United States of America v. Devon Edward Sanders

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This is not an opinion of the full Court and, under 3d Cir. IOP 5.7, is not binding precedent.
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
No. 25-2248
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA
v.
D EVON E DWARD SANDERS ,
Appellant
_____________________________
On Appeal from the U.S. District Court, E.D. Pa.
Judge Anita B. Brody, No. 2:16-cr-00513-001
Before: B IBAS , CHUNG, and MASCOTT , Circuit Judges
Submitted: June 26, 2026; Filed: June 26, 2026
_____________________________
NONPRECEDENTIAL O PINION*
BIBAS, Circuit Judge. Deadlines matter. Devon Sanders was caught with more than 94,000
child-pornography images and videos on his computer, many of which showed girls, toddlers,
and even infants being tortured or sadistically sexually abused. After pleading guilty to pos-
sessing and receiving child pornography, he was sentenced to 84 months in prison followed
by ten years’ supervised release. As conditions of his supervised release, the District Court
ordered him to register as a sex offender and take part in sex-offender treatment. On appeal,
Sanders did not challenge these conditions. But after being released from prison, he refused to
register or take part in treatment, attacking both conditions as illegal. The court rejected both
challenges, first ordering him (again) to register and then ordering him (again) to take part in
treatment. In its second order, the court modified the original treatment condition, requiring
the treatment program to disclose all records of Sanders’s treatment to probation officers.

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Sanders appeals from that modification order. But he waited almost a month to file his
notice of appeal, well past the fourteen-day deadline. Fed. R. App. P. 4(b)(1)(A). Because
the government’s brief properly raises this time bar, we must enforce it. United States v.
Muhammud, 701 F.3d 109, 111 (3d Cir. 2012); Gov’t of V.I. v. Martinez, 620 F.3d 321,
328–29 (3d Cir. 2010).
Sanders’s lengthy, largely incoherent brief does not challenge the modification order.
Rather, it tries to reach back to challenge his original conditions of supervised release,
asking the District Court to modify them under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e), presumably (e)(2). But
he never challenged those at the time. And they are not part of the order that he appealed
from. “An individual may not use § 3583(e)(2) as a substitute for an appeal, belatedly rais-
ing challenges to the original conditions of supervised release that were available at the
time of his initial sentencing.” United States v. D’Ambrosio, 105 F.4th 533, 539 (3d Cir.
2024) (internal quotation marks omitted). Because his challenges are all untimely, we will
DISMISS his appeal.

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