Jeffrey E. Herrera v. Agents of Pennsylvania Board of Probation

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 23-1123
______________
JEFFREY E. HERRERA,
Appellant
v.
AGENTS OF PENNSYLVANIA BOARD OF PROBATION
AND PAROLE; PENNSYLVANIA DEPARTMENT OF
CORRECTIONS; CURT M. PARKINS, Attorneys of
Lackawanna County Public Defenders; DOUG VANSTON,
Lackawanna Public Defender; KURT LYONS, Court
Appointed Attorney; SHANE SCANLON, District Attorney;
OTHER YET DEFENDANTS TO BE NAMED; MICHAEL
BARRASSE, Judge
______________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 3:22-cv-01530)
U.S. District Judge: Honorable Malachy E. Mannion
______________
Argued
January 29, 2025
______________

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Before: SHWARTZ, KRAUSE, and PORTER, Circuit
Judges.
(Filed: March 14, 2025)
______________
Alexandra Bursak
Christopher Cariello
Joseph R. Kolker [ARGUED]
Orrick Herrington & Sutcliffe
51 W 52nd Street
New York, NY 10019
Counsel for Appellant
Kathleen A. Wilde LaBay [ARGUED]
Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania
Strawberry Square 15th Floor
Harrisburg, PA 17120
Counsel for Amicus Commonwealth of Pennsylvania1
______________
OPINION
______________
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
Jeffrey Herrera appeals the District Court’s order
dismissing his pro se complaint that alleged he was detained
1 The Court thanks pro bono and amicus counsel for
their service in this appeal.

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for several months after his maximum release date in violation
of the Eighth Amendment. The District Court dismissed the
complaint based on Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994).
Because Heck does not apply to a plaintiff’s overdetention
claim that, if successful, would not imply that his conviction or
sentence were invalid, and Herrera pleads such a claim, we will
vacate the order dismissing the complaint and remand for
further proceedings.
I2
Herrera alleges that Defendants Agents of the
Pennsylvania Board of Probation and Parole (the “Board”) and
2 Because we are reviewing an order dismissing the
complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we accept all factual
allegations as true, construe them in a light most favorable to
the plaintiff, and may consider documents attached to the
complaint. Pryor v. Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n, 288 F.3d
548, 560 (3d Cir. 2002) (considering documents attached to the
complaint in evaluating a motion to dismiss); Tourscher v.
McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999) (applying Rule
12(b)(6) standard to an order dismissing a complaint under
§ 1915). In addition, we may consider documents “whose
contents are alleged in the complaint and whose authenticity
no party questions,” as well as judicially noticeable documents.
Santomenno ex rel. John Hancock Tr. v. John Hancock Life
Ins. Co. (U.S.A), 768 F.3d 284, 290 (3d Cir. 2014); see also
Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014) (noting
that a court may take judicial notice of matters of public
record).

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Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”)3 detained
him for approximately seven months beyond his maximum
prison term. To understand this assertion, we consider both the
sentence imposed and his release date. In September 2012,
Herrera was arrested for a state crime and in March 2013, was
sentenced to a period of 36 to 72 months’ imprisonment. He
was released on parole in December 2014 and thereafter
violated his parole. Following a post-conviction petition, the
state court entered an order in January 2017 that vacated his
original sentence, imposed a reduced sentence of 30 to 66
months, and had provisions concerning credit for time he had
served. Because the January 2017 order failed to account for
an approximately eleven-month period while he was free on
parole, the state court issued an order in February 2017 that
amended the January 2017 order to reflect credit for time he
served. Specifically, it provided him with 27 months’ credit
for time he had served before he was released on parole and
almost 15 months’ credit for the time he had served for the
parole violation as of the date of the February 2017 order. He
served approximately 31 additional months from the date of
the February 2017 order through his release in October 2019,
resulting in him serving a total of 73 months’ imprisonment for
the state offense.
Herrera asserts that his release date should have been in
March 2019. He asserts that (1) in February 2018, he learned
that his release date was extended by eleven months, from
3 Herrera represents that certain defendants listed in the
caption belong not in this case but in the caption of a separate
action he brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On remand, the
District Court shall take any action it deems appropriate to
address this alleged error.

