Third Circuit disposition — 23-1295

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 23-1295
____________
In re: CONGOLEUM CORPORATION, et al.,
Debtors
BATH IRON WORKS CORPORATION,
Appellant
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 2:22-cv-00423)
District Judge: Honorable Madeline Cox Arleo
_____________
Argued: November 15, 2023
Submitted after rehearing June 12, 2025
____________
Before: CHAGARES, Chief Judge, MATEY and CHUNG,
Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: August 22, 2025)
____________

-- 1 of 40 --

2
Ian H. Gershengorn [ARGUED]
Illyana A. Green
Matthew Hellman
Jenner & Block
1099 New York Avenue NW
Suite 900
Washington, DC 20001
Michael A. Doornweerd
Catherine L. Steege
Jenner & Block
Suite 4500
353 N Clark Street
Chicago, IL 60654
Lawrence Bluestone
Angelo J. Genova
Genova Burns
494 Broad Street
Newark, NJ 07102
Donald W. Clarke
Daniel M. Stolz
Genova Burns
110 Allen Road
Suite 304
Basking Ridge, NJ 07920
Haley B. Zoffer
Davis Wright Tremaine
350 S Grand Avenue
Suite 2700
Los Angeles, CA 90071

-- 2 of 40 --

3
Counsel for Appellant Bath Iron Works Corporation
Daniel B. Butz
Morris Nichols Arsht & Tunnell
18th Floor
1201 N Market Street
Wilmington, DE 19899
Counsel for Amicus Curiae Appellant Six Law
Professors
Erin E. Murphy [ARGUED]
Clement & Murphy
706 Duke Street
Alexandria, VA 22314
Amanda L. Rauer
David E. Romine
Larry D. Silver
Langsman Stevens Silver & Hollaender
1818 Market Street
Suite 2430
Philadelphia, PA 19103
Russell C. Silberglied
Richards Layton & Finger
One Rodney Square
920 N King Street
Wilmington, DE 19801
Counsel for Appellee Occidental Chemical
Corporation

-- 3 of 40 --

4
_____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_____________
CHAGARES, Chief Judge.
This case arises out of the decades-long bankruptcy
proceedings of debtor Congoleum Corporation (“Congoleum”
or “Debtor”). One of Congoleum’s creditors, Occidental
Chemical Corporation (“Occidental”), filed a lawsuit against
appellant Bath Iron Works Corporation (“BIW”), Congoleum’s
former corporate sibling, over certain environmental claims
stemming from the operation of a manufacturing facility in
Kearny, New Jersey. In response, BIW moved to reopen
Congoleum’s bankruptcy case and for a declaration that,
according to the order confirming Congoleum’s plan of
reorganization, BIW was not liable for the environmental
claims. The Bankruptcy Court reopened the case and held that
BIW was not liable for those claims. On appeal, the District
Court reversed. BIW then appealed the District Court’s
reversal.
We conclude that the Bankruptcy Court did not err in
reopening Congoleum’s bankruptcy case or by holding that
Occidental could not recover against BIW for the
environmental claims. We will therefore reverse the judgment
of the District Court.
I.
Congoleum’s various predecessors have operated a
flooring business, the Congoleum Flooring Business, in

-- 4 of 40 --

5
Kearny, New Jersey, since 1886. The Congoleum Flooring
Business manufactured products that contained asbestos, and
by 2003, nearly one hundred thousand asbestos-related
personal injury claims had forced Congoleum into bankruptcy.
Congoleum first filed a bankruptcy petition in 2003.
Occidental did not file a proof of claim, but its indemnitor filed
a claim and entered a notice of appearance on Occidental’s
behalf. As part of the 2003 bankruptcy proceedings,
Congoleum and one of its insurers, Century Indemnity
Company (“Century”), reached a settlement (“Century
Settlement”) through which Century agreed to buy back its
insurance policies from Congoleum in exchange for an
injunction barring any future claims under those policies.
Proceeds from this and similar settlements were used to help
Congoleum emerge from bankruptcy.
Before approving the Century Settlement, the
Bankruptcy Court examined whether additional insureds,
including BIW, held claims under the Century policy. One of
Congoleum’s corporate predecessors had briefly owned BIW,
which has operated a shipbuilding facility in Maine since 1884,
before selling BIW and the Congoleum Flooring Business to
different third parties in 1986 as part of an extensive
restructuring. As part of the proceedings on the Century
Settlement, Congoleum submitted a declaration from its chief
financial officer stating that the Debtor was the sole successor
in interest to the Congoleum Flooring Business and BIW was
not responsible for the liabilities of the Congoleum Flooring
Business. The Bankruptcy Court approved the Century
Settlement after the motion to approve the settlement and
accompanying documents were served on certain creditors.

-- 5 of 40 --

6
The District Court eventually withdrew the reference to
the Bankruptcy Court. The District Court confirmed
Congoleum’s plan of reorganization (“Plan”) in an order
entered in 2010 (“Confirmation Order”). The Plan provided:
“Nothing in the Confirmation Order or Plan shall be construed
as releasing or relieving any Entity of any liability under any
Environmental Law.” Appendix (“App.”) 284. The
Confirmation Order included findings “[i]n support of the
Century Settlement and the Century Approval Order,”
including the BIW Finding, which provided, as relevant: “In
support of the Century Settlement and the Century Approval
Order, the Court finds that the following Century Additional
Named Insureds have no responsibility for any of the liabilities
of the Congoleum Flooring Business (as defined in the Century
Settlement): . . . Bath Iron Works Corp.” App. 200.
In advance of the confirmation hearing, Occidental was
served with various documents, including the Plan, the
proposed Confirmation Order, notice of the confirmation
hearing, and a disclosure statement indicating that the Century
Settlement resolved “both asbestos and non-asbestos claims.”
App. 1161. Occidental did not appear at the confirmation
hearing. After the Plan became effective in 2010, the District
Court again referred the case to the Bankruptcy Court, which
subsequently closed the case.
Seven years later, Congoleum apparently reversed its
stance on BIW’s responsibility for the liabilities of the
Congoleum Flooring Business. While defending against
claims related to environmental contamination at the Kearny
facility, Congoleum impleaded BIW and asserted that BIW,
not Congoleum, was responsible for the environmental
contamination. See DVL, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp., No. 17-

-- 6 of 40 --

7
4261, 2018 WL 4027031, at *2 (D.N.J. Aug. 23, 2018).
Occidental filed a similar lawsuit against BIW seeking
contribution for the cost of remediating environmental damage
resulting from the operations of the Congoleum Flooring
Business.
Congoleum filed for bankruptcy a second time in 2020,
and a new bankruptcy judge presided over the second
bankruptcy case. BIW filed an adversary proceeding against
Congoleum in the second bankruptcy case and sought a
declaration that Congoleum was bound by the BIW Finding
and thus barred from claiming that BIW inherited the
Congoleum Flooring Business’s liabilities, including its
environmental liabilities. The Bankruptcy Court granted
BIW’s motion for summary judgment and held that, under the
BIW Finding, BIW was not responsible for the liabilities of the
Congoleum Flooring Business. The Bankruptcy Court also
held that the BIW Finding had been “actually litigated” and
was necessary to both the Century Settlement and the
Confirmation Order. App. 1627. Based on the Bankruptcy
Court’s ruling, Congoleum agreed in June 2021 to dismiss its
claim in the DVL litigation that BIW was responsible for any
environmental liabilities arising out of the operation of the
Kearny facility.
Shortly thereafter, BIW asked Occidental to dismiss its
civil complaint against BIW in light of the Bankruptcy Court’s
summary judgment order, but Occidental refused. Instead,
Occidental filed for summary judgment in August 2021; BIW
responded that same month by moving to reopen the 2003
bankruptcy case and for an order holding that, according to the
BIW Finding, BIW was not responsible for the Congoleum
Flooring Business’s liabilities. The 2003 bankruptcy case was

