Kelvin Rosa v. Attorney General of New Jersey; Adminstrator of East Jersey State Prison

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_______________
No. 23-1757
_______________
KELVIN ROSA
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW JERSEY;
ADMINSTRATOR OF EAST JERSEY STATE PRISON,
Appellants
_______________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 1:20-cv-04686)
Chief District Judge: Honorable Renée M. Bumb
_______________
Argued: March 26, 2025
Before: BIBAS, PHIPPS, and AMBRO, Circuit Judges
(Filed: June 30, 2025)
Adam Elewa [ARGUED]
W HIPPLE AZZARELLO
177 Madison Avenue
2nd Floor

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Morristown, NJ 07960
Counsel for Appellee
Jennifer B. Paszkiewicz [ARGUED]
BURLINGTON COUNTY PROSECUTOR ’S O FFICE
49 Rancocas Road
P.O. Box 6000
Mount Holly, NJ 08060
Counsel for Appellants
_______________
OPINION OF THE COURT
_______________
BIBAS, Circuit Judge.
Our justice system counts on effective adversaries to ensure
just results. That is why the Sixth Amendment guarantees
criminal defendants effective assistance of counsel. Kelvin
Rosa, a state prisoner seeking federal habeas relief, says he was
denied that. He claims that his lawyer failed to do much when
the state presented hours of prior-bad-acts evidence suggesting
that he had a propensity to commit the very crimes for which
he was on trial. The state habeas court denied his claim. To win,
he must show that it applied federal law unreasonably. Though
this bar is high, Rosa clears it. Given his defense lawyer’s woe-
ful inaction, no fair-minded judge could have confidence in Rosa’s
convictions. So we will affirm the District Court’s grant of habeas.

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I. MOUNDS OF PRIOR -BAD -A CTS EVIDENCE AT TRIAL ,
WITH FEW OBJECTIONS
About two decades ago, New Jersey prosecuted Kelvin
Rosa for burglarizing a check-cashing store and shooting a
police officer who responded to the burglary. Nearly four
months after the burglary, police tried to pull over a driver who
had aroused their suspicions. The driver took off, and police
followed in a high-speed chase. As they followed the fleeing
car, officers watched as its passengers tossed crowbars, screw-
drivers, and two-way radios out the window. The fleeing sus-
pects eventually crashed, abandoned the car, and fled on foot
into a nearby swamp, where they were captured. One of the
passengers whom police captured was Rosa. A few days later,
in bushes near the car-chase scene, police recovered a stolen
Sig Sauer 9 mm pistol. The car’s driver, Mariano Nunez, told
police that he and Rosa had burglarized multiple stores together,
and that during one of them, Rosa had shot and injured an officer.
New Jersey charged Rosa with several types of burglary,
theft, armed robbery, aggravated assault, and attempted mur-
der—all from the burglary of a check-cashing store. At trial, to
place Rosa at the check-cashing store with the attempted-
murder weapon, the state put on evidence that Rosa had (1) sto-
len the gun the night before, while burglarizing a beef distrib-
utor, and (2) carried that gun during the police chase and tossed
it out the window. New Jersey law typically excludes such
prior-bad-acts evidence as unduly prejudicial. See N.J. R. Evid.
404(b). But it admits that evidence for non-propensity reasons
like proving identity. Id.; State v. Cofield, 605 A.2d 230, 234
(N.J. 1992).

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At a pretrial hearing, the judge thus ruled that this prior-
bad-acts evidence could come in—but only to link Rosa to the
gun and, with it, to the burglary and shooting. Because “[t]he
crimes [we]re not similar in nature,” the jury could not use the
evidence to infer that the same person must have committed
both; they were not “signature crimes.” JA 96 (first quotation);
State v. Fortin, 745 A.2d 509, 516 (N.J. 2000) (second quota-
tion) (internal quotation marks omitted). The judge also excluded
another piece of evidence. The state had planned to elicit testi-
mony from Nunez that Rosa had intended to shoot a police
officer during the chase. The judge ruled that this testimony
would be so prejudicial that not only would he keep it out, but,
if it were introduced, he would declare a mistrial. The trial
ended in a hung jury.
The state then retried Rosa. At the retrial, a new judge pre-
sided but adopted the first judge’s rulings limiting prior-bad-
acts evidence. Right before the jury was set to enter the court-
room, Rosa’s lawyer tried to stipulate to the identity of the gun,
conceding that the “gun retrieved from the side of the road …
was the weapon that was fired on the day of the [check-cashing
shooting].” JA 101. The state argued that it still needed to intro-
duce testimony about the beef-distribution burglary and police
chase to link the gun to Rosa—in other words, to show “who
possessed it and how he came into possession” of it. JA 102.
The trial judge agreed with the state, rejecting the stipulation
and letting the evidence in for that limited purpose.
Though much of this evidence was properly admitted to tie
Rosa to the gun, the state’s presentation of it blasted past the
lawful limits. From the jump, it highlighted similarities between
the beef-distributor burglary and the cash-checking one. In his

