United States of America v. Spencer Lamont Bryant, a/k/a Spend Money

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-4705
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SPENCER LAMONT BRYANT, a/k/a Spend Money,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. James C. Dever III, District Judge. (5:19-cr-00113-D-1)
Submitted: August 31, 2022 Decided: September 13, 2022
Before NIEMEYER, RICHARDSON, and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Stacey D. Rubain, QUANDER & RUBAIN, PA, Winston-Salem, North
Carolina, for Appellant. David A. Bragdon, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF
THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh, North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Spencer Lamont Bryant pleaded guilty, pursuant to a written plea agreement, to
conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 280 grams or more of cocaine
base, in violation of 21 U.S.C. §§ 846, 841(b)(1)(A), and distribution of cocaine base, in
violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C). Under the plea agreement, Bryant agreed to
waive his right to appeal his convictions and any sentence not in excess of the Sentencing
Guidelines range established at sentencing. The district court sentenced Bryant to 210
months’ imprisonment, the top of the 168- to 210-month Guidelines range, and Bryant
appealed. On the Government’s motion, we vacated Bryant’s sentence and remanded for
resentencing because the court did not orally pronounce all of the non mandatory
conditions of supervised release. See United States v. Bryant, No. 20-4108 (4th Cir. June
30, 2021) (unpublished order). On remand, the court resentenced Bryant to 210 months
and Bryant again timely appealed.
Counsel for Bryant has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal. Although informed of his
right to do so, Bryant has not filed a pro se supplemental brief. The Government moves to
dismiss the appeal as barred by the appellate waiver included in Bryant’s plea agreement.
We affirm in part and dismiss in part.
A guilty plea is valid if the defendant knowingly, voluntarily, and intelligently
pleads guilty “with sufficient awareness of the relevant circumstances and likely
consequences.” United States v. Fisher, 711 F.3d 460, 464 (4th Cir. 2013) (internal
quotation marks omitted). Before accepting a guilty plea, the district court must conduct a

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plea colloquy in which it informs the defendant of, and determines he understands, the
rights he is relinquishing by pleading guilty, the charges to which he is pleading, and the
maximum and mandatory minimum penalties he faces. Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(1); United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116 (4th Cir. 1991). The court also must ensure that the
plea is voluntary and not the result of threats, force, or promises not contained in the plea
agreement, Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(b)(2), and “that there is a factual basis for the plea,” Fed.
R. Crim. P. 11(b)(3). Because Bryant did not move to withdraw his guilty plea, we review
the adequacy of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 hearing for plain error. United
States v. Lockhart, 947 F.3d 187, 191 (4th Cir. 2020) (en banc) (discussing standard). We
have reviewed the record and conclude that the magistrate judge complied with Rule 11
and that Bryant’s guilty plea is valid.
Next, we review the validity of an appeal waiver de novo and “will enforce the
waiver if it is valid and the issue[s] appealed [are] within the scope of the waiver.” United
States v. Adams, 814 F.3d 178, 182 (4th Cir. 2016). Generally, if the district court fully
questions a defendant regarding the waiver of his right to appeal during a plea colloquy
performed in accordance with Rule 11, and the record shows that the defendant understood
the waiver’s significance, the waiver is both valid and enforceable. United States v.
Thornsbury, 670 F.3d 532, 537 (4th Cir. 2012). Our review of the record confirms that
Bryant knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal. We therefore conclude that
the waiver is valid.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no meritorious grounds for appeal falling outside the scope of the waiver. We

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therefore grant in part the Government’s motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal as to all
issues within the waiver’s scope, and we affirm the remainder of the judgment. This court
requires that counsel inform Bryant, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme Court
of the United States for further review. If Bryant requests that a petition be filed, but
counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in this
court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a copy
thereof was served on Bryant. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal
contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would
not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART,
DISMISSED IN PART

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