-- 7 of 40 --

8
subsequently transferred to the same bankruptcy judge who
had presided over the 2020 bankruptcy case. Occidental’s
summary judgment motion was stayed pending resolution of
the bankruptcy proceedings.
After the parties were given an opportunity to submit
evidence in support of their arguments, the Bankruptcy Court
granted the motion to reopen the 2003 bankruptcy case and
held that the BIW Finding bound Occidental. The Bankruptcy
Court first determined that it could properly reopen the case
because it, not the District Court, was best positioned to
interpret the BIW Finding. Second, the Bankruptcy Court
rejected Occidental’s argument that BIW had waited too long
to file its motion because it filed promptly after Occidental
made clear that it would not agree to dismiss its complaint.
Third, it held that the BIW Finding was not an improper third-
party release that violated the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (“CERCLA”), 42
U.S.C. § 9601 et seq., but rather a determination regarding
BIW’s liability that was necessary to the Century Settlement.
The Bankruptcy Court also held that the Confirmation Order
had res judicata effect and bound Occidental, which had
received notice of and “was a party to the confirmation
proceedings.” App. 60. The Bankruptcy Court further found
that it was “more likely than not that Occidental received
adequate notice” of the motion to approve the Century
Settlement. App. 46.
On appeal, the District Court reversed. The District
Court held that it, not the Bankruptcy Court, was best suited to
interpret the Confirmation Order because the Confirmation
Order had been issued by a district court judge, and the District
Court was already presiding over a separate dispute among

-- 8 of 40 --

9
Occidental, BIW, and Congoleum regarding environmental
contamination at the Kearny facility. It also concluded that the
Bankruptcy Court lacked jurisdiction because the motion did
not affect the Debtor’s estate. The District Court further held
that the Bankruptcy Court erred in finding that there was good
cause to reopen the bankruptcy case because the Debtor’s
estate would not be affected, the issues raised in BIW’s motion
were pending in Occidental’s lawsuit against BIW, and the
motion was filed more than a decade after the case was closed.
The District Court additionally determined that the BIW
Finding was a third-party release that violated CERCLA. It
also held that the Bankruptcy Court erred as both a matter of
law and fact in determining that the Confirmation Order had
res judicata effect and bound Occidental because, inter alia,
Occidental had not received adequate notice.
BIW timely appealed, and we affirmed the District
Court’s judgment. After BIW petitioned for rehearing, we
granted the petition for panel rehearing and vacated our prior
opinion affirming the District Court.
II.
The Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over the motion
to reopen under 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) because the motion for an
order interpreting and enforcing the Confirmation Order was a
core bankruptcy proceeding. See In re Essar Steel Minn., LLC,
47 F.4th 193, 199 (3d Cir. 2022) (holding that a post-
confirmation request from a third party to interpret and enforce
confirmation order was a core proceeding). The District Court
had jurisdiction over Occidental’s appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 158(a)(1), and we have jurisdiction over BIW’s appeal under
28 U.S.C. §§ 158(d)(1) and 1291.

-- 9 of 40 --

10
We apply the same standard of review as the District
Court in reviewing the Bankruptcy Court’s decision. In re
Global Indus. Techs., Inc., 645 F.3d 201, 209 (3d Cir. 2011)
(en banc). We review the Bankruptcy Court’s factual findings
for clear error, its legal conclusions de novo, and its decision
to reopen bankruptcy proceedings for abuse of discretion. See
id.; In re Lazy Days’ RV Ctr. Inc., 724 F.3d 418, 421 (3d Cir.
2013).
III.
We hold that the Bankruptcy Court properly exercised
its jurisdiction and did not abuse its discretion in granting
BIW’s motion to reopen the case and interpret the
Confirmation Order. The Bankruptcy Court had subject matter
jurisdiction because the resolution of the dispute regarding the
BIW Finding’s effect was a core proceeding, and the District
Court had not withdrawn the 2010 order of reference to the
Bankruptcy Court. The Bankruptcy Court did not err in
granting the motion because resolution of the instant dispute
required a detailed analysis of that order, and BIW’s motion
was timely filed.
A.
We review the Bankruptcy Court’s determination that it
had subject matter jurisdiction de novo. See In re Zinchiak,
406 F.3d 214, 221–22 (3d Cir. 2005). The Bankruptcy Court
correctly determined that it had jurisdiction to interpret the
BIW Finding. We have repeatedly held that bankruptcy courts
have jurisdiction to interpret their own orders. See, e.g., Lazy
Days’, 724 F.3d at 423 (citing Zinchiak, 406 F.3d at 224); see
also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557 U.S. 137, 151 (2009)

-- 10 of 40 --

11
(noting that a bankruptcy court “plainly ha[s] jurisdiction to
interpret and enforce its own prior orders”).
“[T]he scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction diminishes with
plan confirmation” but “does not disappear entirely.” In re
Resorts Int’l, Inc., 372 F.3d 154, 165 (3d Cir. 2004). When a
district court refers a matter to bankruptcy court, the
bankruptcy court can exercise jurisdiction over proceedings
that are either “core proceedings,” id. at 163, or non-core
proceedings “related to bankruptcy,” id. at 164. After a
reorganization plan has been confirmed, bankruptcy courts
have “related to” jurisdiction only if the claim “affect[s] an
integral aspect of the bankruptcy process” such that “there is a
close nexus to the bankruptcy plan or proceeding.” Id. at 167.
No such requirement exists for core proceedings. See Essar
Steel, 47 F.4th at 198.
The Bankruptcy Code enumerates a non-exhaustive list
of core proceedings, one of which is the “confirmation of
plans.” 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(L). In Essar Steel, we held that
a “contempt proceeding [that] arose out of [a] previously
entered plan and confirmation order . . . was also a core
proceeding over which the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction.”
47 F.4th at 200; see also In re Allegheny Health, Educ. & Rsch.
Found., 383 F.3d 169, 174–76 (3d Cir. 2004) (holding that an
adversary proceeding in which the bankruptcy court was
required to interpret and enforce its own sale orders was a core
proceeding).
BIW sought both declaratory relief and enforcement of
the BIW Finding in the form of an injunction against

-- 11 of 40 --

12
Occidental.1 The motion to reopen the bankruptcy case and
interpret the BIW Finding was thus a core proceeding because
BIW asked the Bankruptcy Court to “interpret and enforce” the
Confirmation Order. Essar Steel, 47 F.4th at 199. Although
Occidental argues that a bankruptcy court only has jurisdiction
to interpret and enforce a prior order if that order is coercive,
we have never embraced such a requirement.
Occidental argues that our many cases holding that a
bankruptcy court may reopen proceedings to interpret and
enforce its own order are inapposite.2 It distinguishes those
cases because the bankruptcy court, not the district court, had
entered the order that the bankruptcy court was subsequently
asked to enforce. But this distinction is of no significance
because the District Court in this case entered the Confirmation
1 The Bankruptcy Court denied BIW’s request for
injunctive relief because it determined that injunctive relief
was only available in an adversary proceeding under what is
now Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(g).
2 The dissent further argues that Lazy Days’ and Zinchiak
are inapposite because in those cases, reopening was proper to
protect the federal interest in bankruptcy uniformity as the
alternative forum was state court, whereas in the instant case,
both available fora were federal courts. Our opinions in Lazy
Days’ and Zinchiak did not limit their holdings to disputes
where the only alternative forum is state court, however. See,
e.g., Lazy Days’, 724 F.3d at 423; Zinchiak, 406 F.3d at 223–
25. Rather, we emphasized that the bankruptcy courts were
“well suited to provide the best interpretation[s]” of the orders
at issue. Zinchiak, 406 F.3d at 224 (cleaned up); see also Lazy
Days’, 724 F.3d at 423.

