Josue Roman Sanchez v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA On Petition for Review of a Decision of…

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
____________
No. 24-2279
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JOSUE ROMAN SANCHEZ,
Petitioner
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
___________
On Petition for Review of a
Decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA-1: A204-600-853)
Immigration Judge: Adrian N. Armstrong
___________
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
March 10, 2025
___________
Before: SHWARTZ, RESTREPO, and CHUNG, Circuit
Judges
(Filed: August 15, 2025)

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___________
OPINION
___________
Michael G. Brucki
Law Office of Michael G. Brucki
911 N Wood Avenue
Linden, NJ 07036
Counsel for Petitioner
Erik R. Quick
Jonathan A. Robbins
Yaakov M. Roth
United States Department of Justice
Office of Immigration Litigation
P.O. Box 878
Ben Franklin Station
Washington, DC 20044
Counsel for Respondent
RESTREPO, Circuit Judge
Josue Roman Sanchez, a native and citizen of Mexico,
petitions this Court for review of the denial of his applications
for asylum, withholding from removal, protection under the
Convention Against Torture (CAT), and cancellation of
removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) did not
abuse its discretion in finding that Sanchez waived his
challenges to the denial of asylum, withholding of removal,
and CAT protection, rendering the claims unexhausted below
and unreviewable by this Court. We also agree with the BIA

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that Sanchez failed to raise a meritorious issue of law in
challenging the denial of his cancellation of removal. In
addition, we hold the BIA properly rejected Sanchez’s Fifth
Amendment due process claim. We will therefore dismiss in
part and deny in part his petition for review.
I.
Sanchez was born in Mexico in 1997 and illegally
entered the United States in 2000. Between June 2019 and
December 2021, Sanchez was charged with an array of crimes,
including arrests for assault by automobile, aggravated driving
while intoxicated, theft, and drug offenses. In August and
December 2021, he was convicted of driving under the
influence (DUI) pursuant to Pennsylvania and New Jersey
laws, respectively.
In June 2023, the Department of Homeland Security
(DHS) detained Sanchez and charged him as removable under
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i). Sanchez conceded the
removability charge. In July 2023, he applied for asylum,
statutory withholding of removal, and CAT protection. In
January 2024, Sanchez applied for cancellation of removal
under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1).
Sanchez appeared before the Immigration Judge (IJ) for
a merits hearing on March 20, 2024. Regarding the application
for cancellation of removal, the IJ found that Sanchez failed to
rebut the presumption that he lacked good moral character due
to his DUI convictions or demonstrate that his removal would
cause sufficient hardship for his wife, whom he married while
in immigration detention. Deeming their testimony
unnecessary, the IJ declined to have Sanchez’s psychologist
and wife testify as witnesses, choosing instead to rely on the

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reports and exhibits submitted as evidence.1 On April 3, 2024,
the IJ denied all forms of relief.
Sanchez appealed to the BIA, which dismissed the
appeal on July 8, 2024. The BIA deemed waived any issue
regarding the denial of his asylum, withholding from removal,
and CAT protection applications. It agreed with the IJ that the
DUI convictions precluded a finding that Sanchez possessed
good moral character. It also denied Sanchez’s due process
claim, concluding that he was afforded a “full and fair hearing”
before the IJ. A8. Sanchez petitioned this Court, seeking
review of the denial of his application for relief.
This Court has jurisdiction to review the Agency’s
rulings under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). Because the BIA issued a
separate opinion that incorporated only some aspects of the IJ’s
decision, this Court must review both decisions. See Voci v.
Gonzales, 409 F.3d 607, 613 (3d Cir. 2005) (directing the Court
to review both IJ and BIA opinions if the opinions address
different aspects of the petitioner’s claims).
1 The record included, among other things, the psychologist’s
thirty-page report that outlined Sanchez’s mental health
conditions and their linkage to his abusive use of alcohol. The
record also included a report of the physical and psychological
conditions suffered by his wife, including her diagnoses of
depression, anxiety, and polycystic ovarian syndrome. In
addition to the reports, the record included several letters from
Sanchez’s counselors, wife, family, and friends discussing his
participation in rehabilitation and counseling.

