Jason Jorjani v. New Jersey Institute of Technology

PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
_____________
No. 24-2588
_____________
JASON JORJANI,
Appellant
v.
NEW JERSEY INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY;
JOEL S. BLOOM;
KEVIN J. BELFIELD;
FADI P. DEEK;
HOLLY STERN;
CHRISTINE LI
_____________
On Appeal from the United States District Court for the
District of New Jersey
(D.C. Civil Nos. 2:18-cv-11693 and 2:20-cv-01422)
District Judge: Honorable William J. Martini
____________
Argued July 9, 2025
Before: KRAUSE, MATEY, and PHIPPS, Circuit Judges

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(Filed: September 8, 2025)
_____________
Frederick C. Kelly, III [ARGUED]
One Harriman Square
P.O. Box 60
Goshen, NY 10924
Counsel for Appellant
Connor E. Bradley
Marc D. Haefner [ARGUED]
Tricia B. O’Reilly
Eric S. Padilla
Walsh Pizzi O’Reilly & Falanga
100 Mulberry Street
Three Gateway Center, 15th Floor
Newark, NJ 07102
Counsel for Appellee
___________
OPINION OF THE COURT
____________
MATEY, Circuit Judge.
New Jersey Institute of Technology declined to renew a
lecturer’s contract based on his private comments about race,
politics, and immigration. But NJIT’s regulation of speech
outside the classroom and off the campus is subject to the
restraints of the First Amendment, and the school documented
no disruption to its educational mission. So we will reverse the
District Court’s judgment.

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I.
NJIT hired Jason Jorjani in 2015 to teach philosophy,
and twice renewed his contract in 2016 and 2017. During this
time, Jorjani “formed the Alt Right Corporation,” to “widen
the message of his philosophy, which he describes as an
affirmation of the Indo-European Tradition” and “the idea that
European cultures are intimately related to those of Greater
Iran and the Persianate World, Hindu India and the Buddhist
East and are the sources the [sic] world’s greatest scientific,
artistic and spiritual developments.” App. 106. He spoke at
conferences and published an essay titled “Against Perennial
Philosophy” on “AltRight.com,” a website he helped found. In
the essay, he argued that “human racial equality” is a “left-
wing myth” and that a great “Promethean” “mentality” rests on
a “genetic basis” which “Asians, Arabs, Africans, and
other non-Aryan peoples” lack. App. 662, 668. The essay also
argued that, through “genetic engineering” and eugenic
“embryo selection,” Iran could produce great philosophers by
“restor[ing] the pre-Arab and pre-Mongol genetic character of
the majority of the Iranian population within only one or two
generations.” App. 669. Jorjani did not discuss these outside
associations with his students or colleagues, nor did he disclose
them as required by NJIT policy.
Then, in 2017, a person posing as a graduate student
contacted Jorjani to discuss “how the Left persecutes and
silences Right wing thought in academia.” App. 104–05. But
he was working with a group called “Hope Not Hate,” whose
goal is to “deconstruct[]” individuals it deems “fascist” or
“extremist.” App. 104. The two met at a pub where the
undercover operative recorded their conversations, at first with

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Jorjani’s consent. But later, apparently assuming the recording
had stopped, Jorjani commented on matters concerning race,
immigration, and politics. The meeting became a piece
published by the New York Times featuring a video excerpt
from Jorjani’s remarks at a conference characterizing
“liberalism, democracy, and universal human rights” as “ill-
conceived and bankrupt sociopolitical ideologies,”1 before
cutting to the secretly recorded portion of Jorjani’s
conversation where he predicts “[w]e will have a Europe, in
2050, where the banknotes have Adolf Hitler, Napoleon
Bonaparte, Alexander the Great. And Hitler will be seen like
that: like Napoleon, like Alexander, not like some weird
monster, who is unique in his own category.” App. 407–08.
The day after the Times piece was published, NJIT’s
President emailed all faculty and staff, denouncing Jorjani’s
statements as “antithetical” to NJIT’s “core values.” App. 412.2
NJIT’s Dean of the College of Science and Liberal Arts sent a
separate email echoing those sentiments. In the following days,
NJIT received some unverified number of calls and, at most,
fifty emails expressing concern about Jorjani’s recorded
1 Jesse Singal, Opinion, Undercover With the Alt-Right,
N.Y. Times (Sept. 19, 2017), https://perma.cc/52T9-KGTM.
2 Following the New York Times’ article, Hope Not
Hate “launched a campaign” gathering signatures to support its
petition “calling on the NJIT to fire their fascist employee.”
App. 411. NJIT learned about the “Facebook campaign” from
a professor at Yale, who encouraged NJIT to “get
out . . . ahead” of the petition. App. 411. NJIT’s President
authorized a response to the Yale professor, denouncing
Jorjani’s views as “repugnant” and noting that NJIT was
“acting on the matter.” App. 730.