-- 12 of 40 --

13
Order while sitting in bankruptcy. Additionally, after the case
was referred again to the Bankruptcy Court, it was the
Bankruptcy Court, not the District Court, that was tasked with
adjudicating the case. The motion to reopen was plainly a core
bankruptcy proceeding, which included disputes concerning
the meaning of the Confirmation Order.
Occidental also argues that a bankruptcy court should
only reopen a case to interpret a prior order if the bankruptcy
judge presiding over the reopening proceedings is the same
judge who issued the prior order. According to Occidental, the
presiding bankruptcy judge could not reopen the bankruptcy
case to interpret the BIW Finding because he had not been
assigned to the case until after the Confirmation Order was
entered. We disagree. The identity of the judge cannot be a
jurisdictional prerequisite because the administrative needs of
courts frequently require reassignment of cases. Cf. United
States v. Colon-Munoz, 292 F.3d 18, 22 (1st Cir. 2002)
(“Reassignment of civil and criminal cases within a district
court occurs regularly, for numerous reasons related to
administrative convenience or necessity, and a litigant has no
vested right to a particular judge.”). Furthermore, the District
Court had referred the case to the Bankruptcy Court, not a
specific bankruptcy judge.
Because BIW’s motion was a core proceeding and was
filed after the District Court had reinstated the reference to the
Bankruptcy Court, the Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction over
the motion.

-- 13 of 40 --

14
B.
Having determined that the Bankruptcy Court had
jurisdiction to decide the motion, we consider whether the
Bankruptcy Court erred in granting the motion to reopen the
case. We hold that it did not. Bankruptcy courts may reopen
cases “to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for
other cause.” 11 U.S.C. § 350(b). Because “bankruptcy courts
have broad discretion to reopen cases after an estate has been
administered,” we review a bankruptcy court’s decision to
reopen proceedings for abuse of discretion. Zinchiak, 406 F.3d
at 223 (collecting cases); see also id. at 222. Under an abuse
of discretion standard, we will affirm “unless there is a definite
and firm conviction that the court below committed a clear
error of judgment.” Sec’y U.S. Dep’t of Lab. v. Nursing Home
Care Mgmt. Inc., 128 F.4th 146, 161 (3d Cir. 2025) (quoting
Pineda v. Ford Motor Co., 520 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 2008)).
We have not articulated a comprehensive test to guide
the fact-specific inquiry of whether cause exists to reopen
bankruptcy proceedings, but we have identified several
relevant factors, including whether the motion raises issues
determined in a bankruptcy court’s prior order, whether
reopening would generate additional assets for the debtor’s
estate, and whether non-bankruptcy courts are available and
better-suited to adjudicate the dispute. See Zinchiak, 406 F.3d
at 225; see also Lazy Days’, 724 F.3d at 423. Our sister Courts
of Appeals have also considered “the length of time that the
case has been closed.” Redmond v. Fifth Third Bank, 624 F.3d
793, 798 (7th Cir. 2010); see also, e.g., In re Case, 937 F.2d
1014, 1018 (5th Cir. 1991); Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351,
355 (4th Cir. 1962).

-- 14 of 40 --

15
The Bankruptcy Court correctly determined that it, not
the District Court, was best suited to preside over BIW’s
motion, which required “careful analysis of the history of this
bankruptcy case.” App. 27. The instant dispute depends
substantially on the correct interpretation of the BIW Finding,
which the Bankruptcy Court was well-positioned to interpret.
See Lazy Days’, 724 F.3d at 423. The Bankruptcy Court had
presided over a substantially similar dispute in Congoleum’s
second bankruptcy case, and the District Court had no
particular familiarity with the issues raised in BIW’s motion.
Although Occidental’s suit against BIW raised similar issues
before the District Court, the motion for summary judgment in
that case had been stayed pending resolution of the bankruptcy
proceedings.3
The Bankruptcy Court properly rejected Occidental’s
argument that there was no cause to reopen the bankruptcy case
because the relief sought by BIW did not affect Congoleum’s
estate or the administration of its assets. As we explained in
Lazy Days’, cause to reopen a bankruptcy case can exist where,
as here, the bankruptcy court is asked to interpret and enforce
a provision in a confirmation order regarding a “[s]ettlement
3 Because a district court always retains the ability to
withdraw a reference to a bankruptcy court, we respectfully
disagree with our dissenting colleague that our holding permits
bankruptcy courts to usurp the Article III authority of district
courts. See 28 U.S.C. § 157(d) (allowing a district court to
withdraw on its motion a reference “for cause shown”); In re
Pruitt, 910 F.2d 1160, 1168 (3d Cir. 1990) (listing factors to
consider in determining whether cause exists, including
whether the withdrawal discourages forum shopping and
expedites bankruptcy proceedings).

-- 15 of 40 --

16
[a]greement that it had previously confirmed.” Lazy Days’,
724 F.3d at 423. While impact on the bankruptcy estate or the
administration of the debtor’s assets are factors that can
counsel in favor of granting a motion to reopen, they are not
prerequisites under § 350(b). To hold otherwise would render
§ 350(b)’s “for other cause” provision redundant with the other
provisions of that section that permit reopening “to administer
assets” or “to accord relief to the debtor.” 4 See also Bufkin v.
Collins, 145 S. Ct. 728, 741 (2025) (noting that courts strive to
avoid readings of statutes that render any provision
surplusage).
Finally, the Bankruptcy Court correctly determined that
BIW did not unduly delay the filing of its motion to reopen
proceedings. In assessing the timeliness of a party’s motion to
reopen, courts consider the lack of “diligence of the party
seeking to reopen and the prejudice to the nonmoving party
caused by [any] delay.” Redmond, 624 F.3d at 799. We
4 The dissent draws on the statutory history of § 350(b) to
conclude that BIW failed to demonstrate that “other cause”
existed to reopen the case under § 350(b). Although the
Supreme Court has instructed that “pre-code practice may
sometimes inform our interpretation of the [Bankruptcy
Code’s] more ‘ambiguous’ provisions,” Harrington v. Purdue
Pharma L. P., 603 U.S. 204, 223 (2024) (quoting RadLAX
Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank, 566 U.S. 639, 649
(2012)), we do not consider § 350(b) to be ambiguous. After
considering all of the relevant factors, we determine that our
precedent, including Zinchiak and Lazy Days’, justifies us
holding that cause existed, particularly because the Bankruptcy
Court was asked to interpret and enforce an order with which
it was familiar and well-equipped to interpret.