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II.
First, the BIA did not abuse its discretion in deeming
Sanchez’s claims for asylum, withholding of removal, and CAT
protection waived. Because Sanchez failed to exhaust these
claims before the BIA, we lack jurisdiction to review them
now.
We may review final orders of removal “only if . . . the
[petitioner] has exhausted all administrative remedies available
to the [petitioner] as of right.” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1). To fully
exhaust administrative remedies, a petitioner must challenge
the IJ’s determinations denying relief in its appeal to the BIA.
Lin v. Att’y Gen., 543 F.3d 114, 120–21 (3d Cir. 2008); see also
Abdulrahman v. Ashcroft, 330 F.3d 587, 594–95 (3d Cir. 2003)
(petitioner must “raise . . . each claim or ground for relief”
before the BIA). Even issues raised before the BIA may be
deemed waived and precluded from review if a petitioner fails
to “meaningfully challenge[]” an IJ’s decision. Uddin v. Att’y
Gen., 870 F.3d 282, 287–88 (3d Cir. 2017). We review the
BIA’s waiver determinations for an abuse of discretion. See id.
at 288. If deeming a claim waived was a proper act of
discretion, the petitioner has not exhausted all available
remedies, and the claim may not be reviewed by this Court.
Here, the IJ barred Sanchez’s asylum application
because it was filed in 2023, twenty-three years after he first
arrived in the United States and therefore well past the one-
year deadline. 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(B). The IJ rejected
Sanchez’s argument that changed conditions in Mexico either
justified the delay in filing or qualified as an exception to the
one-year time limit under 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)(2)(D). On appeal
to the BIA, Sanchez did not challenge the barring of his asylum
application, either in his notice of appeal or in his brief to the

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BIA. Because the BIA did not abuse its discretion in finding
this claim waived, it is unreviewable on appeal.2 Uddin, 870
F.3d at 288; see also Zheng v. Gonzales, 422 F.3d 98, 107–08
(3d Cir. 2017).
For the withholding claim, the IJ concluded that
Sanchez failed to show that it was more likely than not that he
would face persecution based on his identity as an
Americanized Mexican, or that he had faced past persecution
in Mexico. For the CAT claim, the IJ found Sanchez failed to
demonstrate that he faced a personalized risk of torture as an
Americanized Mexican, or that officials in Mexico would
acquiesce to any such torture. As with his asylum claim, the
BIA did not abuse its discretion in ruling that Sanchez failed to
meaningfully challenge the IJ’s determinations, by not raising
the issue in the notice of appeal or his briefing, and thereby
waived any claim of error. We will thus not review these
withholding and CAT claims on appeal. See Santos-Zacaria v.
Garland, 598 U.S. 411, 416, 423 (2023) (holding, subject to
waiver and forfeiture principles, § 1252(d)(1) allows a court to
2 To the extent Sanchez asserts the IJ failed to consider the
“other serious harm” he would face if removed to
Mexico, see AR 11-14 (Pet. Br. before the BIA); Pet. Br. at 36-
28, and does so in an effort to seek a humanitarian asylum
claim, it fails because he did not establish past persecution, a
necessary element for such a claim. See 8 C.F.R. §
1208.13(b)(1)(iii)(A)-(B); Al-Fara v. Gonzales, 404 F.3d 733,
740 (3d Cir. 2005) (holding that, because an applicant failed to
establish past persecution, his claim for humanitarian asylum
also failed). Thus, the BIA correctly rejected his claim for
humanitarian asylum.

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review final immigration orders only after administrative
remedies are fully exhausted).3
We will thus dismiss Sanchez’s petition as to these
claims.
III.
Regarding the denial of Sanchez’s application for
cancellation of removal, the BIA agreed with the IJ’s
conclusion that his “multiple drunk driving [] convictions
preclude him from establishing the requisite good moral
character.” A8. Because we conclude that substantial evidence
supports the BIA’s determination that Sanchez lacked good
moral character to avail himself of cancellation of removal, we
will deny the petition.
To qualify for cancellation of removal, 8 U.S.C. §
1229b(b)(1) requires the removable individual to show, inter
alia, that he “has been a person of good moral character”
during at least a ten-year continuous period within the United
States. See 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(1)(A-B).4 Multiple DUI
3 Even if we were to entertain the claims raised before this
Court, we would conclude that the IJ properly found Sanchez
was not entitled to relief. Before the IJ, Sanchez did not
provide any proof beyond mere speculation that he would be
subjected to torture or persecution on account of being an
Americanized Mexican upon removal to Mexico.
4 Section 1229b(b)(1)(A-D) allows for cancellation of
removal if the individual:

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convictions during the ten-year statutory period of § 1229b
“are strong evidence that an alien lacked good moral character
(A) has been physically present in the United
States for a continuous period of not less than 10
years immediately preceding the date of such
application;
(B) has been a person of good moral character
during such period;
(C) has not been convicted of an offense under
section 1182(a)(2), 1227(a)(2), or 1227(a)(3) of
this title, subject to paragraph (5); and
(D) establishes that removal would result in
exceptional and extremely unusual hardship to
the alien’s spouse, parent, or child, who is a
citizen of the United States or an alien lawfully
admitted for permanent residence.
The BIA did not address Sanchez’s additional claim under 8
U.S.C. § 1229b(1)(D) that his United States citizen wife would
suffer exceptional and extremely unusual hardship upon his
removal. The IJ determined that Sanchez did not demonstrate
she would suffer hardship beyond what would ordinarily result
from a relative’s removal. We need not address this hardship
determination because the good moral character determination
is dispositive. See INS v. Bagamasbad, 429 U.S. 24, 25 (1976)
(“As a general rule courts and agencies are not required to
make findings on issues the decision of which is unnecessary
to the results they reach.”).

