United States of America v. Natalya Shvets

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 22-2683
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
NATALYA SHVETS,
Appellant
_____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(District Court No. 2:12-cr-00112-002)
District Judge: Honorable Eduardo C. Robreno
_____________________________________
Submitted Pursuant to �ird Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 8, 2025
(Filed: September 29, 2025)
Before: SHWARTZ, FREEMAN, AND RENDELL, Circuit
Judges.

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Natalya Shvets
Brooklyn, NY
Appellant Pro Se
Raj Bhargava
Esteban Flores
Zach Spitz
Yale Law School
127 Wall Street
New Haven, CT 06511
Tadhg Dooley
David R. Roth
Wiggin & Dana
One Century Tower
265 Church Street
New Haven, CT 06510
Court-Appointed Amicus Curiae
Joseph F. Minni
Robert A. Zauzmer
Office of United States Attorney
615 Chestnut Street
Suite 1250
Philadelphia, PA 19106
Counsel for Appellee
_________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_________

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RENDELL, Circuit Judge.
In 2014, Appellant Natalya Shvets was sentenced for
her role in a conspiracy to defraud Medicare and ordered to pay
$253,196 in restitution for the false bills she helped prepare.
�e Court’s judgment provided that Shvets and eight other
defendants were “jointly and severally” liable for this amount.
But her $253,196 share represented only part of a broader
scheme that allegedly caused $16.2 million in loss to Medicare.
Two of the defendants held jointly and severally liable with
Shvets were ordered to pay for the scheme’s entire loss. In
total, seventeen individuals associated with the scheme were
ordered to pay restitution for varying amounts from $42,211 to
$16.2 million. See Appendix 1.
Several years later, Shvets moved in the District Court
for an accounting and to declare her restitution judgment
satisfied based on payments that she and her co-defendants had
made. Although Shvets had not personally paid all of the
amount ordered by her judgment, she urged that payments by
herself and others (with whom she was jointly and severally
liable) had totaled more than that amount, so that the judgment
was satisfied. After ordering the Government to produce
documentation and holding two hearings, the District Court
determined that Shvets’s restitution judgment had not been
satisfied.
�e District Court reasoned that Shvets’s judgment
would not be satisfied until either: (1) Shvets personally paid
the entire $253,196 imposed on her (i.e., without counting co-
defendants’ payments), or (2) Shvets and sixteen co-defendants
collectively paid $16.2 million for the entire fraud loss

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associated with Shvets’s employer. Since neither event had
occurred, Shvets was still liable to pay. �e District Court
recognized that the Clerk of Court had been accounting for
restitution payments using a different (and more complicated)
method of crediting co-defendants’ payments. But the District
Court determined it did not need to decide whether the Clerk’s
method was correct because the Clerk, too, was reporting
Shvets’s restitution balance as outstanding (computing the
remaining balance to be $18,929.69), and neither of the two
conditions it cited had been satisfied.
On appeal, Shvets urges that the District Court
misinterpreted her restitution judgment. She claims her
obligation to pay will end as soon as she and the other eight
jointly and severally liable co-defendants listed in her
judgment collectively pay $253,196, which has already
occurred. She further contends that she is not able to
understand the Clerk’s accounting method from the
information provided and that the Clerk’s totals do not seem to
add up. Shvets also raises various objections to the
Government’s alleged failure to collect property from co-
defendants.
�e Government urges in response that Shvets has not
shown an error in the Clerk’s calculation of her outstanding
restitution balance. And the Government maintains there is no
additional property belonging to co-defendants that should be
credited toward restitution.
We will affirm in part, vacate in part, and remand for the
District Court to ascertain how the Clerk has been accounting
for restitution payments and whether Shvets’s judgment has
been satisfied. We will permit sentencing judges to issue hybrid

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restitution orders under the Mandatory Victim Restitution Act.
�e MVRA authorizes courts to order restitution based on joint
and several liability or based on the defendant’s level of
contribution to the victim’s loss. 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h). �e
hybrid approach allows judges to combine these approaches,
finding them not mutually exclusive. For example, if two
defendants, A and B, rob a victim, resulting in a loss of $1,000,
and B independently robs the same victim again, resulting in a
loss of $500, a sentencing judge may hold A and B jointly and
severally liable for the first $1,000, while finding B liable for
the $500. As a result, A’s and B’s restitution debts are hybrid—
part joint and several, part apportioned. �is hybrid approach
provides compensation to the victim and fairness to the parties.
As we discuss below, we find no merit to Shvets’s
objections regarding the Government’s failure to collect
property from co-defendants.
I. Facts
A. Shvets’s Employer’s Fraud and
Shvets’s Role in It
In 2014, a jury convicted Shvets of healthcare fraud and
conspiracy to commit healthcare fraud in violation of 18
U.S.C. §§ 1347, 1349, and 2. United States v. Shvets, 631 F.
App’x 91, 92 (3d Cir. 2015). Shvets’s convictions resulted
from her employment as a nurse for Home Care Hospice, Inc.
(HCH), where evidence at trial showed that Shvets and other
HCH employees created false records of providing high-priced
“continuous care” (i.e., at least eight hours per day) to patients.
Id. at 93. Bills for those fictitious services were submitted to
Medicare.

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Other HCH employees (prosecuted in separate
proceedings) also defrauded Medicare by falsely documenting
patients as terminally ill and thus eligible for hospice care on
Medicare’s dime. See United States v. Kolodesh, 787 F.3d 224,
230 (3d Cir. 2015). Shvets characterizes these as two separate
conspiracies: the “continuous care conspiracy” that she was
involved in, and the “inappropriate patient conspiracy”
regarding hospice eligibility that involved other HCH
employees. Appellant Br. 13. �e Government, by contrast,
views these as different aspects of the same overarching
conspiracy to defraud Medicare. Inappropriate hospice billing
is mentioned in Shvets’s indictment, although it appears
undisputed that Shvets’s personal involvement was limited to
the documentation of fictitious continuous care.
B. Shvets’s and Her Co-
Defendants’ Sentences
In the judgment of sentence, Shvets was ordered to pay
$253,196 in restitution to Medicare for her role in HCH’s false
billing. �e Government’s sentencing memorandum described
that figure as stemming “from the false continuous care claims
arising from the 52 cases in which [Shvets] participated.” Appx
125. Shvets’s written judgment, following a form used by the
Administrative Office of U.S. Courts (AO), described
$253,196 as the “Restitution Ordered” and also as the “Total
Loss.” Appx 66.
Shvets was not the only HCH defendant accused of
having been involved with the 52 false bills she helped prepare.
For that reason, Shvets’s counsel asked the District Court to
divide the $253,196 total among the defendants who
contributed to it, rather than making Shvets liable for the entire

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sum. �e District Court denied that request. Instead, the
District Court ordered Shvets to pay the $253,196 “jointly and
severally” with the other defendants who participated in the 52
false bills. Appx 184. �ose were Matthew Kolodesh, Alex
Pugman, Cecilia Wiley, Giorgi Oqroshidze, Edward Hearn,
Alexsandr Koptyakov, Yevgeniya Goltman, and Diana
Koltman, although the Government also indicated that “there
may be some other individuals as we go forward.” Appx 167.
Some of those defendants (Kolodesh, Pugman, Wiley, Heart,
and Koltman) had been charged in separate indictments and
tried in separate proceedings from Shvets. And while some had
already been sentenced, others would not be sentenced until
later.
Shvets’s written judgment, per the AO’s form, included
a section titled “Joint and Several” listing those eight names
along with the $253,196 figure, as follows:
Joint and Several
Defendant and Co-Defendant Names and Case Numbers
(including defendant number), Total Amount, Joint and
Several Amount, and corresponding payee, if appropriate.
Mathew Kolodesh, CR 11-464, $253,196.00 Edward Hearn, CR 11-297, $253,196.00
Alex Pugman, CR 09-651, $253,196.00 Alexsandr Koptyakov, CR 12-112-05, $253,196.00
Ceclia [sic] Wiley, CR 11-322, $253,196.00 Yevgeniya Goltman, CR 12-112-04, $253,196.00
Giorgi Oqroshidze, CR 12-112-03, $253,196.00 Diana Koltman, CR 11-182, $253,196.00
Appx 67. Although the AO’s form indicates that separate
figures should be listed for the “Total Amount” and “Joint and
Several Amount,” these were not provided. Id.

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In all, seventeen individuals, divided across several
indictments and docket numbers, were ordered to pay
restitution in connection with HCH’s fraud. Pugman and
Kolodesh (among the defendants listed above as jointly and
severally liable with Shvets for $253,196) were held
responsible for the total amount, $16.2 million. Each written
judgment, like Shvets’s, included a list of “Joint and Several”
obligors. But those lists were not always consistent across
judgments. For example, Shvets’s judgment lists Koltman as
jointly liable, but Koltman’s judgment does not list Shvets. And
although Patricia McGill is absent from Shvets’s judgment,
Shvets does appear in McGill’s. One judgment (Zoya
Shusterman’s) lists Lilia Gorovits as jointly liable for
restitution, even though Gorovits’s own judgment imposed no
restitution but rather a $75,000 fine (not jointly with anyone).
Some judgments list dollar figures next to the joint and several
defendants and some do not. No judgment lists separate “Total”
and “Joint and Several” amounts as specified in the AO form.
After restitution was imposed, the HCH defendants
began making payments. By July 2022, Shvets had paid
$7,591.88 of the $253,196 she owed. In all, $13.3 million of
the total $16.2 million HCH-related loss had been paid. �e
biggest payments came from Pugman and Kolodesh, the two
defendants ordered to pay $16.2 million. By July 2022, they
had paid approximately $4 million and $9 million,
respectively.
Pugman and Kolodesh paid a significant portion of their
$4 million and $9 million through civil settlements in a False
Claims Act lawsuit initiated by two qui tam relators. See United
States ex rel. Fox v. Home Care Hospice, Inc., 06-cv-04679,
ECF Nos. 122-4, 122-5 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 24, 2017). �ese