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opening statement, the prosecutor told the jury that the case
against Rosa began not with the check-cashing-store burglary
but “actually began the day before,” when Rosa had burglar-
ized the beef distributor. JA 109. He also noted how the doors
at both facilities were pried and peeled back in a similar way.
That opening set the tone for the whole trial. First, an early
witness, the cop who responded to the beef-distributor bur-
glary, testified in detail about the crime scene, including the
distinctive way that the burglars broke in. She told the jury that
“the alarm boxes [were] removed,” electrical and phone lines
were cut, and a window was broken. Supp. App. 22. Plus, she
went well beyond discussing the stolen gun, veering into other
weapons and cash that had been stolen from the distributor.
The prosecution even showed a photo of the beef distributor’s
door peeled back like a tuna can—just as the prosecutor’s
opening had described the check-cashing store’s door after it
was burglarized. Rosa’s counsel did nothing.
After hearing from officers who responded to the check-
cashing-store burglary, the jury headed to lunch, with time to
mull the similarities. When they returned, the state put on its
main witness: Nunez, who had agreed to cooperate with the
prosecution. He accused Rosa of belonging to the burglary ring
that Nunez led. The prosecutor elicited detailed testimony from
Nunez about how he had carried out his burglaries, including
the tools and approach he typically used. The prosecutor also
asked Nunez whether he had a “routine or a protocol” for each,
and Nunez confirmed that they were “all done the same way.”
JA 126. Nunez then testified in detail about the beef-distributor
burglary, including how he set it up just like the check-cashing-
store burglary. He described how they “cut the alarm,” broke a

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window, and peeled back the door with a crowbar. JA 130.
Defense counsel again did nothing.
The prosecutor then segued into asking Nunez about the
burglary for which Rosa was on trial. Nunez explained that he
had picked the check-cashing store because it fit the profile of
places he liked to burgle. He testified that Rosa was there, car-
rying the gun that Rosa had stolen the night before. Underscor-
ing that the crew had done this job just like the others, he
explained how they “cut the wires” to the alarm, used a crow-
bar, and “pr[ied] the door open.” JA 135–36. The burglary
ended when Nunez heard shots and ran outside to find Rosa
reloading. Nunez claimed that Rosa had admitted shooting an
approaching police officer.
The testimony then veered again to other crimes. Nunez be-
gan discussing the police chase that had occurred four months
after the charged crimes. He said that he and Rosa were starting
yet another burglary, this time of a cellphone store, when they
heard that police were approaching. Nunez started testifying
that the crew had used “the same procedures” in this robbery.
JA 142. As he told the jury about casing the store, getting the
crew together, and going into the store, Rosa’s counsel finally
objected that this testimony did not go to the identity of the
gun. After the Court overruled the objection and let the testi-
mony continue, Rosa’s counsel objected again. The judge
called a sidebar, at which the state argued that this testimony
went to whether Rosa had the gun at this robbery and thus dur-
ing the ensuing car chase. The judge agreed that setting the
background by showing why Rosa had the gun that night “does
an awful lot to identify Mr. Rosa as the possessor,” a legitimate
end. JA 147. But it ultimately sustained the objection because

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there was no reason the jury needed to understand all the details
of the burglary; it just needed to know that Rosa took part in
the attempted burglary that night, possessed the gun, and was
in the ensuing car chase. Still, defense counsel did not ask for
a limiting instruction, which could have told the jury not to
treat the third (attempted) burglary as evidence that Rosa had
done the second one.
Nunez kept discussing the police car chase. He testified that
as Rosa was tossing burglary materials out of the car’s window,
Rosa took out the gun. And as the officer approached, Rosa
“cock[ed] it.” JA 153. The prosecutor then cut him off, direct-
ing him to discuss how Rosa threw the gun out the window.
Even though the judge presiding over the first trial had ruled
that testimony about Rosa’s intent to shoot the officer would
be so prejudicial that it would trigger a mistrial, defense coun-
sel never objected or asked for a limiting instruction.
Nunez then started telling the jury about fleeing with Rosa
through frozen swamps after they had abandoned the car.
Rosa’s lawyer objected, noting that Nunez had said enough to
place the gun in Rosa’s hand. At sidebar, the judge allowed the
evidence in to show Rosa’s consciousness of guilt. But defense
counsel failed to ask for a limiting instruction along those lines.
Nor did he object or seek a limiting instruction when police
testified in lurid detail about this chase, including their daring
rescue of Rosa from the frozen swamps.
Despite all these witnesses’ testimony dripping with preju-
dicial prior-bad-acts evidence, the court issued limiting instruc-
tions before only one witness’s testimony and at the end of the
trial.

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The state also put on the officer who arrested Rosa in the
Dominican Republic, where he had gone after he made bail on
the New Jersey charges. She testified that Rosa had admitted
upon arrest “that he had to fire a weapon, [but] that he had not
injured anyone.” Appellate Dkt. D.I. 65 at 13.
After the state rested its case, Rosa’s counsel moved at side-
bar to dismiss, arguing that evidence of the attempted cell-
phone-store burglary and eluding incident was unduly prejudi-
cial. The judge denied the motion.
Rosa then put on his case. He denied taking part in any of
the burglaries or shooting the officer. He admitted being a part
of the chase but offered an innocent explanation. He said he
was heading to a construction job with Nunez when it hap-
pened. Nunez began to swerve when he tried to get a phone he
had dropped on the floor, so the cops tried to pull them over.
Rosa claimed that Nunez had refused to stop because his license
was suspended and his insurance was fake. And Rosa testified
that he had run out of the car only because police can shoot at
evading cars in the Dominican Republic, where he was from.
Plus, he said he had left for the Dominican Republic soon after
posting bail only because his father became sick and was hos-
pitalized there. Finally, he told the jury that he thought Nunez
was trying to frame him because he had dated Nunez’s girl-
friend while she had been dating Nunez.
The jury convicted Rosa on both counts, the judge sen-
tenced him to thirty years in prison, the court of appeals af-
firmed, and the New Jersey Supreme Court denied review.
On state habeas, Rosa claimed that his trial lawyer had been
constitutionally ineffective for not objecting to and seeking