-- 16 of 40 --

17
evaluate the timeliness of the motion to reopen from the time
that it became apparent that Occidental “actually decided not
to honor” the BIW Finding by rejecting BIW’s request to
dismiss its lawsuit. Lazy Days’, 724 F.3d at 425. By July
2021, Occidental had communicated its intent to continue to
litigate its claim against BIW despite an order from the
Bankruptcy Court resolving a substantially similar question,
and BIW acted diligently in moving to reopen the first
bankruptcy case approximately one month later. Such a minor
delay did not prejudice Occidental.
At bottom, we cannot say that the Bankruptcy Court’s
well-reasoned decision to reopen bankruptcy proceedings was
a “clear error of judgment.” Nursing Home Care Mgmt., 128
F.4th at 161 (quoting Pineda, 520 F.3d at 243). We therefore
discern no abuse of discretion.
IV.
The Bankruptcy Court correctly determined that
Occidental was bound by the Confirmation Order because it
was a creditor who received adequate notice of the
Confirmation Order and the Century Settlement. While we
have sometimes reviewed the adequacy of notice in bankruptcy
proceedings for clear error, our sister Courts of Appeals have
varyingly applied both clear error and de novo review in
assessing the adequacy of notice in bankruptcy and other
contexts. See Chemetron Corp. v. Jones, 72 F.3d 341, 347 (3d
Cir. 1995) (applying clear error review); In re Smith, 582 F.3d
767, 778–79 (7th Cir. 2009) (discussing standard of review as
to adequacy of notice of bankruptcy petition) (collecting
cases). We need not decide whether clear error or de novo

-- 17 of 40 --

18
review applies here, however, because we would reverse the
District Court under either standard.
A.
The Bankruptcy Court did not err in determining that
Occidental received actual notice of the Century Settlement
and the motion to approve the Century Settlement.5 Occidental
disputes this determination and claims that it did not receive
adequate notice. It relies on an affidavit from its document
custodian, who stated that the papers from the motion to
approve the Century Settlement are not contained in the nine
boxes of papers that Occidental retained from Congoleum’s
first bankruptcy case. But the custodian’s affidavit included
no explanation of Occidental’s document retention policies or
any statement tending to support an inference that all of the
documents from the first Congoleum bankruptcy that were
served on Occidental were contained in those nine boxes.
Occidental also points to the fact that the certification of
service accompanying the motion to approve the Century
5 The Bankruptcy Court found “that it is more likely than
not that Occidental received adequate notice,” although it
noted that the mixed evidence in the record did not support a
“conclusive finding.” App. 46. Occidental did not argue that
a standard of evidence other than the usual preponderance of
the evidence standard applied, nor did it assert that a
“conclusive” finding was required either in its appeal to the
District Court or in the instant appeal. Because there is no
dispute over the applicable standard of evidence, we assume
without deciding that a preponderance of the evidence standard
applies.

-- 18 of 40 --

19
Settlement stated that the notice of hearing, motion, and
settlement agreement attached to the motion were served only
on the e-mail service list, which did not include Occidental.
That statement is contradicted by the Debtor’s application for
approval of the Century Settlement, which indicated that notice
had been provided to the master service list and core service
list, both of which included Occidental. Furthermore,
Century’s counsel represented at the hearing on the Century
Settlement that it had given “notice to every entity” and that
the notice was “published in the Unite[d] States, in Europe,
[and] in Asia” and “mailed to the Secretaries of State” in the
states where several entities were incorporated, clearly
indicating that service was made beyond mere e-mail. App.
1040–41. Century additionally verified that it published the
notice of hearing in USA Today. Occidental also does not
dispute that the motion papers were served on Andrews Kurth,
LLP, which appeared on behalf of Occidental’s indemnitor and
had been retained by Occidental “for certain purposes.” App.
48.
Taken as a whole, the record establishes by a
preponderance of the evidence that Occidental was served with
the motion for approval of the Century Settlement and the
Century Settlement.
B.
Occidental also had adequate notice of the Confirmation
Order and BIW Finding. Occidental concedes that, as
Congoleum’s creditor, it received notice of the Plan, the

-- 19 of 40 --

20
proposed Confirmation Order, and the confirmation hearing.6
It also received a copy of a disclosure statement indicating that
the Century Settlement may affect creditors’ rights. The
Supreme Court has made clear that a creditor’s due process
right to adequate notice is “more than satisfied” when the
creditor “received actual notice of the filing and contents of
[the debtor’s] plan.” United Student Aid Funds, Inc. v.
Espinosa, 559 U.S. 260, 272 (2010).7
Occidental contends that receipt of all of these
documents was insufficient because the BIW Finding was not
“conspicuous[.]” Occidental Br. 48. But due process requires
6 Although Occidental now contends that it was never
served with the proposed Confirmation Order, it conceded
before the Bankruptcy Court that “Occidental received notice
of the Confirmation Hearing and the proposed 2010
Confirmation Order.” App. 1859.
7 Occidental cites an out-of-circuit case, In re Bozeman,
57 F.4th 895 (11th Cir. 2023), in an attempt to distinguish
Espinosa as limited to motions for post-judgment relief
brought under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(4). We
are not persuaded. Although the Supreme Court in Espinosa
“express[ed] no view” on whether the petitioner was entitled
to relief under “other provisions of the Bankruptcy Rules,” 599
U.S. at 269 n.8, it explained that, on constitutional grounds,
actual notice satisfies a creditor’s due process right to notice,
id. at 272. See also In re Le Centre on Fourth, LLC, 17 F.4th
1326, 1335–36 (11th Cir. 2021) (applying Espinosa’s due
process holding outside of the Rule 60(b)(4) context);
Bozeman, 57 F.4th at 912 n.14 (discussing Espinosa and Le
Centre).

-- 20 of 40 --

21
only “notice reasonably calculated, under all the
circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their
objections.” Folger Adam Sec., Inc. v. DeMatteis/MacGregor
JV, 209 F.3d 252, 265 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Mullane v. Cent.
Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314–15 (1950)). It
does not require that a debtor go out of its way to identify all
items of particular interest to each creditor, especially when the
creditor is a sophisticated entity like Occidental.
The Plan and related documents provided to Occidental,
especially the copy of the proposed Confirmation Order, were
sufficient to notify it that its interests might be implicated by
the Confirmation Order. A review of the draft Confirmation
Order, which included the BIW Finding, would have alerted
Occidental to the fact that the Century Settlement included a
determination of BIW’s liability. Furthermore, the disclosure
statement explained that the Century Settlement “resolves
coverage obligations under certain policies of insurance under
which Congoleum is an insured with respect to both asbestos
and non-asbestos claims” and directed creditors to review the
papers accompanying the motion to approve the Century
Settlement that were on file with the Bankruptcy Court for
more information. App. 1161.
Occidental argues that these documents could not
provide adequate notice because the Plan’s statement that
nothing in the Plan or Confirmation Order “releas[ed] or
reliev[ed] any Entity of any liability under any Environmental
Law” was misleading. Occidental Br. 21 (quoting Plan § 11.9).
That statement is not misleading — as discussed infra Part V,
the BIW Finding was not a release of existing liability, but a

