United States of America v. Eric Hughes

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4050
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
ERIC HUGHES,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Columbia. Terry L. Wooten, Senior District Judge. (3:17-cr-00775-TLW-1)
Submitted: May 31, 2022 Decided: June 21, 2022
Before NIEMEYER, AGEE, and THACKER, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: David B. Betts, Columbia, South Carolina, for Appellant. Christopher
Braden Schoen, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Charleston, South
Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Eric Hughes pled guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to conspiracy to
distribute and possess with intent to distribute a mixture or substance containing U-47700,
a synthetic opioid analogous in form and effect to morphine, and Alprazolam, a Schedule
IV controlled substance, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 846; he also pled guilty to conspiracy
to commit money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(h). The district court
imposed a 168-month sentence. Appellate counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v.
California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal
but questioning the validity of Hughes’ guilty plea and whether the district court erred by
denying Hughes’ motion to withdraw his plea. Hughes filed a pro se supplemental brief
arguing that the Government breached his proffer agreement and should not have been
permitted to use his statements pertaining to drug weight against him. For the reasons that
follow, we affirm.
With respect to the validity of Hughes’ plea, a guilty plea is valid if the defendant
voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently pleads guilty “with sufficient awareness of the
relevant circumstances and likely consequences.” United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460,
464 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal quotation marks omitted). “In evaluating the constitutional
validity of a guilty plea, courts look to the totality of the circumstances surrounding it,
granting the defendant’s solemn declaration of guilt a presumption of truthfulness.” United
States v. Moussaoui, 591 F.3d 263, 278 (4th Cir. 2010) (cleaned up). Before accepting a
guilty plea, the district court must conduct a plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant
of, and determines he understands, the rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the

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charges to which he is pleading, and the maximum and mandatory minimum penalties he
faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1). The district court also must ensure that the plea was
voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises not contained in the plea
agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and “that there is a factual basis for the plea,” Fed. R.
Crim. P. 11(b)(3). However, any variance from the requirements of Rule 11 “is harmless
error if it does not affect substantial rights.” Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(h). After reviewing the
record, we conclude that any omissions by the district court were harmless and that
Hughes’ plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by a sufficient factual basis.
Regarding Hughes’ motion to withdraw his guilty plea, we review a district court’s
denial of such a motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Nicholson, 676 F.3d 376,
383 (4th Cir. 2012). A defendant does not have an absolute right to withdraw a guilty plea.
See id. at 383-84. Rather, the defendant bears the burden of demonstrating that a “fair and
just reason” supports his request to withdraw his plea. Id. at 384 (listing factors courts
consider in making such determination). An appropriately conducted guilty plea
proceeding “raises a strong presumption that the plea is final and binding.” Id. (cleaned
up). We have thoroughly reviewed the record and the relevant legal authorities and
conclude that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying Hughes’ motion to
withdraw his guilty plea.
Finally, we turn to Hughes’ argument that the Government breached the proffer
agreement by using his proffered statements of drug weight against him at his detention
hearing. Whether a party breached a proffer agreement presents “a question of law that we
review de novo.” United States v. Lopez, 219 F.3d 343, 346 (4th Cir. 2000). We review

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the district court’s factual findings for clear error. See United States v. Lewis, 633
F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2011) (reviewing factual findings on breach-of-plea-agreement
claim for clear error). “[A] proffer agreement operates like a contract; accordingly, we
examine its express terms to determine whether [a party] is in breach.” United States v.
Gillion, 704 F.3d 284, 292 (4th Cir. 2012).
While the district court declined to determine whether information obtained from
Hughes’ proffer was used against him at the detention hearing, we conclude that the record
supports a finding that the Government did not do so and therefore did not breach the
proffer agreement. See United States v. Riley, 856 F.3d 326, 328 (4th Cir. 2017) (stating
that this court “may affirm on any grounds apparent from the record” (internal quotation
marks omitted)). Because Hughes later breached the proffer agreement by refusing to take
a polygraph test, the Government was justified in using Hughes’ drug-weight statement
against him at sentencing.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record and have found no
meritorious grounds for appeal. Therefore, we affirm the criminal judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Hughes, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Hughes requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy
thereof was served on Hughes.

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We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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