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March 2019 to February 2020, (2) he filed grievances and
requests for information with the Board and DOC, and each
pointed to the other to provide an explanation, and (3) he was
released in October 2019 without any explanation.
Herrera submitted a pro se complaint and an in forma
pauperis application under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. He did not
challenge his conviction or sentence, but instead claimed that
his overdetention amounted to cruel and unusual punishment
in violation of the Eighth Amendment and sought relief under
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
The District Court construed Herrera’s complaint as
challenging the length of his sentence and dismissed it for
failure to state a claim under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Herrera v.
Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, No. 22-cv-1530, 2022 WL
16836615 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 9, 2022). It reasoned that (1) such a
claim must be brought as a petition for writ of habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, id. at *1; and (2) Herrera’s claim for
damages was barred by Heck because it attacked the duration
of his sentence and thus sought to undermine his conviction
without showing that his conviction was unlawful, id. at *2.
The Court further found that any attempt to amend his
complaint would be futile. Id. at *2 n.1.
Herrera sought reconsideration, which the District
Court denied. Herrara, No. 22-cv-1530, 2022 WL 17640205,
at *1 (M.D. Pa. Dec. 13, 2022).4 The District Court
acknowledged that Herrera challenged his overdetention,
rather than his conviction or sentence, but held that his claim
4 The captions of the District Court’s reconsideration
and Rule 60 opinions misspelled Herrera’s name as “Herrara.”

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for damages was nevertheless barred by (1) Heck because it
called into question the validity of the confinement, and (2) the
statute of limitations. Id. at *3-5. Herrera moved for relief
from judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60,
which the District Court denied for the same reasons. Herrara,
No. 22-cv-1530, 2023 WL 173138, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Jan. 12,
2023).
Herrera appeals.
II5
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331. We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
exercise plenary review over a district court’s order dismissing
a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2). See Dooley v.
Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373 (3d Cir. 2020). The standard for
dismissal under § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) is the same as
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), see Tourscher,
184 F.3d at 240, and so we review “the pleaded factual
content” to determine if it “allows the court to draw the
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the
misconduct alleged,” Thompson v. Real Est. Mortg. Network,
748 F.3d 142, 147 (3d Cir. 2014) (quoting Ashcroft v. Iqbal,
556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009)). We review pro se pleadings
liberally. See Dooley, 957 F.3d at 374.
Generally, we review a district court’s orders denying
motions for reconsideration and for relief under Rule 60(b) for
abuse of discretion, but we review legal determinations de
novo and factual determinations for clear error. Howard Hess
Dental Labs. Inc. v. Dentsply Int’l, Inc., 602 F.3d 237, 246 (3d
Cir. 2010) (reconsideration); Giordano v. McCartney, 385 F.2d
154, 155 (3d Cir. 1967) (Rule 60).

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A
1
Because Herrera alleges that he was detained for seven
months past his maximum release date, we construe his claim
as one of overdetention. Detention beyond an inmate’s
maximum term of imprisonment may constitute cruel and
unusual punishment under the Eighth Amendment and give
rise to a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See, e.g., Sample v.
Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1108 (3d Cir. 1989).
2
Before we examine whether Herrera has stated an
overdetention claim, we must first assess whether Heck bars
the type of claim he seeks to lodge. The Supreme Court has
explained that there are “two main avenues” for relief related
to imprisonment under federal law: a petition for habeas corpus
under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 and a complaint under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Muhammad v. Close, 540 U.S. 749, 750 (2004) (per
curiam). Habeas corpus allows an individual to challenge the
“validity of any confinement” or “particulars affecting its
duration,” while § 1983 allows a plaintiff to seek damages
related to his “circumstances of confinement.” Id. Some cases
present “hybrids” of these two avenues of relief, such as when
prisoners seek damages for allegations that “imply the
invalidity either of an underlying conviction or of a particular
ground for denying release short of serving the maximum term
of confinement.” Id.
The Supreme Court has explained that “Heck uses the
word ‘sentence’ to refer . . . to substantive determinations as to