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limiting instructions for the evidence of the beef-distribution
and (attempted) cellphone-store burglaries and the police
chase. The state habeas court denied his petition. In about two
pages of analysis, it rejected that claim, holding that counsel
was effective and (in any event) did not prejudice him.
On federal habeas, Rosa filed a pro se petition, raising the
same ineffective-assistance claim. The District Court granted
habeas, holding in a thorough opinion that the state habeas
court had unreasonably applied Strickland v. Washington, 466
U.S. 668 (1984). The state now appeals.
II. THE STATE HABEAS COURT APPLIED
STRICKLAND UNREASONABLY
To prove ineffective assistance of counsel, Rosa must show
both that (1) his trial counsel performed deficiently and (2) as
a result, he suffered prejudice. Id. at 687. On federal habeas,
we must defer greatly to the state habeas court’s conclusion
that Rosa could not prove these two elements. We presume that
its factual findings are right. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). On a chal-
lenge to its legal ruling, we can grant relief only if its legal
ruling was “contrary to, or involved an unreasonable applica-
tion of, clearly established Federal law.” § 2254(d)(1).
Strickland is clearly established federal law, so we must
decide whether it was applied unreasonably. Williams v. Super-
intendent Greene SCI, 112 F.4th 155, 167 (3d Cir. 2024).
Because the District Court granted habeas without holding an
evidentiary hearing, we review its decision de novo. Saranchak
v. Beard, 616 F.3d 292, 301 (3d Cir. 2010). We agree with the
District Court: In denying relief, the state habeas court applied
Strickland unreasonably.

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A. The state court unreasonably found counsel adequate
A lawyer’s performance is deficient if it falls below “an
objective standard of reasonableness” measured against “pre-
vailing professional norms.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688. Under
the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), our
review of defense counsel’s performance must be “doubly def-
erential.” Knowles v. Mirzayance, 556 U.S. 111, 123 (2009).
We already defer to trial counsel’s choices, presuming that his
“conduct [fell] within the wide range of reasonable profes-
sional assistance.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. And under
AEDPA, we defer once again to the state habeas court’s analysis
of counsel’s performance.
Even so, this state habeas ruling “cannot reasonably be jus-
tified” under Strickland. Rosen v. Superintendent Mahanoy
SCI, 972 F.3d 245, 252 (3d Cir. 2020). The only reason why
the state court held that counsel was effective was because he
had objected to all the prior-bad-acts evidence at the pretrial
hearing. But its analysis ended there. It failed to consider
whether counsel should have asked for a limiting instruction
after the court overruled his objection and admitted the evi-
dence. It also failed to consider whether counsel should have
objected later when the testimony at trial exceeded the allowed
purpose. There is no room for “fair-minded disagreement” that
this analysis, which disregards prevailing professional norms,
unreasonably applied Strickland’s deficiency standard. Har-
rington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011); see Medina v.
Diguglielmo, 461 F.3d 417, 428–29 (3d Cir. 2006).
1. When prior-bad-acts evidence floods the state’s case,
counsel must act. Even after the court admits prior-bad-acts for

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a limited purpose, counsel must keep striving to mitigate its
impact. “[T]he fact that evidence is admissible does not decide
the question whether a limiting instruction should still have
been requested by counsel.” Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103,
127 (3d Cir. 2007). This is because, as both the U.S. and New
Jersey Supreme Courts have long recognized, prior-bad-acts
evidence is highly prejudicial. State v. Reddish, 859 A.2d 1173,
1205 (N.J. 2004) (stressing need for “particular caution”); Old
Chief v. United States, 519 U.S. 172, 180–82 (1997); N.J. R.
Evid. 404(b); Fed. R. Evid. 404(b). It primes juries to draw a
forbidden inference: “[B]ecause he did it before, he must have
done it again.” Breakiron v. Horn, 642 F.3d 126, 144 (3d Cir.
2011) (internal quotation marks omitted). And it is doubly dan-
gerous when “it reveals that the defendant previously commit-
ted the very kind of crime” for which he is on trial. Id.
Still, prior-bad-acts evidence may be admitted for limited
purposes, like proving identity. See N.J. R. Evid. 404(b)(2);
Fed. R. Evid. 404(b)(2). But New Jersey courts strictly limit
how it may be presented. First, even when evidence is admitted
to prove identity, it can go too far. State v. Gillispie, 26 A.3d
397, 416 (N.J. 2011). For instance, when the jury is “exposed
to detailed testimony” about the nature of the prior bad act
while hearing proof of identity, the admission of such details is
“unduly prejudicial and … not outweighed by any probative
value.” Id. So even when a party may bring in evidence for a
permissible purpose, it may not layer on extra details that do
not serve that purpose.
Second, in New Jersey, the jury must get timely and tailored
limiting instructions, “both when the evidence is admitted and
in the final charge,” to focus it on that limited purpose. Id. at

