United States of America v. Mohamed Magi Abusnena

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4216
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
MOHAMED MAGI ABUSNENA,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina, at
Raleigh. Richard E. Meyers, II, Chief District Judge. (5:20-cr-00301-M-1)
Submitted: January 31, 2023 Decided: February 2, 2023
Before NIEMEYER and HEYTENS, Circuit Judges, and MOTZ, Senior Circuit Judge.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Eugene E. Lester III, LESTER LAW, Greensboro, North Carolina, for
Appellant. Michael F. Easley, Jr., United States Attorney, David A. Bragdon, Assistant
United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Raleigh,
North Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
A jury convicted Mohamed Magi Abusnena of possession of a firearm by a felon,
in violation of 18 U.S.C §§ 922(g)(1), 942(a)(2). The district court sentenced Abusnena to
two years’ imprisonment followed by three years’ supervised release. On appeal,
Abusnena challenges the district court’s denial of his suppression motion and his motion
to dismiss the charge against him. We affirm.
The Fourth Amendment provides for “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend.
IV. A search or seizure that is conducted without first obtaining a warrant is “per se
unreasonable . . . subject only to a few specifically established and well-delineated
exceptions.” Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 357 (1967). Among the exceptions to
the warrant requirement is a search incident to a lawful arrest. Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S.
332, 338 (2009).
Under the Fourth Amendment, a police officer may lawfully arrest a defendant
absent a warrant when the officer has probable cause to believe that a defendant committed
an offense. Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 370 (2003). Probable cause exists where
the “facts and circumstances within the officer’s knowledge . . . are sufficient to warrant a
prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that
the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” Michigan v.
DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 37 (1979). Whether the officer has probable cause is a fact-based
inquiry that considers the totality of the circumstances. United States v. Humphries, 372
F.3d 653, 657 (4th Cir. 2004).

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Abusnena argues that the district court erred in finding that the search incident to
arrest exception applied here. He argues his arrest was unlawful because Keeny lacked
either reasonable suspicion to stop him or probable cause to arrest him. We disagree. The
district court correctly found that the arresting officer had probable cause—and thus also
reasonable suspicion—to believe that Abusnena discharged a firearm in violation of a local
ordinance. Further, we conclude that the district court correctly found it was reasonable
for the officers to believe that evidence relevant to discharging a firearm might be found
within Abusnena’s car. See United States v. Davis, 997 F.3d 191, 196-97 (4th Cir. 2021).
In sum, the district court correctly held that the search incident to arrest exception applied
here.
Next, Abusnena argues that the district court erred by denying his motion to dismiss
his charge because, after he was indicted for felon in possession of a firearm, his predicate
felony conviction was expunged. But as this court has held, a conviction for felon in
possession of a firearm is valid even if the predicate conviction has been expunged, so long
as the predicate conviction was in effect when the defendant possessed the firearm or
ammunition. United States v. Kahoe, 134 F.3d 1230, 1234-35 (4th Cir. 1998). Abusnena
invites us to overrule Kahoe, but “one panel [of this Court] cannot overrule a decision
issued by another panel.” United States v. Williams, 808 F.3d 253, 261 (4th Cir. 2015)
(internal quotation marks omitted).

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Accordingly, we affirm. We dispense with oral argument because the facts and
legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument
would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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