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the length of confinement.” Wilkinson v. Dotson, 544 U.S. 74,
83 (2005); see also Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 752 n.1 (“[T]he
incarceration that matters under Heck is the incarceration
ordered by the original judgment of conviction.”). Thus, “a
case challenging a sentence” is Heck-barred because “[i]t seeks
invalidation . . . of the judgment authorizing the prisoner’s
confinement.” Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 83. Heck’s bar,
however, is not limited to claims that would invalidate the
initial court-imposed sentence, but rather it “extends to claims
that a plaintiff’s good-time credit, parole, or supervised release
was improperly revoked,” as such challenges call into question
substantive judgments by entities empowered to make
decisions regarding the fact or duration of confinement.
Courtney v. Butler, 66 F.4th 1043, 1050 (7th Cir. 2023); see
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 643, 648 (1997) (applying
Heck when litigants sought damages for alleged deficiencies in
proceedings that resulted in the loss of good time credits);
Williams v. Consovoy, 453 F.3d 173, 177 (3d Cir. 2006)
(applying Heck when “success on the § 1983 claim would
necessarily demonstrate the invalidity of the Parole Board’s
decision” to revoke parole).
Therefore, Heck bars § 1983 actions “where success in
[the] § 1983 action would implicitly call into question the
validity of conviction or duration of sentence.” Williams, 453
F.3d at 177. In such a case, “the plaintiff must first achieve
favorable termination of his available state or federal habeas
remedies” before he can seek damages that he contends arise
from his “underlying conviction or sentence.”6 Id. Favorable
6 To establish favorable termination, a “plaintiff must
prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed . . . ,

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termination is not an exhaustion requirement, but rather “a
necessary element of the claim for relief under § 1983.”
Garrett v. Murphy, 17 F.4th 419, 429 (3d Cir. 2021). The
purpose of this favorable termination requirement is to avoid a
situation where a plaintiff’s successful challenge to events
connected with his conviction or sentence in a § 1983 action
could result in “two conflicting resolutions.” Heck, 512 U.S.
at 484.
Thus, to avoid Heck’s favorable termination
requirement, a plaintiff “must demonstrate that success on his
§ 1983 claims would not conflict with the prior judicial
resolution of his criminal proceedings.” Bronowicz v.
Allegheny Cnty., 804 F.3d 338, 345 (3d Cir. 2015); see also
Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 751 (observing Heck’s bar “is not[] []
implicated by a prisoner’s challenge that threatens no
consequence for his conviction or the duration of his
sentence”). As a result, to determine whether Heck applies, a
court must look at the plaintiff’s § 1983 claims, assume the
plaintiff successfully proves those claims, and evaluate if such
a resolution would undermine the legal validity of his
conviction or sentence. See Wilkinson, 544 U.S. at 82. If the
court concludes that a judgment in the plaintiff’s favor on such
a claim would undermine the conviction or sentence, then
Heck’s favorable termination requirement would apply. If a
judgment in the plaintiff’s favor would not undermine his
conviction or sentence, then Heck’s favorable termination
requirement would not apply.
expunged . . . , declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized
to make such determination, or called into question by a federal
court’s issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.” Heck, 512 U.S.
at 486-87.