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settlements called for Pugman and Kolodesh to turn over cash,
bank accounts, and real estate, with amounts received by
Medicare (after liquidating assets) to be credited toward
restitution.
C. Shvets’s Request for an
Accounting
In 2017, HCH defendant McGill challenged her
outstanding restitution debt through a motion for an
accounting. Shvets (proceeding pro se) joined McGill’s
request, asserting that the Government’s recoveries from the
other HCH defendants listed on her judgment should be
credited against her own restitution debt and, taken together
and properly accounted, had already satisfied it.
�e District Court ordered the Government to “provide
to the Court a report as to all of the payments made towards the
restitution obligations related [to] the Home Care Hospice
scheme by all related Defendants.” D.C. ECF No. 474. In
response, the Government argued “Shvets . . . should not
receive restitution credit for the payments made pursuant to
[Pugman’s and Kolodesh’s] civil settlements” and “should be
obligated to personally pay the restitution amount that [the
District Court] ordered [her] to pay or until Medicare is
completely compensated.” D.C. ECF No. 485 at 7. According
to the Government, since Medicare still had not been paid
approximately $3.5 million of what the Government
considered to be a total loss of $16.2 million, Shvets’s own
restitution debt was unsatisfied.
�e Government also provided Shvets’s outstanding
restitution balance as reported by the District Court Clerk’s

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Office, which, by the time of this appeal, was said to be
$18,929.69.1 �e Government did not initially explain how the
Clerk’s number was determined or why the Clerk had
apparently afforded Shvets credit for some of the co-
defendants’ payments despite the Government’s urging it
should not do so.
Shvets objected to the Government’s approach and
advanced an alternative theory for when her restitution
judgment would be satisfied. Under Shvets’s preferred rule, she
would be discharged from further payment when she and the
eight co-defendants listed in her judgment had collectively
paid $253,196. Since two of those co-defendants (Pugman and
Kolodesh) had already paid much more than $253,196, Shvets
insisted she was not required to pay any more.
Over the next several years, the parties exchanged
numerous briefs on the restitution issue, with the Government
incrementally divulging additional information about the HCH
defendants’ payments and the Clerk’s accounting system. �e
District Court then held two hearings. An employee of the
Clerk’s Office offered testimony as to how the Clerk had
calculated Shvets’s outstanding restitution balance
(summarized below). �e District Court also heard argument
about how the Government had credited amounts for various
properties belonging to Pugman and Kolodesh.
1 Initially, the Clerk reported Shvets’s outstanding
balance as $124,455.23, but this number was revised several
times over the course of the proceedings.

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D. Clerk’s Accounting System
�e record contains limited information on the precise
way in which the Clerk accounted for restitution payments by
Shvets and her co-defendants. To the extent there are policies
governing the way in which the Clerk is to credit amounts in
this type of situation, they are not publicly available and have
not been made part of the record. Accordingly, we describe the
Clerk’s methodology as best we understand it.
�e HCH defendants had been ordered to pay restitution
in amounts ranging from $42,211 to $16.2 million. Adding
those amounts together would have produced a total in excess
of $30 million. However, the Clerk seems to have concluded
that all judgments represented overlapping portions of a total
loss of $16.2 million.
�e Clerk then appears to have divided the $16.2
million total loss into fifteen “buckets” or “pots,” labeled A
through O. See Appx 316–17, 444–45, 549. �e Clerk’s
documentation suggests that bucket A had a balance of
$42,211, bucket B had a balance of $76,669, and bucket C had
a balance of $2,687. �e bulk of the $16.2 million was placed
in bucket O, which had a balance of $15,588,228.62. �e total
balance of all buckets was $16.2 million.
�e Clerk then assigned each of the seventeen HCH
defendants to some number of buckets. Shvets was assigned to
buckets A through H. �e table in Appendix 2, provided by the
Clerk, appears to reflect which defendants were assigned to
which buckets (except for Svetlana Ganetsky, who was
removed after her debt was discharged), although the precise
derivation of this table is not in the record. For each defendant,

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the total of the assigned buckets appears to equal that
defendant’s restitution judgment. For example, the total of
buckets A through H equals Shvets’s judgment of $253,196.
�e record does not explain why or how the Clerk’s
system ascertains a total restitution amount, divides it into
buckets, and assigns defendants to buckets. �ere is also no
explanation for how the Clerk determined there should be
fifteen buckets, what the value of each bucket should be, or
which defendant should be assigned to which bucket.
When a payment came in, the Clerk would place its
value into some number of buckets. �e proportion placed in
each bucket was based on the buckets’ outstanding balances,
although the precise method is not in the record.
Shvets argued that the Clerk was not actually following
the allocation method just described. She calculated that her
restitution judgment of $253,196 was 1.56% of the $16.2
million total loss figure the Clerk was using, and, thus, she
should receive 1.56% credit for co-defendants’ payments. But,
according to Shvets’s calculation, her reported credit was only
0.785% of the payments that had been made thus far. �e
Government responded (after the hearings) that the percentage
might differ from Shvets’s expectation because “there is no
fixed percentage in the formula” and “[t]he percentage
fluctuates because the balance owed for each defendant
changes with every payment received by the Clerk.” D.C. ECF
No. 535 at 14. �e record does not appear to contain details or
examples that could confirm this.

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E. Shvets’s Other Challenges
Shvets also raised a number of specific challenges to
how the Government had accounted for payments from
Pugman and Kolodesh.
Shvets argued she should receive a credit for money the
Government could have, but did not, collect from Pugman and
Kolodesh’s bank accounts. In 2008, the Government sought
and obtained an injunction under 18 U.S.C. § 1345 prohibiting
various individuals from withdrawing funds from bank
accounts allegedly connected to HCH’s fraud. See United
States v. Home Care Hospice, Inc., No. 08-cv-4711, ECF No.
5 (E.D. Pa. Oct. 1, 2008). In its accounting of restitution
payments, the Government listed recoveries from some but not
all of those bank accounts. Shvets argued the Government
should have recovered money from the remaining bank
accounts and credited it toward her restitution debt. She made
a similar argument about real estate, urging there were real
properties associated with Pugman and Kolodesh (or their
family businesses) that should have been seized and used to
pay restitution.
In an effort to identify other payments that might be
credited toward restitution, Shvets sent a subpoena by certified
mail to Cahaba Government Benefit Administrators
(“Cahaba”), a business that allegedly interfaced between HCH
and Medicare. �e subpoena sought, among other things,
documentation of payments by Cahaba to the United States
relating to HCH. When Cahaba did not respond, Shvets asked
that the District Court require Cahaba to show cause why it
should not be held in contempt. �e docket does not reflect that
Shvets’s motion was ever served on Cahaba.

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Shvets also raised an issue regarding payments to the
relators in the civil False Claims Act lawsuit. �e
Government’s civil settlement with Kolodesh provided for him
to make a combination of cash payments and property
forfeitures. A share of the proceeds was given to the relators as
their incentive payment under 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d). While the
entirety of the settlement’s cash payments was credited toward
Kolodesh’s restitution balance (and thus, under the Clerk’s
system, also partly to Shvets’s), the portion of the relators’
incentive payments taken out of forfeiture proceeds was not.
Shvets objected to this treatment and insisted she should
receive a restitution credit for all forfeiture proceeds, including
the share given to relators.
F. �e District Court’s Ruling
�e District Court ruled that Shvets’s restitution debt
remained outstanding. Relying on United States v. Sheets, 814
F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2016), it reasoned that the HCH defendants
would not have satisfied their restitution judgments “until
either (a) they have personally paid the amount apportioned to
them individually, or (b) the victim has been made whole for
the entire harm caused by the comprehensive scheme.” United
States v. Novikov, 624 F. Supp. 3d 550, 558 (E.D. Pa. 2022).
�e “entire harm,” in the District Court’s view, was the $16.2
million figure found “[i]n connection with the criminal case
against the owner of HCH, Matthew Kolodesh.” Id. at 553.
�e District Court rejected Shvets’s objection to
importing the $16.2 million figure from another proceeding
(i.e., Kolodesh’s separately charged prosecution) where she
was not a party and had no opportunity to challenge it. �e
District Court viewed the $16.2 million total as applying to

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Shvets because her judgment “h[eld] [her] jointly and severally
liable with not only the other defendants who committed the
same type of conduct, but with Kolodesh and Pugman, who
were found to have orchestrated the entire scheme.” Id. at 557–
58.
�e District Court recognized that the Clerk had been
accounting for restitution in a way that “differ[ed]” from the
District Court’s own preferred approach, in that it allowed
some crediting among co-defendants before the entire $16.2
million balance was paid. Id. at 556 n.5. Under the Clerk’s
accounting, Shvets’s outstanding balance was, by then,
$18,929.69. Id. But because Shvets’s balance was still
outstanding under either the Clerk’s method or Sheets’s rule,
the District Court determined it did not need to decide whether
the Clerk’s method was correct. Id.
�e District Court did not discuss in detail Shvets’s
challenges regarding bank accounts, real properties, and relator
payments, but concluded it was “satisfied that the government
has adequately reported all it has recovered toward restitution
in this matter.” Id. at 555. Regarding Shvets’s subpoena to
Cahaba, the District Court viewed the information sought as
only relevant to calculating the harm to Medicare (i.e., the
appropriate amount of the restitution judgment), not what
credit Shvets might receive for payments after the judgment
was imposed. It thus declined to enforce the subpoena.
II. Jurisdiction and Standard of Review
�e District Court had jurisdiction over Shvets’s
criminal case under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. Because Shvets’s
restitution judgment was an order of the District Court, we

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agree with the parties that the District Court could exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over Shvets’s motion to “interpret
and enforce” it. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137,
151 (2009). �e Government did not raise a procedural
objection to Shvets’s motion (nor press one on appeal), and we
therefore do not consider whether the motion was procedurally
proper. See United States v. Dowdell, 70 F.4th 134, 146 (3d Cir.
2023).
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 because
Shvets’s motion was brought after final judgment and the
District Court “completely disposed of” it. Ohntrup v.
Firearms Ctr., Inc., 802 F.2d 676, 678 (3d Cir. 1986).
“We review legal determinations de novo, factual
findings for clear error, and matters committed to the District
Court’s discretion for abuse thereof.” United States v. Doe, 810
F.3d 132, 142 (3d Cir. 2015). “We must give particular
deference to the district court’s interpretation of its own order.”
In re Fine Paper Antitrust Litig., 695 F.2d 494, 498 (3d Cir.
1982).
III. Joint and Several Credits
�e parties agree that “a District Court cannot order
multiple defendants to pay restitution in amounts that will
result in the payment to the victim of an amount greater than
the victim’s loss.” United States v. Diaz, 245 F.3d 294, 312 (3d
Cir. 2001). �ey also agree that the HCH defendants’ various
restitution judgments should be interpreted in such a way as to
comply with this rule, and, further, that our task is to apply the
judgments as written rather than to reassess what restitution
might have been appropriate given the facts of the underlying