-- 21 of 40 --

22
determination that BIW was never responsible for the
Congoleum Flooring Business’s liabilities.
Occidental also received notice of the confirmation
hearing. Had Occidental attended, it would have heard
discussion of insurance settlements regarding policies covering
environmental claims, and Occidental could have objected to
the entry of the BIW Finding. See Davis v. Hutchins, 321 F.3d
641, 646 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding that there was no due process
violation where an appellant “simply did not attend” the
hearing about which it was notified).
In sum, Occidental’s due process rights were “more
than satisfied,” Espinosa, 559 U.S. at 272, because it was
provided notice of the Century Settlement and motion to
approve that settlement; the proposed Confirmation Order,
which contained the BIW Finding; a disclosure statement that
identified the Century Settlement; and notice of the
confirmation hearing, at which the insurance settlements were
discussed.
V.
The Bankruptcy Court correctly interpreted the
Confirmation Order as barring Occidental’s claims against
BIW. We review de novo the bankruptcy court’s “application
of legal principles to an unambiguous provision” and review
its “interpretation of an ambiguous provision . . . for abuse of
discretion.” In re LTC Holdings, Inc., 10 F.4th 177, 184 (3d
Cir. 2021); see also In re Shenango Grp. Inc., 501 F.3d 338,
346 (3d Cir. 2007).

-- 22 of 40 --

23
A.
The BIW Finding clearly provides that various
additional insureds, including BIW, “have no responsibility for
any of the liabilities of the Congoleum Flooring Business.”
App. 200. Occidental argues that the BIW Finding does not
apply to the Congoleum Flooring Business’s environmental
liabilities, but that reading is contradicted by the BIW
Finding’s plain text.
Occidental attempts to construe the BIW Finding as a
statement regarding BIW’s responsibility for only the Debtor’s
liability, but the BIW Finding contains no such limitation.
Rather, it refers broadly to “any of” the Congoleum Flooring
Business’s liabilities. Id.
Occidental next argues that the BIW Finding could not
have encompassed the Congoleum Flooring Business’s
environmental liabilities because section 11.9 of the Plan
provides that “[n]othing in the Confirmation Order of Plan
shall be construed as releasing or relieving any Entity of any
liability under any Environmental Law.” App. 284. As
discussed infra Part V.B, this statement is consistent with the
determination in the BIW Finding that BIW was never
responsible for the Congoleum Flooring Business’s
environmental liabilities. But even if there were a conflict, the
Confirmation Order provides that, in the event of “any direct
conflict between the terms of the Plan . . . and the terms of this
Confirmation Order, the terms of the Confirmation Order shall
control.” App. 212. Accordingly, we decline to read the Plan
as a limitation on the BIW Finding in the Confirmation Order.
Finally, Occidental claims that BIW is responsible for the
liabilities of the Congoleum Flooring Business because the

-- 23 of 40 --

24
Century Settlement concerned only those liabilities of the
Congoleum Flooring Business liabilities inherited by the
Debtor, not BIW. But Occidental never raised this argument
before the Bankruptcy Court, and we decline to consider this
forfeited argument now.8 See Barna v. Bd. of Sch. Dirs. of
Panther Valley Sch. Dist., 877 F.3d 136, 147 (3d Cir. 2017)
(noting that a party forfeits an argument by failing to raise it in
the initial proceedings).
B.
The Bankruptcy Court also correctly rejected
Occidental’s argument that interpreting the BIW Finding to
apply to Occidental’s environmental claims against BIW
renders the BIW Finding a third-party release in violation of
CERCLA. The BIW Finding is not a third-party release but
rather a determination that BIW was never responsible for the
Congoleum Flooring Business’s liabilities.
Occidental argues that the BIW Finding does not refer
to BIW’s liability prior to the entry of the Century Settlement
because the BIW Finding uses the present tense and does not
say, for example, that BIW “never had” responsibility for the
Congoleum Flooring Business’s liabilities. Occidental Br. 51.
8 Although Occidental argues it did not forfeit this
argument because BIW’s motion to reopen never asserted that
the Debtor was solely responsible for the entirety of
Congoleum Flooring Business’s liabilities, BIW repeatedly
argued before the Bankruptcy Court that (1) the Debtor, not
BIW, inherited all of the liabilities of the flooring business
operated in Kearny and (2) that fact was memorialized in the
Century Settlement and BIW Finding.

-- 24 of 40 --

25
Reading the BIW Finding in the context of the broader
Confirmation Order and Plan, however, it is clear that the BIW
Finding was a determination that BIW had no liability, not a
release of existing liability. Where the Plan effectuated a
release of existing liability, it did so expressly. The BIW
Finding never uses the word “release” or otherwise indicates
that it is a release of existing liability.9 The Plan also explicitly
provides that “[n]o third party releases are being granted
pursuant to the Plan nor are the Plan Proponents seeking
approval of any such third-party releases, except as set forth
specifically in the Plan.” App. 283.
We must enforce the Confirmation Order’s plain,
unambiguous meaning: BIW inherited none of the Congoleum
Flooring Business’s liabilities. See Travelers Indem., 557 U.S.
at 150 (noting that “a court should enforce a court order . . .
according to its unambiguous terms”).
VI.
The doctrine of res judicata precludes Occidental’s
collateral attacks on the BIW Finding. Occidental argues that
the BIW Finding could not have encompassed its
environmental claims against BIW because the Bankruptcy
Court would have lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter
such a finding or approve the Century Settlement. We
9 Because the BIW Finding unambiguously provides that
BIW holds no responsibility for the liabilities of the
Congoleum Flooring Business, we need not address
Occidental’s factual arguments against that interpretation,
including that the BIW Finding was not intended to provide
adequate protection to BIW and was unnecessary to the Plan.

-- 25 of 40 --

26
disagree. In addition, Occidental failed to raise these issues
during the 2003 bankruptcy proceedings, and it may not do so
now.
A.
Res judicata bars a party from relitigating a claim if the
following requirements are met: “(1) a final judgment on the
merits in a prior suit involving (2) the same parties or their
privies and (3) a subsequent suit based on the same cause of
action.” Davis v. Wells Fargo, 824 F.3d 333, 341 (3d Cir.
2016) (quoting Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960,
963 (3d Cir. 1991)); see also In re Aquilino, 135 F.4th 119, 132
n.11 (3d Cir. 2025) (noting that “the normal rules of res
judicata . . . apply to the decisions of bankruptcy courts”
(cleaned up)). Accordingly, no party may “relitigat[e] issues
that were or could have been raised in” an action resulting in
“a final judgment on the merits of the action.” Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). “Our review of an
application of res judicata is plenary.” Elkadrawy v. Vanguard
Grp., Inc., 584 F.3d 169, 172 (3d Cir. 2009).
As relevant to this appeal,10 the Bankruptcy Court held
the doctrine of res judicata barred Occidental from relitigating
the issue of BIW’s responsibility for the Congoleum Flooring
10 The Bankruptcy Court also held that Occidental was
collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of BIW’s
liability, and the District Court reversed. Because we hold that
the related doctrine of res judicata bars Occidental from
relitigating the issue of BIW’s liability, we need not decide
whether Occidental was also collaterally estopped from doing
so.

