Bryan Goyer v. Paul Adams

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 21-7294
BRYAN GOYER,
Petitioner - Appellant,
v.
PAUL ADAMS,
Respondent - Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
Wheeling. John Preston Bailey, District Judge. (5:21-cv-00009-JPB-JPM)
Submitted: November 16, 2022 Decided: December 22, 2022
Before WILKINSON and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Vacated and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Bryan Goyer, Appellant Pro Se.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Bryan Goyer, a federal prisoner, appeals the district court’s order denying relief on
his 28 U.S.C. § 2241 petition. The district court granted Respondent’s motion to dismiss
Goyer’s petition after finding, based on documentation Respondent submitted in support
of the motion to dismiss, that Goyer’s due process rights were not violated during
disciplinary proceedings that led to the revocation of his good time credits. Goyer raises
multiple assignments of error on appeal, including that the district court erroneously failed
to consider Goyer’s claims that (1) he was not provided required notices; (2) signatures on
documents Respondent produced in support of his motion to dismiss were forged; and (3)
Goyer was not allowed to have a staff representative review surveillance video of his
alleged disciplinary infraction. We vacate and remand to the district court.
We review de novo the district court’s order granting a motion to dismiss and
denying habeas corpus relief. Holloway v. Maryland, 32 F.4th 293, 298 (4th Cir. 2022);
Lennear v. Wilson, 937 F.3d 257, 267 (4th Cir. 2019). “To survive a motion to dismiss, a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to ‘state a claim to relief
that is plausible on its face.’” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell
Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). A claim is facially plausible “when the
plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that
the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id.
Admittedly, “[p]rison disciplinary proceedings are not part of a criminal
prosecution, and the full panoply of rights due a defendant in such proceedings does not
apply.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539, 556 (1974). Nevertheless, “constitutional

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procedural due process protections extend to prison disciplinary proceedings that could
adversely impact an inmate’s liberty interests.” Lennear, 937 F.3d at 268. Prisoners have
a liberty interest in the good time credits they have earned. Id.
“[I]n a disciplinary hearing in which an inmate’s liberty interests are at stake,
government officials must provide the inmate with written notice of the charges at least 24
hours before the hearing as well as a written report after the hearing detailing the evidence
relied upon and the reasons for the disciplinary action.” Id. An inmate also “has a qualified
right to call witnesses and present documentary evidence in his defense . . . unless unduly
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
Moreover, we recently held “that inmates at risk of being deprived of a liberty
interest, like good time credits, have a qualified right to obtain and compel consideration
of video surveillance evidence.” Id. at 273-74. Accordingly, upon an inmate’s request, an
inmate is entitled access to, or disciplinary hearing officer review of, prison video
surveillance evidence pertaining to a disciplinary infraction unless the government
establishes that disclosure or consideration of such evidence would be, “under the
particular circumstances of the case, unduly hazardous to institutional safety or correctional
goals.”* Lennear, 937 F.3d at 269, 272 (internal quotation marks omitted). “[I]f prison
* Lennear was decided by this court on August 23, 2019, which was after Goyer’s
hearing before the Disciplinary Hearing Officer. As Goyer’s disciplinary case did not
become final until December 19, 2019, when he exhausted his administrative remedies, we
conclude that Lennear’s new procedural rule is applicable here. Accord Wall v. Kiser, 21
(Continued)

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officials fail to identify a specific safety or correctional concern, courts may not speculate
as to the officials’ potential reasons for denying an inmate access to evidence in order to
uphold a disciplinary decision.” Id. at 270 (internal quotation marks omitted).
Here, Goyer faced the possibility of the loss of earned good time credits because of
his disciplinary charge and, thus, he was undoubtedly entitled to the above-mentioned
rights. Goyer nonetheless alleged that his due process rights were violated when he was:
(1) not served with the incident report within 24 hours (“24-hour claim”); (2) denied the
opportunity to have a staff representative review video surveillance on his behalf; (3) not
allowed to call witnesses or even given information about who was present at the time of
the alleged disciplinary infraction; and (4) not informed of his right to present documentary
evidence in his defense.
We conclude that the district court erred when it dismissed Goyer’s petition.
Although the district court properly informed Goyer about Respondent’s motion to dismiss,
informed Goyer that the court was required to accept as true all well-pleaded material
factual allegations, and warned Goyer that he had 21 days to inform the court why his case
should not be dismissed, the district court improperly converted Respondent’s motion to
dismiss into a summary judgment motion without affording Goyer an opportunity to
substantiate his allegations. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (“If, on a motion under Rule 12(b)(6)
or 12(c), matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, the
F.4th 266, 275 (4th Cir. 2021) (concluding that the rule announced in Lennear does not
apply retroactively to cases on collateral review), cert. denied, 142 S. Ct. 2824 (2022).

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motion must be treated as one for summary judgment under [Fed. R. Civ. P.] 56 [and a]ll
parties must be given a reasonable opportunity to present all the material that is pertinent
to the motion.”).
To be sure, a district court is within its discretion to consider documents “integral
to and relied upon in the complaint” where “the plaintiff does not question their
authenticity.” Fairfax v. CBS Corp., 2 F.4th 286, 292 (4th Cir. 2021). But here, Goyer
denies that he signed the forms confirming that he was notified of his rights, and he denies
declining the opportunity to present evidence or witnesses in his defense in front of the
Disciplinary Hearing Officer.
Accordingly, rather than accept Respondent’s evidence as dispositive of Goyer’s
claims, the district court was required to accept as true the allegations in Goyer’s complaint.
See Ray v. Roane, 948 F.3d 222, 226 (4th Cir. 2020) (recognizing that, when ruling on a
motion to dismiss, “a court must accept as true all of the factual allegations contained in
the complaint and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff” (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Indeed, we recently confirmed that, in a situation similar to the
one the district court faced here, a court is required to conduct an evidentiary hearing to
resolve any factual disputes. Lennear, 937 F.3d at 275 (“[W]hen a prisoner who seeks a
writ of habeas corpus provides competent evidence (such as an affidavit by someone with
personal knowledge of the events) contradicting an assertion by the prison disciplinary
board on a material question of fact pertinent to an issue of constitutional law, the district
court must hold an evidentiary hearing to determine where the truth lies.” (internal
quotation marks omitted)).

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Because the district court failed to make critical factual determinations bearing on
whether Goyer’s disciplinary proceeding violated Goyer’s due process rights, we vacate
the district court’s order and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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