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Under this framework, Heck’s favorable termination
requirement does not apply to a plaintiff who claims only that
he was detained beyond the maximum period of the sentence
imposed when such a claim does not imply that his conviction
or sentence are legally invalid. Following this same reasoning,
several Courts of Appeals have determined Heck does not bar
certain overdetention claims. The Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Circuit determined Heck was inapplicable to a series of
§ 1983 claims alleging that ministerial errors caused inmates
to serve more time than their maximum imposed sentences.
See McNeal v. LeBlanc, 90 F.4th 425, 431 (5th Cir. 2024)
(concluding that “Heck [wa]s no bar” where a plaintiff was
detained past his release date based on prison officials’ failure
to send his release letter to the appropriate facility, and the
plaintiff “d[id] not challenge his conviction or attendant
sentence, but rather the 41 days he was imprisoned beyond his
release date”), cert. denied, 145 S. Ct. 266 (2024); Hicks v.
LeBlanc, 81 F.4th 497, 502, 507-08 (5th Cir. 2023) (holding
that Heck did not apply to a plaintiff’s claim that “he was
detained longer than the proper sentence imposed,” because
such a plaintiff did not seek a judgment that would be “at odds
with his conviction”); Crittindon v. LeBlanc, 37 F.4th 177, 190
(5th Cir. 2022) (holding that “[t]he Heck defense ‘[wa]s not
. . . implicated by a prisoner’s challenge’” to his overdetention
due to “a systemic failure to calculate release dates” because
such a challenge “threaten[ed] no consequence for his
conviction or the duration of his sentence” (quoting
Muhammad, 540 U.S. at 751)), cert. denied, 144 S. Ct. 90
(2023).
Likewise, the Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit
observed that Heck’s favorable termination requirement did
not bar a plaintiff’s Federal Tort Claims Act complaint

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asserting overdetention based on prison officials’ “putting
down the wrong date as the start date of his incarceration,”
because resolution in the plaintiff’s favor would not “impl[y]
the invalidity of his conviction or of the sentence imposed.”
See Morrow v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 610 F.3d 1271, 1272
(11th Cir. 2010). The Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
employed similar reasoning, concluding that Heck did not bar
a plaintiff’s claims that defendants’ deliberate indifference
“caused him to spend an extra year in prison rather than on
mandatory supervised release” when the officials did not
investigate the residential sites for his supervised release,
despite prison directives requiring them to do so. See
Courtney, 66 F.4th at 1051-53.
We agree with our sister circuits that Heck’s favorable
termination requirement does not apply to an overdetention
claim that accepts the validity of the maximum sentence
imposed but alleges that deliberate indifference delayed the
execution of an inmate’s release beyond that sentence.7
7 Our opinions in Powell and Bronowicz are inapposite.
Powell which did not involve a deliberate indifference claim,
recognized the argument that Heck may bar a claim that a
plaintiff was allegedly “supervised on parole seven months
past his sentence date,” but we did not decide the issue,
observing that the plaintiff could proceed regardless because
he had already challenged his sentence successfully. Powell v.
Weiss, 757 F.3d 338, 346 (3d Cir. 2014). Put differently, we
stated only that the plaintiff had demonstrated favorable
termination—not that he must. See id. In Bronowicz, we cited
Powell and, in a parenthetical, characterized it as holding that
a “plaintiff’s § 1983 claims stemming from his supervision on

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Compare Bronowicz, 804 F.3d at 340-41, 345 (applying Heck
when a plaintiff attacked the validity of procedures affecting
the calculation of his sentence), with Hicks, 81 F.4th at 506-07
(holding that Heck was inapplicable when plaintiff challenged
“the execution of his release” but success “would not invalidate
the conviction or its attendant sentence” (emphasis omitted)).
Instead of calling a substantive judgment into question, such a
claim accepts the judgment and challenges some separate
action or inaction that delays a prisoner’s release. Such
allegations “seek[] to vindicate,” Courtney, 66 F.4th at 1051,
rather than collaterally attack, a conviction or sentence, Heck,
512 U.S. at 485-87. Put differently, Heck does not apply when
a prisoner alleges that he and the state agree on the appropriate
maximum release date, yet he was held beyond that date.
Here, Herrera alleges that, under the sentence imposed,
he should have been released no later than sometime in March
2019, but instead he was released in October 2019. He does
not challenge a court order or substantive administrative
proceeding, but rather alleges that a ministerial error caused
him to remain in prison after the duration of his maximum
parole past his maximum sentence date must satisfy Heck’s
favorable termination rule.” Bronowicz v. Allegheny Cnty.,
804 F.3d 338, 345 (3d Cir. 2015). That dictum does not control
here and Bronowicz did not decide whether Heck applied to
claims of detention beyond one’s maximum release date,
holding only that it did apply to a “wrongful incarceration”
claim challenging the validity of “sentencing and probation
revocation proceedings” that allegedly “unlawfully impos[ed]
. . . additional penalties.” Id. at 340-41. In short, neither case
involved the type of overdetention claim that Herrera brings,
nor do they dictate the outcome here.

