Ada Anglemeyer; Richard C. Anglemeyer; Jeffrey Anglemeyer; Joseph Kluska v. Craig Ammons

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 22-2788
_______________
ADA ANGLEMEYER; RICHARD C. ANGLEMEYER;
JEFFREY ANGLEMEYER; JOSEPH KLUSKA,
Appellants
v.
CRAIG AMMONS; BRIAN ATKINSON; NATHAN
AUKAMP; MARK A. BENSON; DAVID BRODEUR;
JOHN P. CHULOCK; PETER DEL GAIZO; BRIAN L.
KING; MICHAEL D. LANG; VINCENTE LOPEZ;
ROBERT W. MCGARVEY; TERRANE W. MERANTE;
CLINTON C. PAINTER; JASON PELOTTE; MATTHEW J.
PIEROTTI; LANCE SCHIMP; KEVIN WARD; DANIEL
WILK; MATTHEW WYSOCKY; JOHN DOE
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 5:19-cv-03714)
District Judge: Honorable John M. Younge
_______________
Argued: September 12, 2023
______________

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Before: JORDAN, BIBAS, and PORTER
Circuit Judges.
(Filed: February 7, 2024)
______________
Caleb Kruckenberg [ARGUED]
Brian Zeiger
Levin & Zeiger, LLP
1500 JFK Blvd., Suite 620
Philadelphia, PA 19102
Counsel for Appellants.
Claudia M. Tesoro [ARGUED]
Office of Attorney General
1600 Arch St., Suite 300
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Counsel for Appellee.
______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
______________
PORTER, Circuit Judge.
Policing can be rough business. But the Constitution
requires police to use reasonable restraint, even when force
may be necessary. Here, four family members who were not
suspected of any wrongdoing suffered injuries at the hands of
certain officers executing a pre-dawn, no-knock raid. The

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injured family members sued the officers for excessive use of
force. The District Court determined the officers were entitled
to qualified immunity. We will reverse.
I
Richard and Ada Anglemeyer live in Bangor Township,
Pennsylvania, with several family members, including their
two sons—Jeffrey and Mark Anglemeyer—and their son-in-
law, Joseph Kluska. At about 6:00 a.m. on February 23, 2018,
forty-three officers with the Special Emergency Response
Team (SERT) of the Pennsylvania State Police took positions
outside of the Anglemeyer home and prepared to execute a no-
knock search warrant. They were acting on information that
Mark allegedly engaged in multiple sales of methamphetamine
in a workshop near the family home. No other members of the
Anglemeyer family were suspected of wrongdoing. The SERT
officers were informed that some members of the Anglemeyer
family may own firearms. They were also informed that Mark
was a white male and 52 years old.
Shortly after arriving, one of the officers noticed
Richard looking out his window and radioed the other SERT
members that the team’s secrecy was compromised. The
officers then rushed into the family home. Their faces were
partially obscured, and they wore helmets but not nameplates
or badge numbers. The four plaintiffs in this case—Ada,
Richard, Jeffrey, and Joseph—each provide their own account
of the events that followed and the injuries that they allegedly
suffered.
Ada was 76 years old at the time of the incident. She
awoke in her first-floor bedroom after hearing a loud noise as

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the SERT team forcibly entered her home. As she took a step
outside of her bedroom wearing her night clothes, Officer
Clinton Painter struck her in the face with his shield, causing
her to fly backwards on her back. The blow broke multiple
teeth and one vertebra, which required long-term treatment.
Ada testified that the SERT officers did not announce
themselves and that she did not hear Officer Painter give
instructions or warnings before striking her.
Richard was 77 years old at the time of the incident. He
slept on the couch that night in the living room. Waking from
the sound of his dog growling, Richard went to the window
where he saw flashing lights. He assumed that it was the fire
department and thought the house might be on fire. As he
moved toward the door to investigate, SERT officers burst
through and stormed inside. An officer whom Richard later
identified as Officer Mark Benson approached and shined a
flashlight into his eyes. Officer Benson then struck Richard in
the head with the flashlight, grabbed his neck, and forced him
to the ground. The fall caused Richard to hit his head on the
fireplace, rendering him briefly unconscious. Richard suffered
multiple contusions and facial abrasions and tore the menisci
in his right knee, requiring surgery.
Jeffrey was 55 years old at the time of the incident. He
was asleep in the living room near his father when he awoke to
loud noise and bright lights. Thinking there was a fire, Jeffrey
walked into the kitchen and was met by Officer Robert
McGarvey, who shouted at Jeffrey to get down. Before Jeffrey
could comply, Officer McGarvey clothes-lined him and forced
him to the ground. An officer, whose identity is in dispute, then
placed his boot on the back of Jeffrey’s neck, zip-tied him,
pulled him up by the zip-ties, and sat him in a chair. Jeffery