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417 (emphases added); see also Gov’t of Virgin Islands v. Toto,
529 F.2d 278, 283 (3d Cir. 1976) (requiring 404(b) evidence in
federal court to be subject to “stringent instruction at the time
of its reception”). Plus, each “instruction should be formulated
carefully to explain precisely the permitted and prohibited pur-
poses of the evidence, with sufficient reference to the factual
context of the case to enable the jury to comprehend and appre-
ciate the fine distinction to which it is required to adhere.” Gil-
lispie, 26 A.3d at 417 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Though our dissenting colleague thinks otherwise, New Jersey
law treats timeliness and tailoring as critical to making limiting
instructions effective. See id. at 417; State v. Blakney, 912 A.2d
140, 144 (N.J. 2006) (holding limiting instruction insufficient
in part because it was not “contemporaneous”).
What is defense counsel’s role here? Counsel is not always
“constitutionally required” to (1) object each time the prosecu-
tion presents 404(b) evidence beyond its limited purpose or
(2) “request a limiting instruction any time one could be given.”
Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 127. Rather, counsel’s duties depend on
the context. We presume that counsel’s silence was sound trial
strategy; sometimes, silence is the right call to avoid “high-
lighting” fleeting prejudicial material. Buehl v. Vaughn, 166
F.3d 163, 170 (3d Cir. 1999); Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 127; see
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. But when the 404(b) evidence is
not fleeting but floods the state’s case, counsel’s silence cannot
reasonably be described as strategic. See Albrecht, 485 F.3d
at 127.
2. By failing to dam the flood, counsel fell below constitu-
tional norms. Because prejudicial evidence flooded the state’s

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case against Rosa, his counsel fell below constitutional norms
by not taking enough remedial action.
First, counsel failed to object when the state put on detailed
evidence about the beef-distribution burglary that went beyond
proving the identity of the gun. The 404(b) order provided that
the evidence could be used only to link Rosa to the weapon and
thus the charged crimes. Gillispie, 26 A.3d at 413–14. It spe-
cifically noted that it was not admitting the evidence to prove
that the other alleged burglaries were “similar” to the burglary
for which Rosa stood trial. JA 96.
But the prosecution blew past those clear bounds. To prove
the identity of the gun, it needed to present testimony only that
Rosa had (1) stolen the gun at the first burglary and (2) possessed
it at the attempted third one, “without the details involving the
actual” heist plans. Gillispie, 26 A.3d at 416. But from the start,
the prosecution slipped extraneous, prejudicial details into the
trial. In his opening statement, the prosecutor detailed how the
beef-distributor burglary was executed and likened it to the
check-cashing-store burglary. A cop testified vividly about
what the scene of the beef-distribution burglary looked like and
the unique procedures that the burglars used. And Nunez explained
to the jury how each burglary was “planned and executed” like
the others. Id. Such detailed testimony was not needed to prove
identity, and it was severely prejudicial. It blurred the crimes
charged with the alleged other crimes and primed the jury to
conclude that Rosa had a propensity to commit burglaries—a
forbidden inference.
Any effective defense lawyer should have known to object
as soon as this evidence went beyond the 404(b) order. Counsel

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did so later on during the state’s presentation, when Nunez began
to testify about the details of the attempted cellphone-store bur-
glary. But his failure to do so throughout this extensive earlier
testimony is inexplicable.
Second, and more importantly, defense counsel never once
asked for a limiting instruction for any of the 404(b) evidence.
Even if the state had presented all the 404(b) evidence within
the bounds of the 404(b) order, it still would have risked severely
prejudicing Rosa absent timely and specific limiting instructions.
Any reasonable defense counsel should have known this. And
there was no downside to asking for them. As in Albrecht,
objecting or instructing the jury would not have inadvertently
underscored “fleeting[ ]” evidence that the jury might other-
wise have missed; the state had spent substantial time dragging
the jury through it. 485 F.3d at 127.
Given these facts, we cannot imagine any valid reason not
to object or to seek prompt, focused limiting instructions—
especially when counsel knew the evidence was objectionable.
There was zero reason not to.
Still, our dissenting colleague paints counsel’s silence as a
sound tactic worthy of deference. In his view, counsel did not
need to protect Rosa from this evidence because his whole theory
of the case was that Rosa did not commit these prior bad acts.
True, we strongly presume that defense counsel’s decisions
were tactical. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689. Counsel must ration
his objections and avoid calling attention to matters that the
jury might overlook. But calling something a “tactic” does not
make it so. Sometimes counsel’s performance is so woeful that
it “cannot be characterized as the product of strategic

