United States of America v. Andrew Suarez

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 23-3241
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UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
v.
ANDREW SUAREZ,
Appellant
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey
(D.C. No. 3-22-cr-00673-001)
District Judge: Honorable Michael A. Shipp
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
November 8, 2024
Before: KRAUSE, BIBAS, and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges
(Filed: November 8, 2024)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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KRAUSE, Circuit Judge.
Appellant Andrew Suarez pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to commit
money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). He now appeals his sentence.
We will affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
Between August and December 2017, Suarez worked with others to send
$525,125.49 in fraudulently procured funds overseas to a South African criminal
organization. To facilitate this scheme, Suarez opened fourteen domestic bank accounts
across three states in the names of fake businesses; laundered the money through these
accounts using wire transfers, cashiers’ checks, and foreign bank transfers; and ultimately
wired the money to South Africa. Eventually, Suarez was arrested, and a grand jury
indicted him on multiple charges. He pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to
commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The District Court
sentenced Suarez to 60 months’ imprisonment, followed by three years’ supervised
release, and ordered him to pay $263,132.96 in restitution. Suarez timely noticed this
appeal.
II. DISCUSSION1
Suarez argues the District Court erred by (1) applying the sophisticated-laundering
enhancement to his sentence under U.S.S.G. § 2S1.1(b)(3); (2) rejecting his request for an
1 The District Court had jurisdiction under 18 U.S.C. § 3231. We have jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 18 U.S.C. § 3742(a). We review the District Court’s
application of the sophisticated-laundering enhancement and rejection of the acceptance-
of-responsibility reduction for clear error. United States v. Fish, 731 F.3d 277, 279 (3d

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acceptance-of-responsibility reduction pursuant to U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a); and (3) mistaking
a then-pending state court charge as a conviction when assessing the need for specific
deterrence. We reject each of these arguments.
First, the sophisticated-laundering enhancement provides a two-level offense level
enhancement “[i]f . . . the offense involved sophisticated money laundering.” U.S.S.G.
§ 2S1.1(b)(3). The enhancement applies to “complex or intricate” schemes, “typically
involve[ing] the use of—(i) fictitious entities; (ii) shell corporations; (iii) two or more
levels (i.e., layering) of transactions . . . ; or (iv) offshore financial accounts.” Id. cmt.
n.5(A). These characteristics are illustrative, not exhaustive, and the enhancement’s
application turns on whether a scheme as a whole evinces attributes of sophisticated
laundering, not whether a defendant’s conduct was itself sophisticated. See United States
v. Fish, 731 F.3d 277, 280 (3d Cir. 2013). The District Court found that Suarez “both
received from and sent money to offshore accounts,” that “many of the transactions that
he conducted were multilayered,” and that the scheme was conducted “under the guise
of” legitimate business activity. App. 66. These factual findings evidence a sophisticated
money laundering scheme, and the District Court did not err by applying the
enhancement.
Second, we discern no error in the District Court’s refusal to apply an acceptance-
of-responsibility reduction to Suarez’s sentence. A court may reduce a defendant’s base
Cir. 2013); United States v. Mercado, 81 F.4th 352, 355 n.1 (3d Cir. 2023). Because
Suarez did not object to the District Court’s consideration of his pending charge, we
review that claim for plain error. United States v. Brito, 979 F.3d 185, 190 (3d Cir.
2020).

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offense level by two levels if the defendant, by a preponderance of the evidence, “clearly
demonstrates acceptance of responsibility for his offense.” U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1(a). In
reviewing the application of this reduction, we afford “the District Court ‘great
deference’ because it [is] ‘in a unique position to evaluate a defendant’s acceptance of
responsibility.’” United States v. Mercado, 81 F.4th 352, 360 (3d Cir. 2023) (quoting
United States v. Boone, 279 F.3d 163, 193 (3d Cir. 2002)). Here, the District Court found
that Suarez “routinely shifts blame to [a co-conspirator] and highlights how little
monetary gain he incurred from his participation in the scheme.” App. 68. Because the
record supports this finding, the District Court did not err by refusing to apply the
reduction here. See United States v. Dullum, 560 F.3d 133, 142 (3d Cir. 2009).
Finally, Suarez argues the District Court’s mistaken finding—that he “was
convicted of at least one prior crime of deception,” namely, theft by deception, so that
there was “at least some need for specific deterrence,” App. 83—amounts to plain error.
As it turns out, at the time of sentencing, Suarez had not been convicted of that crime, but
only faced a pending charge in New Jersey state court for theft by deception. We review
for plain error, see supra n.1, and the District Court’s mistake was error, plain and
obvious, as the Government concedes, see Answering Br. 21; United States v. Brito, 979
F.3d 185, 191 (3d Cir. 2020). But in conducting plain error review, we will vacate a
sentence only where the error, in addition to being plain or obvious, also both prejudiced
the defendant’s substantial rights and would “seriously affect the fairness, integrity, or
public reputation of judicial proceedings” if left uncorrected. Brito, 979 F.3d at 190
(citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 732−37 (1993)). Although the District

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Court clearly erred, its error did not affect the integrity of Suarez’s sentence. District
courts may consider “underlying conduct” that “the PSR adequately details,” United
States v. Berry, 553 F.3d 273, 284 (3d Cir. 2009), so even in the absence of its error, the
District Court could have considered the facts underlying Suarez’s pending charge when
evaluating the need for specific deterrence. And, here, the District Court sentenced
Suarez to 60 months’ imprisonment, on the low end of the 57-to-71 months Guidelines
range. Suarez has not shown that the District Court’s error prejudiced his substantial
rights, and we therefore will not vacate for plain error.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment.

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