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witnessed the attacks on his mother and father and demanded
that someone call for an ambulance. The same officer who zip-
tied Jeffrey slapped him across the jaw and repeatedly punched
him. Jeffrey’s testimony suggests that Officer McGarvey zip-
tied and punched him, while a police report suggests that it was
Officer Vicente Lopez. Jeffrey suffered sprains to his shoulder
and other lasting injuries.
Joseph was 45 years old at the time of the incident. He
was asleep in an upstairs bedroom when SERT officers burst
into his room. Officer Matthew Wysocky jumped onto
Joseph’s bed and zip-tied him. Though Joseph was
cooperative, Officer Wysocky lifted him up and slammed him
on the floor. Joseph suffered tears in both rotator cuffs,
requiring surgery.
After subduing the occupants, the SERT team searched
the property. They did not discover methamphetamine, and
Mark Anglemeyer was never convicted of any crime resulting
from the search.
Ada, Richard, Jeffrey, and Joseph sued several officers
who participated in the raid, alleging that they used excessive
force in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The District Court
concluded that the SERT officers were entitled to qualified
immunity and granted summary judgment. It found that, under
the facts presented for Ada, Jeffrey, and Joseph, the officers
did not engage in objectively unreasonable conduct sufficient
to constitute a claim for unconstitutional use of excessive
force. It further found that Richard’s and Jeffrey’s claims for
excessive force fail because they could not identify with
sufficient particularity the officer or officers who allegedly

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injured them. In reaching its holding, the District Court
predominantly credited the officers’ version of events.
Plaintiffs appealed the District Court’s decision as it
relates to their claims against Officers Benson, Painter,
McGarvey, Lopez, and Wysocky.
II
The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1331 and 1343(a)(3). We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291.
We exercise plenary review over the District Court’s
grant of summary judgment. Jefferson v. Lias, 21 F.4th 74, 77
n.1 (3d Cir. 2021). “Similarly, we review de novo the legal
grounds underpinning a claim of qualified immunity.” Mack v.
Yost, 63 F.4th 211, 227 n.14 (3d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation
marks and quoted source omitted). “Summary judgment is
appropriate if there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact
and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Id.
(internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted). “We
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-
moving party and give that party the benefit of all reasonable
inferences that can be drawn from the evidence.” Id. (internal
quotation marks and quoted source omitted).
III
We use a two-pronged analysis to evaluate qualified
immunity claims. Spady v. Bethlehem Area Sch. Dist., 800 F.3d
633, 637 (3d Cir. 2015). “First, [we] must decide ‘whether the
facts that a plaintiff has . . . shown make out a violation of a

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constitutional right.’ And second, [we] must determine
‘whether the right at issue was clearly established at the time
of the defendant’s alleged misconduct.’” Id. (quoting Pearson
v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 232 (2009)). The officers bear the
burden of persuasion under each prong. Mack, 63 F.4th at 227.
A
The right to be free from the use of excessive force has
been recognized under the Fourth Amendment, which
guarantees the right of citizens “to be secure in their persons
. . . against unreasonable . . . seizures.” Graham v. Connor, 490
U.S. 386, 394 (1989); see Jefferson, 21 F.4th at 78.
The question in excessive force cases is whether, under
the totality of the circumstances, “the officers’ actions are
objectively reasonable in light of the facts and circumstances
confronting them, without regard to their underlying intent or
motivation.” Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (internal quotation
marks and quoted source omitted). We analyze this question
“from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,
rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.” Id. at 396. And
we make “allowance for the fact that police officers are often
forced to make split-second judgments—in circumstances that
are tense, uncertain, and rapidly evolving—about the amount
of force that is necessary in a particular situation.” Id. at 397.
In assessing the officers’ reasonableness, we consider
factors such as “the severity of the crime at issue, whether the
suspect poses an immediate threat to the safety of the officers
or others, and whether he is actively resisting arrest or
attempting to evade arrest by flight.” Id. at 396. We also
consider “the physical injury to the plaintiff, the possibility that