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crimes. �us, although neither the judgments themselves nor
the relevant statutes expressly provide that co-defendants may
receive credit for each other’s payments (other than that the
judgments state that liability is joint and several), the parties
agree that some crediting should be applied to prevent multiple
defendants from paying the same debt twice. �e parties
disagree, however, on the manner in which such credits should
be applied.
�e task is made more difficult by the fact that the
seventeen HCH defendants have overlapping liability that is
neither entirely joint nor entirely separate. �at is, this is not
the simple situation where several defendants who caused a
single harm are held jointly and severally liable for all of it. In
that situation, a payment by any one defendant might be
assumed to reduce the single outstanding balance that all
defendants owe. Also, this is not a situation in which several
defendants who each caused separate harms are held separately
liable, where a payment by one defendant would only reduce
her own outstanding balance with no impact on the liability of
others. Instead, each HCH defendant has been held liable for a
specific sum that may be owed (partially or entirely) by some
(but not necessarily all) other HCH defendants.
To complicate matters further, these seventeen
defendants were charged in multiple indictments, prosecuted
in separate proceedings, and sentenced at different times. �e
resulting judgments reflect a dizzying array of joint and several
obligations that are not all consistent with one another. See
Appendix 1. For example, Shvets’s judgment lists her as jointly
liable with Hearn for $253,196, even though Hearn’s total
restitution debt is only $42,211. Id. �ese inconsistencies have

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left the parties, the District Court, and the Clerk to sort out after
the fact how to apply payments to reduce these various debts.
Unsurprisingly, the parties advance diametrically
opposite proposals for how to handle this situation. Shvets
insists that every payment by a jointly and severally liable co-
defendant must reduce her own debt. By contrast, before the
District Court, the Government urged that no payment by a co-
defendant should reduce Shvets’s debt until all liability
associated with HCH ($16.2 million) has been paid off,
although it no longer advances that position on appeal. And the
Clerk has taken the intermediate view (now with the
Government’s endorsement) that some but not all co-defendant
payments may reduce Shvets’s debt, although this has been
calculated using a formula that has not been explained.
As noted below, we first conclude that the District Court
reasonably understood that Shvets’s liability was not fully joint
and several with her co-defendants. �at is, the District Court
was within its discretion to reject Shvets’s request for dollar-
for-dollar credit for every payment by a listed co-defendant.
Instead, as the District Court recognized, Shvets’s restitution
judgment was part of what has been called a “hybrid scheme”
involving all HCH defendants, in which liability is neither fully
joint and several nor fully apportioned.
But the determination that Shvets’s restitution judgment
was part of a hybrid scheme still leaves open the question of
how payments should be counted to reduce it. And as explained
below, the District Court has a certain amount of discretion to
choose a method it deems reasonable under the circumstances.

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However, on that point, as we discuss more fully below,
we conclude the District Court abused its discretion. Rather
than choose a reasonable method as to how payments would be
counted toward the HCH defendants’ various judgments, the
District Court applied a blanket rule from United States v.
Sheets, 814 F.3d 256 (5th Cir. 2016), that Shvets’s obligation
would only terminate if either: (1) she personally paid
$253,196 (i.e., with no credit for co-defendants’ payments), or
(2) all HCH defendants collectively paid $16.2 million for the
entire scheme. Since neither of these conditions was satisfied,
her judgment was not satisfied. �at approach conflicted with
language in Shvets’s judgment, which held her liable not for
$16.2 million but for a specific $253,196 loss stemming
directly from 52 false bills, and indicated that other defendants
were jointly and severally liable for that same amount. �e
District Court needed to determine which payments (or
portions of payments) from Shvets’s co-defendants should be
counted toward Shvets’s $253,196 debt, so that it could
determine whether her debt had been repaid.
On the present record, we are unable to determine
whether Shvets’s restitution obligation has been satisfied.
While the Clerk has obviously adopted a method for
calculating Shvets’s outstanding balance as $18,929.69, the
facts are not sufficiently developed to understand how that
determination was made, nor are we able to ascertain on appeal
whether the Clerk’s method was reasonable. For these reasons,
and as set forth more fully below, we will vacate and remand
for the District Court to decide whether the Clerk’s system (or
an alternative system, if the District Court determines an
alternative system would be preferable) is appropriate and fair,
and to determine whether, under that system, Shvets’s
judgment has been satisfied.

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We will first explore the propriety of the District Court’s
entry of restitution orders that involve more than the simple
imposition of joint and several restitution against more than
one defendant for the same debt. For the situation before us is
anything but simple and we have not previously opined on
what have come to be called “hybrid” restitution orders.
A. Sentencing Judges May Impose
Hybrid Restitution Orders
�e Mandatory Victim Restitution Act (MVRA)’s main
purpose “is to compensate the victim for its losses and, to the
extent possible, to make the victim whole.” Diaz, 245 F.3d at
312. To achieve that goal, the Act requires district courts to
“order . . . that the defendant make restitution to the victim” of
various offenses, 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1), and vests courts
“with considerable discretion in fashioning restitution orders,”
United States v. Yalincak, 30 F.4th 115, 122 (2d Cir. 2022).
Under the MVRA, if a “court finds that more than 1
defendant has contributed to the loss of a victim,” the statute
grants the court two options: it may (1) “make each defendant
liable for payment of the full amount of restitution”; or (2)
“apportion liability among the defendants to reflect the level of
contribution to the victim’s loss and economic circumstances
of each defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h). �e first option has
been understood to refer to what is traditionally called “joint
and several liability.” United States v. Wall, 349 F.3d 18, 26 (1st
Cir. 2003). For example, suppose two defendants rob a bank
together and steal $10,000. Under § 3664(h)’s first option, the
court could impose a $10,000 restitution judgment on each
defendant, jointly and severally with the other. In that situation,
the victim still may not collect more than $10,000 in total from

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the two defendants. Diaz, 245 F.3d at 312. �us, their
obligations will terminate if, for example, one defendant has
paid $6,000 and the other $4,000 (or one has paid $10,000 and
the other nothing). Alternatively, under § 3664(h)’s second
option, the court could order one defendant to pay $7,000 and
the other to pay $3,000, based on their “level of contribution to
the victim’s loss and economic circumstances.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664(h).
But at least five of our sister courts of appeals have
recognized that § 3664(h)’s two options are not mutually
exclusive, and that they permit what have been termed
“hybrid” restitution orders. Sheets, 814 F.3d at 260; United
States v. Salti, 59 F.4th 1050, 1055–58 (10th Cir. 2023);
Yalincak, 30 F.4th at 118; United States v. Trigg, 119 F.3d 493,
501 (7th Cir. 1997); United States v. Scott, 270 F.3d 30, 52–53
(1st Cir. 2001).2 In a hybrid restitution order, the sentencing
2 �e Eighth and D.C. Circuits have yet to weigh in on
this issue, but district courts in their respective circuits have
discussed hybrid restitution orders. See United States v. Morris,
No. 17-cr-107, 2023 WL 8437551, at *1 (D. Minn. Dec. 5,
2023) (noting that “under the hybrid approach to restitution,
the Court can combine the apportionment of liability approach
while concurrently making all the defendants jointly and
severally liable, which was done in this case”); United States
v. Eastman, No. 22-cr-22-1, 2023 WL 6446931, at *10 (D.D.C.
Sept. 8, 2023) (noting some courts have found that “a court . .
. may apply a ‘hybrid approach’ by holding the ‘most
significant offender . . . liable for the full amount of the loss,’
while requiring ‘lesser participants . . . to contribute lesser
amounts’ ”).

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judge may impose liability that is neither fully joint and several
nor fully apportioned, but a combination of the two. To
illustrate how that could work, consider the following scenario:
Two defendants, A and B, rob a bank together and steal
$10,000, and the next day, B alone robs the same bank and
steals $7,000. �e sentencing judge may feel it is appropriate
to hold A and B jointly and severally liable for the $10,000
stolen in the first robbery, while holding B separately liable for
the $7,000 stolen in the second robbery. A’s total restitution
obligation is therefore $10,000 while B’s is $17,000. (�e total
restitution imposed on both is $17,000, not $27,000.) A’s and
B’s restitution debts are not fully joint and several, because
$7,000 of B’s liability is not shared with A, but they are also
not fully apportioned, because $10,000 is owed jointly by the
two.
Courts have not merely limited hybrid restitution orders
to situations like the above involving separate conduct, but
have used them to apportion responsibility for indivisible
harms. In United States v. Salti, 59 F.4th 1050 (10th Cir. 2023),
two defendants, Salti and Towner, perpetrated a single armed
robbery in which the victim’s loss was $72,000. Towner was
ordered to pay the entire $72,000 in restitution, while Salti’s
judgment recited the total loss of $72,000 but only ordered
Salti to pay $35,000 of it. Id. at 1052–53. Notably, Salti’s
judgment did not represent any discrete harm or portion of the
In addition to the District Court in this case, at least one
other district court in the �ird Circuit has approved of hybrid
restitution orders. See United States v. Limper, No. 19-cr-303,
2023 WL 5401560, at *1 (E.D. Pa. Aug. 22, 2023) (approving
a report and recommendation of a hybrid approach for
restitution apportionment).

