Tatiana Zlobina v. LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 15-1942
TATIANA ZLOBINA,
Petitioner,
v.
LORETTA E. LYNCH, Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the Board of Immigration
Appeals.
Submitted: March 8, 2016 Decided: March 16, 2016
Before KING, GREGORY, and KEENAN, Circuit Judges.
Petition denied by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Alexander J. Segal, THE LAW OFFICES OF GRINBERG & SEGAL,
P.L.L.C., New York, New York, for Petitioner. Benjamin C.
Mizer, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Shelley R.
Goad, Assistant Director, Russell J.E. Verby, Senior Litigation
Counsel, Office of Immigration Litigation, UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Respondent.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Tatiana Zlobina, a native and citizen of Moldova, petitions
for review of an order of the Board of Immigration Appeals
(Board) dismissing her appeal from the immigration judge’s (IJ)
order denying her applications for asylum, withholding of
removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
(CAT), and finding that she filed a frivolous asylum
application. Zlobina challenges the agency’s adverse
credibility finding and the finding that she filed a frivolous
asylum application. She also contends that she sustained her
burden of proof and is eligible for withholding of removal and
protection under the CAT. We deny the petition for review.
Zlobina bears the burden of establishing eligibility for
relief from removal. Hui Pan v. Holder, 737 F.3d 921, 927 (4th
Cir. 2013). To be eligible for asylum, Zlobina must show that
she cannot return to Moldova because she has a well-founded fear
of persecution on account of a protected ground. Id. Zlobina,
like all aliens, faces a higher burden of proof to establish her
entitlement to withholding of removal because she must show “a
clear probability of persecution on account of a protected
ground.” Djadjou v. Holder, 662 F.3d 265, 272 (4th Cir. 2011)
(internal quotation marks omitted). Thus, if Zlobina fails to
meet her burden of proof, she is also ineligible for withholding
of removal. Id.

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The scope of our review is narrow. Hui Pan, 737 F.3d at
926. We review factual findings for substantial evidence; such
findings are conclusive “unless any reasonable adjudicator would
be compelled to conclude to the contrary.” 8 U.S.C.
§ 1252(b)(4)(B) (2012); Cordova v. Holder, 759 F.3d 332, 337
(4th Cir. 2014). We will affirm so long as the decision “is not
manifestly contrary to law.” Hui Pan, 737 F.3d at 926.
(internal quotation marks omitted). We will reverse the Board
only if “the evidence . . . presented was so compelling that no
reasonable factfinder could fail to find the requisite fear of
persecution.” INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 483-84
(1992); see also Rusu v. INS, 296 F.3d 316, 325 n.14 (4th Cir.
2002).
The IJ, after “[c]onsidering the totality of the
circumstances, and all relevant factors,” may make an adverse
credibility determination based on factors such as the
plausibility of the applicant’s account, the consistency between
the applicant’s written and oral statements, the internal
consistency of each such statement, the consistency of such
statements with other evidence, or any other relevant factor. 8
U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii) (2012); Hui Pan, 737 F.3d at 928. A
credibility determination may rest on any relevant factor, even
one that does not “go[ ] to the heart of the applicant’s claim.”
8 U.S.C. § 1158(b)(1)(B)(iii).

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The credibility provision “ensures that an IJ does not
cherry pick solely facts favoring an adverse credibility
determination while ignoring facts that undermine that result.”
Hui Pan, 737 F.3d at 928 (internal quotation marks omitted).
“When an adverse credibility determination has been made, this
court must assess whether the IJ or [the Board] identified non-
speculative, specific, cogent reasons in support of the adverse
credibility finding.” Id. (internal alteration and quotation
marks omitted). We review an adverse credibility finding for
substantial evidence. Id. at 926, 928.
Here, we conclude that the Board’s finding that the IJ
considered the totality of the evidence before making the
adverse credibility finding is not clearly erroneous. We
further conclude that the adverse credibility finding is
supported by substantial evidence. An adverse credibility
finding can rest on the determination that the alien submitted a
fraudulent document in support of her asylum claim.
Borovikova v. U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 436 F.3d 151, 156-58 (2d
Cir. 2006). Zlobina admitted that she submitted several
fraudulent documents in order to bolster her claims.
Moreover, we conclude that substantial evidence supports
the Board’s finding that the IJ did not err in determining that
Zlobina filed a frivolous asylum application. See Siddique v.
Mukasey, 547 F.3d 814, 816 (7th Cir. 2008) (holding that whether

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alien filed false or fraudulent material supporting asylum
application is finding of fact reviewed for substantial
evidence). Zlobina’s claims that she did not receive adequate
notice of the consequences of filing a frivolous asylum
application or of what constituted a frivolous asylum
application are without merit. Finally, we conclude that
substantial evidence supports the Board’s finding that the IJ
did not err in finding Zlobina ineligible for withholding of
removal or protection under the CAT.
Accordingly, we deny the petition for review. We dispense
with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and
argument would not aid the decisional process.
PETITION DENIED

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