-- 26 of 40 --

27
Business’s environmental liabilities because, inter alia,
Occidental “was a party to the confirmation proceedings,” and
thus “both the confirmation proceedings and the Occidental
Lawsuit involve[d] the same parties.” App. 60. The District
Court reversed because Occidental “did not have a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the issue of BIW’s liability in the First
Congoleum Bankruptcy” and because the record was “not
sufficiently clear” to establish that the BIW Finding was “a
final judgment on the merits involving the same parties as in
the Occidental Lawsuit” or that the BIW Finding concerned the
same cause of action underlying Occidental’s claim against
BIW.11 App. 12.
11 Occidental argues that BIW waived any argument that
the doctrine of res judicata applies because “BIW fails to
address” the District Court’s holding that the BIW Finding did
not bind Occidental as it did not receive adequate notice and
the issue of BIW’s liability was not actually litigated.
Arguments regarding issue preservation based on an
inadvertent omission are properly analyzed under the doctrine
of forfeiture rather than waiver, which concerns the intentional
abandonment of a known right. See Barna, 877 F.3d at 148
(defining waiver and forfeiture). BIW’s opening brief,
however, asserts that the BIW Finding binds Occidental under
18 U.S.C. § 1141, which codifies the finality principle of res
judicata in the bankruptcy context. See In re LaHaye, 17 F.4th
513, 519 n.3 (5th Cir. 2021) (summarizing relationship
between res judicata and § 1141). BIW further argues that the
District Court erred in determining that the BIW Finding was
not a final order binding on Occidental because it wrongly
concluded that (1) Occidental received inadequate notice of the
BIW Finding, (2) Occidental was not party to the bankruptcy
case, and (3) the bankruptcy case did not finally determine the

-- 27 of 40 --

28
Occidental was a party to the bankruptcy proceedings
and had an opportunity to litigate the BIW Finding, which was
a final judgment. A plan of reorganization and the
accompanying confirmation order are final orders binding on
all creditors. See In re Smith, 102 F.4th 643, 651 (3d Cir.
2024); see also 11 U.S.C. § 1141(a) (noting that “the provisions
of a confirmed plan bind . . . any creditor”).12 We have
explained that the application of res judicata to confirmation
orders occupies a position of “high importance in the
same issues raised in Occidental’s lawsuit against BIW. We
are satisfied that BIW’s res judicata argument was preserved
and not forfeited, but even if it were forfeited, we would still
consider the argument because it concerns a question of law
that was fully litigated, and no party would be “unfairly
surprised by judicial consideration of the issue.” Barna, 877
F.3d at 148.
12 For these same reasons, we reject Occidental’s
arguments that the Plan does not bind it under 11 U.S.C.
§ 1141. Occidental argues that the “logic” of § 1141 does not
apply because Occidental made no filings in the bankruptcy
case and did not receive a ballot to vote on the Plan, but nothing
in the text of § 1141 limits its application to voting creditors.
Occidental Br. 46. Rather, § 1141(a) broadly provides that a
confirmation plan binds “any creditor.” See also Harrington,
603 U.S. at 214 (“Once the bankruptcy court issues an order
confirming the plan, that document binds the debtor and its
creditors going forward—even those who did not assent to the
plan.”). Because we determine that the Confirmation Order
binds Occidental under the doctrine of res judicata, we need
not address Occidental’s argument that is not bound by the
Confirmation Order under § 1141.

-- 28 of 40 --

29
bankruptcy context” because all parties must be able to rely on
a confirmation order without worry that the order is subject to
change following post-confirmation challenges by dissatisfied
creditors. Smith, 102 F.4th at 651 n.14; see also id. at 651.
Occidental does not deny that it was a creditor but
contends that it was not a party to the proceedings because it
“litigated nothing at all in these Chapter 11 Cases.”13
Occidental Br. 43. As discussed supra Part IV.B, Occidental
had notice of the proceedings on both the Century Settlement
and Confirmation Order. Occidental’s lack of participation is
irrelevant; “a confirmation order is res judicata as to all issues
decided or which could have been decided at the hearing on
confirmation.” In re Szostek, 886 F.2d 1405, 1408 (3d Cir.
1989); see also In re Arctic Glacier Int’l, Inc., 901 F.3d 162,
166 (3d Cir. 2018) (noting that a confirmation order “is res
judicata” and “bars all challenges to the plan that could have
been raised”) (collecting cases). Allowing a creditor like
Occidental to levy challenges to the Confirmation Order years
after it was entered would erode the finality of bankruptcy
orders, on which “debtors, creditors, and third parties are
entitled to rely,” and would lead to uncertainty both after
confirmation and during the process of negotiating settlements
during bankruptcy proceedings. In re Thorpe Insulation Co.,
677 F.3d 869, 880 (9th Cir. 2012).
The bankruptcy proceedings that resulted in the BIW
Finding resolved the same issues raised in Occidental’s lawsuit
13 Occidental has abandoned its previous argument that it
was not a creditor. See Kost v. Kozakiewicz, 1 F.3d 176, 182
(3d Cir. 1993) (noting that a party abandons a claim by failing
to pursue it on appeal).

-- 29 of 40 --

30
against BIW. While courts consider the “unique
circumstances” of bankruptcy and the fact that “any number of
adversary proceedings, contested matters, and claims” may be
litigated in bankruptcy, E. Mins. & Chems. Co. v. Mahan, 225
F.3d 330, 337 (3d Cir. 2000), a claim is nevertheless barred
when it has an “essential similarity” to a claim brought in
bankruptcy, id. at 338 n.14. In evaluating the similarity of a
claim, we consider whether “the factual underpinnings, theory
of the case, and relief sought . . . are so close to a claim actually
litigated that it would be unreasonable not to have brought
them both at the same time in the bankruptcy forum.” Id. at
337. Occidental’s suit against BIW raises the same issue
addressed by the BIW Finding: whether BIW inherited the
liabilities of the Congoleum Flooring Business. The District
Court accordingly erred in holding that the record did not
establish that the Occidental lawsuit lacked an “essential
similarity” to the issues underlying the BIW Finding. Id. at
338 n.14.
Occidental was a creditor in the bankruptcy
proceedings, and those proceedings resulted in the
Confirmation Order, which was a final judgment on the merits
that resolved the same dispute that is central to Occidental’s
claims against BIW. The BIW Finding thus binds Occidental
and has res judicata effect.
B.
Lastly, Occidental argues for the first time on appeal
that, to the extent that the BIW Finding extended to
Occidental’s environmental claims, the BIW Finding was an
impermissible advisory opinion, and the Bankruptcy Court
lacked jurisdiction to determine the liability between non-