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victim’s $72,000 loss—there was only one robbery and thus
one single, indivisible loss. But the district court exercised its
discretion under § 3664(h) to “apportion” $35,000 of that loss
to Salti while also making Salti’s obligation joint and several
with Towner’s. �at arrangement could, perhaps, have
reflected Salti’s “level of contribution” or “economic
circumstances,” permissible considerations under § 3664(h).
We too have previously affirmed a restitution order that
employed joint and several liability even though each
defendant was not held liable for the same amount. Diaz, 245
F.3d at 312. In Diaz, a defendant and her co-defendant were
each ordered to pay a federal agency $846,000 while two other
defendants involved in the scheme were ordered to pay $1,000
in restitution. Id. On appeal, the defendant argued that the
district court may “have ordered restitution in an amount
greater than the actual loss, which it cannot do.” Id. We
affirmed the restitution order, explaining that the district court
appeared to have “impose[d] joint and several liability on
multiple defendants for restitution, permitting the victim to
recover its losses from all or some of the wrongdoers” but
directed the District Court to clarify that the defendants’
restitution obligations, including those apportioned only a
portion of the restitution, “are joint and several.” Id. Although
we did not analyze whether the orders complied with the text
of § 3664(h), we implicitly approved holding the defendants
jointly and severally liable for different amounts.
We now hold that 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) allows
sentencing judges to issue “hybrid” restitution orders—i.e.,
orders that combine apportionment with joint and several
liability. �is flexibility comports with the text of the statute.
Under § 3664(h), a “court may make each defendant liable for

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payment of the full amount of restitution or may apportion
liability among the defendants to reflect the level of
contribution to the victim’s loss and economic circumstances
of each defendant.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(h) (emphasis added).
“[T]he word ‘or’ has an inclusive sense (A or B, or both) as
well as an exclusive one (A or B, not both), and is generally
used in the inclusive sense.” Rush v. Kijakazi, 65 F.4th 114, 120
(4th Cir. 2023) (quotation marks omitted); c.f. Antonin Scalia,
A Matter of Interpretation 37–38 (1997) (interpreting “the
freedom of speech, or of the press” to “stand as a sort of
synecdoche for” all forms of communication). In deciding the
appropriate sense, we may look to statutory context. See
Encino Motorcars, LLC v. Navarro, 584 U.S. 79, 87 (2018); De
Sylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 573–74 (1956) (construing
“or” in a list of beneficiaries to allow multiple beneficiaries to
exercise their rights simultaneously). �e MVRA’s statutory
context supports reading “or” inclusively in § 3664(h):
allowing the sentencing court to combine the two options—
apportionment with joint and several liability—effectuates the
statute’s purpose of making victims whole, see Diaz, 245 F.3d
at 312, while not overburdening criminal defendants
personally with the full scope of the loss. See United States v.
Borino, 123 F.4th 233, 244 (5th Cir. 2024) (Section 3664(h)
allows “courts to ‘apply a hybrid approach in imposing
restitution—frequently employing a combination of the
apportionment of liability approach while concurrently making
all of the defendants jointly and severally liable.’”). �e
flexibility to impose hybrid restitution orders also aligns with
the statutory purpose by ensuring all defendants’ restitution
payments contribute toward the victim’s overall recovery but
does not allow the Government to “collect more from all
defendants together than will make the victim whole.” Sheets,
814 F.3d at 261; see also id. at 262 (“Ensuring that restitution

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payments from all defendants contribute toward the victim’s
overall recovery is a simple and uniform means to have victims
receive full and timely restitution as provided by law and
otherwise ensure that decisions of our district courts align with
the purpose of the MVRA.” (citation omitted)); Diaz, 245 F.3d
at 312 (stating a court “cannot order multiple defendants to pay
restitution in amounts that will result in the payment to the
victim of an amount greater than the victim’s loss”).
Moreover, although the term “hybrid scheme” is new,
the concept that joint and several liability may combine with
separate liability is not, as this occurs in tort law when multiple
defendants cause the plaintiff related but not identical harms.
See Restatement (Second) of Judgments § 50, cmt. c, ill. 2
(1982). �e Supreme Court has instructed that tort principles
may sometimes be informative when interpreting Congress’s
restitution statutes. See Paroline v. United States, 572 U.S. 434,
452 (2014) (using tort law causation principles). Here, the
language of § 3664(h), which grants sentencing judges the
wide discretion to choose between apportionment and joint and
several liability, reflects a congressional intent to preserve the
historic flexibility to combine those options.
In sum, § 3664(h) presents sentencing judges with the
option to combine apportionment with joint and several
liability in a way that is fair to all parties while promoting the
MVRA’s purpose of compensating victims. Accordingly, we
agree with our sister courts to have addressed this issue that the
MVRA authorizes the imposition of hybrid restitution orders.

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B. �e District Court Reasonably
Determined �at Shvets’s
Restitution Judgment Was a
Hybrid One
We conclude the District Court reasonably interpreted
Shvets’s judgment as a hybrid one that combines
apportionment with joint and several liability.
“In interpreting a sentencing court’s statements, we
inspect the sentencing transcript as well as the judgment the
sentencing court entered. When a sentencing court’s oral
sentence and its written sentence are in conflict, the oral
sentence prevails.” Ruggiano v. Reish, 307 F.3d 121, 133 (3d
Cir. 2002) (citations, alterations, and quotation marks omitted).
“When an orally pronounced sentence is ambiguous, however,
the judgment and commitment order is evidence which may be
used to determine the intended sentence.” United States v.
Villano, 816 F.2d 1448, 1451 (10th Cir. 1987); accord
Ruggiano, 307 F.3d at 133 (looking to the written judgment to
clarify the oral sentence). Moreover, “if the judgment fails to
express the rulings in the case with clarity or accuracy,
reference may be had to the findings and the entire record for
the purpose of determining what was decided.” Richman Bros.
Recs. v. U.S. Sprint Commc’ns Co., 953 F.2d 1431, 1439 (3d
Cir. 1991) (quotation marks omitted). �is approach ensures
that a judgment is construed “to give effect to the intention of
the court.” Id. (quotation marks omitted).
Shvets’s judgment states that she is personally liable for
$253,196 and that her liability is joint and several with at least
eight other defendants. �ose statements make clear that
Shvets’s liability was not fully apportioned—i.e., Shvets was

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not the sole defendant liable for all of her $253,196 judgment.
But there are also indications that her liability was not purely
joint and several, either. �e basis for joint and several liability
was that other defendants may have “participated in the false
Medicare claims” that Shvets helped submit, but that fact alone
would not preclude those co-conspirators from potentially
owing other, separate debts not shared with Shvets. Appx 166.
And indeed, the facts known at sentencing proved as much.
Two listed co-defendants who had already been sentenced—
Pugman and Kolodesh—had been ordered to pay $16.2 million
in restitution each, while another, Hearn, had been ordered to
pay just $42,211. It would be mathematically impossible for
the liability of Kolodesh, Shvets, and Hearn to be fully joint
and several and yet consist of three different amounts. See
United States v. Hunter, 52 F.3d 489, 494 (3d Cir. 1995) (“[W]e
cannot comprehend on this record joint and several liability
where the amount of restitution ordered for each defendant is
different.”). And the fact that Kolodesh’s $16.2 million
judgment was mentioned at sentencing suggests the District
Court intended for the various judgments to be consistent,
implying a hybrid approach.3
3 We thus disagree with Shvets’s argument that treating
her judgment as part of a hybrid scheme deprived her of notice
and an opportunity to challenge it. Having been made aware of
Kolodesh’s greater obligation, Shvets could not be surprised
that her lesser one was not fully joint and several with his. We
are also not certain that notice would have been required
anyway, as even in a hybrid scheme, Shvets is not personally
liable for more than the $253,196 written in her judgment, and
certainly not for Kolodesh’s entire $16.2 million. Moreover,
the Government, in its prosecutorial discretion, could have
declined to pursue any of Shvets’s co-defendants for

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In reaching this conclusion, we are mindful that
Shvets’s written judgment contains the words “Joint and
Several,” and that those words are unqualified. Appx 67. But
the words “Joint and Several” do not foreclose that the
judgment may in fact be hybrid, since hybrid restitution
includes aspects of joint and several liability. See Salti, 59 F.4th
at 1058–59 (“[J]oint-and-several-liability nomenclature in the
restitution context” “conveys that the victim can be fully
compensated even if one of those liable is unable to pay that
person’s assigned share of the liability,” not that “any
defendant who is made jointly and severally liable can expect
that his liability will be reduced through another defendant’s
contributions.”). It would be unreasonable for Shvets to
assume that co-defendants with whom she shared some
liability could not have their own, separate debts resulting from
their separate conduct. Moreover, to demand that Shvets’s
judgment specify in advance how payments would be credited
could place an undue, and indeed impractical, burden on
sentencing judges. Defendants sentenced at different times in
multiple proceedings may have a mix of related and separate
restitution debts that are unknown in advance. �us, the words
“Joint and Several” in a judgment are compatible with a hybrid
restitution scheme in which some, but not all, of co-defendants’
liability is shared.4
restitution, making it doubtful Shvets would have a property
right to credit for their payments sufficient to trigger due
process protections.
4 Shvets’s argument to the contrary rests on United
States v. Broadbent, 225 F. Supp. 3d 239 (S.D.N.Y. 2016), but
that case involved unique judgment language not present here.
In Broadbent, four defendants were made jointly and severally
liable in amounts ranging from $120,000 to over one million

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We also note, as the District Court did, that interpreting
Shvets’s restitution judgment as a hybrid one will never
increase the total she must pay beyond the amount set out in it
(i.e., $253,196). �us, the judgment’s statement that Shvets
owes $253,196 in restitution has been fully complied with, and
nothing in the District Court’s hybrid interpretation extends
Shvets’s liability to all $16.2 million owed by the HCH
defendants.
Finally, we owe deference to the District Court’s
interpretation of Shvets’s judgment and other defendants’
judgments as imposing a hybrid approach. See Fine Paper
Antitrust Litig., 695 F.2d at 498. �e District Court acted within
its discretion in imposing a hybrid restitution as such an
dollars. Broadbent’s judgment stated that his “ ‘obligation to
make restitution shall cease once the aggregate of the
restitution paid’ by him and the three other defendants ‘reaches
$120,000.’ ” Id. at 241. Once that happened, the district court
concluded that Broadbent’s obligation must be deemed
satisfied, irrespective of the fact that other harm caused by the
conspiracy remained uncompensated. Id. at 245. “[T]he plain
language of the judgment” compelled that result. Id.
Broadbent is of limited value here: it turned on unique
language that the restitution obligation “shall cease” when a
specified event occurred. Id. at 241. Shvets’s judgment
contains no such language: it simply specifies the amount of
restitution and states that it is “Joint and Several” with eight
other defendants. Appx 67. Nothing in Shvets’s judgment
implies that it will terminate when the eight listed co-
defendants have collectively paid $253,196.

