United States of America v. Shelly Anne Leipham

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4532
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHELLY ANNE LEIPHAM,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of West Virginia, at
Clarksburg. Thomas S. Kleeh, Chief District Judge. (1:21-cr-00019-TSK-MJA-1)
Submitted: August 30, 2023 Decided: September 11, 2023
Before GREGORY, RICHARDSON and RUSHING, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Brian J. Kornbrath, Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Clarksburg, West Virginia, for Appellant. William Ihlenfeld,
Wheeling, West Virginia, United States Attorney, Sarah E. Wagner, Assistant United
States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Clarksburg, West
Virginia, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Shelly Anne Leipham was convicted on three counts of wire fraud, in violation of
18 U.S.C. § 1343, five counts of mail fraud, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1341, and three
counts of money laundering, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1956(a)(1)(B)(i). She was
sentenced to 87 months’ imprisonment. On appeal, Leipham argues that the district court
erred by admitting at trial incriminating statements she made to law enforcement after her
arrest and prior to receiving warnings in accordance with Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436 (1966). We affirm.
We review a district court’s legal conclusions underlying a suppression
determination de novo and its factual findings for clear error. United States v. Guijon-
Ortiz, 660 F.3d 757, 762 (4th Cir. 2011). A defendant subject to custodial interrogation
must be advised of her Miranda rights. United States v. Azua-Rinconada, 914 F.3d 319,
325 (4th Cir. 2019). “Miranda refers not only to express questioning, but also to any words
or actions on the part of the police (other than those normally attendant to arrest and
custody) that the police should know are reasonably likely to elicit an incriminating
response from the suspect.” United States v. Bernard, 927 F.3d 799, 806 (4th Cir. 2019)
(quoting Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 301 (1980)); see also United States v. Bell,
901 F.3d 455, 463–64 (4th Cir. 2018) (holding that subtle compulsion alone is insufficient
to qualify an officer’s remarks as interrogation under Innis). However, “when the police
have no reason to expect that a question will lead a suspect to incriminate himself, that
question cannot constitute an interrogation under Miranda.” United States v. Johnson, 734
F.3d 270, 277 (4th Cir. 2013). Moreover, “the failure to administer a Miranda warning . . .

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is harmless if it is clear that a rational factfinder would have found the defendant guilty
absent the error.” Bernard, 927 F.3d at 807.
After reviewing the record, we conclude that the district court did not err in
admitting the contested statements. Although Leipham was in custody at the time she made
the incriminating statements, neither was she subject to interrogation, nor did the officers
make any statements to Leipham that were designed to elicit a response or incriminating
statements for purposes of Miranda. Here, any error in introducing the statements was
harmless given the substantial evidence linking Leipham to her crimes.
Accordingly, we affirm the district court’s judgment. We dispense with oral
argument because the facts and legal contentions are adequately presented in the materials
before this court and argument would not aid the decisional process.
AFFIRMED

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