-- 30 of 40 --

31
debtors in a hypothetical future dispute. It is axiomatic that
“Article III of the Constitution restricts the power of federal
courts to ‘Cases’ and ‘Controversies.’” Chafin v. Chafin, 568
U.S. 165, 171 (2013). Federal courts accordingly lack
jurisdiction to “decide questions that cannot affect the rights of
litigants in the case before them or give opinions advising what
the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.” Id. at 172
(cleaned up). Therefore, we must ensure the existence of
subject matter jurisdiction through every stage of litigation.
See id. But after litigation concludes and an order becomes
final, any party that was “given a fair chance to challenge the
Bankruptcy Court’s subject-matter jurisdiction,” either when
that order was entered or on direct appeal, cannot avoid
enforcement by disputing the Bankruptcy Court’s subject
matter jurisdiction. Travelers Indem., 557 U.S. at 153.
As discussed supra Part IV, Occidental was given a fair
opportunity to challenge the Confirmation Order and the
Century Settlement before the Bankruptcy Court entered the
order approving the settlement. Occidental’s argument
regarding the lack of subject matter jurisdiction to enter the
order approving the Century Settlement and the Confirmation
Order could have been made years ago, either in an objection
to or on direct appeal of those orders. But even if Occidental’s
challenge to the Bankruptcy Court’s subject matter jurisdiction
were timely, it would not provide a basis to reverse the
Bankruptcy Court’s decision. The BIW Finding was not an
advisory opinion because it was the result of a live controversy
regarding the liabilities of BIW and the insurance companies.
See Lazy Days’, 724 F.3d at 421 (holding that a bankruptcy
court’s decision ordering a landlord to adhere to its prior
decision invalidating the anti-assignment provision of the
debtor’s land lease was not an advisory opinion). The

-- 31 of 40 --

32
Bankruptcy Court had jurisdiction to enter the BIW Finding,
and that order now precludes Occidental’s claim against BIW.
* * * * *
The Bankruptcy Court did not err in exercising its
jurisdiction to reopen the bankruptcy case because it was asked
to interpret and enforce the Confirmation Order, which was
entered by a court sitting in bankruptcy. Because the BIW
Finding conclusively determined that BIW did not inherit the
liabilities of the Congoleum Flooring Business and was a final
order binding Occidental, which had notice of the confirmation
and Century Settlement proceedings, the Bankruptcy Court
also did not err in holding that the BIW Finding barred
Occidental’s claims against BIW.
VII.
For the foregoing reasons, we will reverse the judgment
of the District Court.

-- 32 of 40 --

1
MATEY, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
A dissatisfied litigant crafted a creative path past
proceedings pending before a District Court, hoping a new
referee would bring new fortunes. We disapproved the tactic,
but reconsidered when a few academics warned the sky was
poised to fall. It has not, but still the panel changes course and
empowers a congressionally created adjudicative body to wrest
jurisdiction from an Article III court. Because Congress
created the bankruptcy forum to assist federal judges, not usurp
the Article III prerogative, I respectfully dissent.
I.
Section 350(b) allows a bankruptcy case to be reopened
“to administer assets, to accord relief to the debtor, or for other
cause.” 11 U.S.C. § 350(b). The catchall “for other cause” is
best read as a limited authority to reexamine old estates
consistent with the core principles of bankruptcy, not a general
transfer of the judicial power to decide tangential cases and
controversies. Both text and history explain why.
Start with the text, and the familiar instruction that a
trailing catchall must be read in concert with the preceding
specifics. Epic Sys. Corp. v. Lewis, 584 U.S. 497, 512 (2018);
26 American and English Encyclopedia of Law 520, 609–10
(David S. Garland & Lucius P. McGehee eds., 2d ed. 1904).
The first two grounds for reopening are hallmarks of
bankruptcy: “maximiz[ing] the property available to
creditors,” Truck Ins. Exch. v. Kaiser Gypsum Co., 602 U.S.
268, 272 (2024), and “relieving the honest debtor from
oppressive indebtedness,” Wright v. Union Cent. Life Ins., 304

-- 33 of 40 --

2
U.S. 502, 514 (1938). Anything captured by the catchall must
likewise serve a central tenet of the Bankruptcy Code.
Because Congress did not “write ‘on a clean slate’”
when it enacted the 1978 Bankruptcy Code, history provides
the context that explains the scope of this power. Hall v. United
States, 566 U.S. 506, 523 (2012) (quoting Dewsnup v. Timm,
502 U.S. 410, 419 (1992)). That earlier practice must “inform
our interpretation of the code’s more ‘ambiguous’ provisions.”
Harrington v. Purdue Pharma L. P., 603 U.S. 204, 223 (2024)
(quoting RadLAX Gateway Hotel, LLC v. Amalgamated Bank,
566 U.S. 639, 649 (2012)). The Constitution grants Congress
the authority “[t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States,” U.S. Const. art. 1,
§ 8, cl. 4, but for our first century, the exercise of that power
was largely sporadic.1 That changed in 1898 when Congress
passed the first comprehensive, permanent set of bankruptcy
laws vesting jurisdiction in the federal district courts siting as
“courts of bankruptcy.”2 Bankruptcy Act of 1898, ch. 541, § 2,
30 Stat. 544, 545 (amended 1938).
1 Bankruptcy Act of 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, repealed
by, Act of Dec. 19, 1803, ch. 6, 2 Stat. 248; Bankruptcy Act of
1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, repealed by, Act of Mar. 3, 1843, ch.
82, 5 Stat. 614; Bankruptcy Act of 1867, ch. 176, 14 Stat. 517,
repealed by, Act of June 7, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat 99.
2 The Act also created bankruptcy “referee[s].”
Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 33, 30 Stat. at 555. These officials,
appointed by the federal district courts, id. § 34, 30 Stat. at 555,
exercised “the bulk of the judicial and administrative work”
related to the bankruptcy, Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of
the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 Am. Bankr. Inst.

-- 34 of 40 --

3
The 1898 Act allowed district courts sitting in
bankruptcy to “reopen [closed estates] whenever it appears
they were closed before being fully administered.” Id. § 2(8),
30 Stat. at 546. Reopening often occurred when a debtor had
concealed assets, see, e.g., In re Goldman, 129 F. 212, 212 (2d
Cir. 1904) (per curiam), but the decision was always
“addressed to the sound discretion of the District Court,” In re
Schreiber, 23 F.2d 428, 430 (2d Cir. 1928).
Amendments in 1938 expanded this power, permitting
district courts sitting in bankruptcy to “reopen estates for cause
shown.” Bankruptcy Act of 1938, ch. 575, § 2a(8), 52 Stat.
840, 843 (repealed 1978). Contemporary judicial decisions
understood the 1938 Act to have “undoubtedly . . . widened”
the power to reopen a bankruptcy estate, In re Ostermayer, 74
F. Supp. 803, 804 (D.N.J. 1947), and “to give greater power to
the [district] court in reopening estates,” In re Zimmer, 63 F.
Supp. 488, 490 (S.D. Cal. 1945). But broader did not mean
boundless,3 and interpretations soon agreed that cause existed
when the bankruptcy estate had not been fully administered—
much the same circumstances under which reopening was
L. Rev. 5, 25 (1995), “subject always to a review by the”
district court, Bankruptcy Act of 1898 § 38, 30 Stat. at 555.
3 See Ostermayer, 74 F. Supp. at 804 (“The words ‘for
cause shown’ are not defined in the act but obviously the
discretion so vested in the court should be exercised only
where extraordinary conditions are shown calling for such
relief.”); Hull v. Powell, 309 F.2d 3, 4 (9th Cir. 1962) (“The
power thus conferred is broad, but not unlimited. Its exercise
is conditioned upon a showing that the public interest and the
purposes of the Bankruptcy Act will be served by further
administration of the estate.”).

