United States of America v. Trayvon Hall, a/k/a Tru, a/k/a G-Tru

UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 22-4723
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
TRAYVON HALL, a/k/a Tru, a/k/a G-Tru,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Maryland, at Baltimore.
Richard D. Bennett, Senior District Judge. (1:19-cr-00568-RDB-2)
Submitted: August 29, 2023 Decided: August 31, 2023
Before KING, AGEE, and BENJAMIN, Circuit Judges.
Affirmed in part and dismissed in part by unpublished per curiam opinion.
ON BRIEF: Dallas F. Kratzer III, STEPTOE & JOHNSON PLLC, Columbus, Ohio, for
Appellant. Peter Jeffrey Martinez, Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE
UNITED STATES ATTORNEY, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.

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PER CURIAM:
Trayvon Hall pleaded guilty, pursuant to a Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) agreement,
to conspiracy to participate in a racketeering enterprise, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1962(d)
(Count 1), and conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute 100 grams or
more of heroin and 28 grams or more of cocaine base, in violation of 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), 846 (Count 2). Hall and the Government agreed that Hall should
be sentenced to 480 months’ imprisonment on Count 2 and a concurrent term of 240
months’ imprisonment on Count 1. The parties also agreed that Hall’s sentence should be
adjusted to account for time that he had served in federal prison for a separate offense. The
district court accepted the Rule 11(c)(1)(C) agreement and sentenced Hall to 454 months
and 13 days of imprisonment on Count 2 and a concurrent term of 240 months of
imprisonment on Count 1. The district court also imposed a five-year term of supervised
release on Count 2 and a concurrent three-year term of supervised release on Count 1.
On appeal, Hall’s counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
U.S. 738 (1967), stating that there are no meritorious grounds for appeal but questioning
whether Hall’s guilty plea is valid and whether Hall’s sentence is reasonable. As to Hall’s
sentence, Hall’s counsel questions whether the district court properly considered certain
conduct when imposing sentence, including the conduct of Hall’s coconspirators and Hall’s
conduct related to dismissed charges, and whether an unwarranted disparity exists between
Hall’s sentence and the sentences of his coconspirators. Hall has filed a pro se brief making
three arguments: (1) his guilty plea to Count 1 is invalid because the district court failed to
adequately explain the elements of that offense, and because the written factual basis is

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insufficient to support his conviction on that count; (2) a conflict exists between the district
court’s oral pronouncement of his prison sentence and the written judgment’s description
thereof; and (3) his counsel in the district court rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to pursue the preceding arguments. The Government has moved to dismiss the appeal
pursuant to the appellate waiver in Hall’s plea agreement. For the reasons stated below,
we affirm in part and dismiss in part.
“We review an appellate waiver de novo to determine whether the waiver is
enforceable” and “will enforce the waiver if it is valid and if the issue being appealed falls
within the scope of the waiver.” United States v. Boutcher, 998 F.3d 603, 608 (4th Cir.
2021) (internal quotation marks omitted). Upon review of the record, including the plea
agreement and the transcript of the Fed. R. Crim. P. 11 hearing, we conclude that Hall
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence.
Accordingly, we grant in part the Government’s motion to dismiss and dismiss the appeal
as to all issues within the scope of the appellate waiver, including the sentencing issues
raised in the Anders brief.
Although Hall’s appellate waiver covers his right to appeal his conviction, it does
not preclude our review of the validity of his guilty plea. See United States v. McCoy, 895
F.3d 358, 364 (4th Cir. 2018); United States v. Attar, 38 F.3d 727, 732-33 & n.2 (4th Cir.
1994). We therefore deny in part the Government’s motion to dismiss. Because Hall did
not seek to withdraw his guilty plea, we review the adequacy of the Rule 11 hearing for
plain error only. United States v. Williams, 811 F.3d 621, 622 (4th Cir. 2016). And we
conclude that Hall is not entitled to relief from his guilty plea under the plain-error standard.