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the persons subject to the police action are themselves violent
or dangerous, the duration of the action, whether the action
takes place in the context of effecting an arrest, the possibility
that the suspect may be armed, and the number of persons with
whom the police officers must contend at one time.” El v. City
of Pittsburgh, 975 F.3d 327, 336 (3d Cir. 2020) (internal
quotation marks and quoted source omitted).
Here, the District Court failed to construe the evidence
in favor of each plaintiff. Instead, the District Court
predominantly credited the officers’ version of events. But
when viewing the evidence in the non-movants’ favor, as we
must at this stage of the case, a reasonable jury could find that
the officer or officers who harmed each plaintiff used
objectively unreasonable force.
1. Ada Anglemeyer
There is no dispute that Officer Painter struck Ada with
his shield after she stepped outside of her bedroom in her
nightgown. Giving weight to Ada’s testimony, Officer Painter
could not reasonably believe that Ada posed an immediate
threat to his or his fellow officers’ safety, particularly in light
of Ada’s age and stature. Additionally, the Anglemeyers
owned guns. But a jury could find that Officer Painter should
have known that Ada—confused and dressed only in a
nightgown—was not armed. Officer Painter also knew prior to
entering the Anglemeyer home that Mark Anglemeyer lived
with his elderly parents and other family members, who were
not suspected of any wrongdoing. And he could not reasonably

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confuse Ada with Mark, who Officer Painter knew was a white
male and 52 years old.
A reasonable factfinder could also conclude that Officer
Painter failed to give prior instructions or warnings before
striking Ada, affording her no opportunity to comply.
Although Officer Painter contends that Ada failed to cooperate
with his commands, her testimony refutes that allegation. And
we must weigh the facts in Ada’s favor. Mack, 63 F.4th at 227
n.14. Viewing these facts in the totality, a jury could find that
there was no need for any force against Ada, making Officer
Painter’s conduct toward Ada objectively unreasonable. See
Couden v. Duffy, 446 F.3d 483, 497 (3d Cir. 2006) (finding
unconstitutional excessive force where officers tackled
plaintiff in his own home, even though plaintiff was unarmed,
cooperative, and not resisting arrest or attempting to flee);
Jacobs v. Cumberland Cnty., 8 F.4th 187, 195-96 (3d Cir.
2021) (finding that the officer used unconstitutional excessive
force in striking an unarmed, compliant, and non-threatening
individual).
2. Richard Anglemeyer
As a preliminary matter, the parties dispute which
officer allegedly hit Richard in the head with a flashlight,
strangled him to the ground, and caused him serious injury.
Through process of elimination, Richard concludes that it must
have been Officer Benson, while the officers contend that
Richard failed to successfully zero in on one defendant because
other officers were also in the vicinity. The District Court
agreed with the officers and found that Richard failed “to
present evidence establishing the personal involvement of the
defendant.” (App. Vol. I 21-22.)

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We disagree. Officer McGarvey testified that he took
down a male in the kitchen who was “not [a] senior citizen,”
which thus rules out Richard. (App. Vol. II 164.) Officer Lance
Schimp confirmed in his police report that while Officer
McGarvey handled the male in the kitchen, Officer Benson
was “dealing with another male” in the next room on the
ground floor. (App. Vol. II 221.) That room could only be the
living room, where Richard was attacked. So Richard has
brought forth sufficient evidence implicating Officer Benson
as the officer who engaged with him. Jutrowski v. Twp. Of
Riverdale, 904 F.3d 280, 291 (3d Cir. 2018) (“[A] plaintiff
must produce evidence supporting each individual defendant’s
personal involvement in the alleged violation to bring that
defendant to trial.”).
A reasonable factfinder could also conclude that Officer
Benson’s force was objectively unreasonable. Based on
Richard’s testimony, he was plainly unarmed and cooperative,
following Officer Benson’s flashlight with his eyes before
Officer Benson gratuitously struck him. And Officer Benson
could not reasonably confuse Richard with Mark, who Officer
Benson knew was 52 years old. Like Ada’s case, a jury could
find that no force was necessary against Richard—let alone
force of the degree exercised, particularly against a non-
threatening and elderly individual. See Couden, 446 F.3d at
497; Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 195-96.
3. Jeffrey Anglemeyer
The parties dispute the identity of the officer or officers
who attacked Jeffrey. While the record clearly shows that
Officer McGarvey was the officer who initially took down