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judgment.” United States v. Gray, 878 F.2d 702, 711 (3d Cir.
1989). As the Supreme Court instructs, we may defer to tactics
only if they are reasonable and well-founded. Roe v. Flores-
Ortega, 528 U.S. 470, 481 (2000); Strickland, 466 U.S. at
689–91.
Counsel’s inaction here was neither. He simply messed up.
If counsel’s theory was that Rosa never committed these other
burglaries, then it made no sense to let the jury hear for hours
about how he carried them out. Far from bolstering counsel’s
theory, his silence undermined it. In fact, under any “objective
standard of reasonableness,” a lawyer implementing that the-
ory should have tried to stop this highly suggestive evidence
from coming in or at least mitigate its harm once it did, “even
[if it came] at the expense of purportedly clever theories.”
Workman v. Superintendent Albion SCI, 915 F.3d 928, 944 (3d
Cir. 2019). Doing so would not have been “tangential to core
defense strategy,” but key to Rosa’s defense. Dissent at 2. So
no reasonable trial strategy supported counsel’s inaction; he
was simply asleep at the wheel. His silence was so unjustified
that the state habeas court’s contrary ruling was unreasonable.
B. The state court unreasonably found no prejudice
Defense counsel’s performance is prejudicial when it cre-
ates “a reasonable probability” of a different result. Strickland,
466 U.S. at 694. In making this judgment, we look at all the
evidence at trial. Id. at 695. An error is far more likely to be
prejudicial if the state’s case is weak. Id. at 696. The state
habeas court concluded that counsel did not prejudice Rosa
because a state court on direct appeal had found that admitting

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the evidence did not prejudice him. We reject that conclusion
as unreasonable too.
The state habeas court discounted prejudice because it
thought the evidence of guilt was strong. But the record tells a
different story. No physical evidence linked Rosa to the crime.
The shooter could have been Rosa, Nunez, or any of the look-
outs at the burglary. For example, ballistics evidence showed
that the gun used to shoot the officer at the check-cashing-store
burglary matched the gun found on the road after the police
chase. But that does not show who used the gun at the check-
cashing store. In fact, when police arrested Nunez and sug-
gested that he might have shot the officer himself, Nunez did
not deny it, but said only, “you got to prove it.” JA 162. Only
later did Nunez say Rosa did it and testified against him. And
Nunez had every incentive to blame Rosa: Nunez not only
evaded a murder charge, but also got a big sentence discount
in exchange.
All the other evidence against Rosa at most showed that he
was guilty of something, not that he was guilty of the specific
crimes for which he stood trial. For instance, he was in the car
that eluded police and from which the gun and burglary tools
were tossed. Plus, Rosa fled through the swamps (showing
consciousness of guilt). And he admitted on arrest that he had
fired a gun but injured no one. This evidence certainly supports
the inference that Rosa had something to hide. But to sustain a
conviction, the state needed more than that. It needed to prove
that Rosa was guilty of burglarizing the check-cashing store or
attempted murder—crimes that required proving specific intent.
N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2C:18-2 (burglary); State v. Rhett, 601 A.2d
689, 692 (N.J. 1992) (attempted murder). And at least one juror

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agreed that the state’s case was weak. When the state first tried
Rosa, nearly the same evidence produced a hung jury, a telltale
sign that the case was close. Bey v. Superintendent Greene SCI,
856 F.3d 230, 242 (3d Cir. 2017). So the incriminating evi-
dence was “far from overwhelming.” Breakiron, 642 F.3d at
140, 147.
Given the thin proof of guilt, prejudice is not a close call.
There is a reasonable probability that defense counsel’s failure
to do more to check hours of prior-bad-acts evidence influ-
enced the jury’s verdict. The state habeas court unreasonably
found otherwise. Cf. Albrecht, 485 F.3d at 129 (holding in a
nearly identical context that prejudice was “very close” even
though the evidence of guilt was “ample” and corroborated).
Yet the state and our dissenting colleague claim that the two
belated, boilerplate limiting instructions were enough to guard
against prejudice. But they were not. True, we ordinarily pre-
sume that the jury followed those instructions. United States v.
Allinson, 27 F.4th 913, 926 (3d Cir. 2022). But as both New
Jersey courts and this court have repeatedly recognized, even a
well-heeded instruction may not suffice to purge the taint.
Toto, 529 F.2d at 282–83; State v. Stevens, 558 A.2d 833, 844
(N.J. 1989) (“[T]he inherently prejudicial nature of such evi-
dence casts doubt on a jury’s ability to follow even the most
precise limiting instruction.”).
After all, once prior-bad-acts evidence reaches the jury, it
becomes “difficult, if not impossible, to assume continued integ-
rity of the presumption of innocence. A drop of ink cannot be
removed from a glass of milk.” Toto, 529 F.2d at 283. So even
with the two catch-all instructions, Rosa may well have been

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prejudiced by defense counsel’s failure to try to keep as much
of the extraneous 404(b) evidence out as possible. Of course,
the judge could have overruled his objections. But when defense
counsel finally roused himself to object to evidence of the cell-
phone-store burglary, the trial judge partially sustained his objec-
tion. So if counsel had done his job properly by fighting to keep
this evidence out altogether, he could have reduced the prejudice.
Plus, the limiting instructions had two defects that reduced
what little remedial effect they would have had:
First, they came too late. They were not given “at the time
the evidence [was] admitted.” United States v. Caldwell, 760
F.3d 267, 277 (3d Cir. 2014); see also Gillispie, 26 A.3d at 417
(“The instructions should be timely given both when the evi-
dence is admitted and in the final charge.”). As New Jersey and
federal courts have long recognized, prior-bad-acts evidence
“may indelibly brand the defendant as a bad person.” Blakney,
912 A.2d at 143. Contemporaneous instructions reduce the risk
that this implication will stick in jurors’ minds, leaving them
unable to evaluate the rest of the state’s case against the defend-
ant carefully and correctly. See id. at 143–44. But here, the
jurors had heard hours of prior-bad-acts evidence and gone off
together to eat lunch before they were told not to draw the infer-
ence that they likely already had.
Second, and relatedly, neither instruction was tailored to
each piece of prejudicial evidence. Neither one forbade the jury
to consider the gun-cocking testimony, even though the 404(b)
order had barred that testimony as so prejudicial it could cause
a mistrial. That testimony was dangerous. It could have led the
jury to think Rosa had a habit of shooting at cops and so must

