Charles Lucarelli v. CHARLES SCHULTZ, Chase Bank Branch Manager On Appeal from the United States…

ALD-013 NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
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No. 25-2200
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CHARLES LUCARELLI,
Appellant
v.
CHARLES SCHULTZ, Chase Bank Branch Manager
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On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. Civil Action No. 1:24-cv-02167)
District Judge: Honorable Yvette Kane
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Submitted for Possible Dismissal Due to Jurisdictional Defect or
Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6
October 16, 2025
Before: SHWARTZ, FREEMAN, and CHUNG, Circuit Judges
(Opinion filed: December 4, 2025)
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OPINION*
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* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7 does not
constitute binding precedent.

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PER CURIAM
Appellant Charles Lucarelli, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, appeals
from the District Court’s order dismissing his civil rights complaint. We will summarily
affirm.
I.
In December 2024, Charles Lucarelli filed a complaint against Charles Schultz, a
Chase Bank branch manager, alleging that Schultz committed theft of services, elder
abuse, and bank fraud when he withdrew money from Lucarelli’s bank account instead of
cashing Lucarelli’s check. The Chief Magistrate Judge issued a Report and
Recommendation that recommended dismissing Lucarelli’s complaint without prejudice
because he had failed to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. Over the
plaintiff’s objections, the District Court adopted the recommendation and dismissed
Lucarelli’s complaint without prejudice. Lucarelli was given 20 days to refile an
amended complaint that addressed the deficiencies that had been identified by the Chief
Magistrate Judge. Lucarelli did not refile an amended complaint, and instead filed a
notice of appeal.
II.
We have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.1 We review de novo an order
dismissing a complaint under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). See Allah v. Seiverling, 229
1 By filing a notice of appeal rather than amending within the 20-day period the District
Court provided, Lucarelli stood on his complaint, and we therefore have appellate

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F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000). To survive dismissal, a pleading must “state a claim to
relief that is plausible on its face” by alleging facts that “permit the court to infer more
than the mere possibility of misconduct.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678-79 (2009).
We may summarily affirm if the appeal fails to present a substantial question. See 3d Cir.
L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.
III.
Appellant Lucarelli alleges that the defendant’s mishandling of his Veterans
Affairs disability check amounts to a violation of his civil rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
his rights under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA), elder abuse, and theft of
services. All these claims were properly dismissed.
The District Court properly dismissed Lucarelli’s § 1983 claim because the
defendant, a bank manager at Chase Bank, is not a state actor for purposes of § 1983. See
Kach v. Hose, 589 F.3d 626, 646 (3d Cir. 2009). As to his ADA claim, Lucarelli did not
make any allegations that the defendant’s complained-of conduct was related in any way
to Lucarelli’s disability (which is not identified in the complaint). See Matheis v. CSL
Plasma, Inc., 936 F.3d 171, 175 (3d Cir. 2019) (holding that a plaintiff must show that a
defendant “unlawfully discriminated against him on the basis of his disability by (a)
failing to make a reasonable modification that was (b) necessary to accommodate his
disability”). To the extent that Lucarelli alleged the defendant committed violations of
jurisdiction. See Berke v. Bloch, 242 F.3d 131, 135-36 (3d Cir. 2001); Batoff v. State
Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 851 n.5 (3d Cir. 1992); Borelli v. City of Reading, 532 F.2d
950, 952 (3d Cir. 1976) (per curiam).

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criminal law, the District Court properly dismissed those claims, because “a private
citizen lacks a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution of
another.” Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973).
Finally, the District Court correctly concluded that Lucarelli had not established
diversity jurisdiction. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). Given that conclusion as well as those we
have already discussed, the District Court was well within its discretion to decline to
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over Lucarelli’s state-law claims. See Figueroa v.
Buccaneer Hotel Inc., 188 F.3d 172, 181 (3d Cir. 1999).
Accordingly, we will summarily affirm the judgment of the District Court.

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