Michael A. Rivera v. New Castle County Police Department

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 24-1338
____________
MICHAEL A. RIVERA,
Appellant
v.
NEW CASTLE COUNTY POLICE DEPARTMENT;
CORPORAL ANDREW ROSAIO; OFFICER JOSEPH
MIHALYI; SERGEANT BRADLEY LANDIS;
OFFICER KENNETH GUARINO; MASTER CORPORAL
SILVIO MARTIN
____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Delaware
(District Court No. 1:20-cv-01758)
District Judge: Honorable Gregory B. Williams
____________
Argued on July 7, 2025
____________
Before: RESTREPO, BIBAS, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Filed: August 19, 2025)

-- 1 of 10 --

2
Sophie Davish
Forrest Lovett
Will W. Sachse
Dechert
2929 Arch Street
18th Floor, Cira Centre
Philadelphia, PA 19104
William Rider [ARGUED]
University of Pennsylvania
Penn Carey Law
3501 Sansom Street
Philadelphia, PA 19104
Counsel for Appellant
Daniel A. Griffith [ARGUED]
Whiteford Taylor & Preston
600 N King Street, Suite 300
Wilmington, DE 19801
Counsel for Appellee
____________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
CHUNG, Circuit Judge.
Michael Rivera filed a complaint against the New
Castle County Police Department (“NCCPD”) and several

-- 2 of 10 --

3
John Doe officers. The John Does were later identified
(“Officer Defendants”) and Rivera added them in an amended
complaint. The District Court granted the Officer Defendants’
motion to dismiss, determining that the amended complaint
was untimely and did not relate back to Rivera’s original
complaint under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). Because the District
Court did not apply the correct standard in determining
whether the amendment related back, we will vacate and
remand.
I. BACKGROUND
On December 23, 2020, Rivera filed a complaint against
“New [C]astle [C]ounty PD, officers, Detectives, Turnkey
officers Doe.” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 2 at 1. Rivera alleged that
the police officers violated his constitutional rights during a
traffic stop and subsequent search. Because Rivera was a
prisoner proceeding in forma pauperis, the District Court
screened his complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and
§ 1915A(a). The District Court found that Rivera appeared to
allege “cognizable Fourth Amendment and excessive force
claims against the Doe Defendants[,]” but that the claim
against the NCCPD was “legally frivolous[.]” Dist. Ct. Dkt.
No. 9 at 5. The District Court therefore dismissed the claim
against the NCCPD but in “the interests of justice” directed
service against the NCCPD solely to identify the Doe
Defendants. Id.
The NCCPD responded to that order on November 12,
2021, identifying the Doe Defendants as Corporal Andrew
Rosaio, Officer Joseph Mihalyi, Sergeant Bradley Landis,
Officer Kenneth Guarino, and Master Corporal Silvio Martin.
The NCCPD also filed four documents: a complaint Rivera

-- 3 of 10 --

4
filed with the NCCPD the day after his arrest identifying
Officer Mihalyi (spelled “Mahalley”), Master Corporal Martin,
and an unknown individual as participating in his arrest; two
undated Exoneration Letters from the NCCPD which identified
Rosaio as the unknown individual and also named Officers
Martin and Master Corporal Mihalyi; and the transcript of the
preliminary hearing in Rivera’s state court criminal
proceedings, in which Sergeant Landis and Officer Guarino
(spelled “Quarino”) were identified.
Rivera moved to amend the case caption to add the
Officer Defendants on December 6, 2021. On December 28,
2021, the District Court granted Rivera’s motion and directed
service on the Officer Defendants. The Officer Defendants
moved to dismiss the claim on March 22, 2022, arguing that
the complaint was untimely because amending the complaint
to add the Officer Defendants did not “relate back” to the filing
date of the original complaint.1 Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 34 at 17-21.
In so moving, the Officer Defendants asked the District Court
to take judicial notice of the four documents filed by the
NCCPD. They argued that these documents established that
Rivera knew their names when he filed his original complaint
and made no mistake when he chose not to name them as
defendants. They argued that accordingly, Rivera’s amended
complaint did not relate back to the original under Rule 15(c).
The District Court granted the motion to dismiss,
concluding that the amended complaint was untimely because
1 The parties agree that Rivera filed his initial complaint
within the two-year statute of limitations. Opening Br. at 3;
Response Br. at 2.