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comments and his membership on the faculty. Faculty chimed
in too, highlighting the content of Jorjani’s “Against Perennial
Philosophy” essay.
Six days after the New York Times posted the article,
NJIT sent a letter to Jorjani placing him on paid leave,
explaining the article 1) “caused significant disruption at the
university” that NJIT believed would “continue to expand,”
and 2) revealed “association with organizations” that Jorjani
did not disclose on his outside activity form, despite prior
direction to fully update the form the preceding Spring. App.
542. The letter advised Jorjani that NJIT planned to investigate
whether he had violated university policies or State ethics
requirements.
Fallout continued with NJIT’s Department of Biology
penning a statement published in the student newspaper
asserting “Jorjani’s beliefs, as revealed by his remarks, cannot
help but produce a discriminatory and intimidating educational
environment for [NJIT’s] diverse student body.” App. 708. The
Faculty Senate followed suit, releasing an “Official Faculty
Senate Statement,” explaining that “NJIT is a university that
embraces diversity and sees that diversity as a source of
strength. The NJIT Faculty Senate finds racist pronouncements
made by University Lecturer Jason Reza Jorjani to be morally
repugnant. Hate and bigotry have no place on the NJIT
campus.” App. 710–11. The Department of History also joined
the fray, demanding Jorjani’s termination and asserting his
“published beliefs create a hostile learning environment for
students of color in particular.” App. 714.
As this occurred, NJIT retained a law firm to investigate
whether Jorjani had disclosed his outside activities, or engaged

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in practices “that resulted in a conflict of interest with his
responsibilities toward NJIT.” App. 117. The firm’s report
concluded he did, finding Jorjani: 1) “violated the New Jersey
ethics code by failing to disclose that he was a founder,
director, and shareholder of the AltRight Corporation”; 2)
“violated NJIT faculty policy by cancelling 13 classes in the
Spring of 2017,” some of which “were not due to illness as he
suggested” and resulted in negative student evaluations; 3)
erroneously claimed the “video excerpts in the NYT Op-Ed
were misleadingly edited to paint [him] in a false light”; and 4)
“exhibited a clear pattern of non-responsiveness from the time
he started working at NJIT” by neglecting his email inbox.
App. 49. NJIT then elected not to renew Jorjani’s contract.
Jorjani sued NJIT, alleging retaliation in violation of the
First Amendment. During discovery, Jorjani argued that by
disclosing an unprivileged factual report and including its
General Counsel in discussions about his contract, NJIT
waived its attorney-client privilege over all communications
and work product related to his non-renewal. Finding no
waiver, the District Court affirmed the Magistrate Judge’s
ruling denying Jorjani’s request for privileged
communications.3
3 We see no error. The investigative report was not itself
privileged, given it stemmed from a factual investigation and
contained no legal advice. See In re Chevron Corp., 650 F.3d
276, 289 (3d Cir. 2011). And counsel’s participation in
discussions concerning Jorjani’s contract did not result in an
“attempt[] to prove [a] claim or defense by disclosing or
describing an attorney client communication.” Rhone-Poulenc
Rorer Inc. v. Home Indem. Co., 32 F.3d 851, 863 (3d Cir.