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approach reasonably comports with the “language in [the]
judgment” and is “fair.” Salti, 59 F.4th at 1056–57.
C. District Courts Have Discretion
in How to Credit Payments
Toward a Set of Hybrid
Restitution Orders
Deciding that the MVRA permits “hybrid” restitution
orders turns out to be the easier question on this appeal. �e
harder question is how to count payments by defendants
obligated under different hybrid restitution orders (so as to
determine when the orders are satisfied). Cases referring to
“the” hybrid approach may give the misimpression that there
is just one way, or one preferred way, of counting payments
toward such judgments. But as we will see, that is not the case.
Instead, the district court has wide discretion to apply
payments in a way that reasonably comports with “language in
[the] judgment[s]” and is “fair.” Salti, 59 F.4th at 1056–57.
To start, the MVRA itself does not specify how to count
restitution payments. (�e only statement relevant to payment
is that the “amount paid to a victim” must be “reduced” by
amounts recovered in civil proceedings. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664(j)(2).) Any constraints on the method of counting must
therefore come from other sources—such as the MVRA’s
purpose of compensating victims, the nature of joint and
several liability, the text of specific restitution judgments, and
the principle, recognized in various cases, that district courts
may consider whether a method of counting would be “fair”
(both to the victim and the defendants). Salti, 59 F.4th at 1056–
57.

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In the case of judgments that are fully joint and several
or fully apportioned (i.e., not hybrid), the rules of arithmetic
dictate just one method of counting payments. For full joint and
several liability, the defendants’ obligations are discharged
when their combined payments reach the amount of their
judgment. And in the case of fully apportioned liability, each
defendant’s obligation terminates when her own payments total
the amount in her judgment, irrespective of any payments by
other defendants. �ose are the only options for those kinds of
judgments.
If hybrid restitution judgments similarly admitted one,
self-evident method of determining when they are satisfied, we
would likewise be constrained to conclude that that method and
only that method must be used. So too if the text of the MVRA
or principles of joint and several liability dictated the method
of counting. Unfortunately, neither is true. Basic arithmetic
inevitably permits multiple, incompatible ways of counting
payments toward hybrid restitution orders, and nothing in the
statute or background principles provides a single, generally
applicable rule for all cases.
�e best way to illustrate why is to consider an example.
Suppose two defendants, A and B, are held jointly liable for
$10,000, while B is separately liable for an additional $7,000.
Now suppose each defendant has personally paid $5,000, and
the district court is to determine whether A’s obligation has
been satisfied. �e answer depends on how B’s payment is
counted. If it is counted toward the $10,000 joint debt, that debt
would be paid off, and A would have no further liability. But if
B’s payment goes only toward B’s separate debt, A would still
owe $5,000 of the joint debt. And if B’s payment is split
equally between the joint debt and B’s separate debt, A would

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still owe $2,500 of the joint debt. As a result, the fact that A
and B have paid $5,000 each, standing alone, does not tell us
whether A’s judgment is satisfied.
�ere is nothing in the text of the MVRA stating that
district courts should apply B’s payment to one debt or the
other, nor are we aware of anything in the common law of joint
and several liability that would provide such a rule. It could be
argued that the first option—attributing B’s payment to the
joint debt—should be excluded for undercutting the MVRA’s
purpose of compensating the victim, since it discharges A’s
liability based on B’s payments, even though B has yet to
satisfy his own debt. See Salti, 59 F.4th at 1057. We agree that
compensating the victim is a paramount concern, and it may
therefore be appropriate to insist that B pay his separate debt
before the joint debt. See Yalincak, 30 F.4th at 129 (“[O]ne of
the benefits of the hybrid approach is that it works to ensure
multiple sources of restitution, up until the point at which the
victim is made whole or an individual defendant has satisfied
his or her obligation.”). But we are not prepared to say that
such a principle will dictate a single approach for all cases. See
id. at 130 n.5 (noting the district court’s “considerable
discretion” to choose alternative approaches). If the two debts
were owed to different victims, for example, insisting that B
pay his separate debt first would hurt the victim owed the joint
debt. And as the number of defendants and complexity of their
overlapping obligations increases, it is not so obvious that there
is a single best way to maximize victims’ recoveries. We are
thus forced to conclude that there is not one, generally
applicable rule under the MVRA for how to count payments
toward hybrid restitution orders. �at gap must be filled by the
sentencing court’s discretion. See Salti, 59 F.4th at 1057
(approving district court’s discretion in how it counted

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restitution payments); Yalincak, 30 F.4th at 130 n.5 (“[D]istrict
courts are granted considerable discretion by the MVRA to
order full restitution by all participants in a crime, to apportion
the liability among defendants, to use the hybrid approach as
described in this opinion, or to create variant hybrid
approaches in order to effectuate the goals of the MVRA in
particular cases.”).
It appears that, in practice, hybrid restitution payments
are frequently counted using software promulgated to district
court clerks’ offices by the Administrative Office of U.S.
Courts (AO), as was done in this case. See United States v.
Bronke, No. 01-cr-532, 2022 WL 4119784, at *1 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 8, 2022) (noting the widespread use of the software). For
the reasons discussed more thoroughly below, we are not in a
position to opine on whether or under what circumstances the
Clerk’s system may be appropriate, but we note that no party
to this appeal has argued that the system is inappropriate in
theory (despite disagreeing on its application here). Some
courts have concluded that the Clerk’s system produces unfair
results in certain situations and have therefore overridden it.
See Salti, 59 F.4th at 1053–54 (district court overriding the
Clerk’s computation that one defendant overpaid); United
States v. Gonzalez, No. 12-cr-260, 2019 WL 2524840, at *2
(W.D. Tex. June 18, 2019) (expressing “concern” with results
produced by the Clerk’s system but concluding language of
judgment precluded deviating from it). We agree that
sentencing judges retain discretion to make that call. But we
cannot say that the Clerk’s system or another system is
preferable in all cases.
Finally, we do not intend for this wide flexibility to
place a heavy burden on sentencing judges. Deciding how to

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count restitution payments will normally be a simple judgment
call, requiring neither factual exploration nor extensive
argument, and the fact that a defendant may view an alternative
system as more fair will not be grounds for upsetting the
sentencing judge’s determination so long as the system used is
also within the wide range of fairness. �e sentencing judge
does not need to choose the best possible system in each case,
only a fair system it views as appropriate.
D. Shvets’s Judgment Precludes
Application of the Fifth Circuit’s
Rule in Sheets
Although the District Court reasonably determined that
Shvets’s restitution judgment was part of a hybrid scheme, it
did not decide which payments should be credited toward it.
Instead, applying a rule from United States v. Sheets, 814 F.3d
256 (5th Cir. 2016), it decided that Shvets’s judgment would
not be satisfied until she had personally paid all of it
(irrespective of co-defendants’ payments) or Medicare was
fully compensated for the broader $16.2 million scheme. We
will refer to these two criteria as “Sheets’s rule.” Since neither
criterion was satisfied, the District Court concluded Shvets’s
judgment was outstanding, without deciding which (if any)
payments by Shvets’s co-defendants should be credited toward
her personal $253,196 debt.
We conclude the District Court’s decision to apply
Sheets’s rule conflicts with the language of Shvets’s judgment.
To understand how, it helps to review the facts of Sheets. �ere,
a number of defendants were convicted of a scheme to submit
fraudulent bills to the government. Relevant here, three of
those defendants (Sheets, Otto, and Reed) were ordered to pay

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as follows: Sheets was ordered to pay restitution for the
scheme’s entire $972,794.70 loss; Otto was ordered to pay
$66,606.48; and Reed was also ordered to pay “the $66,606.48
loss” for the “same conduct” as Otto. Sheets, 814 F.3d at 258.
After Reed had paid off his $66,606.48 portion, the district
court held that Otto’s obligation had been discharged “because
the amount attributable to Otto and Reed’s conduct together is
$66,606.48” and thus “Otto and Reed cannot in turn pay more
than this amount combined.” Id. at 261. But the Fifth Circuit
reversed and concluded Otto’s judgment remained
outstanding. Id. at 260. �e Fifth Circuit apparently considered
that letting Otto off the hook entirely based on Reed’s payments
would be unfair—given that Otto had paid nothing and the
victim was still not fully compensated for the broader scheme.
Id. at 262. To avoid that unfairness, the Fifth Circuit crafted a
rule that Otto’s judgment could only terminate on either of two
conditions: (1) Otto personally paid the entire $66,606.48
allocated to him (i.e., without counting payments by co-
defendants); or (2) all defendants involved in the scheme
collectively paid the scheme’s entire $972,794.70 loss. Id.
Critically, the Court of Appeals in Sheets required Otto
and Reed to pay more, combined, than the loss they were
collectively ordered to repay. Id. �eir payments in excess of
$66,606.48 would go toward repaying liability imposed solely
on Sheets. And under the second part of the rule, even if each
paid $33,303.24 toward their shared $66,606.48 liability, the
Fifth Circuit’s rule would presumably have them keep paying
so long as Sheets’s separate liability remained unsatisfied.5
5 Sheets indicated that concern for Otto and Reed paying
more than the loss for which they were sentenced would be

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We would not foreclose that, under appropriate
circumstances, a sentencing judge could order restitution in
such a way that Sheets’s rule would apply. For example, if Otto
and Reed were culpably involved in the entire fraud, but the
sentencing judge felt, for whatever reason, that they should pay
less than the entire scheme’s loss, it might make sense to hold
each liable for a $972,794.70 total loss while capping their
payments at $66,606.48 each. Under that interpretation, the
$66,606.48 cap would not represent any specific loss, and Otto
and Reed would not owe the “same” $66,606.48 debt; payment
by one would not affect the liability of the other. �e facts of
Salti might present another scenario where ordering Sheets-like
restitution would make sense, in that multiple defendants
perpetrated a single robbery with a single loss but were
nonetheless ordered to repay different amounts of it.
But setting aside whether and under what circumstances
a sentencing judge may order restitution so as to follow
Sheets’s rule, a judgment that has already been issued must be
complied with and, if incompatible with Sheets’s rule, will
preclude application of it. When we say restitution payments
from multiple defendants may not exceed the victim’s “loss,”
Diaz, 245 F.3d at 312, it is important to understand which
“loss” we are talking about. Sheets’s rule conceives of the
victim’s loss as being the entire loss from a broader scheme,
irrespective of the liability imposed on any one participant.
(�at is, only payment of the entire scheme, not any subset of
it, will be considered full compensation.) For some restitution
judgments, that may be true. However, it is clear that if a
defendant’s restitution judgment is based on a more limited
“misplaced,” 814 F.3d at 262, although the precise reasoning
on that point is unclear to us.