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Jeffrey in the kitchen, they offer competing evidence as to who
subsequently zip-tied him and struck him in the face. Based on
the evidence in the record, a reasonable jury could conclude
that, after Officer McGarvey struck Jeffrey with his shield,
Officer Lopez zip-tied Jeffrey’s wrists, sat him up in a chair,
and punched him. Though Jeffrey’s testimony implicates
Officer McGarvey in those acts, Officer Lopez’s police report
states that he zip-tied a man who matched Jeffrey’s description.
And Jeffrey later claimed that the same person who zip-tied
him also punched him. At this stage in the case, that is enough
to proceed to trial against Officer Lopez. See Smith v.
Mensinger, 293 F.3d 641, 650 (3d Cir. 2002) (stating that, even
though the plaintiff was not sure who participated in the
beating, competing evidence as to the identity of the officers
was “a classic factual dispute to be resolved by the fact
finder”).1
1 The officers argue—and the District Court held—that
our decision in Jutrowski necessitates dismissing Jeffrey’s
action against Officer Lopez because Jeffery focused on
several “possible wrongdoers” instead of homing in on one
defendant (Appellee’s Br. at 29, citing Jutrowski, 904 F.3d at
280). But Jutrowski held that the plaintiff could not proceed
against multiple officers because he failed to provide “any
ascertainment” of who engaged in excessive force. Jutrowski,
904 F.3d at 292 (internal quotation marks and quoted source
omitted) (emphasis added). We thus concluded that the “record
[was] insufficient for any reasonable jury to identify which, if
any, of the [i]ndividual [d]efendants used excessive force.” Id.
at 292-93 (footnote omitted). But here, Jeffrey has offered
evidence implicating Officer Lopez—most persuasively
Officer Lopez’s own police report suggesting he zip-tied

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Weighing the evidence in favor of Jeffrey, a reasonable
jury also could conclude that the officers’ force was objectively
unreasonable. Like his mother and father, Jeffrey was unarmed
and not suspected of any wrongdoing. Jeffrey also had no time
to comply with Officer McGarvey’s command to get down
before Officer McGarvey struck him with his shield. Once
Jeffrey was zip-tied, the officers could not have reasonably
believed that Jeffrey posed any threat, and there is no
indication that he was resisting the officers’ restraints. So a jury
could find that an officer stepping on Jeffrey’s neck, yanking
him up by his zip-ties instead of aiding him to his feet, and
punching him—all while Jeffery was bound and defenseless—
rises to objectively unreasonably conduct. See Couden, 446
F.3d at 497; Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 195-96; Smith, 293 F.3d at 649
(“Punching and kicking someone who is handcuffed behind his
back and under the control of [officers] . . . is ‘repugnant to the
conscience of mankind.’”) (quoting Hudson v. McMillian, 503
U.S. 1, 10 (1992)).
4. Joseph Kluska
Finally, giving weight to Joseph’s testimony, a
reasonable jury could conclude that Officer Wysocky engaged
in objectively unreasonable conduct when he picked up Joseph
by his zip-tied arms and dropped him to the floor, tearing both
Jeffrey—sufficient for a reasonable jury to conclude Officer
Lopez ultimately punched him. While Officer Lopez’s alleged
conduct may not ultimately be proven, the very fact that this
material evidence is disputed necessitates reserving this
question for the jury.

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of his rotator cuffs. Though Officer Wysocky saw a handgun
lying on the back of Joseph’s bed, Officer Wysocky harmed
Joseph after he was fully secured, cooperative, and not at risk
of flight. As we have previously explained, “striking a
physically restrained and nonthreatening” person is “nowhere
near the hazy border between excessive and acceptable force.”
Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 197 (internal quotation marks and quoted
source omitted).
B
Because the officers have failed on the first prong of the
qualified immunity analysis, they are entitled to summary
judgment only “if they can bear the burden of showing, on the
second prong, that reasonable officers could not have known
that their actions violated clearly established law.”2 Mack, 63
F.4th at 228. We must proceed by defining the right allegedly
violated with a “high degree of specificity” and then asking
“whether that right was clearly established at the time of its
2 The District Court at times conflates both prongs of
the qualified immunity analysis. (See App. Vol. I 14-15, 17.)
However, like the parties, we understand the District Court’s
opinion to resolve only the first prong of the qualified
immunity analysis. Because we resolve the first prong in favor
of Plaintiffs, we exercise our discretion to also address the
second prong. See Hudson United Bank v. LiTenda Mortg.
Corp., 142 F.3d 151, 159 (3d Cir. 1998) (stating that it is
“generally appropriate” for us to reach an issue that the district
court did not if “the issues provide purely legal questions, upon
which an appellate court exercises plenary review”).