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have done it earlier during the check-cashing-store burglary.
The jury should have been told that it could not consider that
evidence at all. So the two catch-all instructions came far too
late to undo the damage done.
We do not, as our dissenting colleague insists, adopt “a
blanket rule” that limiting instructions are ineffective unless
given immediately. Dissent at 7. Prejudice under Strickland al-
ways depends on context. Our ruling depends on the amount
and severity of the prior-bad-acts evidence here (both of which
are astonishing) and the thin evidence of guilt, as shown by the
hung jury at the first trial.
To be clear, even woeful deficiency will not always be prej-
udicial. But here, the evidence was weak, and defense counsel’s
silence mattered. On this record, we see no room for debate:
Rosa’s trial was unfair. There is a reasonable chance that effec-
tive defense counsel would have moved the needle, ending the
second trial in at least a mistrial or a hung jury like the first
one. The state habeas court’s contrary ruling was unreasonable.
*****
The federal standard for habeas is “difficult to meet,” not
impossible. Harrington, 562 U.S. at 102. On habeas, federal
courts must defer to state ones, doubly so when checking defense
counsel’s performance. But the record reveals that this is the
rare case where the state-court decision is unjustifiable “beyond
any possibility for fair-minded disagreement.” Id. at 103.
Defense counsel denied Rosa a just trial by not doing more to
shield him from many hours of prior-bad-acts evidence. Because
the state habeas court’s contrary ruling was unreasonable, we
will affirm the District Court’s grant of habeas corpus.

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1
Rosa v. Attorney General of New Jersey, No. 23-1757
PHIPPS, Circuit Judge, dissenting.
A claim of ineffective assistance of counsel under the Sixth
Amendment requires two showings: objectively deficient
performance by counsel and resulting prejudice. See
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984). When an
application for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 relies on
such a claim to challenge a state-court judgment, two tiers of
deference apply. First, for the performance prong, the well-
founded strategic choices of state-court defense counsel
receive near-absolute deference. See id. at 690 (emphasizing
that tactical choices “made after thorough investigation of law
and facts relevant to plausible options are virtually
unchallengeable”).1 Second, the “last reasoned” state-court
rulings on the performance and the prejudice prongs receive
deference under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 104, 110 Stat. 1214, 1219
(codified in relevant part at 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)). Laird v.
Sec’y, Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 129 F.4th 227, 243 (3d Cir. 2025)
(quoting Abdul-Salaam v. Sec’y of Pa. Dep’t of Corr., 895 F.3d
254, 265 (3d Cir. 2018)).
In evaluating Kelvin Rosa’s § 2254 application claiming
ineffective assistance of counsel, the Majority Opinion does
not grant either tier of deference. Instead of respecting defense
counsel’s trial strategy – one that previously resulted in a hung
1 See also Cullen v. Pinholster, 563 U.S. 170, 196 (2011)
(requiring courts to “‘indulge [the] strong presumption’ that
counsel ‘made all significant decisions in the exercise of
reasonable professional judgment’” (alteration in original)
(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–90)); Yarborough v.
Gentry, 540 U.S. 1, 8 (2003) (per curiam) (explaining the
“strong presumption” that decisions by trial counsel were
strategic rather than neglectful – a presumption that “has
particular force where a petitioner bases his ineffective-
assistance claim solely on the trial record”).

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2
jury – the Majority Opinion faults Rosa’s counsel for failing to
incessantly object or request limiting instructions with respect
to an issue that was tangential to core defense strategy. And
rather than affording AEDPA deference to the last reasoned
state-court decision on the performance and the prejudice
prongs, see State v. Rosa, No. 06-10-01443-I, slip op. at 14–18
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Feb. 27, 2018), the Majority Opinion
declares that “no fair-minded judge could have confidence in
Rosa’s convictions.” Maj. Op. at 2. In my view, Rosa cannot
overcome either layer of deference, and I respectfully dissent.
A. The Majority Opinion Does Not Afford the
Requisite Deference to the Strategic Choices of
Defense Counsel.
As to the first tier of deference, Rosa’s trial counsel had a
strategy. He did not contest that the burglaries took place; he
argued instead that Rosa did not commit them and that Rosa
was framed by Mariano Nunez – a key witness for the
prosecution. Under this theory, Nunez was portrayed as a
dangerous and “conniving” “mastermind” of a burglary ring
who had decided to pin his crimes on Rosa, an innocent man
who happened to be in Nunez’s car when Nunez was caught by
the police. Retrial Day 1 Tr. 24:20–21, 25:10 (App. 116–17).
Thus, it was not necessary to exclude Nunez’s testimony as to
the other crimes at all costs: under this theory, those burglaries,
like the burglaries and robberies with which Rosa was charged,
were committed by persons other than Rosa. Any abstract
doubt about the effectiveness of this strategy gives way to a
concrete result – the first trial resulted in a hung jury. And
because trial tactics grounded in reason and professional
judgment are “virtually unchallengeable,” counsel’s pursuit of
a strategy that previously proved successful qualifies for that
high level of deference. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 689–91
(explaining that the degree of deference increases for the
decisions of counsel that are well founded).