-- 35 of 40 --

4
authorized under the 1898 Act.4 So courts allowed reopening
when a debtor concealed assets in the bankruptcy or the assets
were previously unreachable.5
The 1973 Federal Bankruptcy Rules then added the
“other good cause” language later codified in 1978. See Bankr.
R. 515 (1973) (“A case may be reopened . . . to administer
assets, to accord relief to the bankrupt, or for other good
cause.”). The reformulation had a narrow purpose:
This rule is an elaboration of the provisions of
[the 1938] Act authorizing estates to be reopened
for cause shown. Although this provision was
amended in 1938 to clarify the authority of the
court to reopen for purposes other than the
administration of newly discovered assets, the
courts have been reluctant to sustain exercises of
this authority for the benefit of the bankrupt. The
grant of an application to reopen under this rule
remains a matter of discretion of the court, but
relief to the bankrupt is explicitly recognized as
a proper cause for the reopening.
4 See, e.g., Tuffy v. Nichols, 120 F.2d 906, 908 (2d Cir.
1941) (“[R]eopening the estate to recover previously
unadministered assets was certainly the ‘cause shown’ required
by Bankruptcy Act . . . .”).
5 See, e.g., Saper v. Viviani, 226 F.2d 608, 609–11 (2d
Cir. 1955) (concealed); In re Reid, 198 F. Supp. 689, 692
(W.D. Va. 1961) (previously unreachable), aff’d sub nom.,
Reid v. Richardson, 304 F.2d 351 (4th Cir. 1962).

-- 36 of 40 --

5
Id. advisory committee’s note (citations omitted). In other
words, the drafters saw no need to expand the reopening power
or remove its connection to administration of the bankruptcy
estate, acting narrowly to clarify that reopening was proper to
provide relief to the debtor. And that language was imported
into the present Bankruptcy Code through the Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 1978, which incorporated the standard of the
1938 Amendments, as clarified by the 1973 Rules.6 Pub. L. No.
95-598 § 350(b), 92 Stat. 2549, 2569. In sum, section 350(b)
incorporates the unbroken understanding of a restricted
reopening power recognized for nearly ninety years.
II.
Our precedent does not disturb this conclusion. When
we have affirmed bankruptcy reopening for other cause under
section 350(b), we have done so to ensure the active state court
actions did not intrude on federal bankruptcy cases.7 See In re
6 See In re Montney, 17 B.R. 353, 355 (Bankr. E.D.
Mich. 1982) (discussing the relevant history and concluding
“[p]rior law has not been changed by the enactment of section
350”); see also Hawkins v. Landmark Fin. Co., 727 F.2d 324,
326 (4th Cir. 1984).
7 This practice of protecting federal jurisdiction from
parallel state actions is hardly novel. See, e.g., Loc. Loan Co.
v. Hunt, 292 U.S. 234, 241 (1934) (reopening a bankruptcy
estate for the debtor to avoid a “long and expensive course of
litigation” in state court). But because these cases typically
involved a debtor’s request for relief, which courts disfavored
before Rule 515, they were rarely granted. In re Barber, 140
F.2d 727, 728 (3d Cir. 1944); Ciavarella v. Salituri, 153 F.2d
343, 344 (2d Cir. 1946). When Rule 515 clarified that

-- 37 of 40 --

6
Lazy Days’ RV Ctr. Inc., 724 F.3d 418, 421–23 (3d Cir. 2013);
In re Zinchiak, 406 F.3d 214, 220–21, 223–25 (3d Cir. 2005).8
This protectionist pose crowded out state suits to secure the
federal interest in maintaining bankruptcy uniformity,9 itself a
constitutional command. So by preventing state courts from
encroaching on bankruptcy law, these applications of section
350(b) accorded with both its text and practice. But those cases
cannot be read to countenance a bankruptcy judge wresting
jurisdiction from an Article III court competent and capable of
interpreting an order collateral to the bankruptcy.
Nor do these decisions support the majority’s position
that the Bankruptcy Court was “best suited” to consider the
motion to reopen. Majority Op. at 14. While we have said a
bankruptcy court is “well suited to provide the best
interpretation of its own order,” Lazy Days’, 724 F.3d at 423
(quoting Zinchiak, 406 F.3d at 224), that was a comparison to
state courts understandably unfamiliar with federal regulatory
reopening can also benefit the debtor, cases extending this
protection principle to state debt-enforcement actions
followed. E.g., In re Rosinski, 759 F.2d 539, 541–42 (6th Cir.
1985). 8 Zinchiak also involved a petition with “the potential to
generate assets for the benefit of unsecured creditors of the
Debtor’s estate,” 406 F.3d at 224, one of the enumerated bases
for reopening under section 350(b).
9 By doing so we respected the central “purpose to
establish uniformity,” which “necessarily excludes state
regulation.” Int’l Shoe Co. v. Pinkus, 278 U.S. 261, 265 (1929).
While that is certainly “other cause,” it is by no means the only
cause under which reopening is permitted. But that does not
mean “other cause” knows no other bounds.

-- 38 of 40 --

7
law.10 But that does not embrace a broad “bankruptcy
exceptionalism” that will “tilt in favor of those more adept at
maneuvering within the bankruptcy system, at the expense of
the less powerful, able, or sophisticated.” Jonathan M.
Seymour, Against Bankruptcy Exceptionalism, 89 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 1925, 1930 (2022). Here, the Confirmation Order was
entered by the District Court exercising its supervisory
authority over the bankruptcy judge following a series of
errors, leaving the trial judge well-suited to confirm its
meaning. The Bankruptcy Court simply does not possess a
preternatural ability for “careful analysis of the history of this
bankruptcy case.” Majority Op. at 14 (quoting App. 27).
Respectfully, “careful analysis” is exactly what the District
Court did here, with diligence that we owe deference.11
10 Lazy Days’, 724 F.3d at 421; Zinchiak, 406 F.3d at
220–21.
11 The majority sees an out in 28 U.S.C. § 157(d). But
query who could have withdrawn the referral to the Bankruptcy
Court. A bit of history sets the stage, beginning with a standing
order of the District of New Jersey referring all bankruptcy
petitions to a bankruptcy judge, which is exactly what
happened when Congoleum petitioned for bankruptcy in 2003.
That resulted in a 2009 appeal to the District Court handled by
Judge Pisano, who withdrew the referral and issued the
Confirmation Order. Judge Pisano then referred the matter
back to the Bankruptcy Court, which entered a final decree and
closed the case in 2011. Because the case was closed, it was
never reassigned from Judge Pisano. In August 2021, Bath Iron
Works filed a motion to reopen the Congoleum bankruptcy.
The Bankruptcy Court granted the motion to reopen, and that
decision was appealed to the District Court. But Judge Pisano

-- 39 of 40 --

8
* * *
Today’s result stymies the District Court’s
constitutional and statutory authority while commanding
future judges to make way for the “experts.” Congress did not
promote such protectionism from Article III officials and “the
word ‘cause’ is too weak a reed upon which to rest so weighty
a power.” Czyewski v. Jevic Holding Corp., 580 U.S. 451, 466
(2017). For that reason, I respectfully dissent.
had passed away in 2021, so the appeal was assigned to Judge
Arleo.
While I agree section 157(d) allows a district judge to
withdraw a referral, there was no district judge to act. When
Bath Iron Works filed the motion to reopen, Judge Pisano was
still assigned to the case at the District Court, despite his death
earlier that year. Judge Arleo, who currently oversees the case
at the District Court, was not assigned until the appeal was
taken from the Bankruptcy Court. By then the window to
withdraw the referral was welded shut.

-- 40 of 40 --