Cordell Young v. JOHN DOE On Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 24-3244
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CORDELL YOUNG,
Appellant
v.
JOHN DOE
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 2:24-cv-04875)
District Judge: Honorable Mark A. Kearney
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Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
on January 26, 2026
Before: BIBAS, CHUNG, and BOVE, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: January 30, 2026)
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___________
OPINION*
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PER CURIAM
Cordell Young appeals pro se from the District Court’s order dismissing his de-
claratory judgment suit for failure to state a claim. We will affirm.
Young was sentenced to life in prison without the possibility of parole after a
Pennsylvania jury found him guilty of first-degree murder in 2007; he was 20 years old at
the time of the offense. In 2024, Young filed a civil rights complaint in the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.1 He
alleged that the Commonwealth’s sentencing statute for first-degree murder, 18 Pa. C.S.
§ 1102(a), is facially unconstitutional under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments be-
cause it “does not permit mitigation evidence before sentencing 18-to-20 year old age
group to life without parole.” See ECF Doc. 2 at 13. Although the United States Su-
preme Court has held that mandatory sentences of life without parole for those
under 18 at the time of their crimes is unconstitutional, see Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S.
460, 465 (2012), Young sought to extend Miller’s holding in reliance upon studies indi-
cating that biological and psychological development continues beyond the age of 18. He
named “John Doe” as the sole defendant, but otherwise provided no information about
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.
1 The complaint was signed by two other prisoners who are serving life sentences,
but the District Court dismissed those plaintiffs without prejudice because they did not
move to proceed in forma pauperis or pay the filing fee.

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that individual. As relief, he sought “an injunction against . . . § 1102(a)” and a “declara-
tory judgment that states [that his] rights under the Eighth Amendment to the United
States Constitution ha[ve] been violated.” See ECF Doc. 2 at 19.
The District Court screened Young’s complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A and dis-
missed it with prejudice sua sponte for failure to state a claim. The court held that
“Young’s life imprisonment without parole is not presently understood to be cruel and
unusual punishment for a twenty-year-old under the Eighth Amendment.” See ECF Doc.
9 at 3. It also reasoned that a “life sentence for first-degree murder does not mean the
state court disregarded mitigation evidence or violated procedural due process, because
the adult offender could otherwise face the death penalty.” See id. at 5. And noting that
“[d]rawing a line at age eighteen is not arbitrary when considering the Supreme Court’s
guidance and national consensus,” the court concluded that Young’s “sentence does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause” either. See id. at 6. Young timely appealed.
We have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo the Dis-
trict Court’s dismissal of Young’s complaint for failure to state a claim under
Section 1915A, accepting as true his factual allegations and drawing all reasonable infer-
ences in his favor. See Dooley v. Wetzel, 957 F.3d 366, 373–74 (3d Cir. 2020) (citing Al-
lah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000)). We may affirm on any basis sup-
ported by the record. See Tourscher v. McCullough, 184 F.3d 236, 240 (3d Cir. 1999).
Young assails the District Court’s merits analysis. But his lawsuit is doomed for a
more fundamental reason: he cannot satisfy the favorable termination rule of Heck v.
Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). Heck provides that, where success in a Section 1983

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action necessarily would imply the invalidity of a conviction or sentence, an individual’s
suit for damages or equitable relief is barred unless he can demonstrate that his convic-
tion or sentence has been overturned or otherwise undone. See id. at 486–87; see also
Edwards v. Balisok, 520 U.S. 641, 648 (1997) (clarifying that Heck also applies to claims
for declaratory relief). Young sought to have the District Court declare Section 1102(a)
unconstitutional. That provision is part of the sentencing scheme that mandates life with-
out parole for defendants convicted of first-degree murder. Although Young did not ex-
pressly seek immediate or speedier release, the inevitable consequence of declaring Sec-
tion 1102(a) unconstitutional is the invalidation of his extant mandatory life sentence. Cf.
Scott v. Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole, 284 A.3d 178, 198 (Pa. 2022) (holding that successful
constitutional challenge to statute prohibiting parole for those convicted of second-degree
murder “would necessarily invalidate the criminal punishment imposed by [Pennsylva-
nia’s] ‘sentencing practices’”). Heck thus means that his claims are not ones “upon
which relief may be granted.” 18 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1).
Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court’s judgment, though we will modify
the order of dismissal to reflect that the claims are dismissed without prejudice. See Curry
v. Yachera, 835 F.3d 373, 379 (3d Cir. 2016) (collecting cases and holding that dismissal
of Heck-barred claims should be without prejudice).

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