Ariele Cristina Martins De Franca; Cleber Diego Armando Silva v. ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA On Petition for Review of A Decision of…

NOT PRECEDENTIAL
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
______________
No. 25-2231
______________
ARIELE CRISTINA MARTINS DE FRANCA; CLEBER DIEGO ARMANDO SILVA,
Petitioners
v.
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
______________
On Petition for Review of A Decision of
The Board of Immigration Appeals
(BIA-1:A201-514-250, BIA-1:A201-514-251)
Immigration Judge: Mary C. Lee
______________
Submitted Under Third Circuit L.A.R. 34.1(a)
July 1, 2026
______________
Before: SHWARTZ, PHIPPS, and McKEE, Circuit Judges.
(Filed: July 8, 2026)
______________
OPINION*
SHWARTZ, Circuit Judge.
* This disposition is not an opinion of the full Court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7,
does not constitute binding precedent.

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2
Ariele Cristina Martins De Franca (“Martins”) and her husband, Cleber Diego
Armando Silva, Brazilian citizens, petition for review of a decision of the Board of
Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) dismissing their appeal of the decision of an Immigration
Judge (“IJ”) denying their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and
protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”).1 The IJ denied the asylum
application because (1) it was not timely filed, and no exception to the filing deadline
applied, and (2) regardless, Martins had not shown past persecution or a well-founded
fear of future persecution on account of a protected ground because: (a) the particular
proposed social group (“PSG”) was not cognizable; (b) she had not shown that she would
be persecuted on account of her membership; and (c) she had not established that she
held a political opinion or that one was imputed onto her. The IJ also denied her requests
for withholding and CAT relief. The BIA adopted the IJ’s decision and held that Martins
was “time-barred from seeking asylum and did not meet [her] burden of proving [her]
eligibility for asylum, withholding of removal,” or CAT relief.2 App. 3. For the
following reasons, we will deny the petition.
I3
1 Martins is the lead Petitioner, and Silva seeks asylum as her derivative
beneficiary but does not seek withholding of removal or protection under CAT.
2 Martins makes no arguments to us concerning her application for CAT relief, so
any such argument is also forfeited. See Leslie v. Att’y Gen., 611 F.3d 171, 174 n.2 (3d
Cir. 2010).
3 The IJ had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1208.2(b) and 1240.1(a)(1); the BIA
had jurisdiction under 8 C.F.R. §§ 1003.1(b) and 1240.15, and we have jurisdiction under
8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). See Garcia v. Att’y Gen., 665 F.3d 496, 502 n.4 (3d Cir. 2011).

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3
A
First, Martins does not challenge the finding that her asylum application was
untimely and that none of the exceptions to the timeliness requirement apply. Therefore,
she has forfeited any arguments concerning the untimeliness of their asylum application.
See In re Wettach, 811 F.3d 99, 115 (3d Cir. 2016). Accordingly, we will deny her
petition for review of the asylum ruling.
B
Martins’s challenge to the withholding ruling also fails. To be eligible for
withholding, noncitizens must show a “clear probability” of persecution on account of a
protected ground if they were removed to a certain country. I.N.S. v. Stevic, 467 U.S.
407, 429-30 (1984); 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(b)(2); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1231(b)(3). This clear
probability standard is “more demanding” than the standard for asylum, which requires
showing “a subjectively genuine fear of persecution and an objectively reasonable
possibility of persecution.” Valdiviezo-Galdamez v. Att’y Gen., 663 F.3d 582, 590-91
(3d Cir. 2011).
We generally review the BIA’s opinion as the agency’s “final order,” however,
when “the BIA affirms an IJ’s decision and adds analysis of its own, we review both the
IJ’s and the BIA’s decisions, referring to the BIA’s opinion generally and to the IJ’s
opinion when necessary.” Luziga v. Att’y Gen., 937 F.3d 244, 251 (3d Cir. 2019)
(internal citations and quotation marks omitted). We review legal determinations de
novo and “accept factual findings if supported by substantial evidence.” Sesay v. Att’y
Gen., 787 F.3d 215, 220 (3d Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Under the “deferential” substantial evidence standard, id., “the [agency’s] finding must
be upheld unless the evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it,”
Abdille v. Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001); 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).

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4
The BIA adopted the IJ’s ruling that Martins “cannot satisfy her burden of
eligibility under withholding of removal’s . . . clear probability standard.” App. 17.
Martins, however, argues only that she has a well-founded, objectively reasonable fear of
future persecution. She does not argue that she would meet the “more demanding” clear
probability standard. See Valdiviezo-Galdamez, 663 F.3d at 591. She has thus forfeited
any challenge to the BIA’s ruling that she has not shown a clear probability of
persecution. See Vente v. Gonzales, 415 F.3d 296, 299 n.3 (3d Cir. 2005) (concluding
that petitioner waived withholding and CAT claims because “his petition for review
focuses on his asylum claim and makes no specific argument that the BIA’s denials of his
claims for withholding of removal and CAT protection were incorrect”). We therefore
will not disturb the BIA’s withholding ruling. See Norman v. Elkin, 860 F.3d 111, 129
(3d Cir. 2017) (“It is well settled that if an appellant fails to [preserve his argument] on a
particular issue, . . . it need not be addressed by the court of appeals.” (internal quotation
marks and citation omitted)).4
4 Even if we considered Petitioners’ withholding request, it would fail. First,
before us, the particular social group “PSG” in which Martins claims membership is
“family members of João Martins de Franca,” Pet. Br. at 12. (Her grandfather, João
Martins de Franca (“João”), was a well-known farmer and city council member in
Brazil.). Before the agency, however, she described her PSG as “[f]amily members of
politicians in Brazil.” App. 137. Because Petitioner raised a different PSG for the first
time in her petition for review, it is not exhausted and may not be considered. See
Sanchez v. Att’y Gen., 147 F.4th 348, 352 (3d Cir. 2025); see also 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d).
Second, substantial evidence also supports the IJ’s conclusion that Martins lacks a well-
founded fear of future persecution based on her political opinion. Petitioners cite no
evidence to support their claim that “[t]he evidence overwhelmingly demonstrates that
[Valdir Barbalho (“Barbalho”), a city council member whom Martins believed ordered

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5
II
For the foregoing reasons, we will deny the petition.
João’s murder because of his political opinions,] perceives Petitioners as carrying
forward João’s anti-corruption political stance.” Pet. Br. at 19. Furthermore, Martins
testified that she did not know why people working for Barbalho followed her sister upon
her return to Brazil and her relative Vinícius Soares Cunha testified that Barbalho burned
his vehicle because he hired an attorney in the family’s case against Barbalho, not
because of Vinícius’s status as João’s family member who necessarily holds João’s
political opinion. Thus, substantial evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Martins
lacked a political opinion and had not shown that João’s political opinion would be
imputed onto her.

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