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That is, the district court substantially complied with Rule 11 and properly found that Hall’s
plea was knowing, voluntary, and supported by an independent factual basis. See United
States v. DeFusco, 949 F.2d 114, 116, 119-20 (4th Cir. 1991). While Hall contends that
the district court did not adequately explain the elements of Count 1 and that the written
factual basis does not support his conviction on that count, neither contention persuades
us.1 We are thus satisfied that Hall’s guilty plea is valid.
Hall also argues that a conflict exists between the district court’s oral
pronouncement of his sentence of imprisonment and the written judgment’s description
thereof. Hall claims that the district court orally sentenced him to a total of only 240
months’ imprisonment and that the written judgment—imposing a total sentence of 454
months and 13 days of imprisonment—should be amended to reflect that oral
pronouncement. Assuming that Hall’s argument escapes the appeal waiver, see United
States v. Singletary, 984 F.3d 341, 345 (4th Cir. 2021), we conclude that it is frivolous. Put
1 Hall faults the district court for failing to explain what constitutes “a pattern of
racketeering activity” before accepting his guilty plea to Count 1. 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5); see
generally 18 U.S.C. § 1962. But Hall identifies no authority requiring a district court to
give such advice before accepting a guilty plea to a racketeering conspiracy offense, so any
error is not “clear or obvious.” United States v. Carthorne, 726 F.3d 503, 516 (4th Cir.
2013). Moreover, the superseding indictment described “a pattern of racketeering
activity,” and Hall confirmed at the Rule 11 hearing that he read and understood the charges
against him. See United States v. Lemaster, 403 F.3d 216, 221 (4th Cir. 2005). Hall also
admitted to many racketeering activities when he agreed that the written factual basis was
accurate. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(1). We are thus satisfied that, even if the district court
plainly erred, that error did not affect Hall’s substantial rights. See United States v.
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004). Hall further contends that he admitted to only
one racketeering activity, so there is an insufficient factual basis for his guilty plea to
Count 1. See 18 U.S.C. § 1961(5). But, as just explained, the record refutes his contention.

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simply, there is no conflict between the district court’s oral pronouncement of Hall’s prison
sentence and the written judgment’s description of that sentence.
Finally, Hall asserts that his trial counsel rendered ineffective assistance by failing
to challenge his guilty plea to Count 1 and by neglecting to argue that a conflict exits
between the oral pronouncement of his sentence and the written judgment. We do not
consider ineffective assistance of counsel claims on direct appeal “[u]nless an attorney’s
ineffectiveness conclusively appears on the face of the record.” United States v. Faulls,
821 F.3d 502, 507 (4th Cir. 2016). “Because there is no conclusive evidence of ineffective
assistance on the face of this record, we conclude that [Hall’s] claim should be raised, if at
all, in a 28 U.S.C. § 2255 motion.” Id. at 508.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and have
found no potentially meritorious grounds for appeal that are outside of the appellate waiver
or not waivable by law.2 We therefore grant in part the Government’s motion to dismiss
and dismiss the appeal as to all issues covered by the appellate waiver. We also deny in
2 We observe that the parties agreed in the plea agreement that a four-year term of
supervised release was sufficient for Count 2, but the district court imposed a five-year
term on that count. Notwithstanding, the plea agreement reflects that the parties’
recommendation on the supervised release term was not binding on the district court.
Moreover, although the Government agreed in the plea agreement to recommend a
four-year term of supervised release on Count 2 and apparently never did so, we conclude
that the Government’s failure does not entitle Hall to relief. The record does not show that
the Government advocated for a different term of supervised release on Count 2, and the
presentence report described the Government’s obligation to make a four-year
recommendation as to Count 2, so the district court was aware of it. See United States v.
Reeves, 255 F.3d 208, 210-11 (5th Cir. 2001); United States v. Smith 140 F.3d 1325, 1327
(10th Cir. 1998).

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part the motion to dismiss and affirm as to any issue not precluded by the appellate waiver.
At this juncture, we deny Hall’s counsel’s request to withdraw.
This court requires that counsel inform Hall, in writing, of the right to petition the
Supreme Court of the United States for further review. If Hall requests that a petition be
filed, but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move
in this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that
a copy thereof was served on Hall.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED IN PART AND
DISMISSED IN PART

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