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18-4926•United States of America v. Clyde Allen Williams
18-4926Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit24.06.2023
UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4926
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
CLYDE ALLEN WILLIAMS,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Anderson. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge. (8:17-cr-00843-TMC-1)
Submitted: August 31, 2022 Decided: June 26, 2023
Before GREGORY, Chief Judge, and KING and WYNN, Circuit Judges.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Kimberly H. Albro, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE
FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Corey F.
Ellis, United States Attorney, Maxwell B. Cauthen, III, Assistant United States Attorney,
OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Greenville, South Carolina, for
Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
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PER CURIAM:
Clyde Allen Williams appeals his sentence imposed following his guilty plea to
possession of a firearm and ammunition by a convicted felon, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2), (e). The district court sentenced Williams to 100 months’
imprisonment followed by 3 years of supervised release. On appeal, Williams asserts that
(1) one of the discretionary conditions of supervised release in his written judgment is
inconsistent with the court’s oral announcement of that condition at sentencing, in violation
of United States v. Rogers, 961 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 2020); (2) the court failed to orally
pronounce all of the discretionary supervised release conditions that appear in the written
judgment, also in violation of Rogers; and (3) his sentence is procedurally unreasonable.
For the reasons that follow, we vacate Williams’ sentence and remand for resentencing.
In Rogers, we held that a district court must announce all nonmandatory conditions
of supervised release at the sentencing hearing. United States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341,
344 (4th Cir. 2021) (citing Rogers, 961 F.3d at 295-99). “Discretionary conditions that
appear for the first time in a subsequent written judgment . . . are nullities; the defendant
has not been sentenced to those conditions, and a remand for resentencing is required.” Id.
(citing Rogers, 961 F.3d at 295, 300-01).
When, as here, “a defendant claims that a district court committed a Rogers error,
we review the consistency of the defendant’s oral sentence and the written judgment de
novo.” United States v. Cisson, 33 F.4th 185, 193 (4th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). That is,
we “compare[] the sentencing transcript with the written judgment to determine whether
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an error occurred as a matter of law.” Rogers, 961 F.3d at 296 (internal quotation marks
omitted).
At the sentencing hearing, the district court announced a discretionary condition of
supervised release concerning the probation office to which Williams must report upon his
release from custody. We have reviewed the record and conclude that the court’s oral
pronouncement “did not match the description of that condition in the written judgment.”
Cisson, 33 F.4th at 191. Moreover, although the Government contends that the oral and
written conditions are consistent despite their facial differences, Williams strongly contests
the Government’s proffered explanation. Therefore, unlike in Cisson, where we upheld
facially dissimilar supervised release conditions because the defendant did not contest the
Government’s proffered explanation for why the conditions were consistent, id. at 194,
here, we may not disregard the differences between the oral and written descriptions of the
probation district to which Williams must report.
“[W]here the description of a condition in an oral sentence d[oes] not match the
description of that condition in the written judgment, that error alone is reversible Rogers
error.” Id. at 191 (internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore vacate and remand for
resentencing. Furthermore, because the sentence must be vacated in its entirety, we decline
to address Williams’ remaining challenges to the district court’s oral announcement of his
original sentence and the procedural reasonableness of that sentence. See Singletary, 984
F.3d at 346-47 (declining to consider additional challenges to sentence where Rogers error
necessitated vacatur and remand). We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
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legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED
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