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3
Affording such deference is not the same as endorsing
counsel’s performance or finding it beyond reproach. Rather,
deference to counsel’s performance must be understood in
light of the rule that a guilty verdict requires juror unanimity.
See N.J. Ct. R. 1:8-9 (requiring all criminal jury verdicts to be
unanimous effective September 1, 1998). See generally Ramos
v. Louisiana, 590 U.S. 83, 93 (2020) (holding that “the Sixth
Amendment’s right to a jury trial requires a unanimous
verdict”). And with the need to persuade only one juror that
the prosecution has not proved its case, it may be rational for
defense counsel to pursue high-variance strategies principally
aimed at persuading a single juror of reasonable doubt, even if
that approach would be unpersuasive to the average juror – or
even most jurors.
Even still, the Majority Opinion views defense counsel’s
high-variance strategy as constitutionally deficient. According
to the Majority Opinion, trial counsel should have objected
and, if he lost, requested a limiting instruction as to each
reference to the Amaro and Nextel burglaries.
That is a strange fault to find because Rosa’s trial counsel
secured two limiting instructions that governed the jury’s
consideration of those burglaries. The first one was given on
the second day of trial when the judge announced that the
other-crimes evidence was admitted only for the “very limited
purpose of permitting the State to demonstrate or attempt to
prove possession of the handgun involved and the identity of
the person who possessed it.” Retrial Day 2 Tr. 107:11–15
(App. 164). In giving that instruction, the judge underscored
that even if the jury found that Rosa “possessed or . . . was
involved at Amaro Foods or at the Nextel store,” that would
not allow the conclusion that “he’s, therefore, guilty of the
present offense.” Id. at 107:16–18. The judge gave a second,
very similar limiting instruction on the last day of trial before
the jury began deliberating. He explained that it is proper to
“exclude evidence that a defendant has committed other

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4
crimes, or wrongs or acts when it is offered only to show that
he had a disposition or a tendency to do wrong and, therefore,
must be guilty of the charges before the [c]ourt.” Retrial Day 5
Tr. 16:2–7 (App. 192). That instruction made clear, however,
that such other-crimes evidence may be introduced “for a very
specific and narrow purpose,” such as “the issue of identity or
possession of the gun.” Id. at 16:12–18.
Under New Jersey law, a limiting instruction is adequate if
it distinguishes between the proper and improper purposes of
the evidence. See State v. Fortin, 745 A.2d 509, 518 (N.J.
2000); State v. Gillispie, 26 A.3d 397, 417 (N.J. 2011) (citing
Fortin with approval); State v. Rose, 19 A.3d 985, 1000
(N.J. 2011). Both limiting instructions did so, very much along
the lines of a limiting instruction previously approved by the
New Jersey Supreme Court for this purpose. See Fortin,
745 A.2d at 519 (including an example text of a limiting
instruction on other-crimes evidence that would satisfy the
requirements of New Jersey law).
Moreover, as a principle of law, jurors are presumed to
follow limiting instructions. See United States v. Scarfo,
41 F.4th 136, 181 (3d Cir. 2022); State v. Burns, 929 A.2d
1041, 1054 (N.J. 2007) (stating that this presumption is “[o]ne
of the foundations of our jury system”). Thus, Rosa’s counsel
cannot be credibly criticized for not seeking additional limiting
instructions: jurors are presumed to follow a single instruction,
and here two were given. See Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103,
127 (3d Cir. 2007) (disabusing the notion that “[t]rial counsel
is . . . constitutionally required to request a limiting instruction
any time one could be given”). Trial counsel’s choice to refrain
from additional objections and requests for limiting
instructions makes even more sense in light of the reality that
it may be “strategically preferable to omit such a request since
the instruction might have the undesired effect of highlighting
the other crimes evidence.” Buehl v. Vaughn, 166 F.3d 163,
170 (3d Cir. 1999) (Alito, J.).

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5
The Majority Opinion nonetheless declares the
performance of Rosa’s trial counsel constitutionally deficient.
That degree of second guessing – bolstered by fourteen years
of hindsight – exceeds the permissible scope of federal court
review of an ineffective-assistance-of-counsel claim in a
§ 2254 petition. Rather, defense counsel’s trial strategy, which
previously resulted in a hung jury, merits deference.
B. The Majority Opinion Does Not Afford AEDPA
Deference to the New Jersey State-Court
Decisions on the Performance and Prejudice
Prongs.
As to the second tier of deference, the last reasoned state-
court decision on Rosa’s ineffective-assistance-of-counsel
claim concluded that Rosa could not satisfy either prong of that
claim. Rosa, No. 06-10-01443-I, at 14–18; see also State v.
Rosa, 2020 WL 1907810, at *4 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Apr.
20, 2020) (per curiam) (denying the claim and incorporating
the reasoning of the Law Division’s decision). Under AEDPA
deference, those determinations should be upheld.
In evaluating the performance prong, the Superior Court
hewed closely to precedent and concluded that defense
counsel’s performance was not unconstitutionally deficient.
Rosa, No. 06-10-01443-I, at 16 (“The record shows . . . that
trial counsel acted objectively reasonably . . . .”). But even if
reasonable minds could differ on the performance of Rosa’s
counsel, that would not be enough to overcome AEDPA
deference. See Laird, 129 F.4th at 241. More forcefully still,
even if the Superior Court had erred in its assessment of
counsel’s performance, that alone would not overcome
AEDPA deference, which requires “far more than that the state
court’s decision was ‘merely wrong’ or ‘even clear error.’”
Shinn v. Kayer, 592 U.S. 111, 118 (2020) (per curiam) (quoting
Virginia v. LeBlanc, 582 U.S. 91, 94 (2017) (per curiam)).
Instead, to overcome AEDPA deference, the Superior Court’s
decision must have been “so obviously wrong that its error lies

