United States of America v. James Taric Byrd

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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Nos. 23-1216 & 23-3021
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
JAMES TARIC BYRD,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Nos. 2:17-cr-00299-001; 2:21-cr-00227-001)
District Judge: Honorable Cathy Bissoon
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 8, 2024
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Filed: March 5, 2025)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant James Byrd challenges his conviction on four bases, arguing that the
District Court erred by revoking his right to proceed pro se, denying his counsel’s motion
to withdraw, removing him from the courtroom and proceeding in absentia, and
instructing the jury. We will affirm.
I. DISCUSSION1
A. Right to Self-Representation
Once a defendant invokes his right to self-representation, it can be terminated
when he “deliberately engages in serious and obstructionist misconduct.” United
States v. Taylor, 21 F.4th 94, 104 (3d Cir. 2021) (quoting Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 834 n.46 (1975)). Conduct that is “openly hostile” and “repeatedly disrupt[s] the
proceedings” suffices to revoke a defendant’s right to proceed pro se. United States v.
Mabie, 663 F.3d 322, 329 (8th Cir. 2011).
Here, Byrd’s conduct far surpasses this threshold. He repeatedly refused to
participate in pretrial proceedings. He levied abusive and expletive-laden insults on the
District Court. See, e.g., App. 107 (“You can’t order me to do shit.”); id. at 117 (“[F]—k
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231, and our jurisdiction arises
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review a district court’s revocation of a defendant’s right to
represent himself de novo, see United States v. Noble, 42 F.4th 346, 350 (3d Cir. 2022),
and a district court’s denial of a motion to withdraw, decision to proceed in absentia, and
refusal to give a requested jury instruction for abuse of discretion, see United States v.
Bellille, 962 F.3d 731, 738 (3d Cir. 2020); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 347 (1970);
United States v. Titus, 78 F.4th 595, 602 (3d Cir. 2023). But we review statements of the
law in jury instructions de novo. Titus, 78 F.4th at 602

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you and this courtroom.”). And he made sexually explicit and threatening comments to
the District Judge.
The right to self-representation “is not a license to abuse the dignity of the
courtroom,” Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 n.46, and the District Court did not err by revoking
Byrd’s right to represent himself here.
B. Motion to Withdraw from Representation
Byrd next contends that the District Court erred by denying his attorney’s motions
to withdraw. While an attorney must be discharged where there is “good cause”
stemming from “a conflict of interest, a complete breakdown of communication, or an
irreconcilable conflict” with the client, United States v. Senke, 986 F.3d 300, 309–10 (3d
Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v. Goldberg, 67 F.3d 1092, 1098 (3d Cir. 1995)), the
denial of a motion to withdraw does not violate the Sixth Amendment “unless the district
court’s ‘good cause’ determination was clearly erroneous or the district court made no
inquiry into the reason for the defendant’s request to substitute counsel,” Goldberg, 67
F.3d at 1098.
Here, the District Court did not err on either occasion. Byrd contends that his
attorney’s initial motion was motivated by an irreconcilable conflict based on the
attorney’s refusal to call a witness. But decisions over which witnesses to call are
entrusted to counsel’s discretion. See McCoy v. Louisiana, 584 U.S. 414, 422, 424
(2018). And the District Court’s later inquiry established that Byrd and his attorney
remained in contact, and that the latter was committed to representing Byrd despite these

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challenges. This dispute falls well short of the “complete breakdown of communication”
that would justify substitution. Senke, 986 F.3d at 309.
The District Court’s second denial was also proper. We have held that “good
cause for the substitution” does not exist when the breakdown in the attorney-client
relationship is “entirely [the defendant’s] fault.” United States v. Noble, 42 F.4th 346,
351 (3d Cir. 2022). Here, the motion was clearly prompted by Byrd’s unprovoked
physical assault on his attorney. And once again, the District Court probed the reasons
for the motion and heard testimony from Byrd’s attorney, which established that counsel
was recommitted to representing Byrd.
Accordingly, the District Court did not abuse its discretion in either instance.
C. Proceeding In Absentia
Byrd’s challenge to the District Court’s decision to proceed in absentia fares no
better. A defendant “can lose his right to be present at trial if, after he has been warned
by the judge . . . he nevertheless insists on conducting himself in a manner so disorderly,
disruptive, and disrespectful of the court that his trial cannot be carried on with him in the
courtroom.” Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 343 (1970); see also Fed. R. Crim. P.
43(c)(1)(C).
Here, the District Judge warned Byrd that “[i]f you yell out in my courtroom, I
will have you removed,” App. 265, and we harbor no doubt that Byrd’s physical assault
constituted disorderly behavior that prevented the trial from continuing. Of course, the
District Court could have permitted Byrd to return once he was “willing to conduct
himself consistently with the decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and

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judicial proceedings.” Allen, 397 U.S. at 343. But even when efforts were made to
facilitate his participation, Byrd repeatedly refused to attend, seemingly with the goal of
manufacturing a mistrial.2 And each day, the District Court diligently confirmed that his
absence was voluntary.
In the face of this obstinance, the District Court did not err by proceeding with
Byrd in absentia.
D. Jury Instructions
Finally, Byrd contends that the District Court erroneously rejected his proposed
instructions in favor of the Government’s, which clarified that “[t]he defendant does not
have to be in federal custody to qualify as an inmate” for the purposes of 18 U.S.C.
§ 1791. Answering Br. 10 (No. 23-3021). But the Government’s proposed instruction
accurately reflected our precedent holding that the term “an inmate of a prison” properly
reaches any defendant “detained in a facility in which federal prisoners are held.” United
States v. Hendrickson, 949 F.3d 95, 100–01 (3d Cir. 2020). Byrd does not dispute that
federal prisoners were held at the Allegheny County Jail along with him, so the District
Court did not err by giving that instruction.
II. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgments.
2 Byrd was permitted to return to the courtroom to testify in his own defense.

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