TONY PING YEW, Executor of Estate of John Y. Wei v. Attorney General New Jersey

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 23-3005
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TONY PING YEW,
Executor of Estate of John Y. Wei,
Appellant
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL NEW JERSEY;
HON. MARY SIOBHAN BRENNAN, J.T.C. Tax Court of New Jersey
____________________________________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2-23-cv-02069)
District Judge: Honorable Madeline C. Arleo)
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
March 19, 2024
Before: BIBAS, PORTER, and MONTGOMERY-REEVES, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: March 21, 2024)
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OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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2
Tony Ping Yew appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his
complaint. We will affirm.
In May 2019, Yew filed a complaint on behalf of the estate of John Y. Wei in the
New Jersey Tax Court seeking an inheritance-tax refund. The Honorable Mary Siobhan
Brennan entered summary judgment against him and, when Yew sought reconsideration,
advised him that he was not permitted to litigate claims on behalf of Wei’s estate without
an attorney. Yew sought leave to appeal, but the Appellate Division of the Superior
Court and the state Supreme Court denied his requests.
Yew then filed a complaint in the District Court. He claimed that Judge Brennan
and the Attorney General of New Jersey had violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights
by precluding him from litigating his inheritance-tax claim. By way of relief, Yew asked
the District Court to vacate Judge Brennan’s summary judgment ruling and remand the
matter to “permit [him] to continue his suit as Unrepresented Executor of Estate of John
Y. Wei in the State court.” Compl. 3, ECF No. 1. He also asked the District Court to
vacate Judge Brennan’s order denying his recusal motion. The defendants moved to
dismiss the complaint on various grounds, including that the District Court lacked
jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine and that the defendants were immune
from suit. The District Court granted their motion on the latter ground and dismissed
Yew’s complaint. He appealed.1
1 We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We may affirm on any basis supported
by the record. See Fairview Twp. v. EPA, 773 F.2d 517, 525 n.15 (3d Cir. 1985).

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3
We will affirm the dismissal of the complaint. Yew asked the District Court to
review and reject the state Tax Court’s rulings and remand the matter to the Tax Court.
Contrary to his contention, the District Court lacked jurisdiction to do so. Under the
Rooker-Feldman doctrine, federal courts are deprived of subject-matter jurisdiction over
claims when “(1) the federal plaintiff lost in state court; (2) the plaintiff ‘complains of
injuries caused by the state-court judgments’; (3) those judgments were rendered before
the federal suit was filed; and (4) the plaintiff is inviting the district court to review and
reject the state judgments.” Great W. Mining & Min. Co. v. Fox Rothschild LLP, 615
F.3d 159, 166 (3d Cir. 2010) (alterations omitted) (quoting Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi
Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005)). Those elements are all present here: Yew
lost his claim in the Tax Court on the defendants’ motion for summary judgment; he
contends that, as a result, he cannot litigate his claim to recover the inheritance-tax refund
he sought; the state court’s rulings were rendered before Yew commenced this federal
action; and Yew invited the District Court to review and reject those rulings. Thus, the
District Court lacked jurisdiction over his claims.2
We will therefore affirm the District Court’s judgment.
2 Under these circumstances, amendment would have been futile. See Grayson v.
Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 103, 108 (3d Cir. 2002).

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