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alleged violation.” District of Columbia v. Wesby, 583 U.S. 48,
63 (2018) (internal quotation marks and quoted source
omitted); Mack, 63 F.4th at 228.
“Clearly established means that, at the time of the
officer’s conduct, the law was sufficiently clear that every
reasonable official would understand that what he is doing is
unlawful.” Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 196 (quoting Wesby, U.S. at 63).
“In each case, we must focus on ‘whether the violative nature
of particular conduct is clearly established.’” Id. (quoting
Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7, 12 (2015)). “Thus, the central
question is whether the existing law gave the officer ‘fair
warning’ that his particular conduct was unlawful.” Id. (citing
Schneyder v. Smith, 653 F.3d 313, 329 (3d Cir. 2011)).
“[E]xisting precedent . . . [must] place[] the statutory or
constitutional question beyond debate.” Dennis v. City of
Philadelphia, 19 F.4th 279, 288 (3d Cir. 2021) (internal
quotation marks and quoted source omitted). Thus, the
“specificity of caselaw [is] ‘especially important.’” Jacobs, 8
F.4th at 196 (quoting Mullenix, 577 U.S. at 12). While “we do
not require that the prior precedent have indistinguishable
facts,” Dennis, 19 F.4th at 288, “[c]ases with closely analogous
facts can . . . help move a case beyond the otherwise hazy
border between excessive and acceptable force and thereby
provide an officer notice that a specific use of force is
unlawful.” Jacobs, 8 F.4th at 196 (internal quotation marks and
quoted source omitted).
Here, all four plaintiffs had the right to be free from
serious bodily harm as individuals who were plainly unarmed,
substantially outnumbered by law enforcement, cooperative,
not suspected of wrongdoing, and in their own home. Our prior

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decision in Couden—a “closely analogous” case to the facts
before us here—shows that Plaintiffs’ rights were clearly
established.
In Couden, the Delaware Joint Violent Crime Task
Force, after receiving a tip that a fugitive wanted for drug
charges might be staying at a certain address, conducted a
stakeout in a Delaware neighborhood. 446 F.3d at 489. Two
houses down from the surveilled address, Pamela Couden and
some of her children, including 14-year-old Adam, drove up to
their home in the family car. Id. Adam exited the car and
entered his home. Id. Presumably thinking Adam was the
wanted fugitive simply entering a different home, the police
attacked Pamela’s car, causing her to drive off to call 9-1-1. Id.
at 490. At least four officers then stormed inside the house,
grabbed Adam inside his home, and threw him to floor. Id.
While one officer pressed his knee into Adam’s back, they
pushed Adam’s head into the ground, pointed guns at him, and
sprayed him with mace. Id. at 490, 497.
We held that it was clearly established that it was
unlawful for the officers to engage in this level of force when
the individual posed no “potential threat” to the officers, was
substantially outnumbered by officers in his own home, and
was not “resisting arrest, armed, or attempting to flee.” Id. at
497. We determined that, at the very most, officers under this
set of facts would be entitled to only “the use of low level
force.” Id. Our sister circuits have denied qualified immunity
in cases factually similar to Couden. See, e.g., Shannon v.
Koehler, 616 F.3d 855, 864-65 (8th Cir. 2010) (holding it was
clearly established that it is unlawful for an officer to engage
in serious bodily harm when the individual posed no danger to
the officer and did not resist or attempt to flee); Darden v. City

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of Fort Worth, 880 F.3d 722, 733 (5th Cir. 2018) (holding that
the officer’s conduct would violate clearly established rights if
he used violent force, such as slamming or striking, against a
plaintiff who did not resist or presented no safety threats).
Here, the officers’ force against all four plaintiffs was
even more egregious than the force exercised in Couden. The
plaintiffs were not only plainly unarmed, substantially
outnumbered, cooperative, and in their own home, but they
were not suspected of any wrongdoing or facing arrest.
Accordingly, any reasonable officer in our case would have
known that the officers’ force was unlawful under this set of
facts.
* * *
Construing the evidence in the light most favorable to
each plaintiff, a reasonable jury could find that the officer who
harmed each plaintiff used objectively unreasonable force. At
the time of the officers’ conduct, it was clearly established that
it was unlawful for the officers to inflict serious bodily harm
on individuals who were plainly unarmed, substantially
outnumbered by law enforcement, cooperative, not suspected
of wrongdoing, and in their own home. We will therefore
reverse the District Court’s order granting summary judgment
to the officers.

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