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sentence.8 Reading the complaint in the light most favorable
to Herrera, it appears that the Board agreed that Herrera’s
maximum prison sentence ended on March 4, 2019 and that he
was not released until months later. Based on these allegations,
if he prevails, the resulting judgment will not undermine his
conviction or the sentence imposed. Rather, it would simply
reflect that he was held in custody longer than the sentence
contemplated. As a result, the allegations and relief sought in
Herrera’s complaint do not implicate Heck’s concerns and,
thus, its favorable termination requirement does not apply.
3
Having concluded that Heck does not bar Herrera’s
claim as pleaded, we next consider whether he has plausibly
pleaded an Eighth Amendment overdetention claim. To plead
an Eighth Amendment overdetention claim, a plaintiff must
allege that (1) a prison official knew of the prisoner’s possible
overdetention and the risk that unwarranted punishment was
being, or would be, inflicted; (2) the official failed to act or
took only ineffectual action under the circumstances,
indicating that his response to the problem was a product of
deliberate indifference to the prisoner’s plight; and (3) there
was a causal connection between the official’s response, or
lack thereof, and the overdetention. Sample, 885 F.2d at 1110.
8 A ministerial error includes, among other things,
arithmetic errors, clerical errors, such as those resulting from
inaccurate copying, duplication, or misplacement of
documents, or other errors that the prison authority considers
ministerial. Cf. 19 U.S.C. § 1675.

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Accepting Herrera’s allegations as true, (1) Herrera was
informed that his maximum release date was changed to
February 2020 and he asked Board and DOC officials to
review the unexplained change to his release date and resulting
delay in his release; (2) the Board and DOC officials did not
respond to his requests, but rather pointed to each other as the
entity responsible to address the situation; and (3) as a result of
the Board’s and DOC’s inaction, and despite the February
2017 order, Herrera was detained approximately seven months
beyond his maximum release date. Accordingly, Herrera
pleads an Eighth Amendment overdetention claim.
B
Although Heck does not bar Herrera’s claim as pleaded
and his allegations present a plausible basis for relief, the face
of his complaint suggests that his claims may be time-barred
under Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations. Herrera
alleges that his overdetention spanned from March 2019 to
October 2019, but he did not submit his complaint until
September 2022, more than two years after his injury. See
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 634 (3d Cir. 2009) (holding that
the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim arising in
Pennsylvania is two years (citing 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524));
see also id. (providing that a cause of action generally accrues
“at the time of the last event necessary to complete the tort,
usually [when] the plaintiff suffers an injury”). Nevertheless,
a liberal construction of his allegations suggests that he (1)
spent time exhausting administrative remedies by raising his
concern with the Board and DOC; (2) lacked access to the
supplies necessary to prepare his complaint; and (3) suffered
from mental illness during the pandemic that prevented him
from raising his claims sooner. Because such circumstances

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might support statutory tolling, see Pearson v. Sec’y Dep’t of
Corr., 775 F.3d 598, 603 (3d Cir. 2015) (holding that
Pennsylvania’s statute of limitations is tolled “while a prisoner
exhausts administrative remedies”), or equitable tolling, see
Kach, 589 F.3d at 643 (holding that equitable tolling applies
where extraordinary circumstances prevented plaintiff from
asserting his claim), we will remand to allow Herrera to amend
his complaint to further allege facts concerning administrative
exhaustion, his inability to access documents, and his mental
health that may support tolling the statute of limitations. See
Dooley, 957 F.3d at 376.9
III
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand.
9 At Herrera’s request, his counsel raised additional
issues, but we need not address them to resolve this appeal.

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