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6
‘beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement.’” Id.
(quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011)). And
the decision of the Superior Court is not so obviously wrong;
indeed, the strategic choices of Rosa’s counsel had previously
resulted in a hung jury. Rather than respect the rulings of the
court with direct review authority over New Jersey’s evidence
rules, the Majority Opinion draws its own conclusions
regarding counsel’s performance relative to those rules, and in
so doing it disregards AEDPA deference. See 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1); see also Bradshaw v. Richey, 546 U.S. 74, 76
(2005) (per curiam) (“[A] state court’s interpretation of state
law . . . binds a federal court sitting in habeas corpus.”).
The Majority Opinion continues that trend with respect to
the prejudice prong. In adjudicating Rosa’s post-conviction
relief challenge, the Superior Court concluded that the trial
judge’s limiting instructions were sufficient to negate any
hypothetical prejudice. Rosa, No. 06-10-01443-I, at 15–18
(ruling both that Rosa suffered no prejudice from the ‘other
crimes’ evidence and that the limiting instructions were
sufficient); see also Rosa, 2020 WL 1907810, at *5 (affirming
the prejudice ruling); State v. Rosa, 2014 WL 10186979, at
*12–13 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. Aug. 3, 2015) (per curiam)
(finding no prejudice on direct appeal). There is nothing infirm
about that decision. In light of the “almost invariable
assumption of the law that jurors follow their instructions,” it
may be supposed that the jurors followed the clear, specific
instructions that they twice received. Scarfo, 41 F.4th at 181
(quoting Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987)); see
also Burns, 929 A.2d at 1054. Those instructions stated that
the other-crimes evidence could be considered only for identity
purposes, not for propensity purposes. See Retrial Day 2
Tr. 107:15–25 (App. 164); Retrial Day 4 Tr. 16:1–23 (App.
192). There is no prejudice stemming from a lack of
additional, repetitive limiting instructions: again, jurors are

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7
presumed to follow a single instruction, and here there were
two.2
To reach a contrary outcome, the Majority Opinion reasons
that to be effective, a limiting instruction must be issued
immediately following the at-issue evidence. That is a new
rule. At most, this Court has emphasized the value that
temporal proximity plays in limiting instructions, but it has not
gone so far as to hold that delay extinguishes the efficacy of a
limiting instruction. See United States v. Caldwell, 760 F.3d
267, 277 (3d Cir. 2014) (stating that limiting instructions
“must” be given if requested but only “should” be issued close
to the evidence’s introduction). Nor is such a blanket rule
tenable. The Supreme Court has already spoken on this issue
and in doing so has made clear that to overcome the
presumption that a jury followed an instruction, there must be
an “‘overwhelming probability’ that the jury will be unable to
follow” the instruction. Greer v. Miller, 483 U.S. 756, 766 n.8
(1987) (quoting Richardson, 481 U.S. at 208). Applied here,
providing limiting instructions at two times during the trial –
on day two (of a five-day trial) and before the deliberations –
hardly established an overwhelming probability that a jury
would not follow either instruction. Moreover, applying this
new rule here is inconsistent with AEDPA deference: even a
modicum of respect for New Jersey state courts would require
deference to their assessment of the efficacy of the limiting
instructions, especially those, like the ones here, that were
2 Even if there were a shortcoming in those jury instructions,
that alone would not satisfy the prejudice prong. Indeed, in
State v. Stevens, 558 A.2d 833 (N.J. 1989), a case relied upon
by the Majority Opinion, the New Jersey Supreme Court held
that deficiencies in the limiting instructions about three pieces
of other-crimes evidence involving the sexual exploitation of
women in the trial of a police officer charged with official
misconduct and criminal coercion related to the sexual
exploitation of two women were not prejudicial. Id. at 844.

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8
modeled off instructions endorsed by the New Jersey Supreme
Court. See Fortin, 745 A.2d at 519; see also Laird, 129 F.4th
at 240 (explaining that AEDPA deference can be overcome
only by a showing that the state court “arrive[d] at a conclusion
opposite to that reached by [the Supreme] Court on a question
of law” (second alteration in original) (quoting Williams v.
Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 413 (2000))).3
* * *
In sum, this is a double deference case, and affording
deference to the strategic choices of defense counsel and
AEDPA deference to the decision of a New Jersey state court
means that Rosa’s § 2254 application cannot be granted.
3 The Majority Opinion also appears troubled by the fact that
Rosa’s trial counsel did not move for a mistrial once Nunez
testified that Rosa cocked his gun as officers approached.
Those misgivings, however, have no bearing on Rosa’s claim
here because he does not argue that his counsel was ineffective
for failing to move for a mistrial on that ground. Nor did Rosa
raise that argument in his state-court collateral attacks on his
conviction. See Rosa, 2020 WL 1907810, at *3.

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