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during that time and is thus not eligible for cancellation of
removal.” In re Castillo-Perez, 27 I. & N. Dec. 664, 669 (A.G.
2019). Yet Castillo-Perez established a “rebuttable
presumption” of a lack of such character, allowing the
removable person to present “substantial relevant and []
contrary evidence” that he “had good moral character even
during the period within which he committed the DUI
offenses” and that the offenses “were an aberration.” Id. at
665, 671.
The IJ found that Sanchez failed to rebut the
presumption that he lacked good moral character where his
four DUI arrests occurred in three states over the course of 19
months and “were exacerbated by motor vehicle accidents with
other cars, high blood alcohol content, [and] driving at high
rates of speed.” AR 66. On appeal to the BIA, Sanchez argued
that he could have rebutted that presumption had he been
allowed to present his wife and psychologist as witnesses at his
merits hearing.
Generally, we have jurisdiction to review constitutional
claims and questions of law but not the judgments denying
discretionary relief from removal, including decisions
regarding cancellation of removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b).
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), (D); Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S.
328, 347 (2022). In Wilkinson v. Garland, the United States
Supreme Court determined that the question of whether an
applicant demonstrated “exceptional and extremely unusual
hardship” for purposes of establishing eligibility for
cancellation of removal was judicially reviewable because it
was a “mixed question of law and fact,” that required an IJ to
apply factual findings to a legal standard. 601 U.S. 209, 221,
225 (2024) (Wilkinson I). By contrast, in Patel, the Court held
that factual determinations, including those involving witness

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credibility, are not reviewable. 596 U.S. at 334, 340. Like the
hardship standard in Wilkinson I and unlike the factual
determinations in Patel, the good moral character standard is
an “application of a legal standard to undisputed or established
facts,” and thus, reviewable. See Wilkinson I, 601 U.S. at 221
(quoting Guerrero-Lasprilla v. Barr, 589 U.S. 221, 234
(2020)). We review the good moral character determination
under a substantial evidence standard. See Wilkinson v. Att’y
Gen., 131 F.4th 134, 138–40 (3d Cir. 2025) (applying the
substantial evidence standard to the “exceptional and
extremely unusual hardship” determination) (Wilkinson
II). Sanchez was convicted of multiple DUI offenses between
2019 and 2021 in multiple states. His scholastic achievements
and rehabilitative efforts are insufficient to rebut the
presumption that he did not have good moral
character, because the record shows that the DUI convictions
were not an “aberration” given their frequency. A8 (BIA’s
Op.); AR 67 (IJ’s Op.), 199, 201, 341. Accordingly, substantial
evidence supports the determination that Sanchez did not
demonstrate good moral character to qualify for cancellation
of removal.
To the extent Sanchez is raising a legal argument that he
was deprived the opportunity to present witnesses to rebut the
presumption, in violation of his due process rights, we join the
BIA in rejecting this claim. See Serrano-Alberto v. Att’y Gen.,
859 F.3d 208, 213 (3d Cir. 2017) (explaining that the Fifth
Amendment guarantees an individual in removal proceedings
the opportunity to be meaningfully heard and reasonably
present their case). The BIA properly concluded that Sanchez
did not establish how his wife’s and psychologist’s testimony
would have rebutted the IJ’s finding, or that they would have
provided information not already contained in the report and

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statements submitted as exhibits. For this reason, Sanchez
failed to prove that he suffered substantial prejudice, which is
fatal to his Fifth Amendment claim. See id.; see also
Bonhometre v. Gonzalez, 414 F.3d 442, 448 (3d Cir. 2008)
(explaining that due process claim requires a showing of
substantial prejudice). Because we agree no legal error
occurred, we will deny the petition for review regarding the
denial of his cancellation of removal.
Because the claim regarding the denial of Sanchez’s
cancellation of removal application necessarily addresses the
merits of his due process claim, we need not address the alleged
Fifth Amendment violation except to reiterate that he failed to
prove he suffered substantial prejudice. Sanchez’s failure to
establish that the exclusion of his wife’s and psychologist’s
testimony before the IJ caused him prejudice is dispositive of
his constitutional claim. Jarbough v. Att’y Gen., 483 F.3d 184,
192 (3d Cir. 2007) (citing Singh v. Gonzales, 432 F.3d 533, 541
(3d Cir. 2006)).
IV.
For the above reasons, we will therefore dismiss in part
and deny in part the petition for review.

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