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The District Court later granted NJIT’s motion for
summary judgment, concluding that Jorjani’s speech was not
protected by the First Amendment because “Defendants’
interest in mitigating the disruption caused by Plaintiff’s
speech . . . outweighs Plaintiff’s interest in its expression.”
App. 63.4 Seeing error in that conclusion, we will vacate and
remand.5
1994). So the District Court did not abuse its discretion in
concluding NJIT did not waive the attorney-client privilege by
disclosing the report.
4 The District Court did not go further to consider
whether the speech was a substantial or motivating factor in the
alleged retaliation, the same action would have occurred absent
Jorjani’s speech, or NJIT officials were entitled to qualified
immunity. We leave those matters for remand.
5 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
1331 and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We
review the District Court’s grant of summary judgment de
novo, affirming if, after drawing all reasonable inferences for
the nonmoving party, “there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact,” and the moving party “is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law.” Shuker v. Smith & Nephew, PLC, 885 F.3d
760, 770 (3d Cir. 2018) (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a)). And
we review the District Court’s evidentiary rulings, including
waiver of attorney-client privilege, for abuse of discretion. See
Kyriakopoulos v. Maigetter, 121 F.4th 1017, 1020 (3d Cir.
2024).

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II.
The restraints of the First Amendment on public
employment actions arise from caselaw. As we have explained,
“[t]o state a First Amendment retaliation claim, a public
employee plaintiff must allege that his activity is protected by
the First Amendment, and that the protected activity was a
substantial factor in the alleged retaliatory action.” Gorum v.
Sessoms, 561 F.3d 179, 184 (3d Cir. 2009). If those two
requirements are satisfied, the burden shifts and the employer
must show “the same action would have been taken even if the
speech had not occurred.” Dougherty v. Sch. Dist. of
Philadelphia, 772 F.3d 979, 986 (3d Cir. 2014).
A public employee’s speech is protected if 1) “the
employee spoke as a citizen,” 2) his “statement involved a
matter of public concern,” and 3) “the government employer
did not have ‘an adequate justification for treating the
employee differently from any other member of the general
public’ as a result of the statement he made.” Gorum, 561 F.3d
at 185 (quoting Hill v. Borough of Kutztown, 455 F.3d 225,
241–42 (3d Cir. 2006)). In assessing the third prong, we
“balance . . . the interests of the [employee], as a citizen, in
commenting upon matters of public concern and the interest of
the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering
v. Bd. of Ed., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). So “the more
substantially an employee’s speech involves matters of public
concern, the higher the state’s burden will then be to justify
taking action, and vice versa.” Fenico v. City of Philadelphia,
70 F.4th 151, 162 (3d Cir. 2023); see also Dougherty, 772 F.3d
at 991.

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After balancing the parties’ interests, the District Court
concluded Jorjani’s speech was not protected and did not
conduct the rest of the Pickering analysis. Jorjani says 1)
Pickering should not apply to extramural speech or speech
lacking malice, and 2) even if it does, the disruption NJIT
reported cannot outweigh the interest in his off-campus
commentary. His first challenge is beyond our purview, but his
second holds merit.
A.
Jorjani first seeks a new exception to Pickering for
extramural speech or speech void of malice. But the Supreme
Court has uniformly applied Pickering to public employee
speech, even when made during an employee’s spare time. See,
e.g., Lane v. Franks, 573 U.S. 228, 236–38 (2014); City of San
Diego v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 80–81 (2004) (per curiam); see also
MacRae v. Mattos, 145 S. Ct. 2617, 2617–20 (2025) (Thomas,
J., respecting the denial of certiorari). We have followed a
similar course, using Pickering to determine whether a law
enforcement officer’s personal social media posts were
protected, including comments about broader societal topics
like “race, religion, [and] ethnicity.” Fenico, 70 F.4th at 154.
All requiring that we use Pickering here.
Jorjani’s contention that Pickering requires malice also
misreads caselaw. Pickering explained that “absent proof of
false statements knowingly or recklessly made by him, a
teacher’s exercise of his right to speak on issues of public
importance may not furnish the basis for his dismissal from
public employment.” 391 U.S. at 574. But Pickering involved
defamation, occasioning the Court’s malice requirement. Id.
When defamation is not at issue, neither is malice. See, e.g.,

