Kathy L. Connors v. Commissioner of Social Security

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 21-3219
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KATHY L. CONNORS,
Appellant
v.
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 2:20-cv-03950)
District Judge: Honorable Richard A. Lloret
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Submitted September 6, 2022
Before: JORDAN, HARDIMAN, and MATEY, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: September 8, 2022)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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HARDIMAN, Circuit Judge.
Kathy Lynn Connors appeals the District Court’s judgment affirming the
Commissioner of Social Security’s denial of disability insurance benefits under the Social
Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 423. We will affirm.
I1
Connors applied for disability benefits in October 2017. In 2012, Connors injured
her knee while working as a fire service paramedic and had arthroscopic surgery seven
months after the injury. Following surgery and physical therapy, Connors’s pain
“lessened, but did persist,” limiting her ability to resume paramedic duties, though she
“continued on a home exercise program recommended by [her physician] including
walking and light exercises as tolerated at [her] local gym.” AR 1071. Connors did not
seek further treatment for her knee pain until after September 30, 2014, when her
disability insurance expired.
Connors claimed disabling impairments between August 12, 2014 (the alleged
onset of her disability) and September 30, 2014 (the last date she qualified as insured).
When a state medical expert found that her treatment records failed to establish severe
impairment during that period, Connors requested a hearing. In September 2019, she and
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). We have jurisdiction
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We exercise plenary review over legal conclusions reached by
the Commissioner” and “review the Commissioner’s factual findings for ‘substantial
evidence.’” Chandler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 667 F.3d 356, 359 (3d Cir. 2011) (citing 42
U.S.C. § 405(g)).

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her counsel appeared before an Administrative Law Judge. The ALJ called a vocational
expert to testify. While agreeing that Connors could no longer perform a paramedic’s
“very heavy” work, the vocational expert identified “light” jobs which Connors could
perform, given her medical skills (e.g., phlebotomist, medical assistant). AR 75–78, 82.
Following her hearing, the ALJ denied Connors’s claim under the Act. See 42 U.S.C.
§§ 416(i), 423.
The ALJ determined that Connors failed at step five of the disability determination
process, which requires that a claimant be unable to perform work existing in the national
economy. See 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4)(v); Zirnsak v. Colvin, 777 F.3d 607, 616 (3d
Cir. 2014). The ALJ relied on medical evidence, expert opinion evidence, and hearing
testimony showing that Connors had the residual functional capacity (RFC) “to perform
light work” with certain limitations. AR 13–19. Because that RFC allows Connors to find
alternative employment in the national economy, the ALJ found her “not disabled.” AR
19. Connors appealed the ALJ’s decision and tried to reintroduce certain medical records
(exhibits from her hearing) as evidence. When the Appeals Council denied her request for
review, Connors appealed to the District Court, which affirmed the ALJ’s findings.
Connors v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL 4523494, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 4, 2021). Connors moved
for reconsideration, which the District Court denied. Connors v. Kijakazi, 2021 WL
5235272, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Nov. 10, 2021). Connors timely appealed.

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II
Connors claims substantial evidence did not support the ALJ’s decision. First, she
argues that the ALJ’s RFC determination contradicted her medical record—specifically,
an evaluation she obtained to support a workers’ compensation claim she pursued before
applying for disability benefits. Second, Connors contends the agency bore the burden of
proving her RFC for alternative work. In her view, the agency “did not produce
substantial and competent evidence that [Connors] could meet a job requiring her to be
on her feet all day.” Connors Br. 40. So the ALJ erred when she deemed Connors not
disabled.
We disagree. “[W]hatever the meaning of ‘substantial’ in other contexts, the
threshold for such evidentiary sufficiency is not high. Substantial evidence . . . is ‘more
than a mere scintilla.’ It means—and means only—‘such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.’” Biestek v. Berryhill,
139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019) (citations omitted). The ALJ found Connors capable of
performing light work after identifying and evaluating copious medical evidence
consistent with that finding, including evidence from Connors’s own doctors. The ALJ
weighed that evidence alongside Connors’s lack of treatment for knee pain during the
period she alleges disability. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1529(c)(3)(iv)–(v) (type and nature of
claimant’s treatment are relevant factors when evaluating allegedly disabling symptoms).
Because Connors reported being “independent with activities of daily living” and sought
no follow up treatment for her knee after completing physical therapy post-surgery, the

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ALJ concluded that any continued knee impairment would not preclude light work. AR
17–18; cf. AR 514, 622, 631, 641, 646, 656 (hospital records from 2013 and 2014 for
asthma, cold, and difficulty sleeping, all affirming Connors’s report of being
“[i]ndependent in [activities of daily living]” and not “afraid of falling”). And because the
only contradictory medical opinion—offered in connection with Connors’s workers’
compensation claim—was “not supported by any physical examination findings, or
treatment notes,” the ALJ gave it less weight. AR 17; see 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520c(c)(2)
(“The more consistent a medical opinion(s) . . . is with the evidence from other medical
sources and nonmedical sources in the claim, the more persuasive the medical opinion(s)
. . . will be.”). When faced with conflicting medical evidence, “the ALJ is entitled to
weigh all evidence in making its finding.” Brown v. Astrue, 649 F.3d 193, 196 (3d Cir.
2011). The ALJ’s consideration of the entire record and her decision to more heavily
weigh Connors’s lack of treatment for knee pain satisfy the requirements of substantial
evidence. So we decline to disturb the ALJ’s determination that Connors was not disabled
because she could perform light work. See Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1154.
Connors also urges us to reverse the District Court based on the ALJ’s supposed
burden of proof at step five. But Connors disputes the ALJ’s RFC determination (i.e.,
whether Connors “could meet a job requiring her to be on her feet all day,” Connors Br.
40), an assessment the ALJ made before step four, when Connors still had the burden of
proof. See 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4)(iv), (e); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404.1560(c)(2)
(agency “not responsible for providing additional evidence about [claimant’s] residual

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functional capacity” at step five because it uses “same residual functional capacity
assessment” established in earlier steps). So we perceive no error in the District Court’s
decision on this basis.
* * *
For the reasons stated, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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