correctional Institution at Graterford (“SCI Graterford”); Mary Canino (“Canino”),
Hearing Examiner; Captain Thomas Dohman (“Dohman”); and Lieutenant John Moyer
(“Moyer”). Murray alleged that Dohman and Moyer violated his constitutional rights on
December 6, 2006, when they cited him for possession of drugs, possession of
contraband, unauthorized use of the mail, and lying to employees. Murray claimed that
Canino later violated his constitutional rights when she found him guilty of the
misconduct without any supporting evidence and sanctioned him to 360 days in the
Restricted Housing Unit. Lastly, he claimed that he was transferred from SCI Graterford
to another facility on April 2, 2007, in retaliation for filing grievances over his medical
care.
On June 9, 2009, the Defendants moved to dismiss Murray’s complaint on the
basis that his claims were untimely, and thus, barred by the applicable statute of
limitations. Because Murray indicated in his response to Defendants’ motion to dismiss
that some of the underlying events may have occurred within the statute of limitations, the
District Court permitted Murray to amend his complaint to include “all allegations and the
facts supporting them.” Murray filed an amended complaint on July 27, 2009, and the

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Murray also appeals from an order of the District Court denying his motion for relief1
from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
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Defendants again moved to dismiss it. After thoroughly reviewing the amended
complaint, the District Court dismissed it pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to
state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Even construing the amended complaint
liberally, the District Court concluded that the claims were untimely. Murray appeals1
that determination.
II.
We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. When
reviewing a complaint dismissed under § 1915, this Court applies the same standard
provided for in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Tourscher v. McCullough,
184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999). In determining whether a district court properly
dismissed a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6), this Court must “accept all factual allegations
as true, construe the complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and determine
whether, under any reasonable reading of the complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to
relief.” Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 233 (3d Cir. 2008). “To survive a
motion to dismiss, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to
‘state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937,
1949 (2009).
We agree with the District Court’s analysis regarding the timeliness of Murray’s

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claims. A complaint may properly be dismissed for failure to state a claim on statute of
limitations grounds if the untimeliness of the complaint is apparent on its face. See
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 1384 n.1 (3d Cir. 1994).
While 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not set forth a limitations period, “federal courts must look
to the statute of limitations governing analogous state causes of actions.” Urrutia v.
Harrisburg County Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 457 n.9 (3d Cir. 1996). Here, as the
District Court noted, the applicable statute of limitations is that governing personal injury
claims in Pennsylvania. See Wallace v. Kato, 549 U.S. 384, 387 (2007). Therefore,
Murray had two years from the time his cause of action accrued in which to file his
complaint. See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. Ann. § 5524(2). A § 1983 cause of action accrues on
the date when a plaintiff knew or should have known his rights had been violated. See
Genty v. Resolution Trust Corp., 937 F.2d 899, 919 (3d Cir. 1991).
Here, Murray knew, or had reason to know, of his alleged mistreatment when it
occurred. Murray’s claims against the Defendants arose between December 5, 2006, and
April 2, 2007. However, he did not file a complaint until May 18, 2009. Accordingly,
Murray’s claims are untimely and the District Court properly dismissed his amended
complaint on that basis. The District Court also properly dismissed Murray’s motion for
relief from judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b).
As Murray’s appeal presents no substantial question, we will summarily affirm.
See Third Cir. LAR 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. Murray’s motion for appointment of counsel is

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denied. Murray’s motion and amended motion for “Production of Documents, Etc. Under
Rule 34(a)” are also denied.

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