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Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 142–54 (1983); Gorum, 561
F.3d at 184–87.
B.
NJIT’s actions do not pass the ordinary Pickering
analysis on this record. The parties agree that Jorjani spoke as
a private citizen6 on a matter of public concern.7 So we
consider only whether the distractions NJIT identified as
6 We do not foreclose the possibility that the
responsibilities of a public university professor or lecturer may
encompass off-campus speeches and publications in his
capacity as a public employee. Here, however, NJIT argues
that Jorjani was speaking purely as a private citizen, so we need
not address those questions.
7 An agreement we join since speech relating “to any
matter of political, social, or other concern to the community”
is one that involves matters of public concern. Connick v.
Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983). Jorjani’s speech easily falls
within those bounds because it tackles matters of race, which
although “carries the potential to be inflammatory,” Fenico v.
City of Philadelphia, 70 F.4th 151, 165 (3d Cir. 2023), is
speech “inherently of public concern,” id. (quoting Connick,
461 U.S. at 148 n.8); see also Locurto v. Giuliani, 447 F.3d
159, 183 (2d Cir. 2006) (“Whatever our own views of the
quality and prudence of the plaintiffs’ chosen means of
expression, commentary on race is, beyond peradventure,
within the core protections of the First Amendment.”); Snyder
v. Phelps, 562 U.S. 443, 454 (2011) (explaining even speech
“fall[ing] short of refined social or political commentary,” can
still raise issues “of public import”). That conclusion aligns
with NJIT’s decision to immediately join the debate, notifying
the entire faculty of Jorjani’s remarks and denouncing them.

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flowing from Jorjani’s speech outweigh interest in his
discussion. They do not.
1.
Begin with interest in Jorjani’s speech, which cannot
“be considered in a vacuum” as “the manner, time, and place
of the employee’s expression are relevant.” Rankin v.
McPherson, 483 U.S. 378, 388 (1987). Jorjani’s speech
occurred entirely outside NJIT’s academic environs. His
theories, even if lacking in classical rigor, remain of public
import. It matters not that his opinions do not enjoy
majoritarian support, since “the proudest boast of our free
speech jurisprudence is that we protect the freedom to express
‘the thought that we hate.’” Matal v. Tam, 582 U.S. 218, 246
(2017) (quoting United States v. Schwimmer, 279 U.S. 644,
655 (1929) (Holmes, J., dissenting)). All amply showing that
interest in Jorjani’s speeches, writings, and discussions carries
some significance to balance.
2.
Against that interest, we weigh NJIT’s need “as an
employer” to promote “the efficiency of the public services it
performs.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568. NJIT points only to the
“disruption” that followed the publication of Jorjani’s remarks
consisting of certain students’ disapproval of Jorjani’s speech,
disagreement among faculty, and administrators fielding
complaints. Response Br. 46–47. We “typically consider
whether the speech impairs discipline or employee harmony,
has a detrimental impact on close working relationships
requiring personal loyalty and confidence, impedes the
performance of the speaker’s duties, or interferes with the