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loss, it is that more limited loss that needs to be considered in
determining whether the victim has been made whole. �at is,
after all, the only amount for which compensation has been
ordered.
Here, it is clear that Shvets’s restitution judgment was
based on a specific $253,196 loss stemming from 52 false bills,
and that she was not ordered to pay restitution for any broader
conduct or scheme. At sentencing, the District Court
pronounced that Shvets “shall make restitution in the amount
of $253,186 [sic] jointly and severally with” several co-
defendants, and that “[t]he amount ordered represents as
aforesaid, the total amount due to the victim of this loss.” Appx
184–85.6 In so doing, the District Court adopted the
Government’s recommendation that Shvets pay $253,196 in
restitution for her role in helping to submit 52 false bills. It also
followed the Government’s suggestion that Shvets be held
jointly and severally liable with “all of the other co-
conspirators that participated in the false Medicare claims that
involved those 52 cases,” as opposed to all who participated in
the broader fraud. Appx 166. �e written judgment similarly
identified Shvets’s restitution liability and “Total Loss” as
$253,196. Appx 66. Together, these statements show that the
loss underlying Shvets’s judgment consisted of $253,196 for
those 52 false bills, not other parts of HCH’s broader scheme.
�us, payments by co-defendants who contributed to the same
loss may count toward the point at which the victim is fully
compensated for that specific loss.
6 Later in its oral pronouncement, the District Court
corrected this figure to $253,196.

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38
Although the foregoing language appears clear on its
own, our interpretation is buttressed by the fact that no effort
was made at sentencing to pin down the broader scheme Shvets
should be held responsible for. Without identifying the scheme,
Sheets’s rule cannot even be stated, since it cannot be said
whether the victim has been made whole for the entire
scheme’s loss. Neither the sentencing transcript nor the written
judgment choose, for example, between the broader $16.2
million scheme and the $1.56 million “continuous care”
scheme, and all indication is that Shvets’s liability was
attributed just to 52 false bills. �is omission reinforces our
conclusion that Shvets’s liability is limited to repaying a
specific $253,196 loss rather than a broader scheme.7
We are also not convinced that fairness concerns, to the
extent any could be said to favor Sheets’s rule, are strong
enough to overcome the clear import of the judgment. �e Fifth
Circuit was evidently swayed by the unfairness of letting Otto
pay nothing while having his debt discharged by Reed’s
money, all while the victim was still uncompensated for
conduct by Sheets. Here, the payment plans ordered by the
District Court (such as the order that Shvets pay at least $100
each month) prevent that situation. While there is always some
risk of unequal treatment when defendants are held jointly and
severally liable, the defendants here are not free to sit back and
wait for their co-defendants to pay their debts.8
7 We note, however, that if Medicare recovers the full
$16.2 million loss, then Shvets would be absolved of her
restitution obligation because her obligation is a portion of the
entire $16.2 million loss.
8 At the hearing before the District Court, there was a
dispute as to whether Shvets was complying with her payment

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39
Nor is our interpretation altered by those cases that have
repeated Sheets’s rule in the context of other hybrid restitution
orders, as we do not read them to endorse Sheets’s unique
feature of making some defendants pay for liability imposed
solely on others. See Yalincak, 30 F.4th at 126; Salti, 59 F.4th
at 1056. Instead, those cases involved crediting between just
two defendants (where Sheets’s peculiar scenario could not
arise), and appear to stand for the more modest proposition that
it may be preferable to count payments toward separate debts
before joint debts (to the same victim) so as to maximize
available sources for victim recovery. See Yalincak, 30 F.4th at
120 (“�at would be achieved by, in effect, crediting [one
defendant’s] payments first against the portion of the restitution
award owed solely by [himself], and only thereafter against the
‘joint and several’ portion of the total restitution.”).9 So we do
not, as the District Court appeared to do, read those cases as
making Sheets’s rule a default or preferred approach in all cases
of hybrid restitution.
Finally, it is telling that while the Government’s briefs
to the District Court endorsed Sheets’s rule, the Government’s
brief on appeal does not, instead endorsing the Clerk’s system.
Notably, Defendant Hearn already had his judgment satisfied
plan. �at is something the Government may need to look into,
but it does not change the interpretation of her judgment, which
is the only issue before us today.
9 For two defendants and one victim, Sheets’s rule works
the same as counting payments toward separate debts before
joint debts. See Yalincak, 30 F.4th at 120. �at is not always so
with three or more defendants (as here) or more than one
victim.

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40
under the Clerk’s system, applying some payments made by
others, and there is no indication the Government intends to
require Hearn to keep paying by application of Sheets’s rule.
�e Government’s position confirms our belief that it was
never the District Court’s intent that defendants who
contributed only to the 52 false bills underlying Shvets’s
judgment should repay Medicare for other parts of HCH’s
fraud.
For these reasons, while the District Court correctly
determined that Shvets’s restitution judgment was a “hybrid”
one combining apportionment with joint and several liability,
it was erroneous to apply Sheets’s rule to it. On remand, the
District Court needs to decide how payments by HCH
defendants will be counted toward their judgments, using a
method it deems reasonable and compatible with the language
of the judgments. Based on that determination, it should assess
whether Shvets’s restitution judgment remains outstanding.
E. We Are Unable to Determine
Whether Shvets’s Restitution
Judgment Is Satisfied
We are not able to determine whether Shvets’s
restitution judgment has been satisfied. �e District Court has
not addressed whether the Clerk’s methodology for counting
payments is appropriate, or whether the payments were
reasonably applied in this case.
Shvets’s restitution judgment is part of a scheme and,
since there are multiple ways of counting payments toward a
hybrid scheme, the District Court needed to determine which
method would be used, so that it could ascertain whether

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41
Shvets’s judgment might be satisfied. Even if Shvets’s
restitution balance would be outstanding under any reasonable
system, there would still be an advantage in deciding how
payment should be counted so that the HCH defendants could
“know, as they lead their lives and make economic decisions
over the long duration of restitution orders, the extent of their
remaining restitution obligations.” Yalincak, 30 F.4th at 130.
For these reasons, we conclude the District Court erred by not
deciding how restitution payments should be counted.
Even if we assume the Clerk’s method would be
selected, the record does not adequately explain how the Clerk
has been accounting for restitution payments, and we therefore
cannot tell whether the Clerk’s conclusion that Shvets still
owes $18,929.69 follows from a method that is reasonable and
fair. Tentatively, we can say that some aspects of the Clerk’s
system do appear reasonable. �e Clerk’s system recognizes
that some type of crediting is needed among payments on joint
debts to prevent overpayment. It also recognizes that not all
related debts are necessarily joint. So, for example, Pugman
shares some debt with Shvets but also owes separate debt, and
Shvets does not necessarily receive credit for payments on
Pugman’s separate debt.
But many details are missing. We do not know how the
Clerk arrived at fifteen buckets, the amounts of those buckets,
or the assignment of defendants to buckets. Take Roytenberg,
Koltman, and Novikov, for example. All were ordered to pay
restitution in the amount of $405,184, but the Clerk seems to
have determined that Roytenberg and Novikov were assigned
to buckets B, K, L, M, and N, while Koltman was assigned to
B, H, K, and L (assuming we understand the Clerk’s
documentation, which we are not certain we do). �e result

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42
would appear to be that Novikov receives 100% credit for
every payment by Roytenberg but less for payments by
Koltman. �ere is nothing in the record that would explain this
difference in treatment.
We also agree with Amicus that there is no obvious way
to start with the texts of the judgments (or other information in
the record) and arrive at the Clerk’s assignment of defendants
to buckets.10 While the Government points out that the
judgments do place some constraints on the buckets (for
example, once it is known that Hearn is assigned to bucket A
and Shusterman to buckets A and B, the value of bucket B may
be calculated as the difference between their judgments), it is
not obvious how this explains why the defendants are assigned
to the buckets they are. �us, the Government’s observation,
assuming it is accurate, does not help us understand the Clerk’s
system.
We also are unsure if the record precisely describes how
the Clerk allocated payments among buckets. �ere are no
examples of how individual payments were allocated, and the
parties disagree as to whether Shvets received the correct
share.
We disagree with the Government that Shvets failed to
preserve an objection to the Clerk’s system. Shvets maintained
throughout that the Clerk’s system should have given her a
greater percentage of payments by Pugman and Kolodesh. She
also objected that the information the Government had
supplied on the Clerk’s system was “[i]ncomprehensible.”
10 �e Clerk’s assignment of defendants to buckets is in
Appendix 2.

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43
D.C. ECF No. 492 at 12. Moreover, the Government appears
to have divulged that information incrementally over the
course of several briefs and hearings, meaning Shvets did not
have a complete picture from which she could formulate a
coherent objection (other than to point out, as she did, that the
information was incomplete). Notably, the issue of fluctuating
bucket balances (which allegedly explains why Shvets’s
proportional credit was less than she believed it should have
been) was not brought up until after the District Court’s second
hearing.
We will therefore remand for the District Court to
ascertain how the Clerk has been accounting for restitution
payments made by the various defendants and whether
Shvets’s restitution balance remains unsatisfied.
Although we have focused on the language of Shvets’s
judgment, we do not mean to imply that the District Court (and
by extension the Clerk) is limited to the texts of the judgments
in deciding how to apply payments. �e Government stated at
sentencing that there would be jointly liable defendants beyond
those listed in the judgment, and prescribing ahead of time how
payments on joint debts will be credited could be difficult or
impossible where multiple defendants are held responsible for
different amounts at different times. �us, it is unsurprising that
the texts of the judgments contain only lists of names, often
inconsistent with each other, without specifying amounts of
shared and separate liability. �is may not be enough
information to determine which payments apply to which
debts. Analogously, courts applying joint and several liability
in the civil context have looked beyond the judgments
themselves in deciding how to credit joint payments. BUC Int’l
Corp. v. Int’l Yacht Council Ltd., 517 F.3d 1271, 1279 (11th