-- 4 of 10 --

5
Rivera “indisputably knew” the names of the Officer
Defendants when he filed his original complaint. Dist. Ct. Dkt.
Nos. 42 at 8. It thus concluded that the amended complaint did
not relate back under Rule 15(c). Id. Rivera filed a motion to
reconsider, which the District Court denied. Rivera timely
appealed.
II. DISCUSSION2
Rule 15(c) “governs when an amended pleading ‘relates
back’ to the date of a timely filed original pleading and is thus
itself timely even though it was filed outside an applicable
statute of limitations.” Krupski v. Costa Crociere S.p.A., 560
U.S. 538, 541 (2010). Under Rule 15, a plaintiff may change
the name of the party against whom claims are asserted only if
(1) “the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of
the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out—or attempted
to be set out—in the original pleading;” and (2) within the
ninety-day time period for serving a defendant after a
complaint is filed provided by Rule 4(m), “the party to be
brought in by amendment ... received such notice of the action
that it will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits and ...
knew or should have known that the action would have been
2 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. “We
review a district court’s decision granting a motion to dismiss
under a plenary standard,” including “a district court’s
interpretation and application of Rule 15(c), and the dismissal
of a claim based on the statute of limitations.” Fowler v.
UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 206 (3d Cir. 2009); Glover v.
Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., 698 F.3d 139, 144 (3d Cir. 2012)
(internal citation omitted).

-- 5 of 10 --

6
brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper
party's identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c). In Krupski, the
Supreme Court addressed Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii)’s requirement
that “the party to be brought in by amendment … knew or
should have known that the action would have been brought
against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party’s
identity.” 560 U.S. at 541 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed.
R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)). The Court specified that “Rule
15(c)(1)(C)(ii) asks what the prospective defendant knew or
should have known during the Rule 4(m) period, not what the
plaintiff knew or should have known at the time of filing her
original complaint.” Id. at 548 (emphasis in original).
The District Court did not follow Krupski. Instead, the
District Court took judicial notice of Rivera’s complaint to the
NCCPD, the exoneration letters, and the preliminary hearing
transcript to conclude that “Plaintiff indisputably knew the
identities of Defendants when he filed the Complaint and,
therefore, the amendment inserting them in place of the John
Does did not relate back to the Complaint[.]” Dist. Ct. Dkt.
No. 42 at 8.3 But focusing on Rivera’s knowledge was
improper, as “the question under Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) is what
the [Officer Defendants]” knew or should have known in light
of Rivera’s mistake. Krupski, 560 U.S. at 553-54. This error
was not harmless as the Officer Defendants had actual
knowledge that they were being sued, despite Rivera’s original
3 The parties agree that the other requirements of Rule
15(c) are met.

-- 6 of 10 --

7
mistake in failing to name them, in the requisite period.4 This
is evident from the fact that counsel entered an appearance on
their behalf on March 3, 2022, within the ninety-day Rule 4(m)
period.5 Given their knowledge, under a straightforward
application of Rule 15(c) and Krupski, the amended complaint
does relate back to the original and was timely filed.
In the alternative, in considering Rivera’s knowledge,
the District Court may have been determining whether Rivera
made a mistake, pursuant to the second clause of Rule 15(c).
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C)(ii) (an amended complaint relates
4 Thus, even if the District Court were considering
Rivera’s knowledge to resolve whether the Officer Defendants
knew or should have reasonably known that they were the
proper defendants but for Rivera’s mistake (which is not clear
from the opinion), we would still vacate.
5 In this case, the Rule 4(m) period began to run on
December 28, 2021, since that was when the court finished
screening Rivera’s complaint and ordered service of the
amended complaint on the Officer Defendants. The parties do
not dispute the District Court’s conclusion that the ninety-day
period under Rule 4(m) thus concluded on March 27, 2022.
See Rivera Br. at 12; Tr. at 14:47-15:03 (“[W]e don’t dispute
[the District Court’s] finding” of notice to the defendants);
Urrutia v. Harrisburg Cnty. Police Dep’t, 91 F.3d 451, 453-54
(3d Cir. 1996) (noting that the time period for relation back of
an amended complaint is suspended while a court screens a
complaint, but that when the court orders service of the
amended complaint, the suspension ends and the Rule 4(m)
period begins to run); Dist. Ct. Dkt. No. 17.