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enterprise’s regular operations.” Munroe v. Cent. Bucks Sch.
Dist., 805 F.3d 454, 472 (3d Cir. 2015), as amended (Oct. 25,
2019). And we focus mostly on what happened, not what might
have been, because although NJIT can act to prevent future
harms, see id. at 480, and need not “allow events to unfold to
the extent that the disruption of the office and the destruction
of working relationships is manifest,” Connick, 461 U.S. at
152, it must ground predictions in reason, not speculation, see
Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 673 (1994) (plurality);
United States v. Nat’l Treasury Emps. Union, 513 U.S. 454,
475 (1995). The minimal evidence of disruption that NJIT cites
differs little from the ordinary operation of a public university
and therefore cannot outweigh interest in Jorjani’s speech.
First, there is no support for NJIT’s contention that
student disapproval of Jorjani’s speech disrupted the
administration of the university. Some students and alumni
disagreed with Jorjani’s views. But NJIT never identified the
exact number of calls or complaints made in person or writing,
nor any details about the students’ concerns. And although
Jorjani said that he perceived a “huge change in attitude toward
[him] on the part of [his] students,” Supp. App. 3, NJIT points
to no objective evidence that students questioned Jorjani’s
ability to teach, grade, or supervise his classes evenly, beyond
one administrator recalling a student dropped Jorjani’s class.
App. 283. Entirely absent is any evidence of specific student
protests, upheaval, or unwillingness to abide by university
policies. But “in the context of the college classroom,” students
have an “interest in hearing even contrarian views.”
Meriwether v. Hartop, 992 F.3d 492, 510 (6th Cir. 2021); see
also Blum v. Schlegel, 18 F.3d 1005, 1012 (2d Cir. 1994)
(explaining that “the efficient provision of services” by a
university “actually depends, to a degree, on the dissemination

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in public fora of controversial speech”). NJIT’s theory that
student dissent rose to the level of disruption is simply
speculative.
Second, the cited disputes among Jorjani and his
colleagues are not disruption. NJIT cites the pointed letters
denouncing Jorjani published by faculty in the pages of the
student newspaper, but that is precisely the sort of reasoned
debate that distinguishes speech from distraction. And there is
no allegation these editorials, or Jorjani’s belief they were
defamatory and warranted suit, interfered with the ability of
other faculty to fulfill their responsibilities in research,
teaching, or shared governance, or otherwise thwarted the
university’s efforts to educate its students. So although
challenges to “employee harmony” might pose disruption
when disagreements disturb “close working relationships,”
Munroe, 805 F.3d at 472, that concern is irrelevant inside the
university where professors serve the needs of their students,
not fellow academics.8
8 See Munroe, 805 F.3d at 476 n.10 (noting a high
school teacher’s role did not require personal loyalty and
confidence with school administrators); Bauer v. Sampson, 261
F.3d 775, 785 (9th Cir. 2001), as amended (Oct. 15, 2001)
(“[G]iven the nature of academic life, especially at the college
level, it was not necessary that Bauer and the administration
enjoy a close working relationship requiring trust and
respect—indeed anyone who has spent time on college
campuses knows that the vigorous exchange of ideas and
resulting tension between an administration and its faculty is
as much a part of college life as homecoming and final
exams.”).

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That leaves only NJIT’s ordinary obligation to field
calls and emails, routine administrative tasks that, conceivably,
might become so overwhelming in number or nature as to
disrupt. But not here. The record reveals that throughout this
occurrence there were “[p]ossibly” fifty emails received about
Jorjani. App. 388. Calls were so few that NJIT’s witness was
“not sure what the number is,” and only knew “by reading
some emails that so-and-so called the mother, and so-and-so
called, former student called, things of that nature.” App. 390.
All a most minor uptick in communications, if at all, and one
that required no additional staffing to support the single
administrator who handled these inquiries.
While NJIT raises an “interest in providing a non-
denigrating environment,” and appeals to the notion that
Jorjani’s views could, theoretically, undermine the
pedagogical relationship between a teacher and student,
Response Br. 41, it has not pointed to anything in the record
that indicates its determination was based on competence or
qualifications.9 In essence, NJIT posits that because Jorjani
offered views it disliked, the First Amendment should not
apply, and it is entitled to summary judgment. We cannot
agree, lest we permit “universities to discipline professors,
students, and staff any time their speech might cause offense.”
Meriwether, 992 F.3d at 510.
* * *
9 And this case does not implicate a university’s
“discretionary academic determinations” that entail the
“review of [] intellectual work product” or “the qualifications
of faculty members for promotion and tenure.” Kunda v.
Muhlenberg Coll., 621 F.2d 532, 547–48 (3d Cir. 1980)

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On balance, the disruption NJIT described does not
outweigh even minimal interest in Jorjani’s speech, so the
District Court erred in concluding Jorjani’s speech was not
protected by the First Amendment. We will vacate the
judgment and remand for further proceedings consistent with
this opinion.

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