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44
Cir. 2008) (looking to pleadings); Cimino, 501 P.2d at 452–53
(looking to the trial record).
Since we do not fully understand the Clerk’s system, we
will not dictate precisely what information the District Court
needs to ascertain on remand. �e District Court should obtain
the information that it determines, in its discretion, is necessary
for it to make an informed decision as to whether the Clerk’s
allocation methodology was appropriate and fair and whether,
under an appropriate methodology, Shvets’s restitution
judgment has been satisfied, in accordance with the principles
we articulate today.
IV.Collection Issues
We address Shvets’s remaining arguments regarding
how the Government has accounted for money and property it
collected (or failed to collect or recover) from her co-
defendants. We conclude that these arguments lack merit.
A. Bank Accounts and Real Estate
Shvets argues she should receive additional restitution
credit for bank accounts and real estate associated with co-
defendants Pugman and Kolodesh.
Before delving into the specific assets at issue, we
discuss the general nature of Shvets’s objection. Shvets accuses
the Government of abandoning property that could have been
used to pay restitution, and she urges that the value of this
property should be credited as if it had actually been collected.
For this proposition, she advances two theories. First, she
reasons that the Government’s decision to forego collection is

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akin to a settlement with the property’s owner. Under a civil
maritime rule that Shvets asks us to extend to the criminal
restitution context, a settlement with one jointly liable
defendant acts as a credit to other defendants in the amount of
the settling defendant’s share of liability, irrespective of the
amount actually paid. See McDermott, Inc. v. AmClyde, 511
U.S. 202, 208–09 (1994). Second, Shvets, along with court-
appointed Amicus Curiae, posits that the Government’s failure
to recover property breaks the causal chain between her own
misconduct and Medicare’s loss, such that the Government
should bear the shortfall.
We conclude Shvets is not entitled to a credit for money
the Government did not actually collect. As to Shvets’s first
theory, failing to collect money is not analogous to a
settlement. A settlement releases the defendant from liability
and precludes the possibility of future payments. By contrast,
if the Government merely failed to collect a $2.5 million
payment from Pugman (as Shvets alleges), Pugman would still
be liable for the full amount of his restitution balance and the
Government could keep collecting it from him going forward.
Since Pugman and Kolodesh were not released from their
restitution obligations, we do not consider what result would
follow if they were.
As for Shvets’s second theory, we see no merit to the
proposition that the Government’s negligent failure to collect
assets could break the causal chain between Shvets’s criminal
conduct and Medicare’s loss. �e amount of loss Shvets caused
has been determined to be $253,196, and Shvets has not asked
for that final judgment to be reconsidered. Furthermore,
providing a restitution credit for amounts not actually collected
would conflict with 18 U.S.C. § 3664(j)(2), which limits

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46
criminal restitution credit for civil recoveries to the amount
“recovered.” See United States v. Bright, 353 F.3d 1114, 1123
(9th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he MVRA provisions . . . make clear that
funds the victims have not received cannot reduce or offset the
amount of losses the defendant is required to repay.” (emphasis
omitted)); United States v. Martinez, 610 F.3d 1216, 1232 (10th
Cir. 2010) (same). While some of the collections at issue here
were through criminal rather than civil processes, we see no
reason why Congress would have wanted to treat the two
differently.
Since we have concluded that Shvets is only entitled to
credit for money actually collected, the remaining issue is
whether the Government failed to account for any such
collections. �at requires us to discuss the burden of proof,
which the parties dispute. �e restitution statute specifies that
the burden of proving loss rests with the Government, the
burden of proving financial circumstances rests with the
defendant, and the burden of proving “other matters” may be
allocated “as justice requires.” 18 U.S.C. § 3664(e). Factors to
consider in allocating a burden under § 3664(e) include which
party “has an affirmative goal” in proving a fact and which
party has “presumptive access to proof.” United States v.
Smathers, 879 F.3d 453, 460 (2d Cir. 2018). Courts, including
this one, have tended to place the burden of contesting
restitution payments on the defendant. United States v. Bryant,
655 F.3d 232, 254 (3d Cir. 2011); United States v. Parker, 927
F.3d 374, 382 (5th Cir. 2019); United States v. Sizemore, 850
F.3d 821, 828 (6th Cir. 2017); Smathers, 879 F.3d at 461. But
such cases have mostly involved disputes over the defendant’s
own payments, which “the defendant should know.” Bryant,
655 F.3d at 254. We have not addressed who bears the burden

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47
when a defendant is disputing amounts the Government may
have collected from a third party.
As for the initial burden of production, we need not
decide that issue, because the District Court ordered the
Government to account for all restitution payments and the
Government complied. �us, assuming the Government bore
an initial burden of production, the Government met it. At that
point, we hold it was Shvets’s burden to show there were
additional payments not on the accounting. To require
otherwise would put the Government to the impossible task of
disproving every other potential source of recovery. While we
recognize that the Government may have superior access to
information about restitution payments, the District Court
addressed that concern by conducting an extensive inquiry and
two hearings. It was well within the District Court’s discretion
not to require more details about assets belonging to Pugman
and Kolodesh. See United States v. Washington, 869 F.3d 193,
213 (3d Cir. 2017) (“[D]iscovery rulings are ordinarily
reviewed for abuse of discretion . . . .”).
With those principles in mind, we turn to the specific
items of property that Shvets claims entitle her to additional
restitution credit.
1. Bank Accounts
�e Government initially obtained an injunction
freezing certain bank accounts, some of which do not appear
on the Government’s accounting of restitution collected. �e
Government represented to the District Court that it “did not
list these accounts on its summary . . . because it did not
recover any funds from these accounts as they either were

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48
released from the civil restraining order or closed prior to
2017.” Appx 413–14. Although the District Court did not
specifically discuss these bank accounts, it concluded generally
it was “satisfied that the government has adequately reported
all it has recovered toward restitution in this matter.” Novikov,
624 F. Supp. 3d at 555.
�e District Court’s conclusion is a factual one that we
review for clear error. Doe, 810 F.3d at 142. Since Shvets
pointed to no evidence that the bank accounts in question had
positive balances when they were turned over to the
Government in 2017, the District Court’s conclusion was not
clearly erroneous. We need not consider Shvets’s argument that
she should receive a credit for any amounts that were received
but later returned to Pugman, since there is no evidence that
this occurred.
2. Real Estate
Shvets points to various real properties she says the
Government should have seized to satisfy restitution. For the
most part, Shvets does not claim the Government actually
received any money in connection with these properties, only
that it should have. For the reasons explained previously, a
mere failure to collect property does not entitle Shvets to a
credit.
Shvets does suggest that the Government acquired and
then abandoned a statutory lien on some of Pugman’s
properties. �e Government responds that it did not have a lien
because the properties were owned by business entities, not
any of the defendants, and the lien provided by 18 U.S.C.

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49
§ 3613(c) only extends to “property and rights to property of
the person fined.” Factually, Shvets does not dispute this point.
Even assuming merely obtaining a lien could count as
receiving property (an issue we need not reach), Shvets has not
shown that there was in fact a lien. Shvets is therefore not
entitled to any additional credit for Pugman’s real properties.
B. Cahaba Subpoena
Shvets urges that the District Court should have
enforced her subpoena to Cahaba so that she could obtain
information about additional payments Medicare may have
received. �e Government takes no position on that issue.
We conclude Shvets is not entitled to relief because her
subpoena was not served properly and her motion to enforce it
was not served on Cahaba at all. Shvets served her subpoena
by mail, whereas the rules require personal service. Fed R.
Crim. P. 17(d); Fed R. Civ. P. 45(b)(1); In re LeFande, 919 F.3d
554, 562–63 (D.C. Cir. 2019). While that defect could be
viewed as merely technical (an issue we need not address),
failure to serve the motion was not, as it deprived Cahaba of an
opportunity to respond to Shvets’s arguments about why the
information sought was discoverable. See Fed. R. Crim. P.
49(a)(1) (requiring service of written motions on “every
party”); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Reinert & Duree, P.C., 191 F.3d
297, 302 (2d Cir. 1999) (“A court ordinarily does not have
power to issue an order against a person who is not a party and
over whom it has not acquired in personam jurisdiction.”). For
this reason, the District Court was correct not to order an
unserved party to comply with a subpoena.

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50
C. Qui Tam Relator Payments
Finally, Shvets has not shown she is entitled to
additional credit for amounts paid to qui tam relators.
�is particular dispute concerns only the crediting (or
lack thereof) of funds acquired through asset forfeiture under
18 U.S.C. § 982. �ere is no issue as to the monetary portion
of Kolodesh’s settlement, which was fully credited toward
restitution. �e only deduction was from proceeds of
Kolodesh’s forfeited real properties, where relator payments
(among other expenses) were taken out before the balance was
turned over to Medicare. �us, the only question before us is
whether a defendant is entitled to a restitution credit for
forfeited property that is not used to compensate the victim but
used for another purpose, such as paying a qui tam relator.
We conclude that no restitution credit is due. �e
MVRA states that restitution is “in addition to . . . any other
penalty authorized by law.” 18 U.S.C. § 3663A(a)(1). Criminal
forfeiture, which we have described as a “punishment for the
underlying crime,” United States v. Sandini, 816 F.2d 869, 873
(3d Cir. 1987), plainly fits this category, meaning a district
court may impose both restitution and forfeiture for the same
offense, United States v. Joseph, 743 F.3d 1350, 1353–54 (11th
Cir. 2014); United States v. Mei Juan Zhang, 789 F.3d 214, 217
(1st Cir. 2015); see also United States v. Various Computs. &
Comput. Equip., 82 F.3d 582, 588–89 (3d Cir. 1996) (holding
there is no double jeopardy issue with imposing both restitution
and forfeiture for the same stolen property). If the forfeited
property were subsequently given to the victim as
compensation, a question might arise as to whether the
defendant would be entitled to a restitution credit for that
amount—but that is not the issue presented here. �e present

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51
dispute only concerns property paid to qui tam relators, and, as
to that property, there is no “amount later recovered . . . by the
victim” as would be required for a credit under 18 U.S.C.
§ 3664(j)(2), and no risk of overcompensation. Accordingly, no
credit is due.
Shvets argues it was unlawful for the Government to
pay relators out of forfeiture proceeds. We doubt very much
that this was unlawful, as the Government has wide discretion
to dispose of forfeited property, including by “award[ing]
compensation to persons providing information resulting in
forfeiture under” the forfeiture statute. 21 U.S.C. § 853(i)(3);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 982(b)(1) (making 21 U.S.C. § 853
applicable to all criminal forfeitures); United States ex. rel.
Rushing v. Lick, No. 20-cv-210, 2024 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7599,
at *16 (N.D. Miss. Jan. 16, 2024) (allowing forfeited property
to be shared with a relator). Shvets’s cited authority speaks to
other issues. See United States v. Wegeler, 941 F.3d 665, 675
(3d Cir. 2019) (requiring a relator to seek payment in her own
False Claims Act lawsuit rather than by intervention in a
criminal case); Willis Mgmt. (Vt.), Ltd. v. United States, 652
F.3d 236, 244–45 (2d Cir. 2011) (discussing third-party
interests in forfeited property under 21 U.S.C. § 853(n));
United States v. Holy Land Found. for Relief & Dev., 722 F.3d
677, 684–85 (5th Cir. 2013) (same). In any event, we fail to see
how a payment that did not compensate the victim, even if
improperly made, would entitle a defendant to a restitution
credit.
Shvets also argues that Kolodesh’s forfeited property
indirectly inured to Medicare’s benefit because the proceeds
helped satisfy Medicare’s own obligation, under the False
Claims Act, to make an incentive payment to the relators. We

