Tremayne Brown; Roberto Evans; Diane Powers v. Hyoja Akiko Moore

BLD-084 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
___________
No. 09-4087
___________
TREMAYNE BROWN; ROBERTO
EVANS; DIANE POWERS
v.
HYOJA AKIKO MOORE,
Appellant
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civ. No. 09-cv-04498)
District Judge: Honorable Faith S. Hochberg
____________________________________
Submitted for Possible Summary Action
Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
December 31, 2009
Before: McKEE, RENDELL and CHAGARES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed February 23, 2010)
_________
OPINION
_________
PER CURIAM
Hyoja Akiko Moore appeals pro se from the District Court’s order remanding this
matter to state court. We will dismiss this appeal in part and summarily affirm in part.

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The District Court’s order also denied as moot a motion for an injunction that Moore
filed seeking immediate possession of the property at issue. It entered another order on
October 8, 2009, cancelling a previously scheduled conference in light of the remand.
Moore has appealed from the October 8 order as well, but the District Court’s
cancellation of the conference, as well as its denial of Moore’s motion for an injunction,
clearly were proper in light of its remand and do not require separate discussion.
2
See 3d Cir. LAR 27.4 (2008); 3d Cir. I.O.P. 10.6.
Tremayne Brown, Roberto Evans and Diane Powers filed suit against Moore in
New Jersey state court. Their complaint asserts seven state-law claims arising from
Moore’s alleged breach of a partnership agreement concerning the purchase of real
property. Moore removed the action to federal court, purportedly under 28 U.S.C. §§
1441(b) (on the basis of federal question jurisdiction) and 1443. The District Court
served Moore with a standing order requiring her to provide certain information regarding
the basis for removal, and Moore filed a response. The District Court then remanded this
matter to state court by order entered October 7, 2009. The District Court concluded that
the state-court complaint did not give rise to a federal question and that Moore had not
satisfied the requirements for removal under § 1443. Moore appeals.1
With other exceptions not relevant here, “[a]n order remanding a case to the State
court from which it was removed is not reviewable on appeal or otherwise” unless the
case was removed pursuant to § 1443. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d); see also Carlsbad Tech., Inc.,
v. HIF Bio, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1862, 1865-66 (2009) (interpreting § 1447(d)). Thus, we will
dismiss Moore’s appeal to the extent that she challenges the District Court’s conclusion
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. See Davis v. Glanton, 107 F.3d 1044, 1047 (3d

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2
“[T]he second subsection of [§] 1443 confers a privilege of removal only upon federal
officers or agents and those authorized to act with or for them in affirmatively executing
duties under any federal law providing for equal civil rights.” City of Greenwood v.
Peacock, 384 U.S. 808, 824 (1966). Moore has not alleged anything that might permit
removal under this subsection.
3
Cir. 1997). We have jurisdiction, however, to determine whether removal was proper
under § 1443. See id. We exercise plenary review over that legal issue, see Lazorko v.
Pennsylvania Hosp., 237 F.3d 242, 247 (2000), and conclude that the District Court
properly remanded this matter to state court.
Moore purported to remove this action under both subsections of § 1443, but only
her invocation of the first subsection requires extended discussion.2 Section 1443(1)
authorizes the removal of a state law action “[a]gainst any person who is denied or cannot
enforce in the courts of such State a right under any law providing for the equal civil
rights of citizens of the United States, or of all persons within the jurisdiction thereof.”
28 U.S.C. § 1443(1). For this provision to apply, “a state court defendant must
demonstrate both: (1) that he is being deprived of rights guaranteed by a federal law
‘providing for . . . equal civil rights’; and (2) that he is ‘denied or cannot enforce that right
in the courts’ of the state.” Davis, 107 F.3d at 1047 (quoting Georgia v. Rachel, 384 U.S.
780, 788 (1966)). Under the first requirement, the defendant must allege a deprivation of
rights guaranteed by a federal law “‘providing for specific civil rights stated in terms of
racial equality.’” Id. (citation omitted). The second requirement is met when a
defendant’s federal civil rights would “‘inevitably be denied by the very act’ of being

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brought to trial in state court.” Id. at 1050 (citation omitted).
The District Court properly determined that these requirements are not satisfied
here. Moore asserts that removal is proper because the judge presiding over the state
court action has (1) made unspecified biased and prejudicial rulings, (2) failed to follow
unspecified prior precedent, (3) failed to “honor” an order entered in an unspecified prior
action, and (4) relied on falsified or forged documents submitted by the plaintiffs.
(Notice of Removal at 1.) We express no opinion on the merits of these allegations, but
they do not state grounds for removal under § 1443 even if they are true. See Davis, 107
F.3d at 1048 (“‘It is not enough to support removal under § 1443(1) to allege or show . . .
that the charges against the defendant are false, or that the defendant is unable to obtain a
fair trial in a particular state court.’”) (citation omitted). Moore has not identified any
right conferred on her by a federal statute concerning racial equality that inevitably will
be violated by the litigation of this matter in state court, and there does not appear to be
any. To the contrary, as the District Court concluded, she has alleged nothing that cannot
be redressed if appropriate within the state court system itself.
Accordingly, we will dismiss this appeal in part and affirm the District Court’s
ruling that removal was not proper under § 1443.

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