-- 7 of 10 --

8
back to the original, when among other things, there was “a
mistake concerning the proper party’s identity.”). We have
previously held that, for purposes of Rule 15, a plaintiff’s
ignorance of a defendant’s identity is a mistake. Singletary v.
Pa. Dep't. of Corr., 266 F.3d 186, 201 (3d Cir. 2001). Here,
Rivera stated in his original and amended complaint that
“multiple defendants” had “yet to be identified” and that he
was “in the process of requesting” more information. Dist. Ct.
Dkt. Nos. 2 at 1, 8 at 1. The Officer Defendants contested this
in their motion to dismiss by offering the four documents filed
by the NCCPD and arguing that Rivera had actual knowledge
of their names yet did not name them. 6 In that case, knowledge
would be relevant to determining whether or not Rivera did
make a mistake.
At best, the four documents offered by the Officer
Defendants created a factual dispute regarding Rivera’s
knowledge of their identities, establishing that Rivera had
knowledge of their identities at the time the documents were
created. The District Court imputed that knowledge to Rivera
at the time he filed his original complaint, despite the fact that
approximately two years had elapsed, Rivera was incarcerated
at that time, and he stated in both his complaint and a
supplement to his complaint that he did not know the Officer
Defendants’ names. In other words, the District Court made
an inference in a light less favorable to Rivera.
6 In Krupski, the Supreme Court suggested, as have we,
that a mistake is not committed when a plaintiff knows a
defendant’s identity and strategically chooses not to name that
person. Krupski, 560 U.S. at 549. We need not decide that
here.

-- 8 of 10 --

9
The District Court improperly resolved this factual
dispute in granting the motion to dismiss as untimely. “In this
circuit … we permit a limitations defense to be raised by a
motion under Rule 12(b)(6) only if the time alleged in the
statement of a claim shows that the cause of action has not been
brought within the statute of limitations. However, if the bar
is not apparent on the face of the complaint, then it may not
afford the basis for a dismissal of the complaint under Rule
12(b)(6).” Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 (3d Cir. 2014)
(internal quotations, citations, and brackets omitted). Despite
the fact that Rivera plainly stated in his complaint that he did
not know the Officer Defendants’ identities, the District Court
found that “Plaintiff indisputably knew the identities of
Defendants when he filed the Complaint[.]” Dist. Ct. Dkt. No.
42 at 8. At the motion to dismiss stage, the District Court was
obligated to “accept all factual allegations as true, construe the
complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, and
determine whether, under any reasonable reading of the
complaint, the plaintiff may be entitled to relief.” Phillips v.
Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 231 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting
Pinker v. Roche Holdings Ltd., 292 F.3d 361, 374 n.7 (3d Cir.
2002)). This is so even when facts in judicially noticed
documents conflict with those in the complaint. Doe v.
Princeton Univ., 30 F.4th 335, 342 (3d Cir. 2022) (“When the
truth of facts in an ‘integral’ document are contested by the
well-pleaded facts of a complaint, the facts in the complaint
must prevail.”).7
7 We note that, while knowledge may have been relevant
to the mistake alleged here, it would not necessarily have been
dispositive. Under Krupski, a plaintiff may have full
knowledge of a defendant’s identity and yet still mistakenly

-- 9 of 10 --

10
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we will vacate and remand
the District Court’s order denying the motion for
reconsideration of the motion to dismiss for proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
fail to name the defendant. Krupski, 560 U.S. at 549, 554-55
(determining that knowing the identity of the defendant, but
misunderstanding the role the defendant played “in the events
giving rise to the claim at issue” is “clearly a mistake
concerning the proper party’s identity.” (internal quotations
omitted)).

-- 10 of 10 --