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52
do not decide whether such an indirect benefit might, under
some circumstances, count as a payment for which a defendant
should receive credit, because the facts do not support Shvets’s
characterization. Shvets does not dispute that the Government
had a bona fide $16.2 million criminal forfeiture order against
Kolodesh and that his real properties were properly forfeited to
satisfy it. Once those payments were received, it was up to the
Government’s discretion, not Medicare’s obligation, how to
dispose of them. 21 U.S.C. § 853(i). Moreover, Kolodesh’s
settlement simply provided for the relators to receive a uniform
22% of all cash value collected, whether as direct cash
payments or proceeds from selling forfeited properties, which
does not suggest that forfeiture proceeds were used to offset an
obligation Medicare otherwise incurred to pay the relators.
For these reasons, Shvets is not entitled to a credit for
amounts paid to qui tam relators.11
V. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm in part, vacate
in part, and remand for a determination as to whether payments
have been properly credited and whether Shvets’s restitution
judgment has been satisfied.
11 Shvets, in her reply brief, argues that some payments
the Clerk attributed to Pugman should be reallocated to
Ganetsky (possibly altering the proportional credit) because
Pugman and Ganetsky’s civil settlement provided for the
satisfaction of Ganetsky’s restitution debt. But because this
argument was not raised in Shvets’s opening brief, we do not
address it. Rinaldi v. United States, 904 F.3d 257, 263 n.6 (3d
Cir. 2018).

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Appendix 1: Restitution Amounts with Joint and Several Lists
53
Defendant Case No.
Restitution
ordered Joint and several defendants
Kolodesh 11-CR-464-01 $16,200,000.00 Pugman, Ganetsky, Novikov, Roytenberg, Koltman, Wiley, Shvets, Koptyakov, Oqroshidze, Goltman,
Hearn
Pugman 09-CR-651-01 $16,200,000.00 Kolodesh, Ganetsky, Novikov, Roytenberg, Koltman, Wiley, Shvets, Koptvakov, Oqroshidze, Goltman,
Hearn
Ganetskv 09-CR-652-01 $405,184.00 Kolodesh, Pugman, Novikov, Rovtenberg, Koltman
Rovtenberg 11-CR-084-01 $405,184.00 Kolodesh, Pugman, Ganetsky, Novikov, Koltman
Koltman 11-CR-182-01 $405,184.00 Kolodesh, Pugman, Ganetskv, Novikov, Rovtenberg
Novikov 11-CR-189-01 $405,184.00 Pugman, Ganetskv, Kolodesh, Koltman, Rovtenberg
Slipchenko 11-CR-298-01 $296,900.00 Pugman, Ganetsky, Kolodesh, Novikov, Gorovits, McGill, Shvets, Oqroshidze, Goltman, Bagdasarova,
Koptyakov, Roytenberg, Koltman, Hearn, Galperin, Wiley, Yakhnis, Zlatkovskiy, Goldman, Shusterman
Wiley 11-CR-322-01 $258,000.00 Kolodesh, Pugman, Koptyakov, Oqroshidze, Shvets, Hearn, Goltman
Shvets 12-CR-112-02 $253,196.00 Kolodesh, Pugman, Wiley, Oqroshidze, Hearn, Koptyakov, Goltman, Koltman
McGill 12-CR-112-01 $230,713.38 Kolodesh, Pugman, Ganetsky, Shvets, Oqroshidze, Goltman, Koptvakov
Koptyakov 12-CR-112-05 $215,517.00 Pugman, Kolodesh, Wiley, Oqroshidze, Yakhnis, Bagdasarova, Goltman, Hearn, Shvets
Goltman 12-CR-112-04 $195,583.00 Kolodesh, Pugman, Hearn, Shvets, Yakhnis, Bagdasarova, Oqroshidze
Oqroshidze 12-CR-112-03 $189,907.00 Kolodesh, Pugman, Koptyakov, Shvets, Goltman, Wiley
Bagdasarova 11-CR-638-01 $156,213.00 [sealed judgment]
Yakhnis 11-CR-362-01 $121,567.00 Pugman, Kolodesh, Goltman, Heam, Oqroshidze, Koptyakov, Shvets, Bagdasarova, Wiley
Shusterman 11-CR-399-01 $118,880.00 Pugman, Ganetsky, Kolodesh, Novikov, McGill, Shvets, Oqroshidze, Goltman, Bagdasarova, Koptyakov,
Roytenberg, Koltman, Hearn, Galperin, Wiley, Yakhnis, Zlatkovskiy, Goldman, Slipchenko
Hearn 11-CR-297-01 $42,211.00 Pugman, Kolodesh, Goltman, Shvets, Koptvakov
Amicus Br. 10.

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Appendix 2: Clerk’s Table of Restitution Balances
United States v. Pugman, Kolodesh, et al.
Summary of Defendants' Direct Restitution Payments
Includes Civil Settlements $12,286,480.55
0.3% 0.5% 0.0% 0.4% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 1.7% 0.1% 0.2% 96.2% 100.0%
A Restitution per J&S Account $ 42,211.00 $ 76,669.00 $ 2,687.00 $ 68,340.00 $ 5,676.00 $ 2,841.00 $ 17,093.00 $ 37,679.00 $ 4,804.00 $ 25,256.38 $ 13,643.62 $277,192.38 $ 12,422.62 $ 25,256.38 $ 15,588,228.62 $ 16,200,000.00
Joint & Several Account Number:
Ref
No. Defendant Restitution
Ordered
DPAE211C
R000464-A
DPAE211C
R000464-B
DPAE211C
R000464-C
DPAE211C
R000464-D
DPAE211C
R000464-E
DPAE211C
R000464-F
DPAE211C
R000464-G
DPAE211C
R000464-H
DPAE211C
R000464-I
DPAE211C
R000464-J
DPAE211C
R000464-K
DPAE211CR
000464-L
DPAE211C
R000464-M
DPAE211CR00
0464-N
DPAE211CR00
0464-O Totals
1 Alex Pugman $16,200,000.00 $ 716.35 $ 7,140.97 $ 357.43 $11,973.94 $ 1,081.19 $ 564.79 $ 3,807.50 $ 8,050.40 $ 1,137.18 $ 6,160.83 $ 2,887.48 $ 59,431.99 $ 2,823.27 $ 5,740.24 $ 3,888,676.80 $ 4,000,550.35
2 Patricia Mcgill $ 230,713.38 - 1,055.29 - 940.45 78.11 - 235.03 518.71 - 347.41 - - - - - 3,175.00
3 Eugenia Roytenberg $ 405,184.00 - 3,055.97 - - - - - - - - 543.84 11,048.47 495.08 1,006.64 - 16,150.00
4 Diana Koltman $ 405,184.00 - 4,134.49 - - - - - 2,031.82 - - 735.76 14,947.93 - - - 21,850.00
5 Lioudmila Novikov $ 405,184.00 - 4,704.64 - - - - - - - - 837.21 17,010.00 762.36 1,549.86 - 24,864.07
6 Edward Hearn $ 42,211.00 25,897.91 - - - - - - - - - - - - - - 25,897.91
7 Inga Slipchenko $ 296,900.00 487.01 884.37 31.10 788.42 65.44 32.85 197.25 434.64 55.46 291.42 157.04 - - - - 3,425.00
8 Cecelia Wiley $ 258,000.00 1,644.55 3,625.96 127.04 3,232.00 268.50 134.25 808.46 1,782.13 227.11 - - - - - - 11,850.00
9 Anna Yakhnis $ 121,567.00 7,934.06 14,410.89 505.05 - - - - - - - - - - - - 22,850.00
10 Zoya Shusterman $ 118,880.00 284.01 515.99 - - - - - - - - - - - - - 800.00
11 Matthew Kolodesh $16,200,000.00 15.05 15,095.61 783.67 26,771.86 2,429.45 1,272.02 8,625.46 18,200.01 2,583.68 14,014.65 6,524.96 134,384.39 6,402.19 13,016.08 8,865,514.79 9,115,633.87
12 Angelica Bagdasarov $ 156,213.00 - 8,941.04 313.35 7,969.82 661.76 331.38 - - - - - - - - - 18,217.35
13 Svetlana Ganetsky - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
14 Natalya Shvets $ 253,196.00 1,265.67 2,298.85 80.57 2,049.13 170.18 85.19 512.54 1,129.75 - - - - - - - 7,591.88
15 Giorgi Oqroshidze $ 189,907.00 2,511.76 5,184.89 181.57 4,621.78 - - - - - - - - - - - 12,500.00
16 Yevgeniya Goltman $ 195,583.00 852.46 1,848.29 64.92 1,647.54 136.79 - - - - - - - - - - 4,550.00
17 Alexander Koptyakov $ 215,517.00 602.17 1,359.45 47.59 1,211.55 100.77 50.40 303.07 - - - - - - - - 3,675.00
B Totals $ 42,211.00 $ 74,256.70 $ 2,492.29 $ 61,206.49 $ 4,992.19 $ 2,470.88 $ 14,489.31 $ 32,147.46 $ 4,003.43 $ 20,814.31 $ 11,686.29 $236,822.78 $ 10,482.90 $ 21,312.82 $ 12,754,191.59 $ 13,293,580.43
C J&S Account Balance (A less B) $ - $ 2,412.30 $ 194.71 $ 7,133.51 $ 683.81 $ 370.12 $ 2,603.69 $ 5,531.54 $ 800.57 $ 4,442.07 $ 1,957.33 $ 40,369.60 $ 1,939.72 $ 3,943.56 $ 2,